“Shape, Clear, Hold, and Build:”
The Uncertain Metrics of the Afghan War

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Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy

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The Challenge of Afghanistan vs. Iraq

**AFGHANISTAN**
- Land Mass – 647,500 sq km
- Population – 31,900,000 people; 28% literacy
- Land locked, primarily agrarian economy: $35B GDP, $1,000 PC
- Budget: $2.6; $8.9B in aid pledges
- Lacks both transportation and information infrastructure: 34,782 Km of roads, 8,229 KM paved
- Restrictive terrain dominates the country

**IRAQ**
- Land Mass – 432,162 sq km
- Population – 27,500,000 people; 84% literacy
- Economy dominated by the oil sector: $100.0B GDP, $3,600 PCI
- Budget $48.4 billion; $33B+ in aid pledges
- Comparatively developed transportation and information infrastructure; 45,5502 Km of roads, 38,399 Km paved

**TOTAL US AND COALITION FORCES**
- ~49,000
- ~176,000
Enemy Initiated Attacks in Iraq and Afghanistan: May 2003 to August 2009

A One Major Regional Contingency Capability: Priority to Iraq


Iraq costs peaked at $14.3B/month in surge in 2008

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>FY03</th>
<th>FY04</th>
<th>FY05</th>
<th>FY06</th>
<th>FY07</th>
<th>GY08</th>
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<tr>
<td>All Missions</td>
<td>*6.2</td>
<td>*6.3</td>
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<td>*14.3</td>
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<td>?</td>
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Annual Foreign Aid Spending on the Iraq and Afghan Wars (in $US billions): FY2001-FY-2010

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<td>2.6</td>
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<td>4</td>
<td>15.8</td>
<td>19.7</td>
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Annual Spending on the Afghan Wars By Category (in $US billions): FY2001-FY2010

Annual US Aid Spending Iraqi and Afghan Security Forces (in $US billions): FY01-FY09

Underresourcing a Coalition of the Impossible and Eight Years of Ceding the Initiative Without Unity of Effort
Troop Levels in Iraq and Afghanistan

US troop levels in Iraq were approximately 124,000 in November 2009, and 66,500 in Afghanistan.

Source: Adapted by the author from data provided by JoAnne O’Bryant and Michael Waterhouse, U.S. Forces in Iraq, Congressional Research Service (14 December 2007); JoAnne O’Bryant and Michael Waterhouse, U.S. Forces in Iraq, Congressional Research Service (14 July 2008).
US Troop Levels: Reacting and Losing

An Increasing Commitment
Number of American troops in Afghanistan, in thousands.
Source: U.S. Central Command

Planned troop level in November: 68,000

No data.
US Troop Levels: “Surge” During February and November 2009

A “Coalition of the Impossible:” NATO/ISAF Forces and PRTs By Mission Area in October 2009

Source: NATO/ISAF: http://www.nato.int/isaf/docu/epub/pdf/placemat.html, as of October 22, 2009
ISAF Troop Levels: 2007-2009

Source: NATO/ISAF Placemats
US Aid to Afghanistan 2001-2009
In $ Millions

US Aid to Afghanistan 2001-2009
In $ Millions

Annual State Department Spending on the Iraq and Afghan Wars (in $US billions)

## US Aid to Afghanistan: 2001-2009

### Table 1. U.S. Assistance to Afghanistan

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Fiscal Year</th>
<th>2001</th>
<th>2002</th>
<th>2003</th>
<th>2004</th>
<th>2005</th>
<th>2006</th>
<th>2007</th>
<th>2008</th>
<th>2009</th>
<th>2001-2009 Total</th>
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<td>223.8</td>
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<td>Migration &amp; Refugee Asst. (MRA)</td>
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<td>Foreign Military Financing (FMF)</td>
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<td>Other*</td>
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<td><strong>Total 150 Account</strong></td>
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<td>903.9</td>
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<td>DOD—CERP</td>
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<td>DOD—Other*</td>
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<td>176.2</td>
<td>364.2</td>
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<td>Other Functional Accounts*</td>
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<td>52.1</td>
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<td>83.6</td>
<td>352.1</td>
<td>89.4</td>
<td>912.8</td>
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<td><strong>Total U.S. Assistance</strong></td>
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<td>5,819.1</td>
<td>9,305.5</td>
<td>37,789.4</td>
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### Sources:
SIGAR Report to Congress, April 30, 2009; Department of State annual budget presentation documents; and CRS calculations.

