Israel versus the Palestinians: The “Second Intifada” and Asymmetric Warfare

Working Draft

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Introduction

This report is a draft that expands upon the content of a chapter prepared for a book on the Arab-Israeli Balance to be published by Praeger in 2001. The reader should be aware that this text is being circulated for comment and will be extensively revised over time, and reflects the working views of the author and not the CSIS.
Acknowledgements

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**WORKING DRAFT**

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Copyright Anthony H. Cordesman, all rights reserved. No further reproduction is permitted without the author’s express written permission. Quotation or reference is permitted with proper attribution.
One of the many tragedies of the crisis between Israel and the Palestinians that began in late September 2000 is that a “second Intifada” has become a low intensity conflict in which a “war process” has replaced the peace process, and where politics have become an extension of war by other means. It is all too clear that the peace process is reversible, and that a “Second Intifada” has taken on the character of a highly lethal asymmetric war. In fact, the peace negotiations can fail entirely, or become locked in an explosive stalemate that could last for years.

The Second Intifada differs sharply from the first. If the first Intifada was largely a popular political uprising, in which stone throwing and sporadic acts of violence played a secondary role, the Second Intifada is dominated by escalating violence on each side. If the first Intifada was a struggle for recognition that a just peace had to be reached for both sides, the Second Intifada has polarized both sides in ways that support a continuing conflict. Asymmetric methods of conflict interact with asymmetric values and perceptions, convincing each side of the justice of its own goals and tactics and the fundamental injustice of the other side’s goal and tactics. The end result is an equally asymmetric attempt to escalate where each side has so far been provoked, rather than deterred, by the other side’s use of additional force.

Modern warfare has always been a struggle of ideas as well as a test of force, and there is nothing new about the fact that each side always sanctifies its own behavior and demonizes that of its opponent while it struggles for the support of its neighbors, neutrals, and world opinion. The Second Intifada does, however, illustrate that it is far more difficult for two sides that use different tactics to understanding the pressures that shape the other side’s military behavior, and the reasons behind it. It also illustrates that combat does not have to be intense, and casualties do not have to be high, for war to become extremely bitter.

If anything, the Second Intifada has shown that each step of escalation leads to further asymmetries in tactics, weapons, and targeting that convinces the opposing side that the other’s actions are not only immoral and illegitimate, but that it cannot be trusted to move back towards peace. At the same time, each side’s battle to win external political and military support pushes it...
to publicly attack the other, and to couple political weapons to military action. The struggle for political and media attention has pushed both Israel and the Palestinians to use human rights, international law, and civilian casualties as such political weapons. Each side’s casualties become martyrs while the civilian casualties and collateral damage inflicted on the other side is seen as legitimate or a necessary evil. “Terrorism” is used as a political weapon against “excessive force.” Suicide bombings are posed against F-16 strikes, and the Palestinian willingness to use such methods of attack has been matched against the willingness to maintain and expand the settlements. The history of a near century of conflict is parsed by each side to legitimize its actions, and international law is used to justify war rather than the search for peace.

Even the best outcome of the current war seems likely to be a tragedy for both sides. The best outcome is one in which they grudgingly return to positions similar to those raised at Camp David II, and reach compromises that remain unsatisfactory to both sides. Such a peace is nearly certain to be “cold,” and to involve the constant threat of violence from extremists and terrorists on both sides. It will leave a legacy of hatred and hundreds, if not thousands, of casualties that will take years to overcome. It is all too possible, however, that the “Second Intifada” may either last years, and leave both sides sadder, but not wiser, or result in an awkward and unstable end to open violence without a real peace and with continued terrorism and extremism.

**From Peace to War: The Rise and Fall of the Peace Talks**

The Second Intifada was shaped by the course of the peace negotiations, the security arrangements evolved under the Oslo Accords, and the history of tensions between the Palestinian Authority and Israel. There was nothing inevitable about the failure of these efforts, but the fact that they did fail has done much to shape the course of the fighting since September 2000.

**The Initial Framework for Peace**

The Security Annex of the September 1995 accords specified the commitment of Israel and the Palestinian Council to cooperate in the fight against terrorism and the prevention of terrorist attacks. It specifies that the Palestinian Police are the only Palestinian Security
Authority that it will act systematically against all expressions of violence and terror, and will arrest and prosecute individuals suspected of perpetuating acts of violence and terror. It specifies that the Palestinian Council will issue permits in order to legalize the possession and carrying of arms by civilians and that the Palestinian police will confiscate any illegal arms.

The September 1995 accords also began major trades of territory for peace on the West Bank that went far beyond the token control of Jericho the Palestinian Authority obtained in 1993. They divided the West Bank into three areas. The Palestinian Authority was to gradually acquire control over seven largely Palestinian cities and some 450 Palestinian towns. According to the accords,

- **Area A** included Jenin, Nablus, Tulkarm, Kalkilya, Ramallah, and Bethlehem. Special security arrangements were set up exist for Hebron, with one district largely under the authority of the Palestinian civil police and another -- where the Israeli settlers live -- under Israeli control. The Palestinian Council was given full responsibility for internal security and public order, as well as full civil responsibilities.

- **Area B** comprised roughly 450 Palestinian towns and villages of the West Bank. In these areas, which contained some 68% of the Palestinian population, the Palestinian Council was granted full civil authority as in Area A. As a result, the Palestinian Authority was to have authority over nearly 98% of the Palestinian population. The Council was to be charged with maintaining the public order, while Israel had overall security authority to safeguard its citizens and to combat terrorism. This responsibility was to take precedence over the Palestinian responsibility for public order. Twenty-five Palestinian police stations, each with 25-40 civil police, could be established in specified towns and villages to enable the Palestinian Authority to exercise its responsibility for public order. These included stations in Yamun, Meitalun, Kafr Ray, Jalqamus, and Burqin in the Jenin District; Asirat al-Shamaliyya, Talouza, Tell, Talfit, Tamun, and Aqraba in the Nablus District; Shuweika, Kafr Zibad, Anabta, and Illar in the Tulkarm and Qalqilya District, Tuq’oa in the Bethlehem District, and Yata, Dhahiriyaa, Nuba, Dura, and Bani Na’im in the Hebron District. The agreement contained provisions fixing the number of police at each station and requiring that the movement of the Palestinian police in Area B be coordinated and confirmed with Israel.

- **Area C** comprised about 68% to 70% of the West Bank, and included unpopulated areas, Jewish settlements, future Jewish settlement areas, strategic roads, strategic high points along the West Bank hill ridge, and areas used by the IDF such as military depots, deployment areas, early warning and intelligence facilities, and training areas. Israel was to retain full responsibility for security and public order. The Palestinian Council, however, was to assume all civil responsibilities not related to territory, such as economics, health, education, etc. in the parts of Area C that are eventually turned over to the Palestinian Authority.

The Wye agreement of 1998 called for Israel to transfer 13% of Area C (full Israeli control) to the Palestinians, with 1% going to Area A (full Palestinian control) and 12% going to Area B (joint control). Further, it called on Israel to transfer 14.2% of Area B to Area A. These transfers were to take place in three stages.
Early progress was rapid. According to the original schedule agreed to in September 1995, the Palestinian Authority was to take over in Jenin on February 11, 1996, in Tulkarm on February 18, in Nablus on February 25, in Qalqilyah on March 3, in Ramallah on March 10, in Bethlehem on March 17, and in Hebron on March 24. The entire Israeli withdrawal was to be completed by March 24, 1996. In the course of these redeployments, additional parts of Area C were to be transferred to the jurisdiction of the Palestinian Council, so that by the completion of the redeployment phases Palestinian territorial jurisdiction would cover West Bank territory, except for areas where the jurisdiction is to be determined by the final status negotiations (settlements, military locations, etc.).

Peace, however, is made between friends not enemies. The PLO did not make a concerted effort to reject violence or educate its people to accept a realistic peace. Its transformation into the Palestinian Authority could not quickly create anti-terrorism forces or change a violent, authoritarian liberation movement into a de facto government that was moderate, and democratic, and respected the rule of law. The Israeli government failed to halt or roll back the settlements, and realistically address critical issues like Jerusalem. Extremists on both sides opposed the peace process. Movements like Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad turned to terrorist attacks designed to shatter the peace process while Israeli extremists turned to violent attacks on Israel’s leaders.

Rabin’s Assassination and the Impact of Netanyahu

The assassination of Prime Minister Rabin by an Israeli extremist on November 4, 1995 deprived the peace process of one of its most important leaders, and was perhaps the seminal act of terrorism that delayed progress in moving towards a final settlement. Partly as a result of the assassination of Prime Minister Rabin, Israel speeded up its withdrawals from Jenin, Bethlehem, Tulkarm, Nablus, and Qalqilya. Virtually all of the transfers in Areas A and B were completed by early January 1996.

After that time, however, the election of Netanyahu as Prime Minister slowed and then sometimes halted the withdrawals, while Israel expanded its settlements and did little to help the
Palestinians develop an effective economy. Aid flowed to Arafat and his supporters, but little was done by either Israel or the Palestinian Authority to give the Palestinians a meaningful peace dividend or reassure them that a “final settlement” would really bring a just peace. Netanyahu completed the first stage of the Wye Accords, withdrawing from approximately one percent of the West Bank. However, when this triggered a revolt in his hard-line coalition, he froze the agreements, claiming the Palestinians had not upheld their end of the agreement. As a result, Israel completed only the first stage of the transfers, moving 2% from Area C to Area A, and 7.1% from Area B to Area A, before it froze further withdrawals.

Although this was not specified in the various accords, the IDF seems to have planned to retain the right to set up checkpoints and roadblocks around Palestinian cities and villages. The September 1995 accords also call for the PLO to revoke those articles of the Palestinian Covenant calling for the destruction of Israel within two months of the inauguration of the Palestinian Council. The Palestinians claim to have taken major steps in this direction in 1998, but their actions still do not satisfy Israel.

The Wye Agreement of 1998

The near breakdown in the peace process, which began in 1996 during Netanyahu’s term in office, then led to a major new US negotiating effort that resulted in the Wye agreement of 1998, signed in Washington D.C. on October 23, 1998. The Wye agreement called for Israel to resume withdrawals in return for Palestinian concessions relating to timing and security. It called for greater cooperation among the Palestinian security forces in the crackdown against terrorism, an Israeli troop redeployment from an additional thirteen percent of the West Bank (to take place within a ninety day period), and a transfer of more than fourteen percent of jointly controlled land to full Palestinian control. Also included in the memorandum are such elements as the opening of a Palestinian airport in Gaza, the guarantee of two corridors of safe passage between Gaza and the West Bank, and a third Israeli troop redeployment from the West Bank.

The agreement also called for Israel to remove a number of military camps, including Fahme, Bezek, Sanur, and Majnounei, and Nahal Ginat. The agreement called for new Israeli
bases to be constructed, but each was to be smaller in size than the ones they replaced. Newspaper reports stated that several small bases would be established throughout the West Bank, particularly near isolated settlements in the heart of Palestinian areas without an army base nearby. These camps were to separate the territory under Palestinian control from the settlements.\(^6\) The Wye agreement also called for the withdrawal of Israeli troops from roughly thirteen percent of the West Bank in exchange for specific security actions by the Palestinian Authority, in particular cracking down on terrorist groups.\(^7\)

**The Sharm el-Sheikh Memorandum of September 4, 1999**

The failure to fully implement the Wye agreement was one of the factors that eventually led to the collapse of Netanyahu’s government.\(^8\) Netanyahu was defeated in May 1999, and the new Prime Minister, Ehud Barak, was elected in a landslide victory. His commitment to the peace process was a major factor leading to the Sharm el Sheikh Memorandum of September 4, 1999, in which Israel and the Palestinian Authority agreed that Israel would resume its withdrawals according to a new schedule.

- Israel was to transfer 7% from Area C under full Israeli control to Area B under joint control between September 11 and 13, 1999. (Israel completed the transfer on September 10, 1999).
- The Palestinian Authority was to report on the collection of illegal weapons and arrested terrorist suspects on October 15, 1999.
- Israel was to transfer 2% from Area B under joint control to Area A under full Palestinian control, and 3% from Area C under full Israeli control to Area B on November 15, 1999.
- Israeli was to transfer 1% from Area C under full Israeli control to Area A under full Palestinian control, and 5.1% from Area B under joint control to Area A, on January 20, 1999.
- The target date for the completion of final agreement is September 13, 2000. (The original deadline set in the Oslo Agreement of September 13, 1993 was May 4, 1999.)

In return, the Palestinians agreed to implement an effective legal framework to criminalize the importation, manufacturing, or unlicensed sale, acquisition or possession of firearms, ammunition, or weapons in Palestinian-controlled areas.

If one examines the actual history of territorial transfer in terms of percentages, Oslo II put 2% of the West Bank in Area A (Palestinian military and civil control), 26% in Area B
(Palestinian civil control and Israeli military control), and 72% in Area C (Israeli military and civil control.) The first Sharm el-Sheikh agreement raised the percentage to 9.1%, 27.9%, and 70% respectively. The Second Sharm el-Sheikh agreement raised the percentages to 11.1%, 28.9%, and 60%, and a third Sharm el-Sheikh agreement on March 21, 2000 raised the percentages so that 17.2% of the West Bank was under Palestinian military and civil control), 23.8% was under Palestinian civil control and Israeli military control, and 59% was under Israeli military and civil control. While these percentage increases were important, and left only about 40,000 Palestinians in Area C, they still left the West Bank deeply divided.

Israel and the Palestinians signed another agreement affecting Palestinian-Israeli security on October 5, 1999. This agreement established a “safe passage” corridor along a 44-kilometer (27-mile) route using Israeli roads between Gaza and the southern part of the West Bank near Hebron. A second route, between Gaza and the northern part of the West Bank was to open in late January 2000. The agreement was signed by Shlomo Ben-Ami, the Israeli Public Security Minister, and Jamil Tarifi, the Palestinian Civil Affairs Minister, and came after weeks of hard negotiating over what Israel saw as a major security risk. The agreement also involved a compromise in which Palestinians would apply to the Palestinian Authority for transit cards, rather than Israel, but Israel would have the final authority over the list of approved applicants forwarded by the Palestinian Authority.9

The Israeli cabinet approved the hand-over of a further 6.1 percent of the West Bank on March 19, 2000, with 5.1 percent of the West Bank handed over to total Palestinian control. In the remaining one percent, the Palestinians will have administrative control while Israel will retain responsibility for security. This put 39.8% under full or partial Palestinian control. The 39.8 percent was divided roughly equally between full and partial self-rule. Some 60 percent of West Bank Palestinians will be living in areas under full Palestinian control after this step, and this will include all major Palestinian cities and towns. The towns to come under full self-rule included Salfit, Beitounia, Halhoul, Yatta, Dura and Dahariyah. A bridge between Hebron and Halhoul was put under full Palestinian control, but the highway over which the bridge crosses will remain under full Israeli control. No areas adjacent to Jerusalem were handed over in the withdrawal.10 Prime Minister Barak talked later about building an elevated superhighway between Gaza and the West Bank to provide secure, high speed, high volume access between the two sectors.
At the same time, the rate of expansion of the Israeli settlements actually rose under Barak. Like Rabin, Barak seems to have calculated that this did matter because the outlying settlements in the West Bank and Gaza would eventually be withdrawn, and the expansion of settlements in the greater Jerusalem area and near other parts of the 1967 dividing line would be made part of Israel. Barak also gave priority to peace with Syria because of the IDF’s deteriorating position in Lebanon, and the need to capitalize on his political mandate to negotiate over the Golan. Like his predecessors, he paid little more than lip service to helping the Palestinian people achieve a better economy, and talked far more about separating the two peoples than creating some form of partnership. Arafat, in turn, did little to persuade the Palestinian people to reject violence as an option, and his use of aid, mixed with nepotism and corruption, added to popular Palestinian frustration and anger.

**The Camp David Meetings in July 2000**

Between July 11 and July 24, U.S., Israeli, and Palestinian delegations led by President Clinton, Prime Minister Barak, and Chairman Arafat gathered at Camp David to attempt to reach an agreement on final status issues. Barak offered the Palestinians partial sovereignty over East Jerusalem in exchange for broadening the geographical boundaries of the city to include a number of Jewish settlements. On July 25, the parties issued a trilateral statement declaring that they were unable to bridge the gaps.

Israelis and Palestinians subsequently blamed the other party for the failure of the talks. Barak issued a statement saying that “Arafat was afraid to make the historic decisions necessary.” Following the summit, Israelis charged that Palestinian inflexibility, “in particular the positions presented by…Arafat with regard to Jerusalem, prevented the achievement of an agreement.” It also blamed the “the leadership of the Arab world [who] did not provide Arafat with sufficient backing for a more flexible stance.”

Statements by Palestinian leaders confirmed that Jerusalem was indeed a bone of contention, although there had also been disagreements on other issues, such as Palestinian refugees. Mahmoud Abbas (Abu Mazen) said on July 29th that “the Palestinian negotiators are
not willing to sign an agreement that does not include Jerusalem or one which does not preserve [Palestinian] rights in the city as they were in June 1967.” On the refugee issue, Abu Mazen added that “the Palestinian delegation refused to set a certain number for refugees that would be allowed to return, even if they offered three million refugees. We told them (Israelis) that we want them to recognize the principle (the right of return).”\textsuperscript{13} Other Palestinian leaders echoed Mazen’s reaction, including Hanan Ashrawi and Nabil Sha’ath, both of whom said that the Israeli position at the Camp David II talks fell far short of the minimum acceptable to Palestinians.\textsuperscript{14}

\textbf{The Beginning of the Second Intifada}

The Camp David II talks were the last major Israeli-Palestinian negotiation effort before the Second Intifada broke out in late September 2000. The chronology of what happened after the Camp David II meeting in July and November 2000 is presented in Table One. It is long and complex, but it is dangerous to ignore the details. It shows all too clearly how quickly a peace process can turn to war, how the military and political events in asymmetric warfare can fuel a process of escalation that becomes increasingly difficult to halt; and how each side blamed the other while proceeding to escalate or sustain the conflict.

\begin{table}[h]
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\begin{tabular}{|l|}
\hline
\textbf{2000} & \\
\hline
July 11 - President Clinton launches a peace summit with Palestinian Authority Chairman Yasser Arafat and Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak at Camp David. Both sides make progress in compromising on the final settlement issues, seeking to meet a September 13 deadline for a peace agreement. & \\
\hline
July 25 – The Camp David summit ends after 15 days without an agreement. The fate of Jerusalem and Palestinian refugees are the main obstacles. Palestinians want Arab East Jerusalem as the capital of their planned state. Israel, which seized East Jerusalem in the 1967 war, regards it as its indivisible capital. & \\
\hline
July 29 - Arafat begins visits to foreign states in an effort to gain support for the Palestinian position. Many Arab states support his refusal to make concessions over Jerusalem, but many Arab and Western leaders urge him not to declare a Palestinian state before reaching a peace deal with Israel. & \\
\hline
September 6 - Clinton fails to resolve the differences between Barak and Arafat during his separate meetings with the leaders during the UN Millennium Summit in New York. & \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\caption{The Second Intifada: A Chronology}
\end{table}

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• September 10 - The 129-member Palestinian parliament decides to delay the planned declaration of a Palestinian state, saying this will allow more time to reach a peace deal. It says it will meet to consider the matter again by November 15.

• September 13 - Israelis and Palestinians fail to meet a deadline they had agreed for reaching a peace deal.

• September 27 - An Israeli soldier is killed by a roadside bomb in Palestinian-ruled Gaza.

• September 28 - A visit by right-wing Israeli leader Ariel Sharon to the al-Aqsa mosque and the Temple Mount, a holy site in Jerusalem sacred to both Jews and Muslims, leads to major clashes between Palestinian protesters and Israeli security forces. Dozens of police and several Palestinians are injured.

• September 29 - Palestinians clash with Israeli security forces. The Israelis open fire with rubber-coated metal bullets in the al-Aqsa mosque compound in Jerusalem's walled Old City. Six Palestinians killed and close to 200 wounded.

• September 30 - Major clashes erupt in the Gaza Strip and West Bank. Fatah Hawks, Hamas, and Palestinian Islamic Jihad supporters, as well as some Palestinian Authority security personnel, join in mass violence and stone throwing against the IDF. Fourteen Palestinians killed by Israeli fire, including 12-year-old Mohammed Aldura, whose death is broadcast around the world (the IDF would first contend that his death was accidental, and later would revise its position claiming that Palestinians may have shot Mohammed Aldura for sympathy purposes). Scattered sniping by Palestinians.

• October 1 - Clashes erupt between Israeli Arabs and Jews in Umm al-Fahem and Arab-populated towns in northern Israel. Cease-fire agreed on but collapses. Twelve killed, including an Israeli border policeman who bleeds to death inside Joseph’s Tomb in West Bank city of Nablus as Palestinian gunmen keep medics away.

• October 2 - 19 are killed. Israeli Arabs protest in solidarity with Palestinians. Israelis are barred from travel in Palestinian territories.

• October 3 – There are reports of another cease-fire agreement. Clashes resume, and six are killed

• October 4 - Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak and Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat meet U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright and French President Jacques Chirac in Paris. Arafat declines to sign an agreement because of a failure to agree on terms for an international inquiry or fact-finding mission into the violence. Both sides order military forces away from flashpoints. Seven killed.

• October 5 - Arafat attends talks with Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak and US Secretary of State Madeline Albright, but Barak sees no point in going to the talks because of Arafat's refusal to sign the agreement in Paris. Israeli tanks move back from positions in West Bank. Three killed.

