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Contents

Introduction ..........................................................................................................................1
Executive Summary .............................................................................................................1
Findings ...............................................................................................................................3
Recommendations ................................................................................................................8
Conclusion ..........................................................................................................................12
CSIS Sudan Task Force .......................................................................................................13
U.S. Policy to End Sudan’s War

Introduction

The CSIS Task Force on U.S.-Sudan Policy, funded through a grant from the U.S. Institute of Peace, was launched in July 2000 with the aim of revitalizing debate on Sudan and generating pragmatic recommendations for the new administration. Cochaired by Francis M. Deng, then senior fellow at the Brookings Institution, now distinguished professor at the City University of New York Graduate Center, and J. Stephen Morrison, director of the CSIS Africa Program, the task force at all points operated on a nonpartisan, inclusionary basis. It relied on the active participation of more than 50 individuals and presentations by several experts on select topics (see task force list). Regular participants included congressional staff, human rights advocates, experts on religious rights, academic authorities on Sudan, former senior policymakers, refugee advocates, representatives of relief and development groups, and officials of the Clinton administration and United Nations, among others. To all who contributed to the task force’s work—participants, presenters, Sudanese whose views were solicited at different points throughout the review, and the U.S. Institute of Peace—the cochairs are deeply grateful.

The task force report opens with major findings, followed by key recommendations for U.S. policy toward Sudan. The final text represents a strong majority consensus among task force participants, including a full, unequivocal endorsement by the cochairs. The final text, however, does not imply that every participant agrees unequivocally with every specific finding and recommendation.

Executive Summary

Although the policy debate on Sudan encompasses a myriad of issues, the CSIS task force concluded that the central problem on which virtually everything else hinges is the devastating war that has raged in Sudan since 1983. Now is an opportune and appropriate moment for the United States to join actively in a strong multilateral push, in collaboration with interested European powers, to end Sudan’s internal war. A sine qua non to any future progress is the cessation of the government of Sudan’s aerial bombardment of civilian humanitarian sites in the south.

Sudan continues to matter significantly to U.S. interests—on human rights, humanitarian, and security grounds. Washington cannot afford to ignore Sudan’s extreme circumstances, rooted overwhelmingly in Sudan’s 18-year internal war.

The new administration is well positioned to take a fresh look and move beyond a policy of containment and isolation that has made little headway in ending Sudan’s war,
reforming Khartoum, or ameliorating Sudan’s humanitarian crisis and gross human rights abuses. Realistically, the only viable course to end Sudan’s war and see progress in other critical areas is through a hard-nosed strategy based on diplomacy, heightened engagement with all parties, enhanced inducements and punitive measures, and concerted multilateral initiatives.

In the past two years, Sudan’s rising oil production has shifted the balance of military power in the government’s favor at the same time that significant internal rifts have surfaced in Khartoum. The surrounding region is in flux in its relations to the Sudan conflict, and it has become clear that competing regional peace initiatives hold no promise. In this fluid context, the United States possesses significant leverage. Among major powers, it is the lone holdout in renewing a dialogue with Khartoum. Equally important, it is the principal backer, in humanitarian and diplomatic terms, of the southern Sudanese opposition, recognizes the south’s moral cause, and will not countenance the military subjugation of the south.

In brief, the task force recommends that the Bush administration exercise leadership on Sudan:

■ Concentrate U.S. policy on the single overriding objective of ending Sudan’s war.

■ Actively join with the UK, Norway, and Sudan’s neighboring states in establishing an international nucleus to press forthwith for serious and sustained talks between Khartoum and the southern opposition. Its aim should be to end the war as the central means to restore fundamental human rights, stability and improved democratic governance, and regional security. This extra-regional initiative will be essential to move beyond the stasis surrounding regional peace initiatives.

■ Build this new extra-regional initiative on prior agreement by the Sudanese government and the opposition on the Declaration of Principles as the basis of negotiations.

■ Seek first to reach agreement on the creation of an interim arrangement—a “One Sudan, Two Systems” formula—that preserves a single Sudan with two viable, self-governing democratic regions, north and south.