### Notes:
FY2009 figures are estimates. In some cases where funding level is not specified in appropriations language or explanatory statement, amount included is request level or final allocation when available. CERP level is reported allocation, except in FY2009 when it assumes half of appropriation (shared with Iraq) will be allocated to Afghanistan.
US Aid to Afghanistan by Activity: $38.6 Billion in FY2002-FY2009

Dollars (in billions)

- Governance, rule of law, and human rights: ($2.5 billion) 6%
- Counternarcotics: ($3.5 billion) 9%
- Economic and social development: ($11 billion) 29%
- Security: ($21.6 billion) 56%

Source: GAO analysis of DOD and State data.

NATO/ISAF Fights an Uncoordinated Tactical War, Civilians Attempt Post Conflict Reconstruction, and Jihadist Insurgents Fight a War for Control of Territory and the Population
Number of Insurgent Attacks in Afghanistan, January 2003-July 2009

Source: United Nations Department of Safety and Security
Enemy Initiated Attacks in Afghanistan
May 2003 to August 2009

Note: Data on attacks against civilians include attacks against Afghan nationals and other civilians, U.S. and non-U.S. contractors, nongovernmental organizations, and Afghan government personnel. Data on attacks against the International Security Assistance Force and coalition forces include attacks against U.S. and International Security Assistance Force military personnel. According to Defense Intelligence Agency officials, attack data in figures 1 and 2 do not include violent incidents that coalition or Afghan security forces initiated, but represent a reliable and consistent source of information that can be used to identify trends in enemy activity and the overall security situation.

The Insurgents Take Hold: UN Estimate of Expanding No Go Zones:

2005 versus 2007

Areas where the accessibility deteriorated between May 2006 and May 2007

Areas where the accessibility improved between May 2006 and May 2007

Civilian Casualties in Afghanistan and Pakistan (2007)

Legend
- Area with light Taliban presence
- Area with substantial Taliban presence
- Area with permanent Taliban presence
- Border between Afghanistan and Pakistan
- Insurgent attack resulting in death in 2007

Source: ICOS
Winning the Tactical Clashes & Losing 15-20% of the Country a Year: UN Accessibility Map 2008
2008: East Afghanistan - The US is No Longer “Winning” in the East
NATO/ISAF Ignores the Real War? Security Summary 2008

2008

- 24% Afghans perceive improvement, 19% perceive worsening (Sep 08 poll)
- 70% of kinetic events continue to occur in 10% of the districts

33% increase in Kinetic Events

- IED events up 27%...single largest cause of casualties
- 119% more attacks on GIrOA
- 5% less Suicide Attacks
- 50% more Kidnappings/Assassinations

ISAF/OEF Deaths: up 35%
Civilian Deaths: up 40% - 46%*

Building Host Nation Capacity:
ANA: 13 more Kandak BNs formed
46 Kandaks capable of BN Ops

ANP: 52 districts undergoing FDD
13 of 20 Civil Order Police BNs fielded

Source: NATO – ISAF “Metrics Brief 2007-2008”
The Growing Threat to ANA and ANP: 2006-2008

Steadily Rising Problems in the South:
Average Daily Insurgent Initiated Attacks

By Province, January 1, 2009 – May 31, 2009

- The Number inside the bar indicates average daily insurgent initiated attacks (i.e. Helmand averaged 10.7 attacks per day from Jan 09 – May 09).
- The Number on top of the bar indicates the change relative to last month (i.e. average daily insurgent initiated attacks increased by 0.2 per day in Helmand relative to last month). If no number shown for a province, there was no change in the average daily incidence of insurgent attacks (i.e. Kunar averaged 3.9 daily attacks from Jan 09 to May 09 as well as from Jan 09 to Apr 09).
Security and opium poppy cultivation 2009

Source: ADDICTION, CRIME AND INSURGENCY The transnational threat of Afghan opium, October 2009, UNODC, Page 107
Partial Denial: Security Summary (April 2009)

- 64% increase in Insurgent Initiated Attacks¹
- 80% of attacks occurred in 13% of the districts (Jan-Apr 09)¹
- IED events up 80% (IEDs caused 60% of casualties Jan-Apr 09)¹

January to April 2009
Kinetic Activity Density Plot
By District
- More Activity
- Less Activity

Footnotes on Sources:
¹JOIIS, 4 May.
²ANQAR Survey, 31 Mar.
³CJOC CivCas cell, 2 May.
⁴CSTC-A, 4 May.
⁵CJJ, 3 May.