• October 5 - Malaysia presents a draft UN resolution condemning the violence committed by Israeli security forces. The UN Security Council adopts a modified resolution condemning Israel's "excessive use of force" against the Palestinians. The United States abstains. Barak says the Palestinians must end their wave of protests within two days or Israel will consider the peace process dead.

• October 6 - Israel seals West Bank and Gaza Strip as the Palestinians declare a ‘Day of Rage.’ Israeli troops seize a Jerusalem shrine after the Palestinians raise their flag. One killed in clash with police outside the shrine, nine die in West Bank and Gaza.
October 7 – The UN Security Council adopts a resolution condemning Israel’s use of force against the Palestinians. Confrontations take place on the Israeli-Lebanese border and Lebanese guerrilla group Hizbollah seizes three Israeli soldiers in cross-border raid. The guerrillas used a vehicle and uniforms with fake UN markings and flags. These were most likely obtained at one of the many souvenir shops in Lebanon. Under pressure to respond, Barak issues a 48-hour ultimatum for the Palestinian to halt their assaults on Israeli military outposts and civilian settlements, threatening to direct the IDF and the security forces to use all means at their disposal to halt the violence, should the PA fail to comply.

October 8 Israeli forces blow up two apartment buildings and a factory building in Gaza used by Palestinian gunmen. Jewish settler Hillel Lieberman is found dead in a cave near a West Bank highway. Two Palestinians and one Israeli Arab killed.

October 9 - Secretary-General Kofi Annan and Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov travel to the region for meetings with Israeli and Palestinian officials and crisis talks with Barak and Arafat. Clashes in Jerusalem, Nazareth and Hebron continue through Yom Kippur. Barak’s 48-hour deadline is extended to avoid a prolonged armed conflict. Violence between Israeli Arabs and Jews erupts across the country. Three Palestinians killed.

October 10 - Barak says it is too early to tell whether a slight fall in level of violence is enough to resume negotiations. A 12-year-old Palestinian boy, Mohammad al-Dura, is shot in the head in Gaza, while rioting continues in the West Bank.

October 11 - Violence continues, as does diplomatic activity. An effigy of Barak is burned at a Palestinian march in Hebron. Israelis and Palestinians exchange gunfire in cities, villages and along West Bank highways. Three Palestinians killed.

October 12 – a Palestinian mob kills two Israeli soldiers inside a Palestinian police station in Ramallah, and throws one of their bodies out the window in front of television cameras. Israeli helicopters rocket Palestinian targets including Yasser Arafat’s residential compound, police stations and broadcasting centers. The 12-year-old boy shot on October 10th dies.

October 13 - Israeli security forces and Palestinians fight in sporadic clashes. Annan intensifies peace efforts, says he expects a summit in 48 hours. Palestinians staged marches across the West Bank and Israel prevents Muslims under the age of 45 from participating in Friday prayers at Jerusalem’s al-Aqsa mosque. Efforts continue to bring Barak and Arafat together for a summit. Two Palestinians killed in clashes in Hebron, West Bank. Palestinian State Television broadcasts an inflammatory sermon instructing Palestinians: “Wherever you are, wherever you find them (Jews), kill them.”

October 14 - Barak and Arafat agree to attend a summit meeting in Sharm el-Sheikh. Clinton says he will also attend, with Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak, Annan and European Union foreign policy representative Javier Solana. Clashes in West Bank and Gaza Strip are isolated.

October 14, - Hizbollah says it has lured an Israeli intelligence officer and reserve colonel into Lebanon and has taken him captive. Low-level violence continues in the West Bank and Gaza Strip.

October 16 - Arafat joins Barak, Clinton, President Mubarak, and King Abdullah in Jordan for a summit meeting in Sharm el-Sheikh in a bid to end the violence. Low-level violence continues in the West Bank and Gaza Strip.

October 17 - Clinton announces at the end of the summit that both sides have agreed to halt violence, set up an inquiry into its causes and explore a return to peace negotiations. The sides should "take immediate,
concrete measures" to end the 19-day conflict, which has killed more than 100 people, mostly Palestinians, and endangered once promising peace negotiations. The measures include immediate statements from Arafat and Barak urging an end to violence, elimination of points of friction, redeployment of Israeli forces, an end to incitement, restoration of security cooperation between the two sides and a lifting of an Israeli closure of Palestinian towns that has kept residents confined there during the violence. But the "statement of understandings" read out by Clinton is a report on oral undertakings that officials said were not put on paper. It includes no specifics about what is supposed to happen--or in what order--leaving it uncertain whether the two struggling leaders left the summit at this Egyptian resort with the same set of expectations about what they had committed to do.

- October 18 – Neither Barak nor Arafat announces the details of his position on the agreement. Arafat has the Palestinian Authority issue statements but personally remains silence. The IDF does ease constraints on Palestinian movement, but tensions only ease moderately. Sporadic violence continues.

- October 19 – Marwan Barghouti, the head of the Fatah movement on the West Bank, says that the Fatah armed militia or Tanzim, will continue the struggle against Israel in spite of the Sharm el-Sheikh agreement.

- October 20 – Arab leaders arrive in Cairo for summit meeting. Fighting leaves as many as 10 Palestinians dead. Barak threatens to suspend the peace process. The UN General Assembly resolution condenms Israel for the "excessive use of force." The non-binding resolution is adopted with only 92 votes in favor - an unusually low number for resolutions on the Middle East. Six countries vote "no" votes, and 46 countries abstain. Some 30 countries don't vote at all. The resolution was the third adopted by the United Nations since the violence began on September 28th, following a similar one in the Security Council. The Israeli Foreign Ministry calls the resolution "completely one-sided," saying it ignores the mob killing of two Israeli soldiers and the desecration of Jewish holy sites in Nablus and Jericho.

- October 21 – Arab leaders at the summit in Cairo condemn Israeli violence, but call for pressure on Israel to support the peace process on Palestinian terms. Libya walks out. Iraq condemns moderation. Crown Prince Abdullah of Saudi Arabia calls for $1 billion in aid to Palestinians, and offers $250 million. Voice of Palestine radio and television switches to simultaneous FM transmission on several frequencies, after having its primary transmitter destroyed by Israeli retaliatory strikes following the mob killings of two Israeli soldiers. reaching an even larger audiences. These transmissions frequently show clashes between Israeli forces and Palestinian young people, as well as eulogies for Palestinians who have died fighting for the cause.

- October 22 – The final statement of the Arab League condemns Israel: “The Arab leaders confirm that the Al-Aqsa Intifada erupted as a result of continuing occupation and the Israeli violation of Haram al Sharif, and the rest of the Islamic and Christian holy sites in the Palestinian land… They also affirm the Palestinian people's right to just compensation from Israel for moral, human and material losses… Arab leaders demand forming a neutral international committee in the framework of the United Nations that will report to the Security Council, and the Human Rights Committee, on the reasons and the responsibility for the dangerous deterioration in the occupied Palestinian Land, and the massacres committed by the Israeli occupying forces… They also ask that the Security Council and General Assembly take charge of providing protection for the Palestinian people under Israeli occupation, through discussing forming a force or any international presence for this purpose. …Arab Leaders affirm that Arab nations shall pursue, in accordance with international law, those responsible for these brutal practices and demand that the Security Council form an international tribunal dedicated to trying Israeli criminals of war who committed massacres against the Palestinians and the Arabs in the occupied land like the former tribunal formed for criminals of war in Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia. … Arab leaders express their deep resentment and depreciation of the Israeli escalation in aggression and its provocation in a time when the region was getting
ready for comprehensive and just peace, especially after the Arabs decided since the Madrid conference that a comprehensive and just peace is their option and opens the way for a final settlement. . . . Arab leaders affirm that a comprehensive and just peace shall not be achieved without the return of Jerusalem to Palestinian sovereignty and without granting the Palestinians legitimate rights including the founding of an independent state with Jerusalem as its capital. . . . And without restoring all Arab land occupied, including a full Israeli withdrawal from the West Bank and Gaza and from Golan to the borders of June 4, 1967, and the completion of the Israeli withdrawal from southern Lebanon to the international borders including Shabaa plantation. And without the release of Arab prisoners held in the Israeli prisons. . . . Arab leaders affirm that achieving durable peace and security in the region requires Israeli accession to the nuclear non-proliferation treaty. And to submit all Israeli nuclear installations to international inspection system. They stress the importance of making the Middle East free of nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction.

Barak is quoted as saying at the weekly cabinet session: "We will have to take a time-out whose purpose is to reassess the peace process in response to the events of recent weeks." Barak says Israel needs a time-out from peacemaking with the Palestinians because the emergency Arab summit used what he called threatening language against Israel. “Israel totally rejects the language of threats that came out of the summit and condemns the call, folded into the decisions, for continued violence… we will have to take a time-out whose purpose is to reassess the peace process in response to the events of recent weeks " Israeli government spokesman Nachman Shai acknowledges to reporters that taking a time-out from peacemaking could bring about negotiations between Barak and right-wing opposition leader Ariel Sharon to form a national emergency government.

Arafat responds by saying that Barak's decision is no surprise and anyone blocking the Palestinian path to an independent state with Jerusalem as its capital can "go to hell." President Clinton, calls Barak to urge him "to get past the violence and ultimately get back to the peace process," Four Palestinians, including a 14-year-old, are killed in clashes with Israeli forces in the West Bank and Gaza Strip bringing the number of dead in three weeks of bloodshed to 125, of which only eight are Israelis. Shooting takes place in the outskirts of Jerusalem, where police said at least 12 Israeli apartment buildings on West Bank territory were raked by gunfire from Beit Jalla village near Bethlehem. No one was hurt. Israeli attack helicopters fired machineguns at targets in the village in response. Israeli Army Radio says several Palestinians are wounded. Arab leaders end the summit in Cairo by calling for a war crimes tribunal to investigate Israel's handling of the crisis: "Arab states will prosecute according to international law those who caused these barbaric practices and demand that the Security Council form a special international criminal court to try Israeli war criminals." Tunisia severs its low-level diplomatic relations with Israel.

- October 23 – Israeli army imposes a blockade on Beit Jalla, a Palestinian town from which machine guns were fired Sunday night into the nearby Jerusalem neighborhood of Gilo. The army responds with machine-gun fire from tanks and infantry and missiles fired from attack helicopters. A factory in Beit Jalla was destroyed and Beit Jalla and Bethlehem were plunged into darkness. Hundreds of civilians fled from Beit Jalla and the nearby Aida refugee camp. Gilo has repeatedly come under fire from Beit Jalla. On Sunday night, Palestinian gunmen fired at streets that had not been hit before. Nobody is hurt but 16 apartments were damaged. Lt. Gen. Shaul Mofaz, the army chief of staff, says “If they make it impossible to conduct a normal life on the Israeli side I do not think we can tolerate such a situation,” Mofaz said the blockade was imposed to block the entry of armed Palestinian militants into Beit Jalla. The army said neighboring Bethlehem would not be sealed. Palestinians attacked Israeli army positions and bases in both regions. These attacks were also intended as a deterrent to future violence from the city, the Palestinians contend that there were no hostile armed forces in Beit Jalla. The Israeli army spokesman says a Palestinian shooting attack on an Israeli army position in the southern Gaza Strip was "massive." The Israelis respond with small arms and anti-tank rockets.

Syrian spokesmen attack Barak’s decision to take time out to reassess the peace process. One Syrian official says, “The peace process is in fact frozen. Barak is not a man of peace...He does not want peace
and his call for a time-out is only a meaningless threat. Sharon's provocative visit to the holy Al-Aqsa Mosque in Jerusalem which came in full coordination with Barak, and with his blessing, proves that the Israeli premier does not care about peace and that he does not care about the feelings of Arabs and Muslims.”

- October 24- Palestinian killed in Hebron, Israel claims that the man was part of the Tanzim militia, the Palestinian authority claims that he was simply a bystander. Additionally, 3 Palestinian teenagers were killed in fighting in the West Bank and Gaza.

Arafat gives Palestinian Islamic Jihad and Hamas leadership decision-making authority in the Palestinian National Authority and al-Fatah by placing them on the High Committee of the Follow-Up Intifada of Nationalist Islamic Organizations.

- October 25- Sporadic violence continues, President Clinton states that Arafat could dramatically lower the level of violence if he so chooses. Gun sales in Israel are reported to have increased threefold and weapons training courses have increased by five times in the last month. Polls in Israel reveal that most Israeli citizens believe that the army has so far showed restraints in its dealings with the Palestinian protesters.

US House of Representatives passes a resolution (365-30) of support of Israel, while condemning both the use of force by both sides and blaming the Palestinian leadership for the recent outbreak of violence.

Israel releases its rules of engagement: Tear gas and stun grenades are used first. Should these fail to disperse the protest rubber-coated metal bullets are used, which are supposed to be shot at the lower body from a distance of 25 meters or more. Live ammunition is used in response to firebombs, shooting at the lower body and when encountering shooting and/or grenades Israeli soldiers will shoot to kill.

- October 26- The Palestinian Islamic Jihad claims credit for a suicide bombing of an Israeli Army post in Gaza killing the bomber and wounding an Israeli soldier. It was carried out on the fifth anniversary of the assignation of the group’s leader, Fathi Shiqaqi, although the PIJ claimed it was only a coincidence. The PIJ also renewed its pledge to liberate all of Palestine, not just the West Bank and Gaza, therefore their attacks would not be confined to the occupied territories in the future.

A low intensity cyber-conflict develops when Israel teenagers brag that they sabotaged the Hezbollah web site by placing Israeli flags, posting Zionist articles and having the site play the Israeli national anthem when a user logs on. Soon after the Israeli Defense Forces and the Prime Minister’s web site was crashed after being bombarded by a huge number of emails. The Knesset web site had files tampered with by hackers, possibly from Saudi Arabia.

Praising Morocco’s decision to sever ties with Israel, the Secretary General of the Arab League Arab League Ismat Abdul Miguid called on all Arab states which have relations with Israel to cut these relations. He, however, stressed that each nation had the right to make its own decisions about its foreign relations.

- October 27- Sporadic fighting continues, Hezbollah calls for more bombings like that of the PIJ bombing the previous day.

- October 28- One month anniversary of Ariel Sharon’s visit to Temple Mount/Haram al-Sharif, to date 149 dead, the vast majority being Palestinian. Sporadic fighting continues with heavier fighting near Beit Jalla after Israeli forces began to take small arms fire. Israeli helicopter and armor support were called upon to suppress the fire.
Talks between Ariel Sharon and Ehud Barak to form a national unity government fall apart. Recent polls in Israel demonstrate a declining popularity of both leaders, while having increased support for Benjamin Netanyahu.

- October 29- Five Palestinians are killed in on-going fighting. Israel deploys armor to the Gaza Strip. Al-Fatah urges the Palestinian people to “continue and escalate the Intifada.”

- October 30- Two Israelis are killed; both were armed civilians in the greater Jerusalem area. Several Palestinians are wounded in continuing clashes.

Israeli Defense Forces admit that lethal force may have been inappropriately used in the deaths of 2 brothers in the West Bank. The brothers may have been simply throwing rocks and Israeli rules of engagement require that there be immediate danger to military or civilian lives.

Barak’s government does not collapse, despite efforts of Ariel Sharon after the Shas party announces that it would not use its block of votes for a no-confidence vote against Barak. This leaves Barak with a minority government of 30 MPs in a 120 seat Knesset.

Israeli helicopters launch a series of strikes against al-Fatah headquarters installations. Rather than being retaliatory in nature, these were initiated to send a message to al-Fatah. These represent a change in Israeli tactics according to Deputy Defense Minister Ephraim Sneh to “more sophisticate measures” and strikes will no longer necessarily be retaliatory in nature. The air strike against the al-Fatah office in El-Bireh in the West Bank missed and hit a Palestinian home.

New more aggressive attacks are authorized for the IDF land forces, these allow specialized anti-guerilla units to operate and capture suspects in shooting incidents in Palestinian controlled areas.

- October 31- Six Palestinians die in fresh fighting in Gaza. Palestinian forces from al-Fatah and Tanzim make use of anti-tank weapons for the first time. Israel forces responded with heavy machine gun fire and by bulldozing the al-Fatah outpost with military bulldozers.

Israel begins to fortify Jewish towns within Israel against possible Arab attack.

- November 1- Three Israeli soldiers are killed in fighting the West Bank near Bethlehem and Jericho, Israel begins retaliatory strikes. These damage a casino and the Palestinian training facilities in Jericho. The settlement of Gilo near Beit Jalla comes under the heaviest fire since the violence began

Negotiation between Shimon Peres and Yasser Arafat yields a truce despite heavy fighting. Israeli forces are to withdraw from their positions at dawn on November 2.

- November 2- A car bomb explodes in the Jerusalem marketplace killing two, the PIJ claims responsibility. This blast kills the daughter of National Religious Party leader Rabbi Yitzhak Levy.

Israel tanks begin to withdraw from positions in the occupied territories.

- November 3- 2 Palestinians die amid new clashes, however, the overall number of clashes declines.

The web-site of the American-Israeli Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) is hacked 3,500 credit card numbers are stolen, this spreads the low-intensity cyber-conflict to America.
November 4- Sporadic clashes continues. Two Palestinians die, one is a 14-year-old girl who dies due to previously sustained gunshot wounds; the other is a baby who dies of tear gas inhalation. Palestinian and Israeli leaders both announce that they are ready to meet with Clinton to end the violence.

November 5- Al-Fatah leadership declares that the Intifada should continue and there cannot be any negotiations. Two Palestinians are killed in renewed clashes. Two Israeli settlers were killed near Ramallah.

IDF sources report an increased targeting of settlements and IDF soldiers by Palestinian gunmen, however Arafat orders that gunmen take a reduced role in the rock-throwing segments of the uprising.

November 6- Two Palestinians die in continuing clashes. Barak rejects Arafat’s call for an international peacekeeping force

November 7- One Palestinian died when a fishing boat exploded near an Israeli patrol boat off of the Gaza Strip near the Egyptian-Israeli border in what IDF sources called a fumbled suicide bombing. There were no Israeli causalities.

The Israeli government reports that that there has been a 40 percent reduction in the number clashes since the most recent truce was signed.

November 9- Israel forces successfully killed Hussein Abayat, a local military commander in Fatah. He was believed to be responsible for 6 separate shooting incidents involving Israeli soldiers including one in which three IDF soldiers were killed. Abayat was traveling in a van in Beit Sahur when a Israeli attack helicopter destroyed the van with two Hellfire missiles. The IDF hoped that this would have a deterrent effect on other upper and mid-level Fatah officers involved in the recent violence. Two Palestinian women were killed in shrapnel from the explosion. The killing of Abayat is widely regarded as the first successful implementation of a strategy of assassinating Palestinians held responsible for having attacked or planning attacks on Israeli targets in the framework of the recent violence.

Bill Clinton and Yasser Arafat meet in Washington DC hours after the missile strike; very little progress is made.

November 10- Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat appeals to the United Nations Security Council to send a UN force. Four more Palestinians, an Israeli Arab and an Israeli soldier are killed in clashes.

November 12- In Gilo a rare daylight attack against the settlement, this represents a more aggressive use of military force by the Palestinians.

Crown Prince Abdullah of Saudi Arabia demanded that all Arab states cut off their ties with Israel and cut off ties with any nation that moves its embassy to Jerusalem. However, no unified Muslim voices seems to come from the Organization of the Islamic Conference summit in terms of policy, but are able to generate a strong statement of condemnation.

November 13- Four Palestinians, including the nephew of Mohammed Dahlan, the head of Preventative Security, and four Israelis die, including two female civilians. Palestinian gunmen are increasingly targeting settlers and soldiers in ambushes, moving towards a possible Lebanonization of the conflict. Israel once again shuts down non-emergency access to and from the West Bank and Gaza.
November 15- Palestinian Independence Day, eight Palestinians are killed, the Israeli government announces that it will abandon its "policy of restraint" that it previously had towards the conflict. Yasser Arafat calls on Fatah activists to stop shooting at Israeli soldiers. Israeli helicopters attack four Fatah positions in the territories. A German citizen is killed in these attacks.

November 17- For the first time, Arafat makes a call, via radio, for the cessation of shooting in the Palestinian controlled areas. This however, is not satisfactory to the Israeli government because it called for a ban only on weapons firing in Area A, however Areas B and C were noticeably excluded from Arafat’s ban.

November 19- An Israeli embassy official is shot and wounded in Amman, Jordan.

November 20- A roadside bomb in Gaza is detonated next to a school bus killing two adults and wounding five children. Omar Al-Mukhtar, the military wing of the Syrian-based Fatah Uprising claimed responsibility. Israel retaliates by launching numerous missile strikes against Fatah buildings in the West Bank and Gaza marking the heaviest bombardment to date.

November 21- Gunfire escalates in the wake of the missile strikes and Egypt recalls its ambassador in protest to recent Israeli aggression.

November 22- Four Palestinians which Israel claimed were Tanzim militia gunmen are ambushed by IDF infantry with mechanized support while driving in civilian vehicles. The Palestinian Authority claimed these men are not Tanzim and were in fact civilians. Jamal Abdel Razek, a Fatah officer, was among the dead. There are conflicting statements on whether or not the party was armed or attempting to run a checkpoint.

A car bomb explodes in Hadera along a passing bus, killing two and wounding sixty. Hamas’ Ezzedin al-Qassam Brigades claimed responsibility for the bombing.