■ Devise enhanced multilateral inducements and pressures that move both sides to participate in peace negotiations in good faith.

■ Catalyze the launch of a high-level international plan for a viable self-governing south, including commitments of substantial bilateral and multilateral resources toward its eventual realization.

■ Assign top priority in negotiations to early, mutual confidence-building measures; improvements in human rights and humanitarian access; revenue-sharing mechanisms; clarification of the north-south border; definition of regional and central powers; and international guarantees.

■ Resume full operations of the U.S. embassy in Khartoum, including the expedited appointment of an ambassador, and preferably a high-level, fully empowered envoy.
- Aggressively seek the successful conclusion of ongoing U.S.-Sudan negotiations on terrorism.

Findings

❑ Sudan matters to U.S. interests—on human rights, humanitarian, and security grounds.

Sudan matters for immediate negative reasons: the extreme policies, actions, and consequences associated with Sudan’s internal war flagrantly defy fundamental human values and international human rights conventions.

Many Americans are morally outraged by a war that has left over 2 million dead, has displaced within its borders 4.4 million persons (the largest concentration of internally displaced in the world), and has destroyed the physical and moral fabric of southern Sudanese society. Adding to the outrage is the government’s aerial bombardment of humanitarian relief sites; the systematic denial and manipulation by Khartoum and opposition forces of relief to imperiled civilian populations; religious persecution; failure by the government to combat slavery and abductions of children and women into servitude by Arab tribal militias; and mounting allegations that the aggregate consequence of this pattern of violence is genocidal.

Sudan matters because these egregious abuses, the majority at the hand of government or government-affiliated groups and armed southern militias, have attracted media interest; mobilized important members of Congress, faith-based institutions, and advocacy groups; and resulted in a U.S. humanitarian expenditure in Sudan that has exceeded $1.2 billion since 1989. Over the past decade, Sudan’s internal war and the excesses it generates, including persistent high humanitarian demand, have created in the United States new domestic political facts—constituencies and dynamics—that Washington policymakers cannot ignore. The United States recognizes the south’s moral cause and will not countenance the military subjugation of the south.

Sudan matters because in the 1990s Khartoum’s support to terrorist networks directly threatened U.S. personnel and interests. Moreover, war, instability, and the provision of passive (or active) havens to terrorist networks or armed opposition groups have continued to threaten the security of the surrounding region and the individual national interests of Egypt, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Kenya, and Uganda, states whose integrity and future matter in other respects to U.S. interests. The United States cannot invest extensively in ending the Ethiopia-Eritrea border war without also being sensitive to the threat posed by Sudan’s internal war.

Sudan matters because it straddles a fault line between Africa and the Middle East that requires the United States to balance delicate, competing foreign policy interests. Egypt has had an historical engagement in the Sudan and ongoing concerns about Islamic fundamentalism and the Nile waters that merit special consideration. Many key African states remain highly sensitive to religious and racial persecution in Sudan. Depending on how it manages its internal affairs,
Sudan can provide either a constructive link between Africa and the Middle East or a point of confrontation that has destabilizing consequences for both regions.

Prospectively, Sudan matters because of what it could become, should it achieve a just and lasting peace: it has demonstrated in years past its ability to contribute to regional peace, prosperity, democratic process, open debate, and stability. In the future, as Sudan becomes a medium-scale oil exporter, oil could shift from fueling conflict to revitalizing Sudan and building energy-market integration in the Horn of Africa. Eventually, Sudan might provide to the United States an additional source of energy supply.

Oil is fundamentally changing Sudan’s war. It is shifting the balance of military power in favor of Khartoum. It has prompted Khartoum to focus its military efforts, including forced mass displacements of civilians, on oil fields and the pipeline. Oil has also become an integral element of Khartoum’s external partnerships with states and corporations. At the same time, however, the internal coherence and strength of the government in Khartoum remains uncertain and Sudan remains poor. Any Bush administration strategy has to take full account of these realities.

Since 1998, oil has flowed in Sudan, generating for Khartoum 200,000 barrels per day and an estimated $500 million in 2000. Production will double in the next two years, exceeding 400,000 barrels per day. Proven reserves, widely thought to exceed 1 billion barrels, could double or triple in the period of the Bush administration. Under this scenario, Sudan will emerge as a new medium-scale oil exporter.