- Civilian Deaths: down 44%³
- ISAF/OEF Deaths: up 55%¹
- ANSF Deaths: up 25%¹
  (Since Jan 07, ANPs suffered 1.8x more deaths than ANA+ISAF)
- Attacks on GIROA officials & district centers: up 90%¹
- Kidnappings/Assassinations: down 17%¹

Afghan Perceptions (Mar 09)²
- 35% of Afghans say security is better now than it was 6 months ago (last quarter survey results: 28%)
- 13% say security is worse than it was 6 months ago (last quarter survey results: 17%)

Attack Trends: Jan-May 08 Compared to Jan-May 09

- Suicide attacks were up 9%
- Attacks on GiRoA officials were down 11%
- Attacks on GiRoA infrastructure were up 156%
- Attacks on ANA were down 18%
- Attacks on ANP were up 15%

Complex attacks were up 152%.

Kidnappings were down 27%.

The number of Assassinations did not change.
Insurgent Attacks by RC

- Comparing Jan-May ’08 to the same period in ’08, insurgent initiated attacks were down 21% in Kabul City but up 61% in the rest of the province (primarily Surobi District)

- Comparing Jan-May ’09 to the same period in ’08, insurgent initiated attacks were:
  - Up 78% in RC South
  - Up 41% in RC East
  - Up 29% in RC Capital
  - Up 21% in RC North
  - Up 73% in RC West

NATO / ISAF UNCLASSIFIED

Source: JOIS, 2 Jun 09
IED Attacks in Afghanistan: 2005-2009

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<th>Sep-07</th>
<th>Sep-08</th>
<th>Sep-09</th>
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<td>278</td>
<td>352</td>
<td>860</td>
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<tr>
<td>IED's Turned in</td>
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<td>6</td>
<td>15</td>
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<tr>
<td>Found/Cleared</td>
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<td>166</td>
<td>384</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ineffective IED Attacks</td>
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<td>146</td>
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<td>Effective Attacks</td>
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<td>CFWIA</td>
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<td>66</td>
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JIEDDO J9 – 10 OCT 09
Source: IDA Scrubbed SigActs (CIDNE)
Going South to Aid the Taliban: Opium poppy cultivation trends in Afghanistan 2002-2009 (at province level)

Source: Afghanistan opium surveys, 2002-2009 UNODC
## Allocation of U.S. Counter Narcotics (CN) funds 2009

<table>
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<td>NIU/CNPA - Equipment</td>
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<td>CN Border Police - Facilities (BCPs)</td>
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<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
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Heroin retail prices in Europe (US$) 1990-2006

Source: ADDICTION, CRIME AND INSURGENCY The transnational threat of Afghan opium, October 2009, UNODC, Page 31
Taliban Dominates: Opium Poppy cultivation in Afghanistan, 2009 (at province level)

Source: Afghanistan opium surveys, 2009 UNODC
Losing the People:

**NATO/ISAF Fails to Provide Security, GIRoA Fails to Provide Governance and Justice; Aid Never Reaches the People, and Casualties Create a Critical Backlash**
Coalition, ANA, and ANP KIA, October 2008-May 2009
NATO/ISAF Civilian Deaths in 2008

- Up 46% according to ISAF (JOLIS/NATO) database
- Up 40% according to UNAMA database
- INS cause 80% of civilian casualties*

*according to ISAF report procedures / investigations
Civilian Deaths in Afghanistan

- Note: Data from 4 May Farah incident not included (final report not yet released as of 8 Jun).
- Comparing Jan-May '09 to the same time period in 2008, civilian deaths were down 27%.
- Since Jan 07, insurgents have caused 80% of civilian deaths known by ISAF.

- Among events that have caused civilian casualties attributed to ISAF/OEF Forces, Escalation of Force incidents have been the most frequent cause of civilian casualties, but Close Air Support events have caused the greatest proportion of civilian deaths.

ABC/BBC/ARD Poll: Afghan Experiences with Violence in Past Year: 2007 vs. 2009

Can the New Strategy Work?

“Shape, clear, Hold, and Build”
Defining the Concept of Shape, Clear, Hold, and Build

• Create the military conditions necessary to secure key population centers; limit the flow of insurgents.