November 23- An Israeli-Palestinian liaison office is hit by a mortar shelling killing an Israeli officer. This almost immediately results in Israel ordering all Palestinian police and security officers to leave the all liaison offices throughout the West Bank and Gaza. This temporally ends security cooperation between the Palestinians and Israelis. In a gun battle between an Israeli patrol and Palestinian forces one Israeli and one Palestinian are killed. Ibrahim Beni Ouda, a leader of Hamas's armed wing, Ezzedin al-Qassam, is blown up in a car in Nablus.

November 24- Israeli-Palestinian liaison offices are re-opened after a telephone conversation between Barak and Arafat. While “cooperation” is officially resumed the situation remains tense and little to no actual cooperation is taking place. Six Palestinians, an Israeli major (the highest-ranking officer to date killed) and a Jewish settler are slain in continuing violence.

November 26- Israeli soldiers attack a carload of Fatah members with small arms, killing all five individuals in the car; another Palestinian died of previously sustained wounds from a separate incident.

November 27- UN rights commissioner Mary Robinson delivers a highly critical address to the UN General Assembly condemning Israel’s excessive use of force and called for an international monitoring force. For the first time in almost 3 weeks no one on either side died.
November 28- Barak agrees to early elections after his bid to pull together a national unity government fails.

November 29- Four Palestinians are killed attempting to enter Israel, Sharon begins to make plans to run against Barak.

November 30- Barak proposes that a Palestinian state be formed in the West Bank and Gaza, but leaving the status of Jerusalem, refugees and final borders to be resolved by future negotiations over the next three years. The Palestinian Authority was quick to reject this plan, saying only a comprehensive peace plan can be successful.

December 1- On the first day of Ramadan Israel lifts its ban on Palestinians under the age of forty, praying at the Al-Asqa Mosque Complex; both sides show restraint in this sector, however violence continues elsewhere.

Mohammed Dief, a Hamas bomb maker escapes from a Palestinian jail with the help of his guards, this is not disclosed to the public until a week later.

December 2- Head of Fatah in the West Bank Marwan Barghouti, declares that the Palestinians will not stop the uprising as a condition of resumed negotiations.

December 3- Under strong pressure from the Clinton administration, Israel lifts its opposition to an inquiry panel investigating the causes of the recent violence.

December 4- Yasser Arafat is seen in public for the first time since 1994 holding his sub-machine gun. Jewish settlers blocked his route by throwing stones at his convoy and he continued to hold the weapon after the incident while reviewing troops. The settlers were detained by the IDF.

US Ambassador to Israel Martin Indyk publicly states that the continued violence in the occupied territories and Hizbullah attacks in violation of UN Security Council 425 increase the risk of a new regional war.

December 5- An Israeli embassy employee is shot and wounded while leaving a supermarket parking lot in Jordan. He was driving in an unmarked car. This is the second such incident in 3 weeks.

December 6- Fatah leader Marwan Barghouti states that negotiations should not be restarted and that the current uprising should be escalated. Also, he said that Arafat had rescinded the order not to fire from Palestinian controlled areas.

December 7- A Palestinian man is sentenced to death by a Palestinian court in Nablus for spying for Israel and assisting opposing security forces with the November 23 assassination of local Hamas leader Ibrahim Bani Oudeh.

The World Bank authorizes a 12 million dollar grant to the Palestinian Authority to offset the growing economic problems stemming from Israeli travel restrictions.

December 8- Ten people die in the worst violence since the original outbreak of violence on September 28, 2000. Three were Israeli settlers and seven were Palestinian.

December 9- Iraq promises 1 billion Euros (approximately $900 million US) in food and medical aid to the Palestinians.

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• December 10- Barak resigns as Prime Minister in an effort to outflank Netanyahu, as one must be a sitting member of the Knesset in order to run for Prime Minister in an early election. Polls show Netanyahu would crush Barak by an almost 2 to 1 margin in the election, if the two run against one another.

In the West Bank, Israeli soldiers kill a Palestinian man who was planting a roadside bomb. Palestinian gunmen ambush Chief Rabbi Meir Lau. The IDF convinced the rabbi to travel in an armored bus instead of his usual car, therefore the rabbi arrived at his destination unharmed.

• December 11- Bill Mitchell’s probe into the causes and solutions to the recent violence begins, but is overshadowed by the drama of Israeli election policy.

Israeli soldiers kill Anwar Hamran, a suspected bombing suspect for the PIJ, while waiting for a taxicab in Nablus.

• December 12- IDF infantry kills Yousef Abu Swayeh, a local Fatah leader, in front his house.

• December 13- Claiming that they were pursuing a shooting suspect, IDF forces cross into a Palestinian held sector of the Gaza Strip. They crossed only about 100 meters into Area A.

Chief of General Staff Lt.-Gen. Shaul Mofaz said on Wednesday that the IDF is carrying out intensive clandestine actions to foil attempts by Palestinian gunmen to attack Israeli civilians and soldiers in the territories.

Abbas al-Awedi, Hamas member, is shot by the IDF on streets of Hebron. He had been previously been arrested several times by both Israeli and Palestinian authorities.

• December 14- Israeli soldiers stop and shoot at a checkpoint, Hani Abu Bakr, a Hamas member after he attempted to draw a pistol.

• December 17- In a meeting with Israeli Members of Knesset (MKs), Arafat told the Israeli delegation that the Israeli military, led by Chief of Staff Shaul Mofaz, forces its agenda on Israel's politicians. Arafat accused Mofaz of having an extensive plan to flare up the situation, including assassinations, designed to eliminate any possibility of peace.

• December 19- Israeli and Palestinian officials meet in Washington DC to discuss the prospects for peace.

The UN Security Council voted against deploying UN observers to the disputed regions after only receiving 8 of the 9 votes necessary in the 15-member body, France. Namibia, Malaysia, Bangladesh, Jamaica, Tunisia, Mali, Ukraine and China all supported the resolution. Argentina, Canada, the Netherlands, Britain, Russia and the US abstained.

Benjamin Netanyahu declares that he will not seek the office of Prime Minister saying he would only run if Parliament disbanded, and parliamentary elections were held. This leaves Ariel Sharon and Shimon Peres as potential rivals to Barak in February.

• December 21- The Israeli Foreign Ministry decides not to cooperate with an international panel set up by the United Nations Human Rights Commission "to investigate Israel's human rights violations of Palestinians in the territories."
• December 22- Three Israeli soldiers are injured in a suicide bomb attack at the Mehola Junction roadside cafe in the northern Jordan Valley. The attacker, who detonated a belt of explosives strapped to him, was killed in the blast.

• December 23- Five days of discussions at Bolling Air Force Base in Washington, DC, between Israeli and Palestinian negotiators come to a close. President Clinton puts forward a comprehensive framework to resume negotiations and asks the parties to respond by December 27. The plan is said to include a fundamental trade-off between Palestinian sovereignty on the Temple Mount/Haram el-Sharif in return for giving up the demand that Palestinian refugees could return to Israel.

• December 31- Thabet Thabet, a doctor who headed Fatah in the town of Tulkarem and was director general of the Palestinian health ministry, is shot dead.

2001

• January 1- A car bomb explodes in the Israeli coastal town of Netanya, injuring 54 people, mostly lightly.

• January 2- Clinton and Arafat meet in Washington. The President presses Arafat to accept his compromise plan as a basis for continuing the talks with Israel.

• January 3- Arafat accepts Clinton’s outline for an end to the violence. U.S. mediators plan to meet with Israeli and Palestinian negotiators separately in order to refine understandings of Clinton’s ‘parameters.’

• January 7- Clinton describes the details of a ‘fair agreement’. Special Middle East Coordinator Dennis Ross is to travel to the region.

• January 8- Tens of thousands of Israelis demonstrate in Jerusalem against the city’s division.

• January 13- Arafat and Peres meet in Gaza City. Both sides say that no breakthroughs had been achieved.

• January 17- Israeli teenager Ofir Rahum is lured to Ramallah by a Palestinian woman he had previously met on the internet, and is then shot by three assailants.

• January 18- While in Cairo, Arafat extends a proposal for intensive talks to Israeli Foreign Minister Shlomo Ben-Ami.

• January 21- Palestinian and Israeli negotiators meet for a new round of talks in the Egyptian Red Sea resort of Taba.

• Barak orders the Israeli negotiators to the Taba talks back to Israel after two Israeli civilians are killed by Palestinian militants. Barak's office says there would be "no contacts at any level" between the parties’ negotiators until a decision is reached to resume the talks.

• January 27- Negotiators conclude what they termed one of the most ‘profound’ rounds of peace talks ever, yet the sides remain deadlocked.

• February 6- Likud party head Ariel Sharon trounces Ehud Barak in Israeli prime ministerial elections, winning 61 percent of the vote.
February 13- Israeli gunships kill a member of Force 17, Arafat’s personal security force. Israel claims the man, Colonel Masoud Ayad, was a leader of the Hizballah.

February 14- Eight people are killed and 25 injured when a bus driven by a Palestinian plows into a group of soldiers and civilians waiting at a bus stop near Holon, south of Tel-Aviv.

February 19- Mahmud el-Madani, a member of Hamas's armed wing, is shot and killed in the Balata refugee camp near Nablus.

February 20- Under domestic political pressure, Barak withdraws from a deal he had sealed to forge a new Israeli government in alliance with Ariel Sharon, and says that he will not accept the post of defense minister in a future coalition.

U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell tells Israeli and Palestinian leaders that the new U.S. administration believes they must solve their own security problems. America will help, Powell said, but it cannot substitute for the parties themselves.

February 26- The Israeli Labor Party agrees to join a coalition government led by Ariel Sharon. Shimon Peres assumes the post of Foreign Minister, Binyamin Ben-Eliezer that of Minister of Defense.

March 1- One person is killed and nine injured when a terrorist detonates a bomb in a service taxi at the Mei Ami junction in Wadi Ara. The IDF and Israeli civilian officials discuss the possibility of reoccupying Palestinian-controlled territory.

March 4- At a busy intersection in Netanya, a Palestinian suicide bomber kills himself and three Israelis.

March 7- Ariel Sharon is sworn in as Israel’s new prime minister.

March 18- Palestinians fire a mortar shell at an Israeli army base near Kibbutz Nahal Oz, adjacent to the Gaza Strip, lightly injuring one soldier. The mortar attack marks the first time Palestinian insurgents in Gaza have fired at Israeli targets located within Israel's borders. Three mortar bombs are fired at the Israel Defense Forces base.15

March 20- Colin Powell visits the Middle East for the first time as Secretary of State. He calls on both sides to end the violence.

March 21- The Israeli army shells a Force 17 training base, killing one Palestinian officer.

March 26- A Palestinian sniper shoots dead a 10-month-old baby girl, Shalhevet Pass, and wounds her father in the West Bank town of Hebron.

March 27- A car bomb explodes in the Talpiot industrial/commercial zone in Jerusalem. Seven people are injured, one moderately. The Islamic Jihad claims responsibility for the attack. 28 people are injured, two seriously, in a suicide bombing directed against a northbound No. 6 bus at the French Hill junction in Jerusalem. Hamas claims responsibility for the attack.

March 28- In a Palestinian suicide bombing two Israeli teenagers are killed near the Palestinian city of Qalqilya. In response, Israeli helicopter gunships bombard bases and training camps of Yasir Arafat's personal security forces. It is Prime Minister Ariel Sharon's first military response since he took office three weeks ago. One member of the Force and two other Palestinians are killed.
• April 2- Mohammed Abdel Al, a military activist in Islamic Jihad, is killed when Israeli helicopters fire rockets on his car in Rafah in the southern Gaza Strip.

• April 5- Iyyad Hardan, the military leader of Islamic Jihad in Jenin, is blown up while standing in a public telephone booth in Jenin, apparently by a booby trapped telephone.

• April 6- Israeli helicopters fire rockets at Palestinian police installations north of Gaza City. At least four rockets are fired, damaging a two-story headquarters building and two other structures. Israel attacks after three mortar shells are fired from Palestinian areas in Gaza landed near Netiv Haasara, an Israeli village next to Gaza.

• April 10- Palestinians continue to fire mortar rounds at Israeli targets in the Gaza Strip and inside Israel. The shellings do not result in any casualties. Israel responds by firing antitank missiles at Palestinian police posts in Gaza. The attack on one target, a Palestinian naval post, kills a lieutenant and wounded 7 police officers; the second strike, on a police headquarters in a refugee camp, wounds 10. In contrast to recent nighttime raids, these are daylight attacks without warning on occupied buildings.

• April 11- Israelis in tanks and bulldozers enter a densely populated Gaza refugee camp in Khan Yunis before dawn and destroy buildings suspected of serving as launching pads for mortar attacks. The raid is followed by a prolonged ground battle as hundreds of armed Palestinians, summoned by mosque loudspeakers to defend the camp against an "Israeli invasion," rush into the streets. Two Palestinians are killed and two dozen wounded; no Israelis are killed. The assault on the refugee camp represents the largest and deepest Israeli ground attack into Palestinian-ruled territory since the current round of violence erupted in September.

• April 14- For the first time since Ariel Sharon took office, Israeli planes strike targets in southern Lebanon. The attack comes in retaliation for an attack staged by Hezbollah on Israeli soldiers, in which one soldier was killed.

• April 15- In response to Hezbollah attacks, including one in the previous week in which an Israeli soldier was killed. Israeli warplanes attack Syrian radar sites in Lebanon's central mountains. It is the first Israeli strike against the Syrian military in five years. One Syrian soldier is killed and four others wounded.

• April 16- Jordanian foreign minister Abdullah Khatib presents Israel with a proposal, backed by Egypt, to calm Israeli-Palestinian violence and renew peace negotiations. But he meets with a cold reaction from the Israeli leadership, who promises to study the suggestions further. The proposal seeks to set a timetable for completing the negotiations, and also calls for an end to Jewish settlement construction in the West Bank and Gaza, a pullback of Israeli troops from Palestinian towns and villages, and the lifting of Israeli's blockade of Palestinian-controlled areas. In return, it would require the Palestinians to end violence against Israelis.

Isreali Air Force warplanes attack Syrian radar installations in Dar al-Baidar in Lebanon’s central mountains. In the first Israeli strike against Syrian forces in five years, one Syrian soldier is killed and four others wounded. In an IDF statement, the military says that the attack came in response to Hizballah attacks against IDF positions on Israel’s northern border.

Israeli military briefly seizes Beit Hanun in the northern Gaza Strip, an area under full Palestinian control, and bombard posts of Force 17. One member of the unit dies from wounds days later.

• April 17- IDF forces for the first time reoccupy territory in the Gaza Strip ceded to the Palestinian Authority under the 1993 Oslo Agreements. After first vowing to stay in the Palestinian-ruled area for as
long as necessary, Prime Minister Ariel Sharon orders the troops to pull back. Yasser Arafat describes the Israeli action as an "unforgivable crime," and U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell intervenes with a rare criticism of Israel, calling the occupation "excessive and disproportionate." He demands that the government keep its promise to vacate the territory. However, Powell blames a "provocative" Palestinian mortar attack for precipitating the move. "The situation is threatening to escalate further, posing a risk of broader conflict," he says.

- April 18- Hours after Israel withdrew from a corner of the Gaza Strip, Palestinian militants renew mortar shellings of nearby Israeli settlements and military posts. No one is wounded.

- April 21- Israeli and Palestinian security chiefs meet at the Erez junction in the Gaza Strip in an effort to renew cooperation between the sides. The security officials decide to take measures to reduce the violence, and Israel commits itself to easing restrictions placed on the Palestinians. The Palestinians delegation expresses the Israeli response to its demands as insufficient.

Israeli tanks rolled into the Palestinian-controlled town of Rafah and leveled a border police post before quickly pulling out. There were no reported injuries.

- April 22- A Palestinian suicide bomber detonates a powerful bomb at a Jerusalem bus stop, killing himself and an Israeli, and injuring 39. Hamas claims responsibility for the attack.

- April 25- Three Fatah members are killed in an unexplained explosion in the southern Gaza Strip town of Rafah.

- April 27- Israeli foreign minister Shimon Peres makes plans for meetings in Cairo and Washington to discuss the Egyptian-Jordanian proposal to revive the peace talks.

- April 28- A Fatah activist, Imad Daud Karake, 27, is shot dead while driving near Bethlehem in the West Bank

Hassan el-Khadi, a member of Arafat's Fatah movement, who had been accused by the Israelis of taking part in the entrapment and murder of an Israeli youth, is killed in an explosion in a building in Ramallah that also killed two children.

- April 30- The Mitchell commission releases its final report and issues a strong call for an Israeli freeze on settlements and a Palestinian crackdown on terrorism as a prelude to the resumption of peace talks. The committee says the outbreak of the deadly clashes could not be attributed solely to Prime Minister Ariel Sharon's visit to the Temple Mount, nor to a preconceived effort by the Palestinian leader Yasir Arafat to unleash a bloody popular uprising.

Two Hamas militants are killed by the explosion of a booby-trapped car in a garage in Gaza City.

- May 2- Israeli Army bulldozers backed by tanks rumble into a Palestinian refugee camp and raze several homes. One teenager is killed and 14 other Palestinians are wounded, United Nations and Palestinian officials said. The demolition in the refugee camp in Rafah is the latest example of an increasingly common tactic used by the Israeli Army in its battles with Palestinians in the Gaza Strip.

- May 5- Pope John Paul II visits Syria. Syrian President Bashar el-Assad is quoted as saying that “we see them [the Jews] attacking sacred Christian and Muslim places in Palestine... They try to kill the principle of religions in the same mentality in which they betrayed Jesus Christ and in the same way with which they tried to kill the Prophet Muhammad.”
• May 6- Israeli soldiers enter Palestinian-controlled territory for several hours in what the IDF termed an effort to silence shooting at its positions. Israeli tank shells and gunfire kill a Palestinian fighter, Muhammad Abayat, 45, and wound 20 people, including a 5-year-old boy who is in serious condition.

• May 9- Two Israeli teens, one of them also a U.S. citizen, are found bludgeoned to death in a cave in the Judean desert.

• May 12- Israeli helicopters fire rockets at a car parked near the Palestinian Authority security building in Jenin, killing two people, including Moutasem Sabha, a member of the Fatah movement. Witnesses say four helicopters flew overhead and hit the car with at least five rockets. 19

• May 13- Israeli helicopter gunships bombard Palestinian security targets across the Gaza Strip, and naval boats strike at least eight Palestinian armored personnel carriers with rockets.

• May 14- Israeli troops shoot and kill five Palestinian officers stationed at a roadblock in Beitunya, in the West Bank. The IDF says that the post served as a base for firing on Israeli bypass roads. Arafat describes the operation as a “dirty [and] immoral” killing of officers doing mundane, post-midnight guard duty while they were preparing a snack. 20

• May 15- Israel accuses Arafat of calling for more violence on ‘Nakba (catastrophe) Day, in which Palestinians hold mass protests marking their exile after the creation of Israel in 1948. At least 120 Palestinians are wounded by Israeli gunfire. 21

• May 16- An internal Israeli Army investigation determines that the killing of five Palestinian security men earlier this week was an error. Israeli officials says that an intelligence mistake led to the killing of the wrong five Palestinians in an ambush on Monday of a checkpoint in Beituniya in the West Bank. It was a case of "mistaken identity," according to a spokesman for Prime Minister Ariel Sharon. Israeli troops meant to attack members of a different Palestinian security unit, Force 17, whom they held responsible for shootings from that area on an Israeli bypass road, but they did not realize that there had been a changing of the guard at the Palestinian checkpoint. 22

• May 18- A Palestinian suicide bomber wearing an explosive vest detonates himself outside a Shopping Mall in Netanya. Five civilians are killed and over 100 wounded in the attack, for which Hamas claimed responsibility. Israel retaliates by sending F-16 fighter jets against security buildings in the West Bank and Gaza Strip for the first time since the 1967 war. At least nine Palestinians are killed and 90 wounded in fighter jet attacks on Nablus and Ramallah.

• May 20- IDF tanks fire three shells at the home of Col. Jibril Rajoub, director of Palestinian security forces in the West Bank. Palestinians accuse Israel of trying to assassinate him, while the IDF denies aiming its attack personally at Mr. Rajoub, saying its troops had come under fire and responded by shelling "the precise source of the fire, which was definitely from the courtyard of Jibril Rajoub's house." 23

• May 21- Colin Powell dispatches a senior aide, William J. Burns, to meet with Israeli and Palestinian leaders. Powell urges the Israelis and Palestinians to declare an immediate unconditional cease-fire, and issues a formal statement endorsing the recommendations of the Mitchell commission.

• May 22- Israeli military officials order troops to open fire only when their lives are endangered and to otherwise "cease fire." Prime Minister Sharon says that he “proposed to our neighbors that we work together to reach an immediate cease-fire.” 24
• May 25- 65 people are injured in a car bombing in the Hadera central bus station. The Islamic Jihad claims responsibility.

• May 27- A car bomb explodes in the center of Jerusalem shortly after midnight. There are no injuries, and the PFLP claims responsibility. Another bomb explodes in the morning at the ‘Russian Compound’ neighborhood in Jerusalem. It includes several mortar shells, some of which are propelled hundreds of meters from the site of the explosion. 30 people are injured, most suffering from shock. The Islamic Jihad claims responsibility.

Newly appointed U.S. Middle East envoy William J. Burns meets with both Yasir Arafat and Prime Minister Ariel Sharon. Mr. Sharon's office issues a statement saying Israel was "nearing the limits of its patience" with its five-day-old, self-imposed, limited cease-fire.

• May 30- A car bomb explodes outside a school in Netanya. Eight people are injured. The Islamic Jihad claims responsibility.