The advent of oil has widened the strategic imbalance between the government and the opposition and made ever clearer that the prospects of military victory by southern insurgents and their northern allies are slim. In the past two years, Khartoum’s defense expenditures have doubled. The south’s moral cause and its ability to sustain a low-grade guerilla war will persist and enable it to deny Khartoum any full, final military victory. However, over time the south’s threat to the government’s core interests will steadily weaken. If the south negotiates now, in earnest, with adequate external backing, it will be in a stronger position to secure its political and economic interests than if it delays taking that step for several years.

At the same time, although Khartoum’s strategic position may be stronger, and may only increase in time, Khartoum cannot win definitively on the battlefield.

The widening military asymmetry may tempt Khartoum to reject negotiations and instead take full advantage of the south’s military weakness. Ironically, despite its burgeoning oil wealth, the present government in Khartoum is arguably weaker than in earlier periods and for that reason less able to act coherently and deliberately: President Bashir’s break with Turabi in late 1999 divides the Islamist movement, and Bashir is still unable to broaden his domestic power base. For its part, the Sudanese People’s Liberation Movement and Sudanese People’s Liberation Army (SPLM/A) may also conclude that it cannot and will not negotiate from a position of weakness.
Realistically, any external power(s) committed to promoting peace in Sudan will confront two stark challenges: first, to convince Khartoum that it is in its enlightened self-interest to exercise restraint and negotiate a stable peace; second, to persuade the south that negotiating now versus at some point in the future can best advance core southern interests.

Sudan’s exploitation of oil assets has created forced mass displacements and other gross human rights abuses that have drawn intense international criticism. If war persists, future exploitation of other promising energy fields in populated areas of the south will almost certainly involve more forced displacement and abuses. This will in turn trigger intensified media scrutiny and increased interventions by advocacy groups to disrupt access to capital markets by Sudan’s principal corporate partners, most notably Chinese, Malaysian and Canadian energy corporations, as well as newly arriving energy corporations from Sweden, France, Austria, and Qatar.

The Clinton administration’s policy of isolation and containment was a response to threats to U.S. national interests from Khartoum’s export of international terrorism in the early and mid-1990s. It was also grounded in moral outrage over the conduct of the war. While U.S. policy has generated some leverage over Khartoum, it has made little headway in ending Sudan’s war, reforming Khartoum, or ameliorating Sudan’s humanitarian crisis. U.S. policy did not match means to ends and fed the erroneous belief in Khartoum that the United States was committed covertly to the overthrow of the Sudanese government. These shortfalls in U.S. policy inadvertently benefited Khartoum, particularly after the United States bombed the El Shifa pharmaceutical factory in August 1998. If the Bush administration is to be effective in advancing U.S. interests in Sudan, it will need a significantly modified approach.

The Clinton administration stressed the aim of containing, isolating, and marginalizing Khartoum, in partnership with Sudan’s regional neighbors and through routine condemnation, high-level official meetings with opposition groups in East Africa, travel into southern Sudan, and bilateral and multilateral sanctions. A distant secondary goal was to end the war through support of peace talks held by the InterGovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), the regional body that demonstrated resolve in the early 1990s but thereafter became increasingly ineffectual and fragmented.

Throughout the Clinton era, ambiguities persisted over true U.S. intentions: whether the preeminent U.S. aim was to force a regime change, to press for reform of Khartoum, or achieve a sustainable end to Sudan’s war. The United States pursued these multiple ambitions simultaneously, with little attention paid to whether regime change was ever achievable or how to reconcile these diverse and seemingly contradictory policy aims. In the meantime, these ambiguities encouraged the mistaken belief in Khartoum that the United States was engaged in a covert war to overthrow the Sudanese government.