• Remove insurgent and anti-government elements from a given area or region, thereby creating space between the insurgents and the population;

• Maintain security, denying the insurgents access and freedom of movement within the given space; and,

• Exploit the security space to deliver humanitarian relief and implement reconstruction and development initiatives that will connect the Afghan population to its government and build and sustain the Afghanistan envisioned in the strategic goals.
Afghanistan as A Host Country

• Can influence, but not transform.

• Cannot win as an “occupier:” credible, ongoing transfer to host country leadership and full sovereignty critical.

• Need host country forces to become the face of operations are quickly as possible.

• Tactical gains have little lasting value unless provide lasting security, services, and hope.

• Must deal with corruption, power brokers, lack of capacity; cannot ignore -- but must deal with them in terms of local values.

• Governance, and government services, are critical, and are most critical at the local and regional level.

• Must find options to deal with local tensions and concerns, ethnic, sectarian, tribal and other fracture lines in the field.
Realistic and Achievable Objectives

These include:

• Disrupting terrorist networks in Afghanistan and especially Pakistan to degrade any ability they have to plan and launch international terrorist attacks.

• Promoting a more capable, accountable, and effective government in Afghanistan that serves the Afghan people and can eventually function, especially regarding internal security, with limited international support.

• Developing increasingly self-reliant Afghan security forces that can lead the counterinsurgency and counterterrorism fight with reduced U.S. assistance.

• Assisting efforts to enhance civilian control and stable constitutional government in Pakistan and a vibrant economy that provides opportunity for the people of Pakistan.

• Involving the international community to actively assist in addressing these objectives for Afghanistan and Pakistan, with an important leadership role for the UN.
Shape

In the Shape phase, The United States and its Allies and partners conduct reconnaissance to identify the key leaders, key infrastructure, tribal dynamics and the tribes relationship with the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA), and the economic status of a given area.

- Develop mix of US, NATO/ISAF, and host country deployments needed to create conditions where the force can credibly clear the insurgents.
- Limit insurgent ability to reinforce and disperse.
“Coalition of the Impossible:” NATO/ISAF Forces

## A “Dog’s Breakfast:” NATO/ISAF Forces
**October 22, 2009**

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<td>Azerbaijan</td>
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<td>Iceland</td>
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<td>Slovenia</td>
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<td>Belgium</td>
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<td>Ireland</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>1000</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bosnia &amp; Herzegovina</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>2795</td>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>430</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
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<td>Jordan</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia</td>
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<td>Canada</td>
<td>2830</td>
<td>Latvia</td>
<td>175</td>
<td>Turkey</td>
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<td>Croatia</td>
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<td>Czech Republic</td>
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<td>Norway</td>
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<td>France</td>
<td>3095</td>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>1910</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total: 71030

Allied Troops in Afghanistan by Level of Engagement: July 23, 2009

- Stand Aside: 28%
- Peripheral: 57%
- Engaged: 15%
Engaged Troops by Nation: July 2009

Source: NATO ISAF
In September 2008, the Joint Commission and Monitoring Board, co-chaired by the Afghan government and the United Nations, agreed to increase the total strength of the ANA to 122,000 personnel with a 12,000 man training margin. As of mid September 2009, the ANA has an actual strength of approximately 93,980 personnel. This represents 70% of the 134,000 approved strength which is scheduled to be reached by October 2010.

Operationally, the ANA is currently fielding 5 Corps Headquarters, a Capital Division responsible for the security of the Kabul area, and an ANA Air Corps providing the essential air support to the ANA brigades deployed throughout Afghanistan. Over 90% of ISAF operations are conducted in conjunction with the ANA and the ANA leads 62% of joint operations.
In the clear phase, military operations create an initial secure environment in which a stable and prosperous Afghanistan can begin to grow.

Carefully coordinated international forces and host country security forces eliminate, detain, or expel insurgents and anti-government entities from a given area or region, separating these elements from the general Afghan population.
Population Density of Afghanistan

Source: globalsecurity.org
Terrain vs. Population Afghanistan
Terrain vs. Population: Kandahar
In the hold phase, the U.S., its Allies and partners, and the GIRoA seek to maintain the secure environment and take advantage of the separation created between the insurgents and the population to connect the population to the government in Kabul.

International and Afghan military and police forces need to maintain a strong presence, denying anti-government elements the opportunity to return.

Afghan National Police (ANP) must enforce the law according to the Afghan Constitution, including counternarcotics laws and gain the confidence and trust of the local population.

Meanwhile, military and civilian agencies should work with local and tribal leaders, deliver humanitarian relief, and provide initial government services.
Projected Growth of the ANSF: 2005-2014
(Authorized Personnel)

ANA and ANP Casualties: 2006-2008

US Aid to Afghan Security Forces

Progress in ANA Funding: As of 1 July 2009

SIGAR, Special Inspector General for Afghan Reconstruction, Quarterly Report to Congress, July 30, 2009, p. 54.
ANA Readiness: As of 1 July 2009

ANA Capability Milestone Ratings (ANA Units)

- **CM1**: capable of operating independently
  - Total Units: 47

- **CM2**: capable of planning, executing, and sustaining operations at the battalion level with international support
  - Total Units: 32

- **CM3**: partially capable of conducting operations at the company level with support from international forces
  - Total Units: 37

- **CM4**: trained but not yet capable of conducting primary operational missions
  - Total Units: 7

Note: May not include fire support, close air support, and MEDEVAC.

Progress in ANP Funding: As of 1 July 2009

ANP Readiness: As of 1 July 2009


SIGAR, Special Inspector General for Afghan Reconstruction, Quarterly Report to Congress, July 30, 2009, p. 54.
CSTC-A reported that it cancelled 28 ANP construction projects for security reasons. Of these, one contract was terminated for convenience and 27 projects were de-scoped from existing contracts. The awarded amounts on these contracts totaled $33.53 million. As illustrated, these security concerns affected projects in all regions of Afghanistan except for the northern region.

Public Perception of ANSF Propriety

ANA has a more positive image than the ANP. Perceptions of improper behaviors by the ANA have remained relatively low while those of the ANP have decreased.

“Have you seen or heard the police in your mantaqta doing anything improper?”

“Have you seen or heard the National Army doing anything improper lately?”

Source: ANQAR Survey; last version completed Mar 09.

In the build phase, the U.S., members of the international community, and Afghans take advantage of the security and stability established in the clear and hold phases to build the human capital, institutions, and infrastructure necessary to achieve a stable, secure, and prosperous Afghanistan.

The U.S. and other members of the international community provide advisory services and training to the leaders and lawmakers who govern the country. International trainers and mentors help build the capacity of the Afghan National Police (ANP) and Afghan National Army (ANA).

The Afghan citizens who will staff the courtrooms, government offices, and private enterprise of the country receive aid, education, and training. The international community works to build schools, clinics, roads, bridges, and other infrastructure.
A “Coalition of the Impossible:” Mix of NATO/ISAF Forces and PRTs By Mission Area

Key Facts:
• Commander: General (USA) Stanley A. McChrystal
• 43 Troop Contributing Nations
• ISAF Total Strength: approx 71,030
• ISAF AOR (Afghanistan land mass) 650,000 km²
• 26 Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs)

Regional Command Capital: (aprx ISAF strength 6,130)
• HQ ISAF KABUL (COMPOSITE)
• HQ RC(C) KABUL (FRA)
• KAI&A (ESP)

Regional Command South: (aprx ISAF strength 36,500)
• HQ RC(S) in KANDAHAR (NLD) (rotates CAN, NLD, GBR)
• Forward Support Base KANDAHAR (multinational)
• PRT KANDAHAR (CAN)
• PRT LASHKAR-GAH (GBR, DNK, EST)
• PRT TARIN KOWT (NLD, AUS)
• PRT QALAT (USA, ROU)

Regional Command West: (aprx ISAF strength 4,400)
• HQ RC(W) in HERAT (ITA)
• Forward Support Base HERAT (ESP)
• PRT HERAT (ITA)
• PRT FARAH (USA)
• PRT QALA-E-NOW (ESP)
• PRT CHAGHCHARAN (LTU)

Regional Command North: (aprx ISAF strength 5,700)
• HQ RC(N) in MAZAR-E-SHARIF (DEU)
• Forward Support Base MAZAR-E-SHARIF (DEU)
• PRT MAZAR-E-SHARIF (SWE)
• PRT FEYZABAD (DEU)
• PRT KONDIZ (DEU)
• PRT POL-E-KHOMRI (HUN)
• PRT MEYMANA (NOR)

Regional Command East: (aprx ISAF strength 18,300)
• HQ RC(E) in BAGRAM
• Forward Support Base BAGRAM (USA)
• PRT LOGAR (CZE)
• PRT SHARANA (USA)
• PRT KHOST (USA)
• PRT METHAR LAM (USA)
• PRT BAMYAN (NZL)
• PRT PANJSHIR (USA)
• PRT JALALABAD (USA)
• PRT GHAZNI (POL, USA)
• PRT ASADABAD (USA)
• PRT BAGRAM (USA)
• PRT NURISTAN (USA)
• PRT WARDAK (TUR)
• PRT GARDEZ (USA)

US Aid Spending on Afghanistan: As of 1 July 2009

FUNDING SOURCES (TOTAL: $38.07)

- ASFF: $15.06
- CERP: $1.62
- ESF: $7.63
- DA: $0.89
- INCLE: $1.99
- Other: $5.84
- Supp.: $5.04

AGENCIES

- Department of Defense (DoD): $16.68
- USAID: $8.52
- Department of State (DoS): $1.99
- Distributed to Multiple Agencies: $1.99
- Awaiting Appropriation: $0.00

AFGHANISTAN NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY (ANDS)

Security
- International Training Organizations
- Afghan National Army (ANA)
- Afghan National Police (ANP)

Governance
- Elections
- Human Rights
- Judicial Reform and Prosecution
- Rule of Law
- Anticorruption

Development
- Essential Services
- Agriculture
- Industry Growth Banking
- Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs)
Cumulative US Civil Aid to Afghanistan: FY2002-FY2008

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
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<td>Alternative</td>
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<td>5</td>
<td>185</td>
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<td>365</td>
<td>398</td>
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<td>77</td>
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<td>66</td>
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<td>1</td>
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<td>86</td>
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<td>53</td>
<td>397</td>
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<td>111</td>
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<td>113</td>
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<td>87</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>46</td>
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<td>Health</td>
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<td>15</td>
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<td>134</td>
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<td>444</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support to Afghan Gov't</td>
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<td>8</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>68</td>
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<td>Democracy</td>
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<td>6</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>98</td>
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<td>Internally Displaced Persons</td>
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<td>Civilian Assistance</td>
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<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
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<td>10</td>
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<td><strong>Totals</strong></td>
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<td>462</td>
<td>1171</td>
<td>1510</td>
<td>779</td>
<td>1478</td>
<td>1108</td>
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Source: CRS.
## International Aid Pledges to Afghanistan

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Amount ($ in millions)</th>
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<tbody>
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<td>Britain</td>
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<td>World Bank</td>
<td>2,803</td>
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<td>Asia Development Bank</td>
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<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>1,900</td>
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<tr>
<td>European Commission (EC)</td>
<td>1,768</td>
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<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>1,697</td>
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<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>1,479</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>1,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iran</td>
<td>1,164</td>
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<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>1,108</td>
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<td>Norway</td>
<td>977</td>
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<td>Denmark</td>
<td>683</td>
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<td>Italy</td>
<td>637</td>
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<tr>
<td>Saudi Arabia</td>
<td>533</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Total Non-U.S. Pledges</strong></td>
<td><strong>25,800</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>(including donors not listed)</strong></td>
<td><strong>25,800</strong> (includes pledges at April 2009 NATO summit)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source:** Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction. October 2008 report, p. 140. This table lists donors pledging over $500 million total.
US Economic (ESF) Aid to Afghanistan

US Counter-Narcotics Spending on to Afghanistan

US CERP Aid to Afghanistan

Addressing Six Centers of Gravity

- Defeating the insurgency not only in tactical terms, but by eliminating its control and influence over the population.

- Creating an effective and well-resourced NATO/ISAF and US response to defeating the insurgency and securing the population.

- Building up a much larger and more effective mix of Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF).

- Giving the Afghan government the necessary capacity and legitimacy at the national, regional/provincial, district, and local levels.

- Creating an effective, integrated, and truly operational civil-military effort. NATO/ISAF, UN, member country, and NGO and international community efforts.

- Dealing with the sixth center of gravity outside Afghanistan and NATO/ISAF’s formal mission. with the actions of Pakistan, Iran, and other states will be critical to success in Afghanistan.
Execute and Resource an Integrated Civilian-Military Counterinsurgency Strategy

U.S. military forces in Afghanistan will execute two priority missions:

1) securing Afghanistan's south and east against a return of al-Qaida and its allies in order to provide a space for the Afghan government to establish effective government control; and

2) training and partnering with the ANSF so that those forces are able to expand rapidly, take the lead in effective counterinsurgency operations, and allow the United States and other international forces to decrease their role in combat operations.

Security operations are integrated with governance and economic development efforts led by civilian agencies. Security operations will separate the population from the insurgents and provide the space and time in which stabilization and reconstruction activities can take hold. Security operations will be coupled with a strategic communications campaign to counter the terror and misinformation campaigns of the insurgents.
Can the New Strategy Work?

Afghanistan and Pakistan
Official border crossing points between Afghanistan and its neighbors

Source: ADDICTION, CRIME AND INSURGENCY The transnational threat of Afghan opium, October 2009, UNODC, Page 62
Trafficking routes and unofficial border crossing points in Afghanistan 2008

Source: Government of Afghanistan - National monitoring system implemented by UNODC.
FATA’s seven agencies and Balochistan

Source: ADDICTION, CRIME AND INSURGENCY The transnational threat of Afghan opium, October 2009, UNODC, Page 124
### Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Agency</th>
<th>Area (km²)</th>
<th>Population (1998 census)</th>
<th>Density (people/km²)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bajaur</td>
<td></td>
<td>595,227</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khyber</td>
<td></td>
<td>546,730</td>
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<td>Kurram</td>
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<td>448,310</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mohmand</td>
<td></td>
<td>334,453</td>
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<tr>
<td>North Waziristan</td>
<td></td>
<td>361,246</td>
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<tr>
<td>Orakzai</td>
<td></td>
<td>225,441</td>
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<tr>
<td>South Waziristan</td>
<td></td>
<td>429,841</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Six Frontier Regions combined</td>
<td>235,083</td>
<td>235,083</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>FATA</strong></td>
<td><strong>27,220</strong></td>
<td><strong>3,176,331</strong></td>
<td><strong>117</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Drug Trafficking routes in Pakistan

Source: ADDICTION, CRIME AND INSURGENCY The transnational threat of Afghan opium, October 2009, UNODC, Page 63
Afghanistan/Pakistan Border: Balochistan Province

Source: ADDICTION, CRIME AND INSURGENCY The transnational threat of Afghan opium, October 2009, UNODC, Page 132
Refugee camps and heroin seizure locations in Balochistan, 2002-2008

Source: ADDICTION, CRIME AND INSURGENCY The transnational threat of Afghan opium, October 2009, UNODC, Page 137
Pashtun Tribes on the Afghanistan/Pakistan Border

Source: ADDICTION, CRIME AND INSURGENCY The transnational threat of Afghan opium, October 2009, UNODC, Page 19
# Tribes and insurgent groups in Pakistan

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Border agency/province</th>
<th>Main tribes</th>
<th>Main AGE groups (non-exhaustive)</th>
<th>Cross-border representation and linkages in Afghanistan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Khyber</td>
<td>Shinwari, Afridi</td>
<td>Lashkar I-Islam, Ansar ul Islam, HIG, Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan</td>
<td>Shinwari</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kurram</td>
<td>Turi, Mangal, Bangash, Jaji, Moqbil</td>
<td>HIG, Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP)</td>
<td>Jaji, Mangal, Moqbil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Waziristan</td>
<td>Uthmanzai Wazirs, Gurbuz</td>
<td>Al-Qaeda, IMU and Uzbek splinter groups (e.g. Islamic Jihad Union), Haqqani network, Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP)</td>
<td>Uthmanzai Wazirs, Gurbuz</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Waziristan</td>
<td>Ahmadzai Wazirs, Mehsuds</td>
<td>Al-Qaeda, IMU, Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP)</td>
<td>Ahmadzai Wazirs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mohmand</td>
<td>Mohmand, Safis</td>
<td>Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), Al-Qaeda</td>
<td>Mohmand, Safis</td>
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<tr>
<td>Orakzai</td>
<td>Orakzai, Afridi</td>
<td>Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Balochistan province</td>
<td>Ashaqqai, Alizai, Kakar, Baluch</td>
<td>Afghan Taliban, Balochi separatist groups, Jundullah</td>
<td>Ashaqqai, Alizai, Kakar, Baluch</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Tribal Connections at Afghanistan/FATA (Pakistan) Border

Source: ADDICTION, CRIME AND INSURGENCY The transnational threat of Afghan opium, October 2009, UNODC, Page 130
Average daily vehicle crossing in FATA 2007-2008

Source: Information provided by Pakistani embassy officials in Kabul.

Source: ADDICTION, CRIME AND INSURGENCY: The transnational threat of Afghan opium, October 2009, UNODC, Page 122