• June 1- 21 people are killed and 120 wounded when a suicide bomber blows himself up outside a disco on Tel Aviv’s beachfront while standing in a large group of teenagers waiting to enter the disco.

• June 2- For the first time since the latest Israeli-Palestinian violence began in late September 2000, Yasir Arafat publicly calls for an immediate and unconditional cease-fire. He condemns the suicide bombing of June 1. A senior Israeli military official says that Israel would hold off on a direct military reprisal against Palestinian Authority targets to give Arafat time to follow through. Speaking in Arabic on television in Ramallah, Arafat reads a statement drafted with German foreign minister Joschka Fischer, who had been in Tel Aviv at the time of the blast, and with UN envoy Terje Rod-Larsen. Arafat tells the cameras, "We have exerted and will now exert the utmost efforts to stop the bloodshed of our people and of the Israeli people, and to do all that is needed to achieve an immediate and unconditional, real and effective cease-fire."5

• June 3- Arafat orders Palestinian security chiefs to prevent all attacks on Israeli targets from Palestinian-ruled territory. In a statement, Ariel Sharon says that "restraint is also an element of strength," while Defense Minister Binyamin Ben-Eliezer warns that his forces have their "fingers ready on the trigger." Israel’s government makes it known that a military plan of action is ready.

• June 4- On the second day of the cease-fire, Israeli leaders acknowledge that Palestinian violence had dropped significantly. Nevertheless, Israeli forces and Palestinian gunmen trade fire for hours in the Gaza Strip. Israel imposed a blockade on fuel and food shipments to Gaza and the West Bank.

Germany’s foreign minister, Joschka Fischer, spends an additional day in the region, talking to officials on both sides in an effort to get the cease-fire to hold.

• June 5- The Bush administration announced that it is sending the Director of Central Intelligence, George Tenet, to the Middle East to meet with leaders of Israeli and Palestinian security forces. The administration thus reverses a policy it had set when it took office.

Leaders of Hamas make it clear that they do not consider themselves bound by Arafat’s call for a ceasefire.

Appearing on Russian television, Prime Minister Ariel Sharon calls PA Chairman Arafat a ‘murderer’ and ‘pathological liar.’
June 6 - Jewish settlers fight Palestinians near a West Bank crossroads where an Israeli infant was wounded by Arab stone-throwers on June 5. Thousands of settlers gather at a rally in downtown Jerusalem, calling for Arafat’s death and condemning Prime Minister Ariel Sharon’s policy of restraint.

PA International Cooperation Minister Nabil Shaath and West Bank Preventive Security Chief Jibril Rajoub say that the Palestinian Authority does not intend to arrest members of opposition organizations such as Hamas and Islamic Jihad. Shaath is quoted saying that "the arrest of Palestinian activists is unequivocally unacceptable… We don't take orders from anyone, either the U.S. or Israel. The Palestinian Authority acts according to the interests of the Palestinian people."

June 7 - The Palestinian Authority rejects Israeli demands that it arrest dozens of Palestinian terrorist suspects. Shaath said that instead of rounding up the “usual suspects,” the PA is willing to work with Israel on gathering information to prevent terrorist attacks.

DCI George Tenet meets separately with Sharon and Arafat.

June 8 - DCI George Tenet and Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs, William Burns, meet with Israeli and Palestinian officials. Tenet convenes a security meeting with security officials of the two sides, while Burns seeks to reopen a political dialogue.

June 9 - Israel Radio reports that security meetings between Tenet and Israeli and Palestinian officials produce a U.S. document that calls on Palestinians to arrest militants and crack down on anti-Israel attacks. The report also calls on Israel to halt attacks on Palestinian targets and to withdraw IDF forces from West Bank and Gaza Strip positions it held before the outbreak of hostilities on September 28.

Israeli tank shells kill three Palestinian women near Netzarim junction.

June 10 - Eight mortar shells land near Jewish settlements in Gaza. Since Yasir Arafat called for an unconditional cease-fire on June 2, 42 mortar shells have been fired on Israeli targets.

June 11 - Imad Abu Thyab, an activist for the Palestinian Islamic Jihad, is critically wounded when a booby-trapped car he was about to enter exploded. The PJ blames Israel for the explosion, while an IDF spokesman denies any Israeli involvement.

Palestinian and Israeli security chiefs fail to agree on Tenet’s terms for a cease-fire.

June 12 - Israel unconditionally accepts DCI Tenet’s plan for ending the Israeli-Palestinian violence.

June 13 - Shortly after midnight, Yasir Arafat agreed in principle to the truce proposal, after a long meeting with DCI Tenet. Arafat gave Mr. Tenet a letter expressing his two main reservations, one concerning the timetable and the other a proposal for a "buffer zone" separating Israeli and Palestinian territory. The details of the plan were not made public, but a U.S. official said that the plan focused on resuming security cooperation, ending the violence, and restoring the situation on the ground to what existed before the conflict erupted in late September. One of Israel’s central demands, that Mr. Arafat arrest terror suspects on Israel’s wanted list, was a sticking point. Palestinians had insisted that they did not want to serve as enforcers for Israel. According to Palestinian officials, and partly confirmed by Israel, DCI Tenet’s plan envisions that the two sides undertake initial measures within 48 hours of agreeing to a firm timetable sometime within a week. Israel would begin lifting restrictions on Palestinian movement by opening borders and crossing points and reducing the number of checkpoints. It would also pull IDF tanks and troops back to positions occupied before the end of September. Israel would agree to stop attacks on Palestinian Authority targets. Liaison offices in the West Bank and Gaza between Israeli and Palestinian

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Authority officers were to be reactivated. The Palestinians would be required to prevent firing mortar shells, shut down explosives factories, collect illegal weapons and demonstrate an effort to prevent weapon smuggling. They would agree to try to prevent incitement against Israel by the Palestinian media, and would share information with the Israelis about suspected terror attacks.27

- June 14- The Israeli daily Ha’aretz published an unofficial version of the Tenet cease-fire plan.

Despite less serious violence, the IDF removes tanks from some roads near cities and villages in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. Ariel Sharon says that IDF troops would not withdraw from areas where violence continued.

A Palestinian informer shoots an Israeli military intelligence officer and wounds one of his bodyguards during a meeting. Col. Yehuda Edri is the highest-ranking officer killed since the violence erupted in late September 2000.

- June 16- UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan arrives in the region and holds talks with Arafat and Sharon. Annan appealed to both Palestinians and Israelis to take advantage of a crucial moment and move toward resuming peace talks.

- June 17- A Palestinian boy was shot and killed by Israeli forces during a demonstration in the Gaza Strip. Despite the killing, An Israeli military spokesman said that the number and seriousness of violent incidents during the truce dropped sharply.

- June 18- Two Israeli drivers are killed in separate incidents in the West Bank. Settler leaders and far-right cabinet members call on Prime Minister Sharon to retaliate, but Sharon says he is still abiding by the guidelines of the Tenet truce plan. After the second drive-by shooting death, the Israeli Army re-imposes a blockade on Tulkarm that it had partly lifted hours earlier. The PA’s West Bank security chief, Jibril Rajoub, pledges to work to enforce the truce. Israel, meanwhile, warned that it would reconsider the cease-fire arrangement if the Palestinians would not act to prevent the violence.

- June 20- Israeli and Palestinian leaders accuse each other of violating the cease-fire. Following a meeting of the Israeli security cabinet, Israel pledges to stick to the ceasefire, but says it would not fully lift a blockade of Palestinian towns and villages until attacks on Israelis stopped. Following the Israeli decision, Arafat responds to reporters in Ramallah that "It is an attempt to deceive international public opinion...They (the Israelis) are still firing from their tanks and machine guns and are still using internationally banned weapons, and the settlers are pursuing their crimes under the protection of the Israeli army. So their claim they are committed to a cease-fire is a lie."

One Palestinian and one Israeli are killed. So far, six Palestinians and four Israelis have died since the parties agreed to a cease-fire. In light of the continuing violence and the danger that the cease-fire will collapse, Secretary of State Powell will travel to the region next week.

- June 22- Two Israeli soldiers are killed in a suicide bombing attack in the Gaza Strip. Twelve people have been killed since the cease-fire was called ten days ago. Israel warned that its patience was running out.

- June 24- Osama Jawabri, A Palestinian member of the Aksa Martyrs Brigade, a group that has claimed responsibility for the killings of Jewish settlers during the current uprising, is killed in Nablus. A telephone exploded while he was making a phone call in a public phone booth. Israel denied responsibility, while PA officials accuse Israel of violating the cease-fire.

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Prime Minister Ariel Sharon meets with his British counterpart, Tony Blair, in London while on a stopover on his to the United States. In Washington, Sharon is slated to meet with U.S. President Bush.

- June 25- Prime Minister Ariel Sharon meets with U.S. President George W. Bush in Washington to discuss the situation in the Middle East.

Israeli Defense Minister Ben-Eliezer's declares that he plans to dismantle 15 settlement outposts erected illegally in the West Bank.

- June 26- Bush and Sharon meet for discussions at the White House, and differ on the steps required to ease the tensions in the Middle East. Sharon insists that the Palestinians have not done enough to quell the violence, while Bush says that progress has been made. Sharon repeats his demand that Palestinian attacks must end and that the situation must be quiet for ten days before Israel will proceed with a ‘cooling-off’ period and confidence-building measures. The U.S. administration, in contrast, emphasized 100% effort, rather than 100% results by the Palestinians.

- June 28- U.S. Secretary of State Powell arrives in Israel and holds separate talks with Chairman Arafat in Gaza City and with Prime Minister Sharon in Jerusalem. He urges Arafat to decrease the tensions on the ground, and tells Sharon that his stated goal of total quiet was probably unachievable.

- July 2 – 3 Palestinians killed in a helicopter attack in the West Bank. Mohammed Besharat, an Islamic militant on Israel's most-wanted list, was among the three. Arafat accuses Israel of violating the June 13 cease-fire.

- July 16 - In northern Israel, in the town of Binyamina, a suicide bombing kills two Israelis at a railway station bus stop. Islamic Jihad claims responsibility.

- July 31 - Israeli helicopters fire on the Hamas office in Nablus, killing eight – two leading Hamas officials in the West Bank, and four other activists, as well as two children.

- August 9 – 15 people are killed and 88 wounded in a suicide bomb attack on a Sabarro pizzeria in central Jerusalem. Hamas claims responsibility.

Israel takes hold of and closes the East Jerusalem office of the Palestinian Authority. In Ramallah, F-16s flatten a Palestinian police station. Israel retaliates in response to the bombing in Jerusalem.

- August 12 – UN Secretary-General, Kofi Annan urges Israel to end its “occupation” of Palestinian Institutions in East Jerusalem.

- August 13 – In a northern suburb of Haifa, a suicide bombing in a cafe wounds 15 people – one seriously. To date, the area had escaped the worst violence of the intensifying conflict. The Islamic Jihad claims responsibility.

- August 14 – Israeli tanks enter the West Bank city of Jenin, leveling the city’s police station.

- August 15 - Israeli troops kill Palestinian militia leader Emad Abu Sneineh in Hebron, and Israeli paratroopers take up positions outside a second town in the West Bank.
• August 24 - Buildings in Palestinian-controlled sectors of Hebron were shelled by Israeli tanks and helicopter gunships. As many as five Palestinians were injured.  

• August 25 – At a Gaza Strip Israeli army post, guerilla soldiers of the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine breach security and kill three Israeli soldiers. Seven other soldiers are wounded, and two of the guerilla soldiers are shot dead.

• August 26 – Security installations are destroyed in the West Bank and Gaza by Israeli F-16s and F-17s.

• August 27 – Israeli forces assassinate Mustafa Zibri, the secretary-general of the Popular-Front for the Liberation of Palestine in a suburb of Ramallah. Angry protests from Palestinians follow and Israel launches multiple incursions into the West Bank and Gaza. Israeli tanks, armored vehicles, and helicopter gunships take over “dominant positions” in the West Bank town of Beit Jalal in response to Palestinians firing at Gilo. In Gaza, before withdrawing Troops, Israeli tanks demolish eight buildings in area west of Rafah.

• August 28 – The U.S. State Department recommends that Israel withdraw from positions in Beit Jala. Earlier this week, President Bush criticized the Palestinian Authority for not doing more to combat terrorism.

• August 31 – Shooting into the Israeli town of Gilo ceases and so IDF withdraws from Beit Jala.

• Sept 9 – In northern Israel, a suicide attack leaves three dead and 36 wounded. Responsibility for the attack is claimed by Hamas. A second suicide bombing at an intersection in Beit Lid wounds another three people.

• September 12 – The IDF pushes forth into Jenin once again and sends tanks and bulldozers into Jericho.

• September 16 – Israeli tanks enter Ramallah.

• Oct 2 - In the Gaza Strip, two gunmen enter a Jewish settlement, killing two Israelis and wounding 15 others before being killed by soldiers. The gunmen were two young members of Hamas.

• Oct 3 – Israel responds by demolishing 7 Palestinian police posts in the Gaza Strip - nearby the Jewish settlement two gunmen had attacked the night before.

• Oct 4 - Before soldiers fire at and kill him, a Palestinian gunman from the Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades opens fire and leaves three Israelis dead and 14 wounded at the central bus station in the northern Israeli city of Afula.

• Oct 7 - In the northern Israeli town of Beit Shean, a suicide bomber from the Islamic Jihad kills both himself and one Israeli.

• Oct 17 – In east Jerusalem, Rehavam Zeevi, the right-wing Israeli tourism minister, is assassinated and the PLFP claims responsibility.
• October 18 - Near Bethlehem, in Beit Sahour, a member of the Fatah Military Wing on Israel’s most wanted list, Atif Abayyat, was killed along with two other people in a car explosion.

Israel issues an ultimatum to hand over Rechavam Zeevi’s killers. The Palestinians reject the ultimatum.

Israel prepares for the state funeral of right-wing minister Zeevi.

• October 19 – In the city of Ramallah, the Palestinian Authority arrests 20 PFLP members in the West Bank and 13 in Gaza

According to Palestinian Senior negotiator Saeb Erakat, “Every effort is being exerted by the Palestinian Authority by President Arafat to bring those who killed Mr. Zeevi to justice under Palestinian law.” Erakat continued, “We need to come back to the negotiating table immediately without condition because this is the only way to save the lives of Palestinians and Israelis.”

• October 18-20 – In the most extensive military operation in the occupied territories at the time, Israel deploys forces into and around Bethlehem, Beit Jala, and four other Palestinian cities.

• Oct 28 - In the northern Israeli city of Hadera, two gunmen from the Islamic Jihad open fire, killing four women and wounding 31 others before being shot dead by Israeli police officers.

• Nov 4 - In east Jerusalem, an Islamic Jihad gunman shoots at passengers on a bus, killing two schoolgirls and wounding 35 others before being shot dead.

• November 15 – In Gaza, Israeli troops, tanks, and bulldozers enter the Khan Younis refugee camp. The Palestine Red Crescent Society reports one dead and 13 wounded.

According to the IDF, the structures destroyed were suspected firing bases for mortars aimed at settlements and IDF posts in Gush Katif.

• November 24 – Two members of the militant Islamic group Hamas and a third Palestinian are killed near Nablus as an Israeli helicopter attacked the taxi they were traveling in. Israel confirms it carried out this helicopter attack.

• Nov 27 - Two Israelis are killed and more than two-dozen others are wounded when two Palestinian gunmen open fire at a bus station in Afula. One gunman is from Islamic Jihad and another is from a military offshoot of Fatah.

• Nov 29 – On a passenger bus in northern Israel, an Islamic Jihad suicide bomber leaves three Israelis dead and six wounded.

• Dec 1 - Two suicide bombers in west Jerusalem kill 10 people and wound around 170. Hamas claims responsibility.

• Dec 2 - Sixteen people are killed and 40 wounded in Haifa, when another militant from Hamas blows himself up.

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• Dec. 3 – In Gaza City, the IDF sends in helicopter gunships and jets to hit Palestinian Authority targets near Arafat’s headquarters. The mission effectively confines Arafat to Ramallah. Israel is retaliating for the killing of 25 people by suicide bombers over the preceding weekend.

• December 9 - Hamas, Islamic Jihad, Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade, and a fourth militant Palestinian group, propose a plan for a temporary cease-fire through the end of Ramadan on the condition that Israel agrees to halt its policy of assassinations. Israel rejects the offer.

The offer comes the same day that a suicide bombing near a Haifa bus stop wounds 29 people.

A spokesperson for Prime Minister Sharon says, “Israel deals only with the Palestinian Authority.”

• Dec 12 – In an area of the West Bank near a Jewish settlement close to Nablus, a gunman kills 10 Israelis on a bus.

• Dec 13 – Israeli helicopter gunships shoot at Palestinian buildings in the West Bank and Gaza. A Palestinian police station in Ramallah is among the targets.

• Dec 16 – In a statement, Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat calls for an end to attacks on Israel.

• December 17 – In Hebron, a member of Hamas was killed during a raid by Israeli troops.

According to a spokesperson for the IDF, “The force arrived at Dakidek's house in order to arrest him, but he escaped. The force called him to stop, he did not stop and they shot him.”

Meanwhile, in Gaza, a mortar was released into the Jewish settlement of Gush Khatif. No one was wounded in the attack.

The incidents in both the West Bank and Gaza happened one day after Yasser Arafat, the Palestinian leader, called for an end to violence in the region.

• Dec 20 – An announcement is made by the political wing of Hamas: it will stop its suicide bombings and mortar attacks so long as Israel halts its political assassinations and stops killing Palestinian civilians. The Izzedine al-Qassam Brigades, the armed wing of Hamas, agrees to put an end to anti-Israeli attacks the following day.

• December 24 - Unless Arafat arrests the assassins of Israeli Tourism Minister Rehavam Zeevi, Israel says it will not let him attend Christmas Mass in Bethlehem. European and U.S. intervention fails.

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• January 4 – A Palestinian freighter, called the Karine-A, loaded with 50 tons of arms – including anti-tank missiles – is intercepted by Israel.

According to claims by Israel, Iran supplied the arms to the Palestinian Authority.

Arafat denies any connection to the weapons.
• Jan 9: Two Hamas militants kill four Israeli soldiers before being shot dead near an Israeli village on the edge of the Gaza Strip.

• January 17 – At a ballroom celebration, a Palestinian gunman from the Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades kills six Israelis and wounds 24 others before being killed.

• January 18 – Two Israeli tanks and an armored personnel carrier park outside Arafat’s Ramallah headquarters, confining him to his office complex a day after a Palestinian gunman bursts into his banquet hall and kills six Israelis.

• January 19 – A radio broadcasting headquarters - that of the Voice of Palestine - and buildings housing Palestinian television services, are destroyed with explosives by Israeli forces. According to Palestinian security sources, all inside the center were evacuated.

• January 22 - Before being shot dead, a Palestinian gunman kills two Israelis and injures 39 when he opens fire on Jaffa Road. The gunman was from Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades.

• January 27 – The first Palestinian woman suicide bomber, Wafa Idris, blows herself up on the busy shopping street, Jaffa Road, in West Jerusalem. One Israeli is killed and dozens wounded. The Al-Aqsa Brigades claim responsibility for the attack.

• January 30 – Two officers of Israel’s Shin Bet, internal security service, are wounded by a suicide bomber - who had previously been an informer - on the border between Israel and the north-western area of the West Bank.

• February 2 – The Israeli government and Palestinian sources confirm that there was a meeting held on January 30 between Prime Minister Sharon and senior Palestinian officials – the first of its kind since Sharon took office. Sharon’s main agenda was to put an end to the terror and violence in the region – no political progress would be made until critical steps were made to halt violence. Sharon expressed that Israel’s security was his main issue while Palestinian officials presented their interests – that of a Palestinian state and the need for Palestinian security.

According to Palestinian sources, the fact that the meeting happened was significant, however, it “did not produce many results.”

• February 3 – The IDF confirms that a day earlier, its tanks entered a Palestinian-controlled area of Gaza while in pursuit of four armed Palestinian gunmen. The pursuit began when the gunmen were found in an area around the Jewish settlements of Gush Katif.

According to the Israeli army, the tanks entering the Palestinian-controlled area of Gaza were used as cover during searches for the gunmen. Its forces left the Palestinian-controlled area today.

According to Palestinian security sources, five Israeli army tanks and a bulldozer had entered the area.
- February 6 - In the Jordan Valley settlement of Hamra, a Palestinian gunman kills three Israelis and injures four. Al-Aqsa claims responsibility71.

- February 8 - In Mei Ami, an agricultural community in northern Israel, two Palestinians die as a car bomb prematurely explodes72.

- February 10 – Before being shot down, two Palestinian gunmen kill two Israeli soldiers, and wound four other people, in Beersheba, near the army’s southern headquarters73.

From the Gaza Strip, Palestinians fire homemade Qassam-2 rockets into the Negev Desert74.

- February 11-13 – In response to the rocket attacks, Israel bombs security compounds in Gaza City. Moreover, searching for the manufacturing and launching sites of the rockets, the IDF initiates a military incursion into Gaza75.

- February 15 – Palestinian mines blow up an Israeli tank. Three crewmembers are killed in the explosion. This is the first time that one of Israel’s highly sophisticated tanks is destroyed.

Over a Jabalya refugee camp in Gaza, Israeli jets attack a Palestinian police compound76.

- February 16 - In the West Bank settlement of Karnei Shomron, a suicide bombing at a shopping mall kills two and leaves 27 wounded. The PFLP claims responsibility for the attack and a third person later died from wounds suffered during the attack77.

The same day, a Palestinian suicide bomber kills himself though he fails to injure anyone else and a second Palestinian attacker is shot dead near Hadera78.

- February 18 – In southern Gaza, a Palestinian shoots dead three Israelis and then kills himself.

In Galilee, a suicide bomber is stopped for questioning and a policeman from a Bedouin village is killed. The Al Aqsa Martyrs Brigades claim responsibility for both attacks79.

- February 19 – In the settlement of Mehula, in the West Bank, a suicide bomber blows himself up at a bus stop80.

In an ambush on an army checkpoint near Ramallah, Palestinian gunmen kill six Israeli soldiers. Three groups claim responsibility – two groups linked with Fatah and the armed wing of Hamas81.

- February 20 – Israel initiates an attack on buildings belonging to the Palestinian Authority. Arafat’s headquarters in Ramallah and the Palestinian Authority compound in Gaza City are attacked. Sixteen Palestinians are killed82.

- February 25 – An Israeli policewoman is killed and ten are wounded when a Palestinian gunman opens fire in the region of Neve Yakov in northern Jerusalem. Al-Aqsa claims responsibility83.
February 27 - At a roadblock near Jerusalem, a female suicide bomber blows herself up, yet fails to inflict any wounds on others.

February 27-March 1 – Near the West Bank towns of Nablus and Jenin, Israeli troops invade two Palestinian refugee camps – the Balata and Jenin refugee camps. Twelve Palestinians and one Israeli soldier are killed. As the fighting continues there are more than 20 Palestinians casualties in total.

This is the beginning of an operation where Israeli forces will enter several cities and refugee camps. According to the IDF, “the refugee camps are central bases for terrorist factors responsible for the murder of scores of Israeli civilians.” The aim is to send a message that there is “no safe haven for terror.”

March 2 – In west Jerusalem, in an ultra-Orthodox neighborhood, a suicide bombing kills nine Israelis and wounds dozens. Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades claims responsibility.

March 3 – Ten Israelis are killed when a sniper assaults an Israeli checkpoint in the West Bank. Al Aqsa Brigades claims responsibility.

March 5 – One person is killed and 11 wounded when a suicide bomber blows himself up on a bus in Afula, in northern Israel. Islamic Jihad claims responsibility for the bus bombing.

In a Tel Aviv restaurant, a Palestinian gunman opens fire, killing 3 Israelis and injuring more than 30 before he himself is shot dead. Al-Aqsa claims responsibility for the shooting.

March 7 – Six are injured in a suicide bombing in the West Bank settlement of Ariel, in a hotel lobby. The PFLP claims responsibility for the bombing.

In the Gaza Strip settlement of Atzmona, five Israeli youths are killed and 18 wounded in a shooting and grenade attack on the dormitories of a pre-military school.

March 7-8 – Several Palestinians are killed as Israel continues advancing into Palestinian-controlled territory. Israelis enter refugee camps near Tulkarem in search of suspected militants.

In the Gaza Strip, Israeli helicopters fire rockets into Jabalaya refugee camp, killing forty Palestinians.

March 9 – In Netanya, a Palestinian gunman opens fire killing three Israelis and injuring 25. Al Aqsa claims responsibility for the shooting.

A suicide bomber blows himself up killing 11 Israelis and injuring an estimated 54 at Jerusalem's Cafe Moment, across the street from Prime Minister Ariel Sharon's official residence. Hamas claims responsibility for the bombing.

March 14 - Israeli tanks begin to withdraw from Ramallah.

The U.S. had been putting pressure on Israel to withdraw.

March 15 – Israeli pull troops out of all Palestinian-controlled West Bank towns, except for Bethlehem.
• March 17 – In the French Hill district of Jerusalem, a suicide bomber blows himself up and injures nine Israelis. In the town of Kfar Saba, in central Israel, a Palestinian gunman wounds one woman before being shot dead95.

• March 20 – Seven Israelis – including four soldiers – are killed and 29 are injured when a suicide bomber blows himself up on an intercity bus near the Arab-Israeli town of Um-el-Fahm. Islamic Jihad claims responsibility96.

• March 21 – In a shopping center, on King George Street in Jerusalem, a suicide bomber kills himself and three Israelis. Seventy are injured. The Al Aqsa Brigades claim responsibility97.

• March 22 - North of the West Bank city of Jenin, a suicide bomber blows himself up, killing himself and injuring an Israeli army officer98.

• March 26 – Yasser Arafat, Hosni Mubarak, King Abdullah II, and 10 other members of the Arab League are missing from the Arab League Summit in Beirut. Sharon had hardened his conditions for Arafat's trip; and Arafat refused to attend the Summit as he feared that Israel would not allow him to return to the West Bank99.

• March 26-28 – In Beirut, Lebanon, delegates from a number of Arab states endorse a plan for peace in the region which is proposed by Saudi Arabia’s Crown Prince Abdullah.

Sharon had hardened his conditions for Arafat's trip; and Arafat refused to attend the Summit as he feared that Israel would not allow him to return to the West Bank99.

• March 27 – In the lobby of a hotel in Netanya, 29 Israelis are killed, and over 100 are injured when a suicide bomber blows himself up as guests sit down to a seder, a traditional Jewish Passover meal, on the first night of Passover. Hamas claims responsibility for the attack, and a spokesman from Hamas is quoted by the Israeli press as saying that “the attack was timed to undermine the Beirut meeting of the Arab League101.”

Israel responds to this attack with "Operation Defensive Shield" - a destructive Israeli offensive in the West Bank102.

• March 29 - By a Jerusalem supermarket, a suicide bombing attack kills three – including the bomber – and leaves 28 wounded. Al-Aqsa claims responsibility.

The Israeli Cabinet declares Arafat an enemy and Israel launches Operation Defensive Shield. Israel sends tanks and bulldozers to attack Arafat's Ramallah compound, confining Arafat and dozens of aides to several rooms. An offensive into areas in the West Bank, under Operation Defensive Shield, Israeli tanks enter Hebron, Nablus, Jenin, Tulkarem, Qalqilya, Ramallah, and Bethlehem, in addition to a number of Palestinian-controlled villages in the West Bank, by April 4.

Arafat vows he would die as a martyr before surrendering.

Ariel Sharon reports that the goal of the Israeli military operation is to uproot terrorists in the areas under control of the Palestinian Authority103.

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March 30 – Killing himself and wounding at least 29, a suicide bomber attacks a cafe in Tel Aviv's entertainment district. Al-Aqsa claims responsibility.

March 31 – An explosion set off by a suicide bomber in a crowded restaurant in Haifa kills 15 Israelis, and injures more than 30. Izzedine al-Qassam – the armed wing of Hamas – claims responsibility.

Later that day, at an emergency medical center south of Jerusalem, a suicide bombing attack killed the bomber and injured one.

According to an announcement by Ariel Sharon, Israel is at war and Yasser Arafat is “the enemy of Israel and the entire free world.”

In March, a total of 259 Palestinians and 130 Israelis were killed. Not all of the deaths were accounted for above.

April 1 – In Jerusalem, a car bomb explosion leaves a suicide bomber dead and seriously injures the policeman who was inspecting the car. The policeman dies of his wounds.

April 2 – Running from Israeli troops, about 30 Palestinian gunmen enter a Franciscan monastery in Bethlehem, breaking into the compound with their weapons. Accompanying the gunmen are about 170 Palestinian police and civilians.

The Palestinian policemen and civilians entering the church were seeking refuge from Israeli forces. The Israeli attack was part of an Israel military offensive against terrorists behind the suicide attacks on Israelis. Several dozen priests, monks and nuns are caught in the compound. Sharon offers Arafat permanent exile.

Arafat announces that he would rather die than leave the West Bank.

April 4 – An Israeli sniper kills a Palestinian bell ringer while walking to the church.


April 5 – 4 priests leave the Church of Nativity.

Anthony Zinni – the U.S. envoy to the region – is the first foreign official to see the Palestinian leader since Israel began its military offensive.

Israeli forces locate and assassinate six senior leaders of Hamas – the militants had escaped from the Jenin refugee camp.

April 7 – Pope John Paul II communicates his serious concern for the priests inside the church.

April 8 – A battle involving gunfire breaks out around the church and Christian leaders ask Israel to pull out of Bethlehem. According to a Franciscan official, Israel violated “every canon of human decency.” Israel said the Palestinians opened fire, wounding two Israeli border policemen.

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• April 10 - Eight people are killed and 22 injured as a suicide bomber attacks a bus by Haifa. Hamas claims responsibility for the attack117.

The IDF enters Ramallah and IDF security forces arrest Akram Kassam - a senior official in Palestinian military intelligence – for his alleged connection with Hamas118.

• April 12 – A suicide bombing attack kills the bomber and six others, and wounds 86 people outside, Machaneh Yehudah, a busy market in Jerusalem. Two Chinese workers were among those killed in the attack. Al-Aqsa claims responsibility. The attack occurs while Secretary of State Colin Powell is on his trip to Israel119.

• April 13 – In an attempt to end the stalemate, Christian leaders meet with Secretary of State Colin Powell. A Palestinian is fatally wounded by gunfire in a hostel nearby the Church of Nativity. Palestinians say he was a civilian. Israel radio says the man was armed and aiming fire at soldiers120.

• April 14 - Israel will allow the Palestinian gunmen in the Church of Nativity to leave the church unharmed on the condition that they agree to either face trial in Israel or accept permanent exile. The gunmen refuse121.

Secretary of State Colin Powell meets with Arafat for more than three hours. According to Secretary of State Powell, the meeting is “useful and constructive;” however, there is no talk of cease-fire imminent122.

• April 15 – Israeli troops and the Palestinian gunmen in the Church of Nativity exchange fire. An Israeli ambulance evacuates two men from the church compound123.

Israeli forces arrest Marwan Barghouti, the West Bank leader of Fatah and Tanzim.

As a leading official of the al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades, he is arrested for assisting in the orchestration of several suicide bombings and shooting attacks, and for participating in shooting attacks as well124.

• April 17 - Israeli soldiers fire and wound a Palestinian who leaves the Church of Nativity – the injured Palestinian is taken to a hospital. A sick priest is also taken to a hospital after being evacuated125.

• April 23 – Negotiations begin concerning the siege at the Church of Nativity.

Palestinians propose that militiamen on Israel's wanted list be taken to the Gaza Strip. Israel maintains that the gunmen either be tried in Israel or be deported126.

• April 24 – While inside the church compound, two Palestinians are shot – one of the men is critically wounded by an Israeli sniper and dies later in a hospital. Two Palestinian police surrender, saying that they are ill127.

• April 25 - Israeli troops detain nine young Palestinian civilians for questioning when they come out of Church of Nativity in Bethlehem128.

While still inside his compound, Arafat approves the sentencing of four men convicted of Israeli Tourism Minister Zeevi’s murder in a provisional court.

Sharon rejects Arafat’s decision. He continues to demand that the murderers be extradited129.
April 26 – Despite Israel’s policy of isolating Arafat, Turkish and Greek foreign ministers visit Arafat at his compound. In Bethlehem, 4 Palestinian policemen - who had been inside the Church of Nativity - surrender. Israeli sniper fire injures 2 Palestinians in the church compound. The two men are evacuated and given medical treatment.

April 27 - An Israeli sniper wounds a Palestinian inside the Church of Nativity compound. The Palestinian is evacuated for medical treatment.

April 28 – Israel’s Cabinet agrees to a U.S. proposal to release Arafat from his confinement. According to the agreement, six men on Israel’s most-wanted list will be transferred from Arafat’s compound to a West Bank prison in Jericho. The men in detention will be supervised by British and U.S. military officials.

Negotiations concerning the siege at the Church of Nativity in Bethlehem fail to bring agreement. Yet, both sides say the talks will continue.

April 29 - Talks over the siege at the Church of Nativity remain at a stalemate.

April 30 – Israelis and Palestinians agree on a deal for 26 to leave the besieged church compound. Twenty-six Palestinians come forward from within the Church of Nativity, though there are still a number of Palestinians inside.

During the month of April, a total of 311 Palestinians and 58 Israelis were killed - mostly during Israel's West Bank offensive.

May 1 - In accordance with the terms of ending Arafat’s isolation, the 6 men on Israel’s most wanted list are transferred to a jail in the West Bank town of Jericho. Israel then withdraws from Arafat's compound.

In Bethlehem, two Palestinian policemen leave the compound - one is injured with a gunshot wound, the other sick.

May 2 - Areas inside the Church of Nativity compound are ablaze and suffer damage when a heavy exchange of fire erupts between Palestinian gunmen within, and Israeli troops on the perimeter of the site. While trying to control the fire, three are injured with burns.

May 3 - Escaping the watch of Israeli troops, foreigners enter the Church of Nativity in Bethlehem. After entering the church compound, the foreigners report the existing conditions inside the church – food is sparse and there is damage near the basilica.

May 6 – Negotiations are underway to end the siege of the Church at Bethlehem.

According to Palestinian officials, there is agreement for the siege to end so long as six to nine Palestinian militants are expelled to Italy, and more than 30 others are transferred to a Gaza prison guarded by American and British jailers. However, Israeli officials report that though progress is significant, the agreement has fallen through as Italy was not informed of its potential involvement in the agreement.
May 7 – 16 Israelis are killed and at least 57 others are injured in a suicide bombing attack in a crowded hall south of Tel-Aviv, in Rishon Lezion. The armed wing of Hamas claims responsibility for the attack.

May 8 – Near Haifa, a man planning a suicide bombing attack is critically injured when the bomb he is handling prematurely explodes.

May 9 – An agreement is reached and announced over the situation in Bethlehem at the Church of Nativity. Italy and Spain will take a number of the militants while Austria, Greece, Luxembourg and Ireland will take the others.

May 10 – Standoff at the Church of Nativity ends. The Palestinians leave the church.

May 19 Disguised as a soldier, a suicide bomber blows himself up in a market in Netanya, killing three people and injuring 59. Hamas and the PFLP both claim responsibility.

May 20 - A suicide bomber blows himself up at a bus stop when a policeman patrolling the border stopped him for questioning. No one is injured.

May 22 - South of Tel Aviv, in Rishon Lezion, two Israelis are killed and 37 are injured when a suicide bomber attacks. The Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades claims responsibility for the attacks.

May 24 - Outside a Tel Aviv disco, guards shoot a suicide bomber dead before he reaches the club. His bomb explodes prematurely killing him and injuring 5.

May 27 - A suicide bombing attack kills two in Petah Tikva. Fifty-three people are injured. The Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades claims responsibility.

June 5 - At the Megiddo junction in northern Israel, a man drives a car packed with explosives into a bus, killing seventeen Israelis in addition to the driver, and wounding 38 people. Islamic Jihad claims responsibility for the attack.

June 6 – Israeli forces storm into Yasser Arafat’s compound in Ramallah and then pull out hours later. Israel is responding to the suicide bombing attack of the previous day.

June 9 – In Gaza, Palestinian security officials arrest two Islamic Jihad leaders.

June 11 – At a restaurant in Herzliya, a suicide bombing attack kills one Israeli and injures 10. While Hamas lauds the attack, no organization officially claims responsibility for the attack.

June 18 - At rush hour, a suicide bomber blows himself up aboard a bus in Jerusalem, killing 19 people and injuring 74. Hamas claimed responsibility for the attack.

June 19 - At a bus stop and popular hitchhiking spot, in the French Hill area of Arab east Jerusalem, a suicide bombing attack kills seven – including the bomber - and wounds 37 others. Al Aqsa claims responsibility for the attack.

In Gaza, in Khan Yunis and in the Jabalia refugee camp, Israeli helicopters attack weapons’ manufacturing plants.

In another incident, Israeli forces discover and demolish a tunnel on the Israeli-Egyptian border used for smuggling weapons. The tunnel paved a course for travel from an area controlled by Israel to territory of
the Palestinian Authority – the IDF has discovered a number of tunnels of this nature by the Israeli-Egyptian border near Rafah. Israeli soldiers came under heavy fire from grenades and machine-guns while carrying out the operation; the unit did not suffer any casualties. 158

- June 24 – President Bush announces his outlined plan for Middle East peace. According to the U.S. President’s speech, the U.S. would support the creation of an independent Palestinian state on the condition that the Palestinian people "elect new leaders, leaders not compromised by terror," alluding to the U.S. position that Arafat should not be included in a reformed Palestinian government 159.

- June 25 - Israeli troops seize control of Hebron. Israeli forces surround the governor's compound, arrest the leader of Palestinian intelligence, and exchange fire with Palestinian forces. Four Palestinian policemen are killed 160.

- June 26 – Saeb Arakat, chief Palestinian negotiator, announces the Palestinian Authority’s plans for presidential and legislative elections to take place in January. According to Palestinian cabinet member, Nabil Sha’ath, present-day authority President Yasser Arafat says he will run for re-election 161.

- June 30 – Israeli special forces kill leader of Hamas’ militant wing, Muhanad al-Taheer, and two other militants. The assassination was carried out in a raid on a house in Nablus 162.

- July 16 – In the West Bank, near the Jewish settlement of Emanuel, Palestinian gunmen open fire on a bus after detonating a roadside bomb. Eight people are killed and 25 are injured. Hamas claims responsibility.

- July 17 – Two Palestinian suicide bombers kill three people in a low-income neighborhood in Tel-Aviv. Islamic Jihad claims responsibility 163.

- July 23 - An Israeli jet dropped a one-ton bomb on a terrorist’s home in Gaza City, killing Sheik Salah Shehada, the leader of the Islamist group Hamas and 14 other people. An estimated 140 were injured 164.

**The Sharm el-Shiekh Summit of October 2000**

The beginning of the Second Intifada did not bring an immediate halt to the peace process. On October 4, the United States attempted to mediate a cease-fire between Israelis and Palestinians in Paris. The sides reached a verbal accord to the effect that their respective commanders be given orders to withdraw troops and restore calm to flash points under their control. The accord, however, did not hold. Another attempt to de-escalate the crisis was made in the Egyptian resort of Sharm el-Sheikh on October 16-17, 2000. The summit was hosted by Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak and was attended by President Clinton, Chairman Arafat, and Prime Minister Barak. At the end of the summit, a communiqué was released according to which Israel and the PA would “issue public statements unequivocally calling for an end to the violence and agreed to take immediate concrete measures to end the confrontation.” 165

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It was further agreed at Sharm el-Sheikh that the three sides would develop, “in consultation with the UN Secretary-General, a committee of fact-finding on the events of the past several weeks and how to prevent their recurrence.” The report came to be known as the Mitchell Report after the commission’s head, former U.S. Senate Majority leader George Mitchell, and was issued more than six months after the summit, on April 30, 2001.

The Taba Negotiations of January 2001

Although Barak had pledged earlier not to negotiate with the Palestinians as long as violence continued, the sides met for a last negotiation effort under the Barak administration in the Egyptian Red Sea resort of Taba. The marathon talks took place from January 21-27, 2001, and dealt with the issues of refugees, security, borders, and Jerusalem. According to some reports, proposed Palestinian maps ceded major Jewish settlements to Israel. Three major border-area Jewish settlement blocs were to be annexed to Israel under the plan, while Israel would partly compensate by carving off pockets of land from its sovereign territory and ceding them to the Palestinians.

In an additional arrangement, Israeli negotiators apparently attempted to devise language that would formally acknowledge the suffering and right to compensation of Palestinian refugees for the first time. Finally, the parties apparently examined leasing arrangements that would grant Israel the right to keep Israeli military posts in the Jordan Valley.

The talks ended in a joint statement in which Israelis and Palestinians characterized the discussions as “unprecedented in their positive atmosphere and expression of mutual willingness to meet the national, security and existential needs of each side.” At the same time, the time window for prompt action had virtually shut. The statement also said that “the political timetable prevented reaching an agreement with regard to all the issues,” alluding to Israel’s prime ministerial elections that were scheduled for February 6, 2001. Besides the pressing timetable, the Barak administration faced strong internal Israeli opposition for holding negotiations ‘under fire’, which only grew after the killing of two Israeli civilians in the West Bank while the negotiations were held.
An End to Peace Negotiations

By this time, however, the Israelis and Palestinians had already been at war for nearly five months. Prime Minister Barak’s popularity had declined along with Israeli support for the peace process and the Israeli elections brought a new government to power. On February 6, 2001, Ariel Sharon was elected as Israel’s eleventh prime minister. He was sworn into office on March 7, after having established a national unity government in which the Labor Party was assigned two key portfolios: the Foreign Ministry under Shimon Peres, and the Defense portfolio under Binyamin (Fouad) ben-Eliezer. Sharon, who defeated Barak with the largest margin in Israeli electoral history, had run a campaign promising security to Israelis, and reiterated his primary objective in a speech that immediately followed his swearing-in ceremony. Sharon made a pledge not to negotiate with the Palestinians ‘under fire’ that seemed to leave little room for a relatively quick return to the negotiation table. Indeed, except for a few low-key meetings, some of which included Sharon’s son Omri, there were few contacts between Israeli and Palestinian officials.

The end result was that Israeli-Palestinian relations deteriorated steadily as the cycle of violence continued. On the Palestinian side, this escalation included ongoing cross-border and drive-by shootings, the initiation of mortar attacks against Israeli communities, and a campaign of terrorism that included at least ten car bombs and suicide bombings from the time that the Taba talks were suspended. On the Israeli side, it included assassinations of suspected terrorist leaders, violent settler vigilantism, closures on Palestinian towns and villages, destruction of Palestinian houses and the uprooting of trees, and a military response to attacks that included the use of helicopter gunships and F-16 attacks, leading to continuous accusations of ‘inappropriate’ and ‘excessive’ use of force by the IDF.