U.S. sanctions suspending bilateral development and military assistance automatically came into force following the June 1989 overthrow of the democratically
elected government of Sadiq Al Mahdi by the Sudanese military, led by General Bashir. In August 1993, the Clinton administration added Sudan to the list of states supporting terrorism, in reaction to credible evidence of international terrorist activity emanating from Sudanese territory. In April 1996, Washington supported the imposition of UN Security Council sanctions (UNSC Res. 1054) after Khartoum failed to cooperate in the extradition of suspects connected to the June 1995 assassination attempt on Egyptian president Mubarak (as laid out in UNSC Res. 1044). A subsequent UN ban on international flights by Sudan Airways was passed by the Security Council but was never implemented. Frustrated by Khartoum’s apparent intransigence, Washington imposed comprehensive trade sanctions on Sudan in December 1997. In late 2000, Congress and the Clinton administration agreed on exemptions to permit the sale of American medicine and agricultural products to Sudan.

The web of sanctions put in place by the Clinton administration did contribute to the increased isolation of Khartoum. Washington worked successfully to deny Sudan a seat on the UN Security Council in late 2000, blocked access to U.S. corporate investment and technology in the development of Sudan’s energy sector, and impeded Sudan’s full resumption of ties with international financial institutions (IFIs) and its ambition to have its macroeconomic situation reviewed before the Paris Club.

Ultimately, however, U.S. policy did not significantly weaken Khartoum, strengthen southern and northern opposition, moderate the conduct of Sudan’s war, enhance humanitarian access and deliveries, or promote a process of genuine peace negotiations. Instead, in the late 1990s, as neighboring states and European Union member states steadily normalized relations with Khartoum, the United States found itself in conspicuous self-isolation with effectively no partners.

Paradoxically, Washington’s rhetorical excesses, meetings with the leadership of the SPLM/A, and high-level visits into southern Sudan, unbacked by sufficient political will and material resources to meaningfully strengthen the south’s hand in its war against the north, ultimately played to Khartoum’s advantage. For every heavily advertised dollar of nonlethal assistance the United States provided Sudanese in rebel-controlled territory, Khartoum was reportedly able to leverage several dollars for its lethal campaigns against those same imperiled civilians. The August 1998 U.S. bombing of the El Shifa pharmaceutical factory worsened Khartoum’s paranoia and sense of grievance and enhanced the motivation of Middle Eastern states to underwrite Khartoum.

To alter the balance of power to affect either a regime change or a substantial strengthening of the south’s military hand, the United States would have to make a massive military and material investment. That option is neither advisable nor politically feasible in Washington. Realistically, only one viable course of action remains open: to pursue a hard-nosed strategy based on diplomacy, a mix of inducements and punitive measures, and multilateral initiatives.

The withdrawal of a full-time diplomatic presence at the U.S. embassy in early 1996 left Washington with weak information flows and no voice or platform to exert
its influence. In the past four years, there has been effectively no direct, sustained, tough engagement with Khartoum, although former under secretary Pickering periodically engaged with the Sudanese foreign minister, and Special Envoy Johnston made two trips to Khartoum for high-level consultations. Bilateral talks that began in March 2000 on terrorism generated early hopeful signs of progress and could be successfully concluded if there were sufficient political will in Khartoum.

❑ The United States today possesses significant leverage in regard to the Sudan crisis.

Among major powers, the United States is the lone holdout in renewing a dialogue with Khartoum. It is also the principal external backer, in humanitarian and diplomatic terms, of the southern Sudanese opposition. In combination, these create considerable inherent leverage.

By many accounts, Khartoum attaches considerable importance to the prestige of having normal relations with the world’s most powerful nation. And Khartoum cannot reacquire full legitimate standing in the international community until it has persuaded the United States to lift its bilateral sanctions, acquiesce to the lifting of UN Security Council sanctions, and support World Bank and IMF full renewed involvement in Sudanese affairs. Over the past two years, Khartoum has achieved macroeconomic stability: inflation is under control, the currency is stable, but that has been achieved at a cost of higher absolute poverty. Khartoum will not see the onset of IMF programs that could ease Sudan’s internal pressure until it has cleared its situation with the Paris Club. At present, Washington blocks a Paris Club consensus on Sudan.

Southern Sudanese rely on over $100 million per annum in U.S. humanitarian transfers. Opposition leaders have cultivated ties with key members of Congress and will not countenance serious reentry into negotiations unless confident of international protection and guarantees.

The central questions for the Bush administration are how to use its leverage, what specifically it seeks from Khartoum and the armed opposition, and what concerted action it is prepared to undertake with European allies and Sudan’s neighbors to press for a genuine peace process.

❑ Regional initiatives hold little promise for ending Sudan’s war. Although the IGAD peace initiative has had certain achievements on which any future initiatives should build, IGAD cannot be relied on to persuade Sudan’s warring principals to enter into serious negotiations. The Egypt/Libya initiative is essentially intended to checkmate IGAD, specifically on the issue of self-determination of the south. A new, robust extra-regional mediation agency is required if a credible peace process is to begin in Sudan.

IGAD’s signal achievement was the endorsement of the Declaration of Principles (DOP) in 1994. However, IGAD never reconciled the DOP’s endorsement of national unity with its commitment to the right of self-determination for the south. That ambiguity has bedeviled negotiations and stirred opposition to IGAD from Egypt and Libya, which in 1999 launched their own alternative regional
peace initiative, focused on reconciling internal northern Sudanese political interests. That process too has achieved little.

In the past three years, IGAD has barely existed as a regional entity, and infrequent Sudan peace talks chaired by Kenya show no evidence of progress. Today, Khartoum chairs IGAD.

The IGAD Partners Forum (IPF), comprising the United States, Norway, the UK, Italy, and others, provided substantial diplomatic and material support to the IGAD process. In frustration, its members now ponder next steps.

Recommendations

❑ The Bush administration should explicitly concentrate U.S. policy toward Sudan on the single, overriding objective of ending the war.

The essential consideration for U.S. foreign policy stakes in Sudan should be to end the war and achieve a just peace. This single clear goal provides the single best means to see positive change in the multiple other areas where U.S. interests are at stake: an end to mass human suffering; pervasive human rights abuses and denial of democratic liberties; economic decay; and the export of terrorism and proxy wars that destabilize the surrounding region. A singular focus on the war will not, of course, solve all of Sudan’s problems. Nor does it imply indifference to critical related concerns, such as the need for democratic governance in the north, including accommodation of marginalized northern groups, like the Nuba and Ingassana, who now fight alongside the southern armed opposition groups. Only when the war has ended will genuine progress in these areas become possible.

❑ The administration should pursue this goal through a disciplined, activist, multilateral strategy.

To be effective, the administration will need to maintain a sharp and consistent focus on ending the war through new multilateral initiatives. The agenda must be confined to manageable proportions. The administration should avoid cross-linkages with related essential reforms that excessively—and unrealistically—overload U.S. policy ambitions and invite policy paralysis. Any public diplomatic statements should be tied to leveraging the parties into serious sustained peace talks.

❑ A first priority should be establishing a new international nucleus dedicated to ending Sudan’s war.

Discreet consultations should begin immediately to identify select members of a nucleus that draws from among, for example, the UK, Norway, and Sudan’s neighbors.

The United States is essential to the establishment of an effective new core coalition. It can and should take a leadership position, although it need not be always on the front line. However, without a dedicated U.S. commitment to a determined international push for peace in Sudan, any new coalition will be hamstrung in its ability to leverage the parties and create momentum and a sense
of urgency. Hence, the United States should position itself to provide critical, active support to collaborative leadership involving others such as Norway and the UK. It is a pivotal partnership of this sort that offers the greatest promise of bringing heightened pressures and inducements to bear, so that the government of Sudan and the SPLM return in earnest to the bargaining table.

This effort will benefit considerably from regular, quiet consultations with the EU, Canada, and Secretary General Kofi Annan and his staff at the UN. Early on, it will also be important that the core coalition clarify its leadership, phasing of effort, venues, coordination modalities, and methods of outreach to other key parties. An especially delicate consideration will be winning support from key IGAD member states for a new, expanded international effort to promote peace in Sudan that effectively supersedes the moribund IGAD peace effort.

☐ The coalition should base negotiations on the Declaration of Principles and aim to win agreement on the creation of interim arrangements that preserve a single Sudan with two viable systems, north and south.

The Declaration of Principles outlines succinctly the core issues that must be addressed for there to be peace in Sudan. The DOP supports the right of the people of the south to self-determination but assigns priority to national unity. Ideally, unity is to be achieved through a secular and democratic state with legal guarantees of political equality, separation of state and religion, and a fair sharing of wealth and power among regions. After an interim period, the people of the southern Sudan could exercise their right to self-determination through a referendum.

Until 1997, the government of Sudan did not accept the DOP, even as the basis of negotiations. Since then, government negotiators continue to reject the contents of the DOP and present views that diverge from it. Any new international coalition should systematically build on this achievement by IGAD.

One feasible, pragmatic interpretation of the Declaration of Principles is that resolution of Sudan’s internal war can be realized through interim arrangements that give priority to a unified Sudan composed of two self-governing regions. A “One Sudan, Two Systems” formula gives unity a considerable advantage if it is implemented in good faith and with international guarantees; this formula enables the peoples of the north and south to establish their own legal political system according to their particular preferences and would prevent the governments of either region from impinging on the rights and powers of the other. The timing for the exercise of the right of self-determination in the form of a referendum can be calculated to allow time for the “One Sudan, Two Systems” to be tested and the results appraised.

For Sudan to enjoy durable peace, any permanent settlement arrangements will have to address the genuine grievances of other marginalized groups in the north, notably the Nuba and Ingassana.

☐ The negotiations will need to elaborate and bring into force carrots and sticks that effectively influence both Khartoum and the southern opposition.
To Khartoum: it will be critical to elaborate the argument that a negotiated, honorable settlement would permit resources now consumed for military purposes to be put toward domestic social and developmental ends. Further, it is the only path by which Khartoum can possibly achieve full legitimate standing internationally, enter beneficial relationships with the World Bank, IMF, and Paris Club, and enlarge exploration and production of oil fields free of the risk of a mounting international campaign against Sudan’s corporate oil partners. Conversely, if Khartoum rejects a negotiated way out of war, Sudan’s internal war will drag on interminably, owing to the depth of southern grievances and the south’s ability to sustain a guerrilla war. Washington, under these circumstances, will fiercely oppose normalization of Khartoum’s status, both in bilateral relations and access to multilateral institutions, and support measures that have punitive impacts on future development of Sudan’s oil sector and that sustain the south’s ability to withstand military subjugation.

To the Southern and Northern Opposition: it will be critical to elaborate an argument that more can be gained now, versus later, in terms of political and economic interests. The opposition is best positioned now to leverage heightened external pressures on Khartoum to compromise on interim arrangements; an interim settlement with strong international guarantees is indeed attainable under present circumstances, and the international community is poised to mobilize substantial support, materially and diplomatically, for the establishment of a viable, self-governing south. Conversely, if the southern opposition turns away from negotiations in pursuit of military aims, external political support will be put at risk.

As a critical element of this strategy, negotiators will also need to mobilize pressure by other key states—in Africa, Europe, and the Middle East—on both Khartoum and the opposition.

The negotiations will also need to give priority to the following:

- Pursuit of early confidence-building measures: for example, ceasefires, troop pullbacks, and actions to rein in militias; public statements that reaffirm common principles of governance in both north and south (e.g., accommodation of diversity, comprehensiveness, and inclusiveness; respect of human rights and democratic process; accountability); expanded humanitarian cooperation; and external monitors.
- Clarification of the north-south boundary. Some progress has been achieved in this area through the IGAD process.
- Definition of a revenue-sharing formula for oil, mineral wealth, and water rights. This might involve an escrow account and joint water use arrangements, under some form of international administrative oversight.
- Definition of powers for a robust self-governing north and south.
- Definition of residual central government powers and composition of the central government.
- International guarantees (e.g., peacekeepers, military and civilian observers, human rights monitors, and consulates).
At the outset of negotiations, the international coalition should initiate intensive international planning on the critical requirements for a self-governing south that explicitly identifies future sources of external support.

Sudanese experts should undertake this effort, with technical and financial support provided by the World Bank, United Nations Development Program (UNDP), the EU, USAID, and other bilateral donor agencies. It should examine administrative decentralization options; the structure of the southern economy and future export opportunities within the surrounding region; road, rail, and communications requirements to enhance internal and regional integration; and capacity building in the judiciary, police, electoral, education, and health administration. These analyses should be further developed through a series of international conferences that draw on the Bosnia, Kosovo, and West Bank/Gaza experiences.

Early consultations should take place with states whose oil corporations are engaged in Sudan.

Oil corporations from Canada, China, and Malaysia have sizable equities in exploration and production activities in Sudan. China and Malaysia also have other commercial stakes, including military sales. Corporations from Austria, France, Qatar, and Sweden are now increasingly engaged in the emergent next phase of development of Sudan’s oil sector.

Negotiators will need also to conduct regular consultations with nongovernmental interests—in Sudan, neighboring states, Europe, and North America.

Political support and concrete suggestions will be essential: from Sudanese civic organizations and religious bodies; international relief and development groups; and NGOs dedicated to human rights, conflict resolution, and monitoring of peace implementation.

In its first year, the new administration should also take several bilateral steps.

- Resume full operations of the U.S. embassy in Khartoum, including assignment of a senior talent as U.S. ambassador. This will require making the case forcefully that embassies exist to advance U.S. national interests, in friendly and unfriendly environments. All efforts should be made to strengthen embassy staff and Washington line officers. In addition, the Bush administration should see the compelling need to appoint a special envoy to conduct roving consultations in Europe, Africa, and the Middle East and sustain consultations with Capitol Hill and interest groups in Washington. That person should be high level and provided with the necessary authority, access, and financial support to make an effective difference (à la Northern Ireland, Bosnia, and Kosovo).
- Designate a senior-level lead contact with the SPLM and other southern interests. Engage early to explain evolving U.S. policy.
- Attempt to complete bilateral negotiations with Khartoum on terrorism.
- Sustain high-level consultations with Congress and interest groups.
- Intensify consultations and reporting on Sudan by relevant U.S. embassies in Africa, the Middle East, and Europe.

- Expand the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) program to support administrative capacity in the south (the STAR program), and coordinate with a World Bank/UNDP comprehensive planning exercise. Create an interagency task force to advance analysis and planning of a self-governing south and marginalized northern groups, for example, the Nuba and Ingassana. Urge the World Bank and UNDP to play a lead role in planning for a self-governing south.

- Press for a voluntary international arms embargo on all parties to the conflict.

- Accept the lifting of UN Security Council sanctions once the requisite conditions for their lifting have been satisfied.

- Review U.S. bilateral sanctions regularly in light of evolving actions by the government of Sudan. Link the lifting of sanctions and Paris Club consideration of Sudan to concrete, durable progress in the peace process.

**Conclusion**

The time has come for the United States, in league with others, to make a strong push to end Sudan’s war. A new administration is in place in Washington. Officials in Cairo, London, Oslo, Addis Ababa, Kampala, Ottawa, and the UN Secretariat in New York, among other places, have stepped back, taken stock of the demise of IGAD’s efforts and the shifting environment within Sudan and the surrounding region, and begun to ask what is required to renew the prospects for peace in Sudan. In this document, we have attempted to sketch an answer. Admittedly, it is little more than an outline of how Washington and others might proceed.

It will be difficult to achieve results. A first step will be impressing on the warring parties the urgency of demonstrating seriousness of intent. There will also be the need for external parties to operate systematically and patiently, aware that full results will likely only come in the medium to long term.

To varying degrees, the Sudanese themselves, along with their neighbors, have grown indifferent, cynical, or actively resistant to external peace efforts. Their calloused perceptions of what is possible and what is at stake, will have to be aggressively revivified through patient, sustained engagement.

Sudan’s 18-year war, the longest running internal conflict in the world, has created an abominable record of human suffering, loss of life, and societal damage. It has generated a massive, chronic humanitarian demand, met partly by the outside world through routine transfers of hundreds of millions of dollars worth of relief that have been detached from—and uninformed by—any broader external political strategy that might address the root causes of the war and give reason for hope. Now is the time to inject a new dynamism and a new determination in the search for a just peace.
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Sarah Skorupska  
*CSIS Africa Program*

Gare Smith  
*Foley, Hoag & Eliot LLP*

John Voll  
*Center for Muslim-Christian Understanding, Georgetown University*

Joseph C. Wilson IV  
*Rock Creek Corporation*

James L. Woods  
*Cohen and Woods International, Inc.*

I. William Zartman  
*School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University*

Vladimir Zhagora  
*United Nations*

**Presenters**

Elliott Abrams  
*Chair of U.S. Committee on International Religious Freedom, and Ethics and Public Policy Center (Religious persecution)*

L. Paul Bremer  
*Kissinger Associates, Inc. (Terrorism)*

James Burkhard  
*Cambridge Energy Research Associates (Energy/oil)*

Tom Crick  
*Carter Center (Carter Center-engineered Nairobi agreement between Sudan and Uganda)*

Alex de Waal  
*Justice Africa (Humanitarian/transitional assistance to southern Sudan)*

John Esposito  
*Georgetown University (Religious persecution)*

John Harker  
*(Humanitarian assistance)*

Robert S. Litwak  
*Woodrow Wilson Center (Evolving U.S. policy toward “states of concern”)*

Reg Manhas  
*Talisman Energy, Inc. (Oil)*

Meghan O’Sullivan  
*Brookings Institution (Evolving U.S. policy toward “states of concern”)*

Michael A. Sheehan  
*U.S. Department of State (Terrorism)*
Ambassador Tom Vraalsen  
*UN Envoy for Humanitarian Affairs in Sudan and Norwegian Ambassador to the United States (UN humanitarian assistance)*

I. William Zartman  
*School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University (Prospects for a negotiated settlement in Sudan)*

**Sudanese Attendees**

- Fabian Agamlong
- George Bouck  
  *Sudan Democratic Forum*
- Lual Deng
- Ahmed Elbashir
- Anis Haggar  
  *Haggar Foundation*
- Mohamad Khalil
About the Authors

FRANCIS M. DENG, distinguished professor at the City University of New York’s graduate center and senior nonresident fellow at the Brookings Institution, is also the special representative of the UN Secretary General on Internally Displaced Persons. He graduated with an LL.B. (Honors) from Khartoum University and pursued postgraduate studies in the United Kingdom and the United States, where he obtained an LL.M. and J.S.D. from Yale Law School in 1965 and 1968 respectively. In addition to several academic appointments in Sudan and the United States, Dr. Deng served as human rights officer in the United Nations Secretariat; as Sudan’s ambassador to Canada, the Scandinavian countries, and the United States; and as Sudanese minister of state for foreign affairs. Dr. Deng’s expertise lies in the areas of conflict management and resolution, human rights, regional conflict, internally displaced persons, Africa, and the Sudan. He has authored or edited more than 20 books in the fields of law, conflict resolution, human rights, anthropology, folklore, history, and politics; and has written two novels.

J. STEPHEN MORRISON, director of the CSIS Africa Program, has worked extensively on Sudan issues since the late 1980s, when he served as senior staff to the then House Foreign Affairs Africa Subcommittee. He joined CSIS in January 2000 from the Secretary of State’s Policy Planning Staff, where, for the previous four years, he was responsible for African affairs, including interagency deliberations on Sudan policy, and global foreign assistance issues. In 1999, he led the State Department’s initiative on illicit diamonds and chaired an interagency review of the U.S. government’s crisis humanitarian programs. He holds a Ph.D. in political science from the University of Wisconsin, has been an adjunct professor at Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies since 1994, and is a graduate magna cum laude from Yale College. During 1993–1995, at then USAID administrator J. Brian Atwood’s request, Morrison conceptualized and launched USAID’s Office of Transition Initiatives, where he served as its first deputy director, created post-conflict field programs in Angola and Bosnia, and worked on other programs in Rwanda and Haiti. From early 1992 until mid-1993 he served as the democracy and governance adviser to the USAID mission and U.S. embassies in Ethiopia and Eritrea.