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Founded by David M. Abshire and Admiral Arleigh Burke at the height of the Cold War, CSIS was dedicated to the simple but urgent goal of finding ways for America to survive as a nation and prosper as a people. Since 1962, CSIS has grown to become one of the world's preeminent public policy institutions.

Today, CSIS is a bipartisan, nonprofit organization headquartered in Washington, D.C. More than 220 full-time staff and a large network of affiliated scholars focus their expertise on defense and security; on the world's regions and the unique challenges inherent to them; and on the issues that know no boundary in an increasingly connected world.

Former U.S. senator Sam Nunn became chairman of the CSIS Board of Trustees in 1999, and John J. Hamre has led CSIS as its president and chief executive officer since 2000.

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Photo Credits: All photos are taken from http://www.Defenselink.mil/. Detail for Cover photos: Top left: A CH-53E Sea Stallion helicopter, assigned to the Air Combat Element of the U.S. Marine Corps 31st Marine Expeditionary Unit, lands on the flight deck of the forward deployed amphibious assault ship USS Essex (LHD 2) in the South China Sea (DoD photo by Petty Officer 2nd Class Mark R. Alvarez, U.S. Navy). Top right: Over the San Francisco Bay area, two F-16 Fighting Falcons begin to roll into position for a rapid decent during an Operation Noble Eagle training patrol (U.S. Air Force photo by Master Sgt. Lance Cheung). Bottom: Four Marines of Weapons Company, 3rd Battalion, 4th Marine Regiment, dismount their vehicles and punch-out to provide unit security while fellow Marines notionally call the Explosive Ordinance Disposal team to investigate a mock IED during a convoy training exercise outside of Hawthorne Army Ammunition Depot in Hawthorne, Nevada (U.S. Marine Corps photo by Cpl. Nicole A. LaVine).

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Background

In April 2009, with the generous support of Rolls Royce North America, the Center for Strategic and International Studies launched the Military Strategy Forum (MSF) summer series on the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR). The congressionally mandated QDR is intended to be the Department of Defense’s “comprehensive examination” of strategy and priorities. This year’s effort is seen as a particularly important tool for Secretary of Defense Robert Gates as he seeks further adjustments in the department’s long-term course; its outcomes will likely serve as a historical marker against which his tenure is judged. Although the review is still ongoing, many expect one of the QDR’s most significant contributions to be a new force planning construct that will guide decisions on military force structure; it may also build on recent changes in acquisition and other key business processes. Overall, the dominant theme that emerged from the series was a desire for the QDR to produce a strategically coherent set of meaningful trade-offs, a significant feat given increasing fiscal constraints.

For the past few years the MSF has served as a discussion forum for senior defense leaders on key military issues; this summer’s QDR series in particular was designed to provide senior Department of Defense (DoD) civilian and military leaders the opportunity to offer a wide range of perspectives on the Obama administration’s inaugural defense review. CSIS held eight events, beginning in April and concluding in June 2009, focused on some or all of the QDR’s five focus areas of irregular warfare, military support to domestic and foreign civil authorities, global force posture, high-end asymmetric threats, and key defense business practices. Because of the substantive breadth of and interest in the subject, the QDR series included a panel discussion after each address that was moderated by a defense journalist or other expert. The panelists represented a range of congressional, business, academic, military, and former executive branch perspectives. Their contributions enabled a rich, in-depth exploration of these key topics. The series enjoyed broad attendance by military personnel, representatives from the defense industry, domestic and international media, academics, and foreign officials.

Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Michèle Flournoy kicked off the series; she was followed by each of the four military service chiefs. The three remaining sessions featured the vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff who addressed global force posture, the commander of U.S. Joint Forces Command discussing irregular warfare and the future of the ground forces, and the commander of U.S. Northern Command offering his perspectives on homeland defense. Summaries of each event are below, with full video and/or audio available on the CSIS Web site (www.csis.org).

CSIS looks forward to future Military Strategy Forum events and will launch another series this fall that focuses on an in-depth exploration of challenges in various combatant commands.
Executive Summary

The thoughtful remarks of our keynote speakers, panelists, and audience members provided ample fodder to inform the environment into which the QDR will be released. Although there was broad consensus among participants on the complex and uncertain future U.S. forces are likely to face, many also noted the absence of a national grand strategy to inform and bound the defense-specific QDR effort. Two related components of this challenge were highlighted in different sessions: first, the lack of a clear strategic direction (à la "containment") to at least ensure a basic common vector. Second, there was the more pragmatic concern that setting the appropriate course for the Department of Defense within the administration’s stated objective of a more integrated application of all instruments of national power (the “whole of government” approach) is very difficult when DoD is the only executive branch agency undertaking an in-depth high-level review intended to be reflected in long-term budget plans.

As noted above, all participants acknowledged that difficult fiscal realities are likely to increasingly force trades, and many of our speakers alluded, both directly and indirectly, to the tension between a future operating environment that places a premium on human interaction (and thus larger land forces in particular) and the expense of additional manpower. Shifting emphasis from a “platform-centric” force to one that is better able to address “people-centric” missions has significant implications for both current and future budgets and was a clear concern for many of the service chiefs in particular. Across the full range of missions, many speakers also described a future environment characterized by decentralized and distributed operations; embracing the implications of this shift will likely involve significant changes not only in equipment but, more important, in culture, people, and processes.

Another recurring theme was the importance of protecting the national industrial base as a critical hedge against a future that might call for more or new weapon systems or technical capabilities. Some conceded that the current operating environment might suggest fewer purchases of large weapon systems, but they noted that the human capital and expertise required to build complex systems are very costly to recreate and that reviving them may in some cases even be infeasible. They urged careful consideration of industrial base issues in QDR deliberations, warning against penny-wise but potentially pound-foolish decisions.

The QDR series raised these challenges and many others; the issues facing those engaged in the review are legion—and daunting. Through this series CSIS has identified at least four specific recommendations that DoD and the Congress should consider as the QDR process moves forward:

1. At a minimum, this QDR should articulate a clearly defined, shared understanding of DoD’s force sizing and risk assessment frameworks. Many speakers noted that previous “two war” planning constructs are no longer useful or relevant; the challenge for this QDR is to develop a framework that captures the complexity of a hybrid warfare future with sufficient fidelity to inform resource judgments and priorities. Similarly, some participants noted that with frequent use of the term “risk,” it is crucial to clarify the types of risk we care most about and their relative importance.

2. This QDR should also contain or enable a process for setting priorities and objectives among categories of threats or ranges of military missions. Although most past QDRs have presented ways of thinking about threats and/or military missions to address them, some have been
criticized for failing to then determine which should receive priority, which can lead to a defense program that is not adequately focused or fully rationalized.

3. Given the broad acknowledgment that DoD’s responsibilities for national security are part of a larger interagency whole, the QDR should make explicit assumptions about recommended capabilities and capacities of other instruments of national power. Failing to clarify exactly what DoD has assumed other agencies will bring to the table could lead to redundancies or (more likely) gaps in national capabilities that could be significant security concerns. An implicit implication is the fact that DoD cannot assume away nonmilitary responsibilities it may need to fulfill for the foreseeable future.

4. Following the conclusion of this QDR, Congress and the executive branch should both evaluate whether the current process results in outcomes that merit the significant investments required and determine whether the current DoD effort should be refined or be replaced with a more comprehensive U.S. government review.

   In addition to the specific topics above, many speakers and panelists raised issues that exceed the scope of the current QDR. These include national debates on the desired amount of treasure the public is willing to commit to DoD’s needs in an increasingly complex and uncertain future; conduct of the current war’s in Afghanistan and Iraq, the role of the Reserve Components; and the appropriate balance between civil liberties and cyber security. All of these issues are thorny and complex, and the DoD, the executive branch as a whole, Congress, defense industry, and academia all have interests and responsibilities in helping to shepherd them forward in the next few years. We look forward to tackling them together.

Event Summaries: MSF QDR Summer Series


- Keynote Speaker: Michèle Flournoy, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy
- Host: Maren Leed, CSIS

Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Michèle Flournoy kicked off the series with an address on the major issues to be dealt with during the 2009 QDR. Flournoy began by laying out how the Department of Defense sees the strategic environment and its implications for the QDR. Beyond engagement in two ongoing wars, Flournoy described five key challenges that are shaping the current security environment: (1) the rise of violent extremism; (2) the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; (3) fundamental shifts in the balance of power; (4) failed and failing states; and (5) increasing tensions in the global commons. These challenges, Flournoy explained, are in turn being fueled and complicated by five primary trends: (1) the global economic downturn; (2) climate change; (3) demographic shifts; (4) growing resource scarcity; and (5) the spread of potentially destabilizing technologies.

Flournoy asserted that there are two defense challenges that stand out in particular: first, the “hybridization” of warfare, which tends to pull DoD in competing directions (i.e., toward irregular and high-end threats), and second, the simultaneity of challenges posed by strong states in
parallel with the increasing dangers posed by weak and failing ones. During the question and answer period, Flournoy shared that the DoD is using scenarios and war-gaming to better understand the demands weak and failing states might place on the military.

Flournoy noted that the United States has historically faced highly complex environments with remarkable creativity and innovation and will do so again on the basis of six core principles. These principles include pragmatism, global engagement, more selective and intentional engagement, championing the rule of law internationally, a commitment to international partners and alliances, and the institutionalization of a whole-of-government approach to national security. In response to an audience question on this last principle, an audience member asked about how to secure congressional backing for a more integrated interagency budget; Flournoy suggested that the executive branch needs to better explain both the impacts and the significant opportunity costs of failing to invest in nonmilitary civilian capacity.

Flournoy concluded her remarks by emphasizing the utility of the QDR in forcing an explicit consideration of strategic risk. She described three distinct areas in which DoD will evaluate risk and acknowledged that ultimately DoD will need to balance strategic risk across them. First, there is the balance among current priorities, which include the commitment to Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan, the global campaign against terrorism, and the health and readiness of the force. Second, there is the balance among future investments. Flournoy suggested this would require some shift in emphasis from conventional threats to emerging asymmetric challenges at the middle and high end of the spectrum of conflict. Finally, there is the balance between the first two categories (current and future requirements). Flournoy noted that the QDR will draw on feedback from other U.S. government actors, outside experts, the private sector, and international partners throughout the QDR process.

In the question and answer period, Flournoy spoke to the importance of the QDR in light of the budget decisions that Secretary Gates has already announced. She noted that the overall time period addressed by the QDR is 10 to 20 years out. However, special emphasis is on the Fiscal Year (FY) 2011–2015 Future Years Defense Plan (FYDP). She reflected that the impact of past QDRs on strategy and budget have been mixed, but stated that the decisions already taken in FY 2010 are an initial step and that DoD is very mindful of the importance of tying this QDR to upcoming programmatic processes. In response to a question about investing in unmanned technologies, Flournoy remarked that there is a good deal of interest in the potential of unmanned systems both to provide new capabilities and to help alleviate rising personnel costs. When an audience member expressed doubt that Congress would endorse changes that could result in job losses, Flournoy asserted that there is significant overlap between investments that are needed for our security and that have a positive economic impact.
Panel Discussion

- **Moderator:** Vago Muradian, Defense News
- **Panelists:** Barry Blechman, Stimson Center  
  Creighton Greene, Senate Armed Services Committee  
  Bob Soule, Institute for Defense Analysis

Vago Muradian of Defense News moderated the follow-on panel discussion. The first panelist, Creighton Greene of the Senate Armed Services Committee used his brief remarks to debunk his list of QDR myths. First, he contended, the assertion that the congressional view of the QDR as just another budget drill is false. Instead, he claimed, Congress imposed the QDR requirement as a way of asking DoD to reflect on “the broader context in which we ought to be shaping our defense policy.” Another myth Greene disputed is the interpretation that Congress established the QDR requirement with expectations for radical defense changes. On the contrary, Greene argued, the intent was to create an opportunity for a routine strategic-level “reviewing of the bidding.” Further, he argued, although many people criticize the congressional mandate for a new administration to conduct a QDR in its first year, Greene argued that there is never an ideal time and that a QDR at the beginning of an administration is probably better than later in its term. Third, Greene contested the claim that Congress was only concerned with jobs; although he acknowledged that jobs matter, he noted that members are also worried about broader national security interests and what is right for the country as a whole. Greene concluded his comments by cautioning that Congress’s asking tough questions does not make Congress the enemy; instead, he said, Congress is a partner in national defense, and scrutiny from Congress, a co-equal branch of government, should improve the overall quality of the outcome.

Barry Blechman of the Stimson Center opened with his view that the QDR places an unfair burden on DoD because answers to the congressionally mandated questions exceed the bounds of its responsibilities. Blechman characterized most of the questions the QDR is charged with answering as pertaining to global strategy, which have implications far beyond DoD. Blechman cited as examples U.S. policy toward China, the rest of Asia, and Russia, as well as NATO expansion. Accusing Congress of compounding an already impossible task, Blechman cited the requirements for separate reviews of nuclear posture, space policy, and ballistic missile defense, all of which he sees as inextricably linked with QDR.

Bob Soule of the Institute for Defense Analysis focused his remarks on what he believes are criteria against which QDRs could be evaluated. He first claimed that a good strategy that deals with critical defense challenges in feasible and efficient ways is a necessary foundational consideration. The next challenge is to develop an internally consistent and roughly balanced force structure, posture, defense program, and resource plan that aligns with that strategy. This, he said, was a standard that past QDRs have not always met. Soule’s third criterion was a QDR that does not “ignore the elephant in the room.” The last QDR, he averred, failed to address the strain on ground forces, which was a glaring omission. Expanding upon this line of argument, Soule suggested that a QDR’s success also hinges on zeroing in on a few key issues—“hopefully the right ones.” For the current QDR, Soule agreed that determining the appropriate balance between conventional and irregular warfare capabilities should be on this list. He also suggested an examination of the potential vulnerabilities inherent in an extensive reliance on automated systems (including computer
networks, the global positioning system [GPS], and space assets). Soule’s final admonition was that this QDR must address what he termed the “programmatically overconstrained problem,” which he believes comprises the endorsement of planned and very costly expansion of ground forces, the decline of overall resources as the baseline budget and supplemental funding are reduced, and the effects of limited past procurement investments.

During the question and answer period, much of the discussion centered on the issue Blechman raised concerning DoD’s place in a whole-of-government approach. On the subject of building civilian capacity in other departments, for example, Soule suggested that the problem was the lack of an “execution culture” in other government agencies. A State Department representative in the audience countered that a lack of resources precluded a real expansion in whole of government capabilities. Greene suggested there was a need to overcome interdepartmental and interagency problems, which he attributed primarily to cultural differences. All panelists shared their views on the value of the QDR, offering suggestions to improve the process. Both Soule and Blechman, for example, agreed that cabinet-level engagement on and discussion of the key issues and active incorporation of perspectives from other U.S. government agencies and academia would be beneficial for the QDR.

### Future of Maritime Presence (May 1, 2009)
(http://csis.org/event/military-strategy-forum-admiral-gary-roughead)

- **Keynote speaker:** Admiral Gary Roughead, Chief of Naval Operations
- **Host:** David Berteau, CSIS

Admiral Gary Roughead, the Chief of Naval Operations, gave the keynote address at the second event of the series, kicking off the first of the four service perspectives on the QDR. He sees the QDR as a useful opportunity for the U.S. Navy to investigate its investments as well as its associated processes and structures. In his view, from a naval perspective the QDR is fundamentally about evaluating the relative value of different maritime capabilities for employment in current and future operating environments. Roughead contended that the Navy has already taken steps to adapt to this reality. He cited the restructuring of the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) program, the truncation of the DDG 1000 destroyer program, and the cancellation of the Multi-Role Unmanned Water Vehicle as examples where the Navy has made choices to better align resources, required capabilities, and program management.

Turning to the future, Roughead described a world that will continue to be “extremely interconnected,” but fragilely so. He predicted a persistent vulnerability to disruption, a condition he sees as further exacerbated by the current economic crisis. To better respond to this environment, Roughead recounted his establishment of an Irregular Warfare (IW) office, one that he deliberately placed directly on his staff to help insulate it from bureaucracy. Roughead expects this office to bring him ideas on how to better leverage naval capabilities in the IW environment. It has already produced results, in Roughead’s view, to include the flight of an Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) off a ship in the Gulf of Aden as well as the establishment of the National Maritime Intelligence Center and four other regionally and functionally specialized centers.

Roughead focused the next portion of his remarks on the characteristics of the present and future operating environments and their implications for the Navy. He believes that current threats across the spectrum of conflict will persist, but disputed the notion that this operating environ-
ment represents a new set of challenges. Instead, he argued, the U.S. Navy has been involved in hybrid warfare for centuries, tracing its origins to chasing pirates off the Barbary Coast and coming full circle to today’s anti-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden. Roughead highlighted the importance of the proliferation of advanced ballistic missile and anti-ship cruise missiles, developments he believes change the calculus in the littoral areas and render moot any classification of war as either low- or high-end. Although he acknowledged that recent events have showcased the value of “small, cheap, and benign” capabilities, Roughead asserted that these alone are insufficient. Instead, he postulated, the best way to project power and deter future adversaries is to have the capacity and capabilities to address major threats. In this regard, the Navy provides flexibility and options that do not infringe on other states’ sovereignty, which will be increasingly valuable in a world with rising sensitivity to U.S. presence.

With regard to the geographic focus of future maritime presence, Roughead reaffirmed the Navy’s focus on the littoral areas, which he noted is currently home to approximately 70 percent of the world’s population. Although some define the littorals as emanating outward from the shoreline, Roughead sees it as from the shoreline in as well—“anywhere where we [the Navy] can have the reach.” In addition to the increasing importance of the littorals, Roughead pointed to the Navy’s increasing contributions in the cyber realm. He asserted that the Navy has a critical cyber role, noting that 95 percent of what moves in cyberspace passes through cables lying on the ocean floor.

Given his view of the future, Roughead stressed the need for U.S. forces and the Navy in particular to maintain global reach. Furthermore, to meet these varying challenges, he emphasized the need for the Navy not only to have sufficient capacity, but also flexible capabilities (especially combat power) to fulfill the missions laid out in the recent Maritime Strategy. These capabilities include forward presence, a deterrent force, power projection, the ability to provide humanitarian assistance and disaster response, maritime security, and maritime domain awareness. Roughead also highlighted the regional ties the Navy is developing in executing its cooperative strategy. He characterized the Navy’s future relationship with the Chinese Navy as complicated, involving selected areas of cooperation. Roughead contested the view that the way to do security cooperation or influence events is with small, unobtrusive platforms; instead, he argued, large ships can make significant contributions in cooperative planning, maintenance training, and other forms of engagement, at a scale not possible with small assets. When asked about increasing global competition for natural resources, Roughead stressed the importance of U.S. accession to the United Nations Law of the Sea Convention so the United States could have a seat at the table. Still, he said, sometimes “you shape with power.”
Delving into the implications of budget decisions, Roughead expressed his concern about the Navy’s capacity to provide power projection capabilities in the future, noting that the service is operating at its lowest ship total since 1916. However, he voiced optimism that the LCS and Joint High Speed Vessel will help to augment the Navy’s capacity and expects a debate during the QDR on the future of amphibious ships. Roughead also discussed his focus on total ownership costs and flagged efforts to increase energy efficiency and restructure the maintenance processes for surface ships as some of the ways the Navy is seeking to reduce those costs. Of great concern, he shared, is the impending shortfall in strike fighter aircraft from 2012 to 2017—that is, between the planned retirement of a number of squadrons and the arrival of the Joint Strike Fighter. Roughead wrapped up his comments by highlighting the importance of flexible platforms and naval personnel, which he noted are joining and reenlisting but are also very expensive. When asked about unmanned systems, he pointed out that they do require people to operate them and that the associated man-power costs must be factored in.

Panel Discussion

- Moderator: Rear Admiral (Ret.) Stephen Pietropaoli, Navy League of the United States  
- Panelists: Byron Callan, Perella Weinberg  
  Christine Fox, Center for Naval Analyses  
  Eric Labs, Congressional Budget Office

Following Roughead’s address, Byron Callan of Perella Weinberg kicked off the panel discussion by offering his view that political and economic constraints will limit the scope of QDR-recommended changes. Later on in the discussion, Rear Admiral Pietrapaoli and an audience member questioned whether the QDR is really a budget, rather than strategy, exercise. Callan noted, however, that this may be somewhat of a false dichotomy in that large budget deficits could force real trade-offs, which in turn suggests a meaningful QDR. Audience members also raised the topics of seabasing, anti-submarine warfare (ASW), and ballistic missile defense. Callan argued that ASW is likely to be a budget casualty of higher priorities, but that the increased attention to missile defense may redound to the Navy’s benefit.

In his remarks, Callan also echoed Roughead’s concerns about the shipbuilding industrial base, stressing the lack of a viable U.S. commercial industry and the extended time period required to develop competency. The issue of the industrial base reemerged in the question and answer period. Callan and Eric Labs of the Congressional Budget Office agreed that true competition is lacking. Labs added that cost reductions are therefore most likely to come from consolidating ship buys, but that greater efficiencies are unlikely to warrant enough savings to restore the health of the shipbuilding accounts.

Following Callan’s presentation, Labs argued that of the four services, the Navy finds itself in the weakest position with regard to the QDR. He said that the Navy had excelled at explaining why a 313-ship fleet is required, but has been less adept at articulating how this Navy contributes to the current environment of irregular or asymmetric warfare. In an increasingly constrained defense budget, Labs argued that the Navy is going to have to make difficult decisions and trade-offs; he believes that the magnitude of these trades will of necessity require the elimination of some naval missions. Labs emphasized the Navy’s fiscal constraints again during the question and answer session, observing that Secretary Gates appears to be migrating toward a 10-carrier Navy by slowing
carrier procurement. Labs observed that if ten carriers are sufficient for the short and long term, this begs the question of why ten carriers would not be adequate in the intermediate term. If in fact they are, he pointed out, this solves the problem of fighter aircraft shortfalls because there would be no carriers on which to base them.

Christine Fox opened her remarks by noting the analytic challenge faced by naval forces in the QDR. Consistent with Labs’ contention that the Navy has not told its irregular warfare story well, she argued that the character of naval forces does not readily lend itself to the categorization of naval assets into mission or capability bins. Fox provided several examples of how naval forces, in particular aircraft carriers, have supported major combat operations, irregular warfare operations, partnership capacity building, and humanitarian and disaster relief operations. Fox noted that show of force operations have fallen off the table in the recent debate, which she sees as an unwise risk. Fox asserted the QDR has the potential to address three main questions or issues for the Navy: (1) how to regain the capacity to support multiple missions in multiple theatres; (2) how to address the strike fighter shortfall and to quantify the risks associated with present plans; and (3) how to resolve resource shortfalls for ships, weapons, and people to maintain a deterrent capability for potential adversaries. Fox hypothesized that the QDR will not be as analytic as she would like and that its focus will therefore be force structure and budget.


- Keynote address: General James Conway, Commandant, U.S. Marine Corps
- Host: Clark Murdock, CSIS

General James Conway opened his remarks with an overview of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and Marine Corps contributions in both theaters, and he then turned to his view of the state of the Marine Corps and its perspective on the QDR. He described research and development efforts, including improvements to Mine-Resistant Ambush-Protected (MRAP) vehicles and other equipment. He also highlighted the criticality of retaining a U.S. forcible entry capability. He cited numerous recent steps by the Marine Corps to support that capability, including using Navy LCS platforms to deliver high-volume fire support for Marine forces ashore and the development of the “Harvest Hawk” program that adds weapons systems to tanker/transport aircraft to better support of ground forces.

On the personnel front, Conway spoke extensively about the resiliency of the force. Although he voiced concern over rising divorce rates relative to the other services, he was encouraged by other mental health indicators that remain positive (e.g., relatively
low levels of drug, alcohol, and spousal abuse). He believes that Marine Corps rotation policies appear to satisfy the force, and stated that reenlistment levels are very high. In conclusion, Conway described the Marine Corps' specific interests in the QDR. He argued that the Marine Corps has multiple cost efficiency advantages over the other services. He also argued the “two fists” of the Marine Corps fit Secretary of Defense Gates's description of a “balanced” full-spectrum force. Conway referenced global force management decisions in the QDR that may require Marine assets to relocate and highlighted the Marine Corps decision to extend the life of its F/A-18s in anticipation of fielding the Joint Strike Fighter. Finally, Conway warned against the risks involved in cutting back amphibious capability and highlighted the critical need for the Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle (EFV) to get Marines ashore.

Panel Discussion

- Moderator: Rear Admiral Stephen Pietropaoli, Navy League of the United States
- Panelists: Patrick Cronin, National Defense University (NDU)
  Frank Hoffman, Potomac Institute for Policy Studies
  Patrick Towell, Congressional Research Service

Rear Admiral Stephen Pietropaoli opened the panel discussion by remarking that this year's QDR has a high possibility of spurring significant changes in DoD acquisitions and strategic planning because of DoD's current leadership and the broader fiscal and policy pressures they face.

In his opening remarks, Patrick Cronin of NDU noted that in the framework of the QDR, discussions of military capabilities should be based on an overarching political-military strategy, which is currently underdeveloped. Cronin also echoed Flournoy's emphasis on the uncertainty of the future operating environment and the importance of identifying and managing risk. When the QDR process was criticized during the question and answer session, Cronin noted that the current team in the Office of the Secretary of Defense is taking care to vet issues with outside experts. Pietropaoli added that DoD will also benefit from the 535-member “red team” on Capitol Hill. Cronin argued that a deliberate process does in fact increase the chance of a successful outcome, but conceded that it should not be so internally focused that it loses sight of real-world constraints.

Frank Hoffman of the Potomac Institute challenged Conway's assertion that Marine Corps programs are relatively inexpensive and then laid out a four-part case for maintaining a forcible entry capability. Hoffman described these four strategic benefits as: (1) credible conventional deterrence; (2) assured access to littoral targets; (3) national freedom of action; and (4) cost-imposition on adversaries due to the need to spread anti-U.S. defenses beyond ports and airfields. Audience members later returned to Hoffman's argument, spurring a discussion of Navy versus Marine amphibious assets and the continued importance of the forcible entry capability they provide.

Pat Towell of the Congressional Research Service focused his opening remarks on the need for fiscal realism among defense budget professionals in Washington, echoing Secretary Gates's public comments about trade-offs and constraints. Citing a few examples, Towell pointed out that although members of Congress naturally resist cutting military spending in their districts, when a credible secretary of defense with coherent priorities joins forces with a president who is willing to spend political capital, program cuts are indeed possible.
General Norton Schwartz opened by noting that it was a fitting time to speak about the future of the Air Force given the ongoing QDR, Nuclear Posture Review, and the Space Policy Review. He began by calling for a national security strategy with a definable end-state. Understanding what this would then mean for the Air Force requires the Air Force to understand both its historical and present roles as part of the joint force and with respect to broader national defense objectives. He emphasized the need to utilize the enduring aspects of the Air Force when designing the future force. When asked later about his priorities, General Schwartz said that remedying the nuclear issue was his first priority in light of the events that elevated him to Chief of Staff. He identified his second most important task as taking care of airmen, their families, and the wounded.

Elaborating on his statement about the past, present, and future roles of the Air Force, General Schwartz then described the Air Force’s enduring contributions and how they relate to the current and future operating environments. First, he noted airpower’s ability to provide lines of communication and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities. Schwartz emphasized the historical role that the Air Force has played in providing speed, range, and flexibility to conventional ground forces, increasing efficiency and lethality; he argued these capabilities remain highly relevant in the realms of cyber and space today. Schwartz offered that the primary enduring contribution of the Air Force was friendly freedom of action in the air, protecting sea and ground forces from aerial attack. In this regard, he offered as evidence of the Air Force’s effectiveness the fact that no U.S. troops have been killed in combat by an enemy air force in more than 50 years. This same freedom of action, Schwartz believes, allows the Air Force to underwrite command and control across the air, cyber, and space domains. It also enables the Air Force to provide persistent global ISR capabilities to joint and coalition forces and to employ its air, cyber, and space non-kinetic assets from a distance to deter and dissuade potential adversaries.

General Schwartz moved on to address budgetary issues surrounding the QDR, acknowledging that all technology and platforms are under scrutiny. He called for an even-handed, fiscally sound strategy that puts the taxpayer’s dollar to best use. He observed that the reputation of the Air Force depends heavily on how it acquires major systems. As Roughead had done, Schwartz stressed the fact that “unmanned” weapons systems are crewed by humans. That said, he acknowledged that the Air Force can reform how it provides those crews to increase efficiency, perhaps
making crews capable of operating multiple aircraft at the same time. Although Schwartz raised the potential for more unpiloted systems, he expressed caution about the idea that such systems might carry nuclear payloads in particular.

In addition to discussing Air Force weapons systems, Schwartz acknowledged that the Air Force must integrate its capabilities in the joint and interagency realm. Schwartz stated that the Air Force needs a greater presence in building partnership capacity with other air forces around the world beyond just fighter pilots. Seeking to clarify the Air Force’s commitment to the current campaigns, he declared that there should be no doubt that “your Air Force is all in” and ready to contribute in any way necessary. In conclusion, Schwartz articulated the need for the Air Force to keep pace with a rapidly changing security environment through innovation and adaptation so its joint partners can rely on the Air Force to make its enduring contributions with precision and reliability.

Panel Discussion

- Moderator: Peter Spiegel, Wall Street Journal
- Panelists: Richard Aboulafia, Teal Group
  Sid Ashworth, The Ashworth Group
  Rudy deLeon, Center for American Progress

Richard Aboulafia of the Teal Group, the first panelist to speak, expressed his concern that despite the need for the industrial base to be stable and protected, it has not been a high priority. He acknowledged the priority to win the current wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, but stressed that irregular war is also cyclical and that it is difficult for the industrial base to rapidly transition back to high-end capabilities if needed.

Sid Ashworth of the Ashworth Group followed Aboulafia, stating that the Air Force has been a loser in the budget wars, with too many programs and not enough money to fund them. She focused her remarks on platforms the Air Force is purchasing to supplement the current force as stopgap measures before new platforms come on line. She raised DoD’s need to address the strategic risk associated with (1) the lack of replacement platforms and (2) the second and third order effects of the drawdown of units and bases. With respect to tanker aircraft, Ashworth suggested that the only way forward was to split the contract between Boeing and EADS. In the question and answer period, the panelists fielded several questions concerning the tanker. Aboulafia asserted that the political dynamics surrounding the tanker made it “the worst defense contract ever” and concurred with Ashworth’s recommendation of a split buy. Ashworth emphasized the need to find some way ahead, noting that the stakes are too high for the country to fail.

Rude deLeon of the Center for American Progress gave a macro-level view of the QDR. He noted that Secretary Gates has directed an expansion of ground forces, which are very expensive, in order to win the current wars. However, deLeon stressed that in light of the economic crisis, the Defense Department will have to do more with fewer resources. He added that DoD must remain focused on the big picture and pay more attention to regions outside the Middle East and South Asia, notably the Pacific. The discussion ended with a question about Air Force QDR priorities. Aboulafia urged Schwartz to stress the importance of the Air Force as a strategic asset; Ashworth encouraged him to increase funds for modernization; and deLeon advised him to articulate the Air Force’s role in deterrence and prevention.
The Army in an Era of Persistent Conflict (May 28, 2009)
(http://csis.org/event/military-strategy-forum-army-era-persistent-conflict)

- Keynote speaker: General George W. Casey, Jr., Chief of Staff, United States Army
- Host: Maren Leed, CSIS

General George W. Casey, Jr., offered a view of the current and future operating environments and their implications for Army force structure and size. Casey described how the Army is continuing its process of shifting institutional focus to full spectrum dominance in order to be able to deal with hybrid threats. To do so, the Army is building a mix of tailorable organizations organized for a rotational cycle designed to generate a sustained flow of ready forces. According to Casey, they are doing so while hedging against uncertainty and remaining mindful of the need to manage deployments at a rate acceptable to the volunteer force.

Strategically Casey described a world in which the United States is engaged in a long-term ideological struggle. This struggle, which includes the current conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, will likely be exacerbated, he argued, by trends in globalization, the hostile use of high technology, demographics, increased urbanization, and competition for scarce natural resources. Casey placed particular emphasis on the threat posed by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the phenomenon of safe havens from which the enemy can launch attacks against the United States with impunity. Casey shared the view of all previous keynote speakers that future conflicts are likely to be hybrid in nature, more akin to the Israel-Hezbollah war of 2006 than the largely conventional 1991 Gulf War.

Against this backdrop, Casey described the Army’s role. Its first responsibility, he asserted, is to win the wars we are in. This includes fighting protracted counterinsurgency operations while building partner nations’ capacity to maintain the rule of law and deny safe havens to terrorist groups. In addition, Casey stated that land forces must continue to provide support to civil authorities within and external to the United States. To meet these missions, Casey described how the Army has rebalanced and will continue to rebalance its force structure, operational concepts, and expertise (e.g., for military policy, civil affairs, and psychological operations capabilities), adding greater versatility across the spectrum of conflict. He explained how the Army has changed from a garrison-based force prior to 9/11 to a modular force better able to adapt to changing requirements.

An audience member asked why U.S. forces are in Afghanistan, giving Casey the opportunity to link Army force structure back to national objectives. He emphasized the criticality of ensuring
that Afghanistan cannot be used as a terrorist safe haven. Casey reiterated his view of future force commitments, stating his assumption that the struggle against violent extremism will require a sustained commitment of approximately 10 Army brigade combat team equivalents worldwide over the next 10 years. He emphasized that he was not making policy, but instead making prudent assumptions consistent with his Title X responsibilities as Army Chief of Staff.

Casey then turned to the Army's implementation of a force management process similar to rotational cycles used by the other military services. He characterized it according to four “bins” (one set of deployed forces and three in various states of readiness at home). Forces in the first bin would be deployed in support of current operations, while those in the second would be in a “ready state” and would serve as nation's operational reserve. Forces in the third and forth bins would be at varying levels of readiness, would contain Active, Guard and Reserve Components, and would serve as a strategic reserve. Each bin would contain a mix of heavy and light forces with the appropriate enablers. The concept, Casey argued, provides substantial ground capabilities, designed to hedge against uncertainty, in a manner that is sustainable for an all-volunteer force over the long term. Casey's short-term goal is to get units to a ratio of one year deployed followed by two at home by fiscal year 2011, with a longer-term goal of a one-year to three-year ratio (deployed to nondeployed time). Casey stated that acceptance of this model is the most important outcome he is seeking in the QDR. Casey concluded his remarks by addressing the issue of the quality of the force, which he argued is very high.

In the question and answer period, Casey described how the Army is planning and investing to hedge against uncertainty. First, he highlighted the importance of cultural awareness and described the Army's attempt to inculcate it via training and education. On planning, he shared his view that the current operating environment of extended counterinsurgency ought to be one of the planning scenarios adopted by the QDR, with additional planning scenarios for other potential operating environments. In response to a question on the Army's level of preparedness for a North Korean contingency, Casey answered that the Army is prepared, but that it would likely take longer than he would prefer because of the challenge of rebuilding time-intensive combined arms combat skills at higher echelons. Returning to specific Army programs, an audience member inquired about cuts to the Future Combat System (FCS). Casey acknowledged that the program design was not easy to explain and was too costly. That said, he highlighted the lessons and capability improvements the Army has already seen from FCS.

Panel Discussion

- Moderator: Thom Shanker, New York Times
- Panelists: Valerie Baldwin, Baldwin Consulting, Inc.
  John Wason, House Armed Services Committee
  G. Kim Wincup, Science Applications International Corporation

Wason opened the panel discussion by hypothesizing that the order of the FY 2010 budget and the QDR process may be inverted. He claimed that many on the congressional side would like to see more discussion on the strategy underlying program decisions. He argued that discussions of weapons systems should be secondary to clear statements of requirements, threats, and potential gaps.
Baldwin echoed these concerns, adding that decisions to preclude discussions of additional end-strength levels have effectively decided levels of readiness. If budget toplines are flat but items below it have been rearranged (or “rebalanced”), Baldwin worried that critical training and weapons capabilities may be sacrificed. Baldwin noted that the QDR, though intended to be strategic, always becomes a budget exercise.

As had previous panelists, Kim Wincup of SAIC expressed more concern than optimism about the QDR, particularly for the Army. He suggested that although the Army has performed operationally, it has been less adept in securing resources. The other panelists concurred with this observation, describing an Army culture that does not value the ability to interact effectively with Congress and other key external stakeholders. Wincup observed that, as the largest service, the Army’s financial commitments to its personnel result in less fiscal flexibility than exists for the other services. In the event of budget cuts, Wincup saw Active Component force structure as the only feasible area for reduction. Wason and Baldwin both suggested that equipment reset and recapitalization was an equal if not more likely target. Army force sizing and structure was one of the most extensive debates during the panel question and answer period. Moderator Thom Shanker asked whether the Army was big enough or whether it needed to continue to grow. All of the panelists agreed that although current missions might imply additional Army growth, increasing Army end-strength is politically infeasible in the current economic climate.

Irregular Warfare, Hybrid Threats, and the Future Role of Ground Forces (June 1, 2009)
(http://csis.org/event/irregular-warfare-hybrid-threats-and-future-role-ground-forces)

- Host: Nathan Freier, CSIS

General James Mattis opened by arguing that the QDR seeks to solve the problem of maintaining U.S. nuclear and conventional superiority while building an irregular warfare capability to dominate future hybrid threats. He noted the challenge of defining an appropriate balance in the absence of a national grand strategy, a theme echoed by many of the subsequent panelists. Despite that void, Mattis cautioned against failing to prepare across the full spectrum of conflict, as history shows that the enemy will choose to fight us where we are weak. While emphasizing the uncertain nature of the future, Mattis argued that operating in concert with other nations will remain a constant. The other constant, which he asserted we have not sufficiently heeded, is that war is fundamentally a human endeavor. Mattis called out two specific resulting implications: first, that technology will never fully substitute for ground forces and their interactions with the populace, and second, that planning must be informed by threats. He added that casting programs in capability terms rather than as responses to threats is too abstract to muster public support.

Mattis identified three primary implications of the future environment for ground forces: (1) the need for articulate leaders and forces; (2) the continued movement by our enemies toward “lawfare,” or the use of our laws against us; and (3) the need to construct new triads, one combining Army, Special Operations Forces, and Marines (with aviation and naval forces in support),
and one among leaders, teams, and individuals. He sees high-performing small units as a national imperative and future environments that will require those units to aggregate and disaggregate as the situation dictates. This will conflict with our natural cultural tendency toward centralization of command and control. He argued that surrendering to this tendency represents the greatest vulnerability to future success.

Mattis argued that our technical superiority is overrated because technology is widely accessible and can be used against us. Therefore our advantage must be in the human dimension, with technology playing a supporting role. This will necessitate a change in personnel policies, especially in training and education, to prepare young service members for increased responsibilities. Some of this can be done through greater use of advanced simulations to develop leaders by presenting them with hundreds of varying tactical and ethical scenarios. We will also have to shift the command and control paradigm to command and feedback so operational tempo can keep pace with the environment. Forces must be able to disaggregate, but they must also be able to reaggregate when needed, which acknowledges that large, massed forces will be destroyed rapidly.

Weighing in on a subject raised by Conway, Mattis argued that we must accept that we live in an anti-access world, that our desire to impact actions in this world will require ground forces, and that this in turn will require forces that can conduct forcible entry operations in order to deter enemies and assure allies.

Mattis concluded by highlighting the critical deficit in national commitment to service and a general absence of a sense of responsibility in the U.S. public, calling for greater leadership from civilians. He expressed concern that too much responsibility has been placed on the backs of the notional Army sergeant, in between multiple deployments, trying to recruit new soldiers.

Panel Discussion

- Moderator: Nathan Freier, CSIS
- Panelists: Steve Coll, New America Foundation
  Lieutenant General Frank Kearney, Deputy Commander, U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM)
  Celeste Ward, RAND Corporation

Lieutenant General Frank Kearney put forth two of the critical assumptions that he believes underpin the QDR: end-strength is fixed, and all capability trades must be cost neutral. He argued that these assumptions stifle debate and pit services against one another in competitive, parochial positions. The second assumption is also problematic because not all capabilities are equal in cost. He argued, for example, that additional investments in extremely expensive high-end capabilities such as cyber compete against capabilities of more direct relevance to SOCOM missions, particularly those aimed at shaping the environment and influencing others’ choices prior to conflict, a mission that he noted still lacks validity in some parts of DoD.

Ward reiterated Mattis’s characterization of the future environment as uncertain and complex. She cautioned against being too hasty in interpreting our recent past. She argued that we do not yet fully understand the right lessons to be learned from Iraq and that the role of the surge has likely been overstated. Further, the strategic cost associated with Iraq so far is relatively modest. The challenge for the QDR, she argued, is to take a more strategic approach to identifying what
kinds of wars we think we might engage in, and then evaluate those against the likely strategic benefits and our national interests. She also urged caution in applying Iraq lessons to Afghanistan and noted that the QDR should also come up with a way to think about risk.

Ward identified three possible ways to address the challenge of developing a force to address the full spectrum of conflict. The first approach is to optimize for irregular threats, taking risk in conventional capability. The second approach is to divide the force, which is already the case in some respects, given the distinction between special operations and general purpose forces. If dividing the force is the desired approach, it leads to additional questions, such as whether to further subdivide general purpose forces. This approach also carries risk in that it relies on our ability to predict which capabilities we might need and in what quantities. The third approach is to develop multipurpose forces, which also carries risk but maximizes flexibility in an uncertain world.

Ward endorsed this last construct, echoing Mattis on the increased importance of training and education to ensuring the success of this model.

Coll offered his thoughts based on his experience as a self-described “traveler in the world of irregular warfare.” Based on that experience, he has observed the greatest deficiencies in U.S. power in two principal areas: in the political-military environment surrounding hybrid conflicts and in appreciating the impacts of technology. Coll believes the greatest gaps in U.S. strategy, policy, and doctrine are found in the murky middle ground, between fully functioning nation states and failed ones, within those states where intact but weak institutions operate alongside hostile or semi-hostile organizations. In these environments, he argued, U.S. approaches can only be indirect. He further argued that we do not do well applying interdisciplinary perspectives and capacity to generate coherent and more purposeful indirect effects. On the technological side, Coll believes that we still fail as a nation to appreciate the full implications of Moore’s law (capacity doubles every two years). Our systems, he argued, are based on an implicit assumption that our bits will defeat theirs, but the implications of Moore’s law are all horizontal. In addition, on the biology side, the future of human enhancement is accelerating at about the same pace, and its implications for defense policy remain underappreciated.

Audience members pressed the panelists to comment on security force assistance (SFA) missions. When asked if dedicated SFA forces are needed, Kearney responded that they are not, because all U.S. forces know how to train. The challenge, he argued, is to get the right language and cultural skill sets to the right forces before they engage in those missions. He concluded that it was really a question of how much depth we want in which segments of the force. Ward framed her response more broadly, pointing out that we do not have a good way for judging the effectiveness of building partner capacity activities as a whole. Lacking accurate data, she averred it may be premature to make large decisions in this regard, given multiple second- and third-order effects. Coll added that he believed that we do not do a good job of integrating training missions into broader strategy.
General James Cartwright began his remarks by noting that DoD is conducting a Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) simultaneously with the QDR, which is especially important given that we are about to enter into negotiations for the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) and several other treaties in the near future. The NPR and QDR are providing a forum to address questions about changing international relationships and the future of deterrence.

Cartwright argued that planning has often been conducted against threats assessed in terms of their likelihood and their consequence or danger, with those perceived to have the greatest consequence driving planning and threats of lesser danger being treated as lesser included cases. However, he claimed, the ability of a wide range of actors to inflict significant damage has meant that lethality is now more evenly distributed across potential adversaries. Because consequence no longer serves as a useful discriminator, likelihood takes on increased importance, and one of the most important dimensions that differs among threats is time. Given that we tend not to fight the wars we plan for, strategic posture is a critical piece of ensuring that we can respond quickly enough.

Cartwright laid out five “bins” or mechanisms that support U.S. military responses to global events: (1) permanent basing of U.S. forces overseas; (2) rotational deployments of forces from their U.S. bases; (3) prepositioning of military equipment; (4) global strike capabilities; and (5) cooperative arrangements. He then discussed each and some of the attributes that differentiate among them, including cost, ease of obtaining funding, flexibility, responsiveness, force readiness, and vulnerability to other nations’ political interests.

He went into more depth on the aspects of global strike, which Cartwright described as the set military capabilities that have “global regard” and can move to global scale very quickly. The need for such capabilities has increased because of the proliferation of ballistic missiles, which places a premium on being able to deter a conflict that could be over in minutes. In this context, Cartwright asserted, nuclear weapons are likely insufficient, and conventional bombers are too slow and too intrusive to be credible. Therefore, we need to have the capacity to create effects anywhere on earth in a period ranging from an hour (e.g., conventional long-range hypersonic capabilities, which are expensive and thus likely to be few in number), down to 300 milliseconds (cyber).
Finally, Cartwright discussed basing activities that are unrelated to physical presence but are integral to the ability of the United States to act globally—specifically, arrangements with foreign partners for forward operating or cooperative security locations (FOL/CSLs). These arrangements allow for access and are critical in particular to ensuring logistical support of deployed forces.

Panel Discussion

- Moderator: Robert Burns, Associated Press (AP)
- Panelists: Alexander Cooley, Columbia University
  Daniel Else, Congressional Research Service
  Ambassador Robert Loftis, National Defense University

Daniel Else from the Congressional Research Service began by reviewing Congressional views on overseas basing, which have principally focused on ensuring the Department of Defense has a logical strategy for its overseas presence. There are some indications of Congressional concern in that regard, and Else asserted that the Hill is looking to this QDR to help articulate a well-reasoned plan.

Else was followed by Alexander Cooley from Columbia University, who focused his remarks on three types of political challenges that basing presents for U.S. policymakers. First, he sees a need to broaden our planning processes to better account for (1) the objectives of host or partner nations, whose interests differ (to varying degrees) from our own; and (2) political/regime changes in host or partner nations. Second, economic demands by hosts and partners are likely to continue to increase. Third, Cooley argued that the United States should consider a more deliberate, open communications strategy about the purpose of our bases with host/partner nation populations in an attempt to garner more broad-based support. In the future, Cooley contended that globalization will make it increasingly difficult for the United States to obscure details of bilateral agreements from other potential partners, leading to increased bargaining and likely increased costs. Globalization has also allowed anti-U.S. basing movements to become more networked and better able to increase their impact on a broader basis. Finally, Cooley speculated about whether a lighter U.S. footprint in various locations meant possible partners find it easier to engage in “competitive bidding” with other major powers, as was the case in Ecuador and Kyrgyzstan.

NDU’s Ambassador Loftis asserted that remaining globally engaged will require sustained support from friends, allies, and host nations. Building those relationships is much more complicated with nations with whom the United States has ambivalent relations, and he believes such nations will likely increase in number. Audience members raised the issue of U.S.-Iraqi relations, focusing on the future of U.S. presence in Iraq. The panelists noted that continued engagement is likely at some level. Cooley stated that based on historical analysis, the Iraqis will continue to pursue a series of short-term arrangements to give themselves flexibility as their needs and desires change over time. Loftis argued that the “era of big FOBs” (forward operating bases) is over, which in turn puts a premium on the ability to move forces rapidly, as well as on a wide network of FOLs and CSLs to provide maximum flexibility. Loftis sees FOS/CSLs as a better model than permanent bases precisely because they are more flexible, cheaper, and not tied to the fortunes of a given political regime.

Moderator Bob Burns from the AP asked about the implications of DoD’s increasing emphasis on building partner capacity for U.S. overseas posture, especially in Asia and Europe. Loftis remarked that he sees declining forces in both theaters as logical and necessary, especially in
Europe, but noted the difficult balance between helping people to do more themselves and creating a perception of pulling out.

Expanding the discussion of U.S. bases and engagement with allies, an audience member asked about the utility of naval seabasing. Loftis acknowledged that sea bases work relatively well for littoral states, but operations in landlocked nations will still require transit agreements. He further argued that building effective arrangements with the flexibility the United States desires requires a broad, long-standing relationship with the partner nation, which in turn is built from long-term engagement rather than half-hearted approaches such as regional embassies where diplomats shuttle in and out. Cooley agreed that seabasing can be one of many useful tools. He repeated his earlier caution that the United States should strike a careful balance between publicly acknowledging the value of our partners and giving them the sense that they are vital and irreplaceable, which leaves us open to coercion. The ability to ensure U.S. freedom of action is an enduring objective of forward basing.

Defending the Homeland (June 16, 2009) (http://csis.org/event/defending-homeland)

- **Keynote Speaker:** General Victor Renuart, Commander, U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM) and North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD)
- **Host:** James Lewis, CSIS

Despite NORTHCOM’s relatively recent creation as a unified combatant command charged with defending the homeland, Renuart discussed the command’s many successes as well as the specific challenges it faces. The successes include the beginning of coordination and communication efforts between agencies involved in homeland defense such as the Federal Aviation Administration, the Transportation Security Administration, the White House, the Department of Homeland Security, or DHS, DoD, and their Canadian and Mexican counterparts. Specific examples of success in the area of homeland security include improved intermilitary, intergovernmental, and interagency collaboration on counter-narcotrafficking between the United States and Mexico and the role of NORTHCOM in civil support and disaster response during Hurricane Gustav. According to Renuart, lingering challenges remain in interagency cooperation (including an emphasis on professional interagency education) and building capacity in other agencies consistent with their respective missions.

Regarding interagency cooperation, Renuart stressed the importance of understanding the different interagency forces at work in homeland defense and security. For example, he cited the issue of constitutional authority and the governor’s ownership of the National Guard. Renuart explained that there is a delicate balance between differing authorities that must not be overstepped. Sometimes the DoD role is supportive and at other times DoD is in the lead, and it is important to know and distinguish between the two. Renuart advocated professional education that emphasizes joint or interagency approaches. He also recommended that department heads, including assistants and deputies have at least two to three years of work experience in a different agency, department, or service to understand the interagency processes and just how important the relationships are. Renuart noted that there is a need for more funding to build capacity in agencies outside DoD, such as DHS, so that DoD is not consistently filling the need beyond the mission area.
Other issue areas that Renuart highlighted were Arctic security, border security, and preparation for a catastrophic flu pandemic. Renuart pointed to the Arctic as a site of new concern as the Arctic waters have become increasingly navigable and more vessels are passing through the area for purposes of commerce and natural resource exploration. NORTHCOM is closely watching the area in anticipation of challenges in search and rescue and the potential for resource competition to become security competition. Regarding border security, one of the major concerns is making sure that our borders are open yet secure against illicit trafficking of money, humans, and narcotics. Renuart mentioned discussions between himself and Admiral Thad Allen, Coast Guard Commandant, about a possible national taskforce on “counter-trafficking.” Finally, Renuart noted that the possible resurgence of a catastrophic flu pandemic in fall 2009 is an area of DHS and DoD collaboration and should be closely followed, because it represents an area in which the military could provide civil support.

Panel Discussion

- Moderator: Jeanne Meserve, CNN
- Panelists: David Howe, Civitas
  Marcus Sachs, Verizon
  Fran Townsend, Baker Botts LLP

David Howe of Civitas began the panel discussion by stressing the utility of creating a cross-agency process for homeland defense and security that applies common risk criteria across a common budget and that sets explicit priorities for prevention, protection, and response recovery investments. Howe argued that such a process would require a clear definition of roles and that DHS should serve as the connector between all involved entities. The process should clearly identify the resources required from DoD, especially for the prevention mission and for circumstances in which DoD might be asked to go beyond its civil support role.

Marc Sachs of Verizon cited three main issues that are integral to DoD’s role in homeland defense: global technological interdependence, the role of the private sector in cybersecurity, and the role of the private sector in critical infrastructure. With an increasingly globalized economy, Sachs explained that there is not enough attention paid to the potential challenge posed by domestic military and computer technologies being built by our adversaries or potential adversaries. He also discussed the importance of establishing strong relationships with the private sector as providers in both the cyber and critical infrastructure arenas.

Fran Townsend of Baker Botts LLP expressed a need for someone in the national security arena to look at the cross-cutting budget and make sure it is consistent with the president’s objectives. Howe added that it would be helpful
at this point to pass the bar to the vice president as the champion for the budget in the political realm. Townsend also advocated establishing a separate five-year budget cycle for DHS to effectively plan and build capacity. In order to implement effective investments in critical infrastructure, Townsend argued that the homeland security budget should involve metrics of accountability for states and eventually score states for every dollar spent. Last, and most important, according to Townsend, was the issue of forward deployment of the National Guard in the case of a national emergency. Townsend repeatedly stressed the vulnerability of DoD’s planning assumption that governors will cede control of the National Guard when required and predicted that this is a problem NORTHCOM will continue to address on a case-by-case basis.
Maren Leed is a senior fellow in the CSIS International Security Program, where she works on a variety of defense issues. She previously served as an analyst at the RAND Corporation, where she led projects concerning intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) and countering improvised explosive devices (IEDs). From 2005 to 2008, she was assigned as a special assistant to the vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and was responsible for a range of issues including IEDs, ISR, cyber operations, biometrics, rapid acquisition, and Iraq policy. From 2001 to 2005, she was a professional staff member on the Senate Armed Services Committee, where she handled the operation and maintenance accounts and conducted oversight of military readiness, training, and logistics and maintenance for committee members. She was an analyst in the Economic and Manpower Analysis Division of the Office of Program Analysis and Evaluation in the Office of the Secretary of Defense from 2000 to 2001, where she conducted macroeconomic analyses relating to military manpower and coordinated Department of Defense performance contracts with its defense agencies. Leed was a doctoral fellow at RAND from 1995 to 1999, analyzing military manpower issues, training for operations other than war, and leader development, and providing strategic planning support for the military and private-sector organizations. She received an A.B. in political science from Occidental College and a Ph.D. in quantitative policy analysis from the RAND Graduate School.

Becca Smith is a research associate in the CSIS International Security Program. Before joining CSIS, she analyzed National Security Council processes from Harry S. Truman to George W. Bush for the Project on National Security Reform. Earlier she witnessed foreign policy in operation as a public affairs intern at the U.S. embassy in Paris. Smith holds a M.A. in international affairs from the George Washington University, a French studies diploma from the Université de Tours, France, and a B.A. in English and French from Bryn Athyn College.

David Sokolow is a research assistant with the International Security Program at CSIS, where he works on U.S. defense and national security policy issues. As an intern at CSIS, he collaborated with CSIS’s military fellows, Lieutenant Colonel Robert Scott (USMC) and Captain Jeffrey Maclay (USN), to interview foreign military attachés and to author a piece on NATO and allied civil-military cooperation doctrine, operation, and organization of forces. Previously, Sokolow interned at the Middle East Institute and at the U.S. Army War College’s Strategic Studies Institute. He holds an A.B. cum laude with honors in history from Bowdoin College.

Mahrukh Hasan is a research intern with the International Security Program at CSIS. She is also an associate at Humanitas Global Development, an international development consulting firm based in Washington, D.C. Before joining CSIS, Hasan led the Government Relations Department at the San Francisco chapter of the Council on American-Islamic Relations, a Muslim American civil rights group, where she advocated on issues such as citizenship delays, racial profiling, and FISA wiretapping. She speaks Urdu and French and is studying Arabic and Spanish. Hasan holds a B.A. cum laude in international relations from the University of the Pacific.