Asymmetric Values and Asymmetric Warfare

There was nothing inevitable about this slow transition from a peace process to a war process. At the same time, asymmetric warfare is almost always the result of fundamentally asymmetric values and conflicts where one or both sides comes to believe these differences
cannot be reconciled through negotiations alone. This is certainly the case in the Second Intifada. The fighting that began in September 2000, and the earlier failure of the Camp David summit, exposed the fact that Israelis and Palestinians still had deeply asymmetric goals and expectations, not only over key issues Jerusalem, but over many of the final settlement issues.

In retrospect, the period between the Oslo Accords and the beginning of the Second Intifada led the way towards war both because of a history of frustrating delays and outbreaks of violence, and because of other times when facade of hopes and good intentions was substituted for serious negotiations over final settlement issues. Very real progress was made, but it occurred too slowly and often focused on minor issues while disguising the depth of the failure to shape a common understanding of just how serious the remaining differences were.

At the same time, it failed because too much security was promised to both sides at the start of the negotiations and too little was delivered. The peace benefits were also largely one-sided. Israel made major economic progress that was not accompanied by major benefits for the Palestinians. Aid to Arafat and the Palestinian Authority often was wasted, used to buy political influence, or stolen. Settlement activity continued regardless of which Israeli Prime Minister was in power. Both sides had strong political elements which either rejected a peace or rejected a peace that was just to the other side. Arguments over territory bogged down in details and were too slow to address fundamental issues. The peoples on both sides were never really educated to fully understand the other side’s values and the limits to the other side’s ability to make concessions. The average Israeli and Palestinian never really came to understand the level of compromises that would have to be made. Ultimately, the peace process became a race against a deteriorating political reality in which the negotiations were either going to collapse, or the sheer momentum of rapid negotiation over fundamental differences had to push both sides to build sudden bridges across years of delay.

**Asymmetric Values: The Failure to Remember that Peace is Made Between Enemies**

In looking back, it is difficult to blame the leaders or negotiators on either side for the events that occurred at any given time. In fact, they came remarkably close to creating a framework that could bridge their differences in spite of continuing violence and differences over security issues, and internal divisions within Israel and the Palestinian movement. It seems equally pointless to blame the US and other outside negotiators who struggled to bring both sides
together. No outsider could compel either side to give up its values, or to move towards serious final settlement talks before it was ready.

The steps that Israel proposed at Camp David and then at Taba went further than Israel had ever gone before, but they were not a return to the June 4, 1967 boundary that the Palestinians sought. They did not meet Palestinian expectations regarding East Jerusalem, the Mosques on the Temple Mount, Palestinian sovereignty, borders, an Israeli military presence in the West Bank and Gaza, or treatment of the Israeli settlements in the Occupied Territories. And they certainly did not meet Palestinian expectations regarding the right of return of Palestinian refugees.

The Israelis, on the other hand, had their own expectations, and the Palestinian negotiators did not make the concessions that could meet them. The Israelis felt that the Palestinians failed to understand the limits of the right of return, and had never really fully accepted the legitimacy of the Jewish state. The felt that the Palestinians did not accept the adjustments that had to be made to ensure Israel could preserve its internal and external security, and to reflect the realities on the ground that had development in the thirty-three years between 1967 and 2000. They had their own goals for the future of Jerusalem. They also felt that the Palestinian side had done little to prepare the Palestinian people for peace. It had not changed its internal propaganda and education efforts to reject violence, and it had not been willing to take the political risk of preparing the Palestinian Diaspora for the sharp limits on the right of return.

The end result was that in 2000, the negotiators on both sides could not wait to negotiate as the climate for peace deteriorated, but were forced to try and reach a final settlement without really preparing their respective political systems to accept one. Some Israeli leaders on the political left, and to a larger extent on the political right, rejected Barak’s far-reaching concessions. To those Israelis, Barak had not only crossed a negotiation position, but a genuine security ‘red line’ to peace that would leave Israel without the strategic depth they claimed would be critical in any future attack from the east. In fact, Prime Minister Barak almost certainly went further at Camp David and Taba than the Israeli people were willing to go, but did so without truly bridging the gap between Israeli and the Palestinians.
Asymmetric Values and the Pressures for Conflict

It is scarcely surprising that violence originated on the Palestinian side. Israel’s values centered around the search for security against foreign and domestic enemies, putting an end to terrorism, and winning Israel lasting security in dealing with both the Palestinians and the rest of the Arab world. At the same time, Israel wanted undisputed control over all of the urban area of Jerusalem, acceptance of the creation of adjustments to its 1967 boundaries that gave it an improved security position and sovereignty over a “greater Jerusalem,” a lasting security presence in a demilitarized West Bank and Gaza, control over its most of its settlements and security guarantees for the rest. It wanted to preserve the Jewish character of Israel and sharply limit – if not prevent – any return by Palestinians to Israel proper.

Israel was, however, the “have” power. It had vastly superior conventional military strength and occupied virtually all of the major areas in dispute. It could take reprisals for attacks on Israelis and use military force, as well as impose economic sanctions and limit Palestinian movement. There were also deep underlying political, economic, demographic, and religious pressures on the Palestinian side. They were occupied, the “losers” in practical economic terms, governed badly and by a Palestinian Authority that manipulated violence rather than rejected, and subjected to a wide range of petty day-to-day Israeli discrimination and harassment. Even when Israel had leaders sincerely committed to peace, the settlements continued, and other governments manipulated the peace process as a political weapon.
The Problem of Palestinian Sovereignty and the Final Settlement Issues

The uncertain evolution of a sovereign Palestinian government and the slow progress towards a “final settlement” were other key issues. The “final settlement” negotiations over Jerusalem and the rest of the West Bank were supposed to begin in 1996, and lay the groundwork for resolving the issue of Palestinian sovereignty. However, Israel and the Palestinian Authority made little progress after September 1995 and only token progress in the Wye River Memorandum concluded in November 1998. While progress was made in 1999 and 2000, the failure of the Camp David talks in the summer of 2000 and Israeli-Palestinian clashes beginning in September 2000 have left the West Bank’s future unresolved.

This does not mean that there has not been major progress towards creating a Palestinian state. The Palestinian Authority has a functional chief executive and an elected 82 member Palestinian Council. The Palestinian Authority has the power to tax, to zone land, to control some aspects of communications, to control local radio and TV broadcasts, to regulate many aspects of commerce, to issue passports, to have foreign currency reserves, to enter into some types of international agreements, and to set up courts and enforce their judgments over Palestinians.

Nevertheless, Israel and the Palestinian Authority still have not resolved the issue as to whether the Palestinians are to become a fully independent and sovereign state, and the Palestinian Authority continued to threaten that it will declare statehood without Israeli approval. These issues were an important source of tension at the time the Second Intifada began. At an April 1999 meeting, the Palestinian Authority discussed unilaterally declaring statehood by 2000. At a later stage, Arafat set September 13, 2000 as the date by which Palestinian independence would be declared in the event that no permanent status agreement would be reached by then. He later backed off, partly due to heavy international pressure to postpone the declaration.

During the prime ministerial election campaign, Ariel Sharon had kept his position regarding a Palestinian state, and of what a final status with the Palestinian might look like, relatively vague. In an interview with the Israeli daily Maariv published a month after his election, Sharon conceded that he was willing to recognize a demilitarized Palestinian state in less than half the size of the West Bank—considerably less than what his predecessor, Ehud Barak, had apparently offered at Camp David. Sharon referred to Barak’s offer to cede to the

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Palestinians over 90 percent of the West Bank as a "horrible mistake," and told the newspaper that he was willing to offer the Palestinians up to 42 percent of the West Bank as part of a peace deal.171

Barak, in turn, was considerably more receptive to negotiations over statehood than his predecessor, Binyamin Netanyahu, had been.172 Barak said in an NBC interview on July 18, 1999, that he did not rule out the possibility of a Palestinian state, but asked Arafat to delay a declaration until after a final settlement.173 His receptiveness was also conditional on the success of peace negotiations. Events since September 2000 have created the dilemma that in some ways they have made a unilateral Palestinian declaration more likely, but under conditions where it will be tied to a second Intifada. At the same time, Israeli military actions have gravely weakened the Palestinian Authority and led to the occupation of Palestinian towns and cities, while Israel has pushed strongly for a kind of Palestinian political reform that would remove Arafat and leave the Palestinians without a strong leader. Israel also seems to be moving towards trying to execute a separation plan, isolation of Gaza, and fragmentation of the West Bank at the same moment the Palestinians might seek to create a state.

Regardless of what happens in terms of any unilateral Palestinian declaration of sovereignty, it will not make moving towards peace any easier and any such government must still address all of the underlying issues affecting the West Bank that existed before the Second Intifada. Israel and the Palestinian Authority, or government will still have to work with other Arab governments to resolve the rights and treatment of Palestinians outside the West Bank and Gaza. A decision will have to be made regarding what rights the Palestinian entity will have to develop military or paramilitary forces.

Any declaration of government, and indeed any reform of the Palestinian Authority, will also leave more serious problems in the West Bank which all have security implications and where Israelis and the Palestinians also have asymmetric values:

- Demographics and population growth.
- Poor economic conditions and high unemployment for Palestinians.
- The threat of major immigration to areas controlled by the Palestinian Authority or government by Palestinian refugees, and the strain such immigration would put on the water supply.
- Control over Jerusalem and adjustments to Israel’s boundaries.
The strategic value of the Jordan River area, which makes Israel reluctant to give up control over its security.

• Competition for water, which is compounded by the fact Israelis now use three times more water per capita than Palestinians.

• Resolving the issue of whether there should be any form of confederation with Jordan. Such a confederation now seems extremely unlikely, but the issue remains and would have a major potential impact on the future role of the Jordanian military and Jordan’s role in the peace process.

The Problem of Demographics and the Right of Return

As has been touched upon earlier, Palestinian demographics present security problems in terms of both military manpower and economic pressure. The US Census Bureau estimates that the Palestinian population in Gaza rose from only 250,000 in 1950 to 343,000 in 1970, and 643,000 in 1990. It puts the population at 1,132,000 in 2000. Although the population growth rate is projected to decline from 4.0% in 2000 to 2.6% in 2025, it is projected to grow to 1,651,000 in 2010, 2,260,000 in 2020, and rise steadily to 4,209,000 by 2050. Similarly, the population in the West Bank, was from 771,000 in 1950, dropped to 696,000 in 1970, rose to 1,255,000 in 1990 and was 2,020,000 in 2000. The annual birth is projected to drop from 3.4% in 2000 to 2.0% in 2025, but the population is estimated to rise to 2,765,000 in 2010, 3,501,000 in 2020, and 5,580,000 in 2050. These figures do not include any return of population from the Palestinian Diaspora. Estimates by the World Bank indicate that the total population of the West Bank and Gaza doubled between 1980 and 1996, and will double again by 2010.

In contrast, Israel had a population of 1,286,000 in 1950. This rose to 2,903,000 in 1970 and 5,842,000 in 2000. The Israel population growth rate is projected to drop from 1.7% in 2000 to 0.7% in 2025, and the population is projected to rise to 6,645,000 in 2010, 7,315,000 in 2020, and 8,517,000 in 2050. This compares with a total population in both Gaza and the West Bank at 3,152,000 in 2000, and an estimated total at 4,416,000 in 2010, 5,761,000 in 2020, and 9,789,000 in 2050.

This population growth poses daunting problems for the political and economic success of any peace settlement. It also compounds the problem of giving Palestinians outside the West Bank and Gaza any right of return. Estimates indicate that there are up to 1.5 million people outside the West Bank and Gaza that are registered as Palestinian refugees and who might claim the right of return, and the UN has registered a total of over three million refugees.

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In 1999, the CIA estimated that this total included 367,610 Palestinians in Lebanon (200,707 in refugee camps). This total amounted to 10.5% of the country’s population and had an annual growth rate of 2.9%). There were 370,035 Palestinians in Syria (2.6% of the country’s population with an annual growth rate of 3.0%, and 107,931 in camps), and 1,487,449 people in Jordan (33.9% of the country’s population with an annual growth rate of 3.6%, and 272,257 in camps). There are over 562,000 registered refugees in the West Bank and East Jerusalem (30.1% of the population with an annual growth rate of nearly 5.0%, and 150,904 in camps). There were over 785,000 registered refugees in Gaza (77% of the population with an annual growth rate of over 3.5%, and 427,840 in camps). 176

The total Palestinian population in Jordan is projected to increase from 1.9 million in 1995 to 2.3 million in 2000, 2.7 million in 2005, and 3.1 million in 2010. The total Palestinian population in Lebanon is projected to increase from 0.39 million in 1995 to 0.46 million in 2000, 0.53 million in 2005, and 0.6 million in 2010. The total Palestinian population in Syria is projected to increase from 0.36 million in 1995 to 0.41 million in 2000, 0.46 million in 2005, and 0.51 million in 2010. 177

These demographic realities make the problems of agreeing on any form of Palestinian “right of return” a part of any peace agreement an extremely serious problem. It is already doubtful that a Palestinian state can develop a viable economy under the pressure it faces from indigenous population growth, and water will be a critical problem, as well as for Israel and Jordan. Meaningful compensation for nearly 3.8 million refugees would also involve massive costs. Both sides also still are bitterly divided over the extent to which the refugees fled because of Israeli military action and persecution, on their own, or because Arab leaders encouraged them to do so. There is also the fact that most such Palestinians have never seen any part of “Palestine.” More than 70% of the refugees have been born since their parents left Israel, and this raises questions as to whether refugee status can be inherited.

These pressures help explain why Israel is not prepared to absorb more Palestinians into Israel proper. Israelis on both sides of the political spectrum profess that they refuse to agree to a settlement that will allow for the return of large numbers of Palestinians to Israel proper for fear of being demographically outnumbered by the Arab population. In a telling example, Yossi Beilin, a Labor Party member generally considered a political dove, told the Israeli daily Ha’aretz in an interview on June 15, 2001: “I definitely did not agree, and will not agree, to a permanent settlement that will ultimately worsen the demographic balance inside sovereign

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Israel. That is my sharpest red line. On that issue I am absolutely tough. I am generous geographically but tough demographically. A Jewish majority within the sovereign [borders of the] state of Israel is the main thing as far as I am concerned. For me it is the most important thing.¹⁷⁸

Regardless of what happens, there will be massive development and absorption problems in Gaza and the West Bank. Both are under extreme demographic pressure and have few prospects of getting the water, development funds, and infrastructure they need to deal with their current population. At the same time, it is far from clear that Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria are prepared to deal with the political, social, and economic problems of moving the refugees out of the camps into their territories and fully assimilating them as citizens with local or dual nationality. Some experts have proposed compensation, but there are serious questions as to who should be compensated and how it would be paid out in a region where corruption is not totally unknown and refugees have little ability to appeal to governments and the courts.

At the same time, questions arise as to what will happen to the Palestinians outside Israel and the Gaza and the West Bank if they are left as refugees or in some form of political limbo. This could well lead to new forms of terrorism if the issue is not resolved. Many groups representing Palestinian refugees have long demanded the right of return and/or compensation from Israel, as have the registered refugees in the West Bank and Gaza. Palestinian refugees help fund and support the Palestinian Authority, secular Palestinian movements, Hamas, and the PIJ. They sometimes infiltrate into Gaza and the West Bank as “freedom fighters, and sometimes secular extremist/terrorist movements. Others, particularly Palestinians in Lebanon, might be organized into a paramilitary force that could attack across the border into Israel proper or infiltrate into the West Bank, possibly with support from Hizbollah, Syria and/or Iran.

One other factor must be kept in mind. Some Israelis still talk of Jordan as a Palestinian state, and speculate about massive Palestinian movements from Gaza and the West Bank to Jordan. Like all Arab states in the region, Jordan already faces an indigenous population crisis. Jordan’s population was 561,000 in 1950, 1,503,000 in 1970, and 3,262,000 in 1990. Its annual population growth rate is projected to drop from 3.1% in 2000 to 1.7%, but its population is projected to grow to 6,486,000 in 2010, 7,920,000 in 2020, and 11,773,000 in 2050. Its economy is already extremely weak and it must share its main aquifers with Israel and the Palestinians. A massive new influx of refugees is more likely to create a lasting economic and demographic crisis than a Palestinian state.

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The Problem of Economics

Economics are both an incentive for a Second Intifada, a popular uprising, and a major problem for any peace settlement. Currently, the Palestinian population on the West Bank has relatively low living standards and has seen little benefit from the seven years of peace negotiations following the Oslo Accords. Per capita income is about $2,000 -- much higher than Gaza, but much lower than Israel’s $18,300. While some figures put Palestinian unemployment as low as 12%, true unemployment and disguised unemployment on the West Bank can vary from around 35% to 40%, depending upon political conditions.

Although little firm evidence about the impact of the Second Intifada on the Palestinian economy is available, there is little doubt that the sanctions imposed on territories under Palestinian control have drastically reduced economic activity and living standards of the Arab population in the West Bank and Gaza.

The June 2001 West Bank and Gaza Update of the World Bank Group (WBG) published some data on the impact of the Second Intifada on the economy, often quoting estimates by the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics (PCBS). According to the World Bank Group (WBG), the West Bank was more severely affected by Israeli closures than Gaza. The closures have generated the so-called ‘new poor’, 57 percent of whom are to be found in Gaza. 40 percent of the total number of the new poor are concentrated in Khan Yunis and Gaza City. 43 percent of the “new poor” are located in the West Bank, a third of them concentrated in the Governorate of Hebron. The WBG estimates that it is in the poorest regions that the largest numbers of ‘new poor’ can be observed, due to the fact that those regions are the most vulnerable to negative economic shocks.179

According to estimates of the World Bank, GDP per capita shrank by approximately 10 percent in 2000 compared to 1999, constituting the sharpest drop in real GDP since the beginning of the peace process. The sharp drop was largely due to an extremely weak fourth quarter of 2000, which pulled down the average for the year as a whole. Gross National Income (GNI) is estimated to have dropped by 12 percent in 2000 compared to 1999, since remittances have vanished almost entirely in the last quarter of 2000.180

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By the end of the first quarter of 2001, the dramatic increase in unemployment seen during the first three months of the Second Intifada had apparently come to a halt. Data provided by the PCBS has shown some signs of stabilization during the first quarter of 2001, as the number of employed persons has increased by approximately 10,000—an improvement that should be seen against the backdrop of an earlier decline of approximately 175,000 from the third to the fourth quarter of 2001. During the first quarter of 2001, some 55,000 Palestinians worked in Israel—less than half the level prior to the Second Intifada. The number of persons employed in territories under Palestinian control declined by 79,000 during the fourth quarter of 2000, and by an additional 16,000 in the first quarter of 2001, returning the level of domestic employment back to what it was in 1998.  

Income in the PA has dropped significantly since the outbreak of the Second Intifada. According to the PCBS survey, the median household income by March 2001 was almost 50 percent below the level prior to the outbreak of the violence, and 64 percent of the population in the Palestinian territories are currently living below the poverty line. To cope with the drop in income, households have been forced to sell family jewelry, postpone paying bills and borrow money. Some households turned towards agricultural production of basic food products or have emigrated. Both strategies hamper economic growth in the future.

Private investment has also suffered considerably during the crisis, especially in the tourism and export-oriented sectors. The crisis has also affected the fiscal situation of the Palestinian Authority, as revenues have decreased drastically due to a drop in economic activity and private consumption, as well as Israel’s suspension of transfers of funds accrued to the PA. As of July 15, 2002, it is estimated that since the start of the Second Intifada, Israel was withholding more than $600,000,000 in export tax receipts that the Palestinians claimed was due to them. It should be stressed that the given figure is an estimation – Israel has a developed economy while the PA struggles to develop economic infrastructure – and particularly in times of war, it is unclear as to how much one side owes the other. As of July 29, 2002, still in the midst of violence and conflict, Israel planned to hand over $15 million in withheld tax revenue to the Palestinian Authority. However, there are conflicting reports as to whether the financial
transaction had taken place as promised, emphasizing the difficulty in monitoring actions and business dealings in times of war. Finally, domestic tax collection has become less efficient in the Palestinian Authority.  

After the first Oslo agreement, World Bank studies recommended a minimum of $1.35 billion in short-term investment, and $1.6 billion in long-term investment to improve living standards in the West Bank and Gaza over the next five years. Such investment would not, however, have made more than a limited reduction in the gap between Palestinian and Israeli living standards and estimates in 2000 came closer to $10 billion. The figure now may be closer to $15-20 billion and finding jobs and career opportunities for both older Palestinians and the large and volatile younger Palestinian population would still be a major problem.

Even the most favorable projections of economic development in the region indicate that there is only a moderate chance that the living standards of Palestinians already in East Jerusalem, the West Bank, and Gaza can be improved at a rate that will reduce the security problems inherent in the gap between their present per capita income and that of Israelis. Any major immigration by Palestinians from outside the West Bank and Gaza would sharply increase the economic problem, while major immigration to Israel will also mean more competition for water.
The Problem of Jerusalem

The final settlement negotiations have shown that Israel and the Palestinian Authority differ fundamentally over control of Jerusalem and the extent to which Israel will seek substantial adjustments in its pre-1967 boundaries. As recently as the spring of 1999, former Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu continued plans to make a permanent Jewish settler enclave in Hebron, 80% of which has been turned over to Palestinian rule in 1997. While Prime Minister Barak advanced a far more generous proposal at Camp David, neither side has as yet shown that it can compromise over control of the Temple Mount, East Jerusalem, or the greater Jerusalem area. The Hebron issue is as contentious with Israelis as Palestinians and led to new incidents of violence on both sides in September through November 2000.

Religion is always a problem between Israeli and Palestinian. Tolerance is always tentative, and passions run deep. This reality became all too clear during the fighting in September through November 2000, which rapidly made religion a major issue, as it did in a very different way during the siege of the Church of the Nativity in the spring of 2002. There are many areas and shrines to fight over, including Hebron, Bethlehem/Rachel’s tomb, and Joseph’s tomb, but Jerusalem is as much a matter of religion as one of territory.

Both violence and a peace process must deal with a deeply divided city. There are approximately 200,000 Palestinians with ID cards registered in Jerusalem, while approximately only 86,000 Palestinians actually live in the city. (about 2,400 Jews and 27,000 Palestinians live in the old city. The Israeli population of the greater Jerusalem area is approximately 433,000, with two-thirds of the population actually in Jerusalem. Israelis have long been moving into settlements that surround Arab East Jerusalem in order to separate the Arabs of Jerusalem and those of the West Bank, while the Palestinians had built around 5,000 houses in the area without Israeli permission by late 1999 – around 2,500 of which had pending demolition orders.

The present area of East Jerusalem is about 10 times the size it was under Jordanian administration in 1967. It extends to Kafr Aqab, about 10 kilometers to the north of the old boundary, and then about two kilometers west of the old boundary -- almost as far west as Abu
Dis. It extends to Umm Tuba and Har Homa in the south, roughly four kilometers to the south of the old boundary. As a result, modern East Jerusalem is larger in territory than the entire Jewish-occupied area around Jerusalem was in 1967. East Jerusalem, however, also now includes about 100,000 Palestinian residents, and isolated Palestinian villages like Um Tuba and Sur Baher.  

Demographics again are a problem. The Jewish population only grew by one percent in 1998, while the Palestinian population had a natural increase of around 3.5%. Israel attempted to reduce the number of Palestinians with Jerusalem ID cards between 1995 and 1999 – although it claims to have confiscated only around 2,800 ID cards while Palestinian sources talk about over 11,000. As a result, it is almost impossible for the IDF to secure the Arab areas in East Jerusalem or the greater Jerusalem area without either urban warfare or the forced evacuation of large number of Palestinians.

Until the Camp David summit in July 2000, Israel insisted on undivided control over Jerusalem and its Israeli-occupied suburbs, although this can mean very different things. The Israeli government has not yet defined precisely how much of “greater Jerusalem” it will seek to retain. Former Prime Minister Rabin made it clear that he regarded control of Jerusalem as non-negotiable in a speech he gave on October 25, 1995, at Israeli’s celebration of the 3,000th anniversary of King David’s establishment of Jerusalem as the capital of Israel. He told an audience of Israeli lawmakers and leading Jewish figures that, “There is only one Jerusalem. For us, Jerusalem is not a subject of compromise, and there is no peace without Jerusalem. Jerusalem ... was ours, is ours, and will be ours forever...” This position was also endorsed by former Prime Minister Peres and former Prime Minister Netanyahu.

It is also an issue where Israel since had strong US political support. On October 24, 1995, the US Senate voted 93 to 5 to move the US Embassy to Jerusalem by 1999. However, President Clinton exercised his waiver authority under this act on June 18, 1999, saying that the issue of Jerusalem should be resolved through direct negotiation between Israel and the Palestinians, and the US should not take steps that would prejudice the negotiations or make them harder. However, he implied the United States would support moving the capital after the failure of the Camp David talks in the summer of 2000.
Clinton’s successor in the White House, President George W. Bush, continued with the Jerusalem policy of the previous administration. On June 11, 2001, he signed a waiver that postponed any relocation of the U.S. Embassy in Israel from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem for six months for reasons of U.S. national security. Bush maintained, however, that he remained committed to moving the embassy in the future.\footnote{196}

Prime Minister Barak did offer significant compromises at Camp David, but the violence that broke out in September 2000 has shown there are few indications that the Palestinians are willing to accept the Israeli position. As far as Jerusalem is concerned, the long duration of the Second Intifada—the crisis was in its ninth month in June 2001—and the electoral victory of Ariel Sharon are not Regardless of the justice of the arguments on both sides, and the legality of the issue, this is perhaps the most difficult single case of asymmetric values, and one where it is far easier to pose innovative solutions and compromises, or legal and historical arguments, than create a realistic basis for a mutually agreed settlement. Going beyond Camp David requires one or both sides to accept a result that has so far been fundamentally unacceptable.

The problems in reconciling the Israeli and Palestinian positions are compounded by the fact that Jerusalem is not easy to define in either religious or geographic terms. The old city involves complex religious issues regarding the control of Jewish and Muslim holy places. The Jewish and Palestinian population of greater Jerusalem now extends far beyond the former administrative boundaries of Jerusalem and involves suburbs and settlements beyond the boundaries of several Palestinian cities.

This fundamental asymmetry in goals and values presents problems regardless of whether a state of violence exists, or both sides can negotiate a peace. “Jerusalem” will remain a large area with very complex demographics and economies. Metropolitan Jerusalem has a population of nearly half a million, and spreads over more than 100 square kilometers (42 square miles) of hills and valleys.\footnote{197} East Jerusalem, in the West Bank, occupies about 67 square kilometers. In addition, the Israeli-occupied suburbs in the West Bank now extend beyond Ramallah and Bethlehem. There are four major Jewish settlement complexes in the greater Jerusalem metropolitan areas, including Betar-Gush Etzion-Tekoa in the south (16,713 Israelis), Ma’aleh Adumim-Mishor Adumim in the East (21,348 Israelis), Beit El-Kochav Ha Shahar in the north (7,573 Israelis) and Givon-Beit Horon in the west (17,644 Israelis). Israeli settlements as far away from the old city as Beit Shemesh in the west, Almog junction in the east, Ofra in the north, and Tekoa in the south are still within a 30-minute commute of modern Jerusalem.\footnote{198}
Given the background, it seems all too possible that a prolonged Second Intifada could eventually lead to complex mix of battles of containment and low-level urban warfare over a broad area around and within Jerusalem. Any such battles would also mean dealing with the fact that the Israeli definition of “Jerusalem” is likely to remain at least 60% larger than the Jerusalem of 1967, and the Israeli controlled area around Jerusalem could grow to include much more territory during the course of a long struggle. Many Israeli analysts believe it is likely to include a zone that begins at Gush Etzion in the south and extends north to Givat Ze’ev, and some Israelis have argued that it should extend to Beit El. This, however, would mean dealing with municipal areas that mix at least 160,000 Jews and 150,000 Palestinians, and leave at least 64,000 Israelis in settlements in the greater Jerusalem area.\(^{199}\)

Given the violence that broke out in September 2000, any Israeli Prime Minister is now more likely to insist on firm ‘red lines’ in making any final peace deal with the Palestinians: Israel will not withdraw all the way to its pre-1967 borders, Israeli concessions on Jerusalem will remain limited, most Jewish settlers will remain in West Bank blocs, and no foreign army will be allowed west of the Jordan River.\(^{200}\)

**The Problem of West Bank Security**

The West Bank also presents another set of serious security issues for Israel and the Palestinians in both a Second Intifada and in creating and enforcing a peace. The Jordan River Valley forms a natural security barrier between Israel and Jordan, and effectively acts as a giant anti-tank ditch. Giving up this defensive line affects the amount of time Israel has to mobilize and therefore its ability to ensure control over the West Bank in the event of a war. This is why former Prime Minister Rabin stated that Israel would never give up control of this area in an October 5, 1995 speech to the Knesset shortly before his assassination. Similar statements could have been heard from Barak and Sharon. During the election campaign of former Prime Minister Ehud Barak, preventing a foreign army from entering territory west of the Jordan Valley was one of the former chief of staff’s pronounced ‘red lines.’ Ariel Sharon has always declared his opposition to relinquishing the Jordan Valley altogether, although he has kept direct comments regarding the Jordan Valley to a minimum after having been elected prime minister.

These reasons explain why the IDF will maintain a major presence in the area as long as the Second Intifada lasts and will seek to remain as part of any peace settlement. The ability to occupy key areas in the West Bank gives the IDF major military advantages. Israel now occupies

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“Green Areas” that run through the Jordan Valley and that are approximately 60 kilometers long from north to south and 10 kilometers deep. Israel also has created two security corridors from west to east that separate the Palestinian controlled areas into four parts. One runs from the Ariel settlement to the Shilo settlement to the Jordan Valley and separates the Ramallah and Nablus-Jenine areas. The other runs from East Jerusalem through the Ma’ale Adumim settlement to the Jordan and separates Ramallah, Bethlehem-Hebron, and Jericho. As a result, the IDF can control virtually every key communication route and junction and will do so in a prolonged confrontation.

From a Palestinian viewpoint, the ideal answer is simple: a return to the 1967 boundaries, or something very close to it, and full Palestinian sovereignty. The Palestinians have every incentive to seek to create a contiguous state on the West Bank, and obtain the return of as much territory as possible. This is not merely a matter of percentages or UN resolutions; it is a matter of status and security for the Palestinians, and their ability to limit the growth of Israeli settlements.

It is sometimes said that the Palestinians want peace with dignity and sovereignty while Israel wants peace with security and separation. The problem is that both sets of demands are just in theory, but may not be achievable in practice. From an Israeli viewpoint, each sacrifice of control over the routes up to the heights above the West Bank, and down to Israel’s pre-1967 territories, reduces both this control over the West Bank, and the ease with which the IDF can deploy, increasing the potential risk of a Jordanian, Palestinian, or Syrian force being able to deploy into the heights. Control of access of the heights above the Jordan River Valley provides a major military advantage in terms of sensor coverage, warning, artillery operations, and armored warfare.

This explains why Israel has long resisted giving up control of the Jordan River area north of Jericho, positions on the heights on the West Bank that provide sensor and intelligence coverage of Jordan and the West Bank, and a substantial strip of the West Bank to the east of its 1967 boundary south of Tulkarm and north of Ramallah. Former Prime Minister Rabin indicated in his October 5, 1995 speech that Israel would retain a security border in the Jordan Valley and annex the west bank of the Jordan and the settlement blocs of Ma’ale Adumim, Givat Zeev, and Gush Etzion around Jerusalem. This would put the homes of about 48,000 Jews, or one-third of the current settlers, under full Israeli sovereignty.  

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At the same time, securing the West Bank does incur costs to the IDF, and costs that will steadily increase if the Second Intifada continues or any peace settlement or ceasefire is broken by sporadic violence. Control over the West Bank means dealing with complex and sometimes overlapping enclaves of both Palestinians and Israeli settlers. Securing any strong point or settlement can leave the IDF and settlers isolated in any given battle, and a major West Bank-wide Second Intifada would force the IDF to disperse into a wide range of areas. The Palestinians are relatively easy to isolate in much of the West Bank, but the Israelis are extremely sensitive to casualties. This, in turn, reinforces each side’s incentives to adopt asymmetric tactics and methods of warfare.

This is another reason why adequate security issues will be equally important in terminating a conflict. If peace negotiations do resume, it seems likely that Israel will seek to occupy part of the West Bank along the upper part of the Jordan River, and keep the Jordan River Valley as its security border.

Even though the Camp David talks have shown Israel is willing to make some concessions in this regard, Israel is virtually certain to demand an agreement that limits the growth of Palestinian paramilitary capabilities to levels only slightly higher than those allowed in the 1995 accords. Israel is likely to demand that no regular Palestinian or Jordanian military forces be permitted in the West Bank area, or deployed closer to Israel than Jordanian forces are today. Israel will almost certainly demand that there be fixed force limitations, force deployment and disengagement agreements, limits on the nature and size of military exercises, and warning and pre-notification agreements.

Yet, on the other hand, a Palestinian entity or state is likely to resist every such concession and compromise that does not go back to the 1967 border, and seek the maximum amount of flexibility and sovereignty. This means that even a successful compromise could be highly unstable for years, and that extremists on both sides are likely to try to undermine a peace with terrorism and violence.202
The Problem of Water

Control of the West Bank and Gaza involves serious water issues that can easily affect any future fighting or move towards peace. Water is both an economic weapon in war, and a key economic problem in peace. Israel clearly controls most of the flow of water to the Gaza, but the division and control of water between Israelis and Palestinians is particularly visible and contentious in the West Bank area. While various reports differ significantly over the amounts of water involved, a large system of mountain aquifers supplies both the West Bank and Israel’s pre-1967 territory. This system of aquifers can supply about 970 million cubic meters of renewable water per year. It currently provides about 40% of the water Israel uses for agriculture and 50% of its drinking water -- much of it for Tel Aviv and its suburbs.

While the West Bank has over 600 million cubic meters (21 billion cubic feet) of this water, much of it drains into Israel’s pre-1967 boundaries and is easier to collect there. The Palestinian Authority has made claims for a total of roughly half of the entire 970 million cubic meters. However, virtually all of the water collected within Israel’s pre-1967 boundaries goes to Israelis, and about 470-480 cubic million meters of the 600 million cubic meters worth of water available from the mountain aquifers on the West Bank was used by Israel in 1994 -- about 80-83%. About 50 million cubic meters of the 600 million cubic meters was given solely to Jewish settlers on the West Bank. The average per capita water use in Israel is 12,040 cubic feet, compared to 3,290 cubic feet in the West Bank and Gaza.203 Thus, Israelis use at least three times more water per capita than Palestinians do.

In contrast, the entire Palestinian population was only given about 120-130 million cubic meters (4.2 billion cubic feet) -- 16% to 20% of the total supply. This allocation forced many Palestinian villages on the West Bank to severely ration water, and 37% of the Palestinian villages were entirely without running water. Only a few Israeli and Palestinian towns had wells in addition to piped water.204

The allocation of West Bank water to the Palestinians increased as part of the accords signed by Israeli and the Palestinian Authority in September 1995, but the new allocation scarcely met Palestinian demands and the control of water remained a major security issue. It is both a potential political and economic weapon in a Second Intifada and a source of asymmetric values in a peace process. Population growth is steadily reducing the amount of water per capita. Even if no outside immigration takes place, World Bank studies indicate that current population growth...
growth levels in Israel, Gaza, and the West Bank will restrict renewable water use for human consumption and light industrial needs by 2010. However, as mentioned earlier, there are up to 1.5 million people who claim Palestinian refugee status who could, upon returning to Israel, sharply increase the water problem.

Some experts have indicated that shifting water use away from agriculture, making better use of recycled water, and creating major new desalination plants could solve this problem. Other experts have claimed such shifts are costly and impractical for Israel. They could take up a decade to accomplish, and could involve an investment in excess of $10 billion. The one thing that is certain is that the combination of water and security problems is likely to present growing strategic complications as far into the future as anyone can currently foresee.
Map 7.2

Jerusalem
Table 7.3
Changes in Israeli Settlers in Gaza and the West Bank: 1992-1998
(Not including Israelis in annexed Jerusalem)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Growth of Settlements</th>
<th>West Bank</th>
<th>Gaza</th>
<th>Total</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>January 1, 1992</td>
<td>97,800</td>
<td>3,410</td>
<td>101,210</td>
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<td>June 1, 1996</td>
<td>145,000</td>
<td>5,500</td>
<td>150,500</td>
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<td>June 1, 1998</td>
<td>163,173</td>
<td>6,166</td>
<td>169,339</td>
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<tr>
<td>July 1, 1999 (CIA)</td>
<td>166,000</td>
<td>6,000</td>
<td>172,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>Population Increase</td>
<td>65,373</td>
<td>2,756</td>
<td>68,129</td>
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<tr>
<td>Percentage Increase</td>
<td>67%</td>
<td>81%</td>
<td>67%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Number of settlements gaining population since 1992 (–1996?) - - 109
Number of settlements losing population since 1992 (-1996?) - - 13

The CIA estimated that in July 1999 there were 216 Israeli settlements and land use sites in the West Bank, 42 in the Golan heights, 24 in the Gaza strip, and 29 in East Jerusalem. In addition to the settlers shown, there were 19,000 in the Golan and 176,000 in East Jerusalem.

Status of Occupancy

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Residential Units</th>
<th>Empty Units</th>
<th>Vacancy Rate in Percent</th>
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<td>West Bank</td>
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<td>CIA Estimate</td>
<td>41,000</td>
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Gaza Strip

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<td>Katfi Bloc Settler Council</td>
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<td>Peace Now, Nov, 96</td>
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Golan Heights

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<th>Empty Units</th>
<th>Vacancy Rate in Percent</th>
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<td>Golan Settler Council</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Note: There are roughly 15,000 Israeli settlers in the Golan. Ariel Sharon called for an expansion of this total to 25,000 on September 26, 1996, and for building roughly 600 new dwelling units a year. The Likud government has indicated that Israel plans to increase the population of the settlements in the West Bank and Gaza by 50,000 over the next four years, and build 10,000 new dwelling units at a rate of 2,500 per year.

Source: Adapted from data developed by the Foundation for Middle East Peace and Ha’aretz. May 20, 1997 and May/June 1999. Some data adjusted or estimated by the author.

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### Table 7.4

#### Status of Settlements in the Occupied Territories in 1994-2000

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Settlement population beyond Green Line</td>
<td>290,000</td>
<td>301,000</td>
<td>313,000</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Settlements beyond Green Line</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Settlers in West Bank</td>
<td>121,000</td>
<td>127,600</td>
<td>136,000</td>
<td>161,000</td>
<td>171,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yearly increase in settlers in West Bank</td>
<td>9,400</td>
<td>3,500</td>
<td>6,000</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Residential sites in West Bank</td>
<td>181</td>
<td>180</td>
<td>190</td>
<td>207</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israeli population in 20 neighborhoods of East Jerusalem</td>
<td>149,000</td>
<td>153,700</td>
<td>166,800</td>
<td>180,000</td>
<td>(172,000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yearly increase in Israelis in East Jerusalem</td>
<td>9,000</td>
<td>4,700</td>
<td>2,600</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israeli population in 20 neighborhoods of Gaza Strip</td>
<td>4,800</td>
<td>5,000</td>
<td>5,000</td>
<td>6,000</td>
<td>6,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yearly increase in Israelis in Gaza Strip</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Settlers in Golan Heights</td>
<td>14,700</td>
<td>14,800</td>
<td>15,000</td>
<td>17,000</td>
<td>20,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yearly increase in settlers in Golan</td>
<td>700</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Settlements in Golan</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israeli settlers as percent of total population in the Occupied Territories</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unoccupied housing units in existing Israeli settlements</td>
<td>15,000</td>
<td>15,600</td>
<td>17,000</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Housing starts in settlements beyond the Green Line</td>
<td>3,700</td>
<td>4,100</td>
<td>3,100</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Housing completions in settlements beyond the Green Line</td>
<td>2,600</td>
<td>3,800</td>
<td>3,500</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Adapted from statistical Yearbook, Jerusalem, 1996; US reports to Congress on the status of the disbursement of loan guarantees to Israel, Foundation for Middle East Peace, and CIA World Fact book.

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The Different and Changing Character of the Second Intifada

The are many different views as to the extent to which these differences in values drove the Palestinian people to a new uprising or the Second Intifada was triggered by Yasser Arafat in an effort to force Israel to take a new approach to the peace process. The answer may well be that both explanations are correct. In any case, as the previous chronology has shown, the Second Intifada quickly became very different from the first Intifada. The first Intifada, which began in 1987, was more an exercise in civil disobedience than an effort to use violence to force Israel to accept Palestinian demands.

The course of the first Intifada was shaped by both the lack of a centralized Palestinian body and the pervasive Israeli occupation of all of the West Bank and Gaza. The Palestinians had no basis for organized armed resistance, and were dependent largely on world opinion and outside political pressure. At the same time, they quickly found that their very lack of military strength and an in-place centralized military leadership had certain advantages. Israel had no clear target to attack with military force, and using troops against youths armed with stones produced negative news coverage throughout the world. The fact that the Intifada was not firmly tied to the PLO decoupled it from the image of terrorism the PLO had acquired in previous years. While Israel could impose crippling sanctions on movement, business, and the day-to-day life of ordinary Palestinians, it had no effective way to use its superior military force and it took the IDF years to develop the mix of training, equipment, and experience need to contain riots, stone throwing, and civil unrest.

The end result was largely a struggle of political and economic attrition which neither side won. Israel had to accept that it could not govern the Palestinian areas of the West Bank and Gaza. The Palestinians were brought to the point of economic crisis. Both sides faced a climate of political exhaustion that pushed them toward negotiation without becoming involved in levels of force that breed hatred and escalation.

In contrast, Table One shows all too clearly that the Second Intifada quickly became a real war in which Israel increasingly used advanced weapons and technology, and reoccupation of Palestinian areas to try to attack and intimidate the Palestinians while minimizing its casualties. The Palestinians, in turn, increasingly turned to the use of small arms, mortars, suicide attacks, and bombings. Israel made extensive use of economic warfare, and its alliance
with the US to put pressure on the Palestinians, while the Palestinian side has attempted to mobilize the Arab and Islamic world, and the support of Europe and most developing countries to take political and economic action against Israel.

Another striking difference between the two Intifadas is that this time the Palestinians had a de facto government. There was no central Palestinian authority and decision-making body in the first Intifada. The ‘Palestinian Authority’ (PA) was only formed as a result of the Israeli-Palestinian Declaration of Principles (DOP) of September 13, 1993, and after the first Intifada was over. Until that time, the whole of the Gaza Strip and the West Bank was under Israeli occupation. Israel now confronts a Palestinian Authority with considerable central authority and with significant military capabilities. At the same time it confronts other Palestinian groups that may or may not be allied with the Palestinian Authority, but are now well experience in the use of violence and suicide bombings.

Finally, the military equation has changed in several ways. The Palestinians have no air force, no navy, and no heavy weapons. They lost most of their light armored vehicles comparatively early in the fighting and they could never have hoped to engage Israeli armor. Nevertheless, they have tens of thousands of rifles and small arms, mortars, rockets, and other light weapons. These weapons are dispersed throughout built-up areas that Israel no longer occupies or cannot fully search and control, and where the IDF lacks the intelligence to determine the location of many of the weapons.

**The IDF Focus on Isolation, Containment, and the Selective Use of Conventional Military Power**

The IDF began fighting the Second Intifada by focusing on a strategy of containment and isolation rather than reoccupation. It isolated key Palestinian population centers, secured access roads and lines of communication, and improved the security of the settlements and military installations in the West Bank. Israel attempted to combine military isolation with economic measures like freezing financial operations and transit between Palestinian areas, cutting off communications, and limiting the shipment of goods. Israeli forces emphasized the use of helicopters and standoff precision weapons, while seizing and destroying key Palestinian strong points or facilities that could be used to attack Israel. Caterpillar D-9 bulldozers and additional
special ground forces also entered the combat scene as Israeli forces began to infiltrate Palestinian cities and increase their presence in area A lands on the ground\textsuperscript{205}.

During October 2000, Israel made its first extensive use of attack helicopters to strike targets in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. AH-64A Apaches were used to hit targets in Nablus and in Gaza, including Chairman Arafat’s compound. The AH-64 was used instead of the AH-1G/S Cobra because of its superior range, sensors, and weapons, and ability to better distinguish between civilians and “combatants.”\textsuperscript{206} Between October 2000 and December 2001, Israeli forces used these weapons to assassinate at least 60 Palestinian militants\textsuperscript{207}. “Precision,” however, is always relative and any attack on built up and urban areas risks killing innocent civilians. Unfortunately in some cases the AH-64’s have failed to hit the desired targets and inflicted collateral damage. For example, an AH-64 attack against the al-Fatah in El-Bireh in the West Bank in October 2000 hit the house next door.\textsuperscript{208}

IDF tactics on the ground quickly became more aggressive in comparison to the previous Intifada. For example, Israel deployed special anti-guerrilla units in October 2000 that could be used for more aggressive penetration and counter-guerrilla missions. The problem with such units, is that they require superb human intelligence (Humint) if they are to be directed against the right targets, avoid striking at civilians or young men caught up in the Intifada, and avoid taking casualties. Israel’s ability to employ human intelligence had naturally diminished as the territory under the control of the Palestinian Authority expanded. Israel was able to recover some of its capabilities through a mixture of bribes and threats, and by exploiting Palestinian factionalism, but the deep-seated Palestinian anger that has increased with the prolongation of the violence has led to repeated Palestinian counter-intelligence operations, arrests, executions and lynchings, and made such intelligence-gathering operations even more risky. It has proved far easier to call for raids and commando missions than execute them, the political costs of collateral damage and casualties can be high, and even success can simply increase Palestinian political hatred and commitment to violence.

Despite the inherent difficulties of commando raids, Israel began employing them on a limited basis with a good success rate in November 2000. Anwar Hamran, a PIJ bombing suspect, was killed while waiting for a taxicab on December 11, 2000. The first occurrence of Israel’s policy of selective assassination occurred on November 9, 2000, when an Israeli helicopter attacked a truck carrying Hussein Abayat, a local Tanzim commander. Barak

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acknowledged Israel's responsibility and pledged to continue with similar operations if Israelis will continue to be attacked.209

On February 13, 2001, two Israeli helicopter gunships dropped four missiles on the car of Massoud Ayyad, whom Israel held responsible for a failed mortar-bomb attack on a Jewish settlement in Gaza. Then caretaker-Prime Minister Barak declared that the killing sent the message to those who would attack Israel that "the long arm of the Israeli Defense Forces will reach them."210 Deputy Defense Minister Ephraim Sneh told Israeli radio in regards to the recent deaths “You can't beat terror at symposiums at the university. The most effective and just way to deal with terror is the elimination or incarceration of the people who lead these organizations." Hamas members Abbas al-Awewi and Hani Abu Bakr, and Yousef Abu Swayeh, local Fatah leaders, were all recently killed by Israeli forces. According to a report by Agence France Press, Israel killed some 31 Palestinians in the period between November 9, 2000 and May 5, 2001.211 Whether or not these individuals were armed or not is disputed.

Most of these raids were successful and did not create Israeli casualties. Some, however, resulted in collateral damage or were admitted to be mistakes. On April 30, 2001, for example, an explosion targeted at a member of Fatah who was accused of the entrapment and murder of an Israeli youth also killed two children. On May 14, Israeli troops shot and killed five Palestinian officers stationed at a West Bank roadblock at Beitunya. The IDF later admitted that it had killed the wrong persons as a result of an intelligence error.212

On July 31 2001, an Israeli missile attack that targeted two Hamas leaders in Nablus killed eight people. Among the eight killed, were two children playing in front of the targeted civilian building – no Israeli patrol had been sent against the building. In the case of the Nablus attack, Israel had avoided entering the Palestinian city on the ground, executing the operation with a greater risk for collateral damage.213

In any case, assassinations and raids were not enough. As time went on, IDF ground tactics became increasingly aggressive with IDF forces entering, exiting, and re-entering Palestinian cities in the West Bank – extending their stays as the situation dictated.

On August 27, 2001, for example, Israeli forces employed both armored vehicles and helicopter gunships to enter the West Bank town of Beit Jallah.214 The IDF claimed that the
seized structures were sites where mortars were being launched by militants into the Israeli settlement of Gilo.\textsuperscript{215} The IDF withdrew from Beit Jalla on August 31.\textsuperscript{216}

On October 17, 2001, the right-wing Israeli tourism minister, Rehavam Zeevi was killed. Later that evening, the IDF responded by tightening its security surrounding the West Bank cities of Ramallah, Nablus, and Jenin – access routes to Jenin were closed and placed under the control of Israeli forces.\textsuperscript{217} On October 19, 2001, Israeli infantry forces and armored units once again entered the town of Beit Jalla after incidents of renewed launching of mortars on nearby Gilo. Israeli forces seized a number of buildings in the area and returned fire when shot at.\textsuperscript{218}

Engineering equipment was used as a weapon in the first Intifada, and has been used even more extensively in the second. After taking office on March 7, Ariel Sharon ordered an incursion into the Gaza Strip, beginning the new trend of entering Palestinian-controlled territory. In April 2001, bulldozers were used for the first time since the start of the second Intifada in order to level Palestinian civilian and security buildings and clear trees to create “free-fire zones” nearby the Khan Younis and Rafah refugee camps in Gaza - areas determined to be the source of gunfire and mortar attacks on Israeli troops and settlements.

According to the \textit{Washington Post}, the Israeli press criticized Sharon for ordering an invasion of Gaza and then pulling back “under U.S. pressure.” The launching of mortar attacks on Israeli military posts and settlements continued after the IDF withdrawal from Gaza.\textsuperscript{219} As the months wore on and the fighting on both sides intensified, however, the frequency of such ground incursions escalated, despite original disapproval from the international community. The first incursion into Palestinian-ruled territory led to “international outcry, including . . . criticism from Secretary of State Colin L. Powell. Over time, however, the incursions became routine”\textsuperscript{220}.

The IDF also began to penetrate into Palestinian cities. Beginning in the evening of February 27, Israeli Forces entered the Balata refugee camp nearby the city of Nablus in the north of the West Bank. Following the IDF incursion into Balata, the IDF entered other camps and Palestinian cities including Bethlehem and Beit Jalla in the West Bank, and Jabalya in Gaza.\textsuperscript{221} Many of the Palestinians highest on Israel’s most-wanted list escaped capture, yet thousands of Palestinians were rounded up during the three-week operation which began on February 27, 2002 and ended on March 18 with the withdrawal of troops from Bethlehem and Beit Jalla.\textsuperscript{222} While the three-week operation included deeper incursions into refugee camps, the
operation did not represent a shift in IDF strategy but instead signified a more intense implementation of IDF military tactics which were already in use – Israeli air, ground, and naval forces were used to conduct simultaneous operations in cities and camps across the West Bank. Several joint task forces based on infantry and armored units, and including special forces, engineer corps, and intelligence units moved into the areas.

According to a report by the Washington Institute, “it is estimated that several thousand troops took part in the operation, with two or three hundred tanks alongside the air and naval forces.”

Israeli forces attacked terrorist infrastructure, refugee camps perceived as safe-havens for terrorists, and facilities of the Palestinian Authority. In the camps and towns under attack, Israeli forces seized strategic locations – using armored vehicles to clear the tightly-planned streets of refugee camps – and then began implementing curfews, gathering information, and conducting searches. The IDF seized a number of Kassam rockets, demolished about 10 factories where rockets were manufactured, destroyed and seized a number of other weapons and explosives, and arrested and killed several suspected militant activists. After collecting intelligence and damaging terrorist infrastructure, Israeli forces pulled out without accepting the task of overseeing civilian aspects of life. To avoid confrontation as much as possible, the IDF warned the Palestinian security forces in each area. The danger to both Israeli troops and civilians was only limited by demolishing buildings, to open corridors through the narrow streets.

After about two weeks of restraint for mediation efforts, tensions escalated again in late March and early April 2002. This followed an escalation in suicide bombings during March.

After one such suicide bombing in Netanya on March 27, Israeli forces began to use bulldozers, armored forces, and special units at an even greater frequency.

These attacks also led to the first major IDF attack that penetrated deep into Palestinian controlled urban areas. While the IDF had already been moving in and out of Palestinian cities for months, Operation Defensive Shield involved a major Israeli attack on six major Palestinian cities in the West Bank: Ramallah, Bethlehem, Tulkarem, Qalqilya, Nablus, and Jenin. According to IDF Col. Nitsan Alon, “targets were . . . prioritized to achieve as much as possible before international pressure culminated”.

Operation Defensive Shield lasted from March 29 to May 10, and had the following chronology:

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March 29 – Israel launches ‘Operation Defensive Shield.’ Israeli forces enter Ramallah, including parts of Arafat’s compound. Arafat and several of his advisors are confined to the leader’s West Bank headquarters. Hundreds of Palestinians are detained for questioning.

March 31 – Over 100 Israeli tanks enter Qalailiya. Prime Minister Sharon says Israel is at war.

April 1 – A bulldozer and 5 Israeli tanks enter Tulkarem in the West Bank.

Israeli forces enter two villages near Bethlehem – Al-Khader and Beit Jalla. Before Israeli forces arrive, Palestinian militants kill 10 suspected collaborators.

April 2 – In Ramallah, Israeli tanks and helicopters attack Palestinian Preventative Security Services headquarters – this Palestinian security service had been “well-known for having stayed out of the resistance so as to implement whatever crackdown might be needed later”. 400 Palestinians trapped inside are allowed to surrender and walk free while the IDF captures 6 Hamas detainees who had been kept there. Sharon proposes the idea of exile for Arafat.

Israeli troops enter Bethlehem and an estimated 200 Palestinians - including several dozen gunmen – escape to the Church of Nativity.

April 3 – Israeli tanks enter Nablus – the West Bank’s largest city.

Israeli troops also encircle the West Bank refugee camp of Jenin. Once the IDF enters Jenin, the fighting lasts 9 days.

April 5 - In his besieged Ramallah headquarters, Arafat meets with U.S. mediator Anthony Zinni.

Israeli troops enter the city of Tubas in the West Bank, 12 Palestinians are killed.

April 9 – Israeli forces pull out of Qalailiya and Tulkarem.

In Jenin, 13 Israeli soldiers are killed upon entering a booby-trapped building.

April 11 – In Jenin, the last Palestinian gunman surrenders to Israeli forces.

April 18 – In Jenin, the Israelis pull back to the edge of the city.

May 2 – Arafat emerges from his headquarters after the IDF ends his 5 months of confinement.
May 10 – At the Church of Nativity, the 39-day siege ends in a deal that sends 26 Palestinian gunmen to Gaza and exiles 13 wanted Palestinian militants to a number of European countries. According to the deal, the IDF is expected to withdraw troops once the church is emptied. Operation Defensive Shield comes to a close.

Israeli forces went deep into Palestinian territories with armored vehicles and infantry. They secured positions in selected Palestinian cities, imposed 24-hour curfews, and searched for illegal weapons and militant activists on the ground. They also maintained positions surrounding the cities in case of a need to re-enter. The IDF took an increasingly large number of Palestinians into custody during Operation Defensive Shield – as a means of both gaining intelligence information and placing under arrest those discovered to have connections with militant groups. Israeli forces also carried out its policy of confiscating weapons on an even more expansive scale. After three days in Ramallah, the IDF had “arrested 10 wanted men and seized 19 sniper rifles, two mortar shells, [and] four pipe bombs.” Israeli forces took 700 Palestinians into custody in the first four days of its incursion into Ramallah.

Israeli forces also acted to weaken the Palestinian Authority and isolate the Palestinian leader, Yasser Arafat. During Operation Defensive Shield, the IDF destroyed civilian and security facilities of the Palestinian Authority. They not only targeted Arafat’s compound and Palestinian police offices but the Legislative Council offices, the Chambers of Commerce, and the Ministries of Agriculture, Education, Trade and Industry. Moreover, the Palestinian headquarters for Preventative Security was targeted for the first time by the IDF.

Though Operation Defensive Shield in some ways represented a more forceful implementation of tactics already in place it initially led to a level of Palestinian resistance obliged Israeli forces to adjust their tactics and engage in heated urban warfare. In Ramallah, the resistance was minimal, lacked organization, and was over within the first two days; Israeli forces were able to enter the city without fierce battle. Palestinian resistance in Nablus, however, lasted for five days, and Israeli F-16s, tanks, and bulldozers had to demolish buildings to clear “some 300 booby traps” for IDF ground troops. The fighting was fiercest in Jenin - in April 2002 - where militants engaged the IDF in urban warfare. The IDF had to use D-9 bulldozers and a special unit of engineers to clear mines and defend the front-line in order for other special units and infantry to move forward into the dangerous urban area filled with booby-trapped passageways and buildings. In the fighting at Jenin, 22 Israeli soldiers were killed, including 13 in one ambush. This ambush occurred on April 9 2002. Two squads of reservists
had been maneuvering through narrow alleyways in Jenin when an explosion erupted and Palestinian gunmen seized the opportunity to open fire on the soldiers.\(^{244}\)

The battle of Jenin became the first real battle of the Second Intifada, one that showed the IDF could reoccupy Palestinian cities in spite of considerable Palestinian resistance. Some 15,000 Palestinians lived in the 90-acre refugee camp, where the resistance fighters held out for 9 days. In spite of charges made during the fighting, and significant physical destruction, there is no evidence of a massacre, and urban warfare often involves brutal fighting at close quarters and considerable collateral damage. According to Human Rights Watch, 22 Palestinian noncombatants were killed in the fighting. However, it is noted that Palestinian militants “did endanger Palestinian civilians in the camp by using it as a base for planning and launching attacks, using indiscriminate tactics such as planting improvised explosive devices within the camp, and intermingling with the civilian population during armed conflict.”\(^{245}\) The events of Jenin did, however, reveal the need for Israel to improve its training, planning capabilities and tactics for urban warfare, pay more attention to the political costs of such actions, and develop a better media strategy. The Palestinians learned they could not fight the IDF even using urban cover, but they won the battle for media support and sympathy\(^{246}\).

Israel has also maintained a policy of searching to thwart operations to smuggle and manufacture arms which have been attempted by both Palestinian militant groups and the Palestinian Authority. In its attacks on Palestinian cities, the IDF has demolished many warehouses in addition to many factories where weapons are manufactured locally. The IDF has also closed off air, land, and sea passages granting access into the Palestinian territories. Most weapons are smuggled into Gaza by means of the Mediterranean Sea.

On January 29, 2001, near Ashkelon, Israeli forces came across two sealed barrels filled with weapons – it is assumed that other barrels from the same shipment reached their destination in Gaza. After inspecting the barrels, the IDF deduced that the arms had been carried from Hizballah in Lebanon and was bound for Gaza where the Palestinian Islamic Jihad was to pick up the shipment. The Israeli Navy discovered the Karine-A in the Mediterranean Sea on January 4, 2002. It was carrying weapons “that have never before been in the PA’s possession,” including modern missiles carrying Tandem-Charge warheads with the ability to penetrate heavy armor, and 122-mm katyusha rockets with a range of 12 miles\(^{247}\).
Blockading and isolating Gaza is less of a military problem for the IDF than the West Bank. However, Gaza does force the IDF to defend isolated Israeli settlements with little or no political, economic, and strategic value. Despite sporadic incursions into the strip, the IDF has no desire to reoccupy Gaza, and several senior Israeli officers privately make it clear that they would like to see an end to all of the remaining Israel settlements in the Gaza Strip. They regard these settlements as a useless drain on Israel’s security assets, just as they do many of the small hard line Israeli settlements deep in Palestinian territory in the West Bank. Nevertheless, domestic Israeli politics prevent the IDF from evacuating and isolating settlements, and leads to the adoption of a strategy of isolating the Palestinian areas of Gaza as much as possible, while providing expensive and dangerous protection to Israeli settlements.\(^{248}\)

**Israeli Policy Shifts Towards Isolating the Palestinian Authority Leader and the Palestinian Response**

Just as Operation Defensive Shield represented a major escalation in warfare, Israel also gradually escalated its political challenge to Arafat. As the following chronology shows, Israel first tried to pressure Arafat, then sought to isolate him, and then sought to remove him from power. In the process it had considerable success in persuading the Bush Administration that Arafat and suicide bombings, not the Sharon government and IDF military actions, were the reason the Second Intifada continued to escalate. This IDF tactic demonstrates the fine line between military strategy and political maneuvering:

- December 3, 2001 – Two of Arafat’s three helicopters are destroyed in Gaza City by an Israeli helicopter attack while Arafat is in Ramallah.
- December 13 – Israel declares Arafat “irrelevant” and cuts ties with the Palestinian Authority.
- December 24 – Sharon bans Arafat from traveling to Bethlehem for Christmas midnight mass.
- January 2, 2002 - Sharon announces that Arafat will remain confined in his headquarters until he places those responsible for Minister Zeevi’s murder under arrest.
- February 20 – Israeli military forces target Arafat’s Gaza City headquarters.
- February 25 – The Israeli cabinet eases its restrictions on Arafat, allowing him to leave his compound, but not Ramallah.
• March 6 – Israeli helicopters fire rockets that hit a building next to Arafat’s offices in Ramallah. While the building is being attacked, Arafat is meeting with Miguel Angel Moratinos – an envoy from the European Union.

• March 10 – The IDF raids Arafat’s compound in Gaza City, completely destroying the leader’s headquarters.

• March 11 - Prime Minister Sharon’s office releases a statement allowing Yasser Arafat to travel freely in the West Bank and Gaza. There is no mention in the announcement that restrictions will be lifted regarding Arafat’s travels abroad.

• March 15 – In Ramallah, US envoy to the region Anthony Zinni meets with Arafat even though Israeli forces have evacuated the city.

• March 18 - EU envoy to the Middle East, Miguel Angel Moratinos, meets with Arafat.

• March 19 – According to a statement by Sharon, Israel will allow Arafat to leave the Palestinian territories once the Tenet ceasefire agreement is implemented.

The key military motives for Israel’s actions were a rise in the number of suicide bombings and the success of Palestinian attackers in penetrating into Israel. Within the first two days of December, there were two suicide bombings – one killing 10 Israelis in Jerusalem and a second killing 15 Israelis in Haifa. Hamas and Islamic Jihad claimed responsibility for these attacks; neither one an organization loyal to Arafat. Israel responded to these attacks by isolating Arafat, holding him responsible for not keeping militant organizations under control.

Israel responded with political statements that held Arafat responsible for the terrorism in Israel. It gave up on Arafat as a potential partner for future multi-lateral policy decisions, and ceased to try to pressure the relationship Rabin had forged with Arafat when they co-signed the Oslo accords. Israel systematically associated Arafat with the terrorist attacks on Israel proper.

Israel also reacted to the suicide attacks of early December, on December 3, 2001 by destroying Arafat’s three Mi8 helicopters in Gaza with air-to-land missiles and demolished the Gaza International Airport with bulldozers. On December 4, 2001, it imposed a siege on Arafat’s West Bank compound by surrounding it with armored vehicles and troops. On December 4, Israelis launched air strikes against offices of the Palestinian Authority in both the West Bank and Gaza – one missile was fired near an office where Arafat was working. US Secretary of State Powell responded to a question regarding whether Israel was targeting Arafat himself by saying, “Israel says they are not targeting Arafat.” Nonetheless, attacking targets

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which were close to Arafat and part of his administrative infrastructure put pressure on Arafat, and Israeli positioned tanks “only a few hundred meters from his office” confining Arafat to Ramallah.  

Demolishing Arafat’s helicopters and surrounding the leader’s headquarters’ kept him from traveling to places outside of Ramallah. At the same time, the IDF hindered his ability to mobilize his forces, curtail extremist forces, and engage in dialogue with internal political opponents, as well as international political leaders. Israel sought to both weaken Arafat’s power and diminish his legitimacy in the eyes of the international world, and the Palestinian people.

Sharon stated in the first week of December that Israel’s aim in attacking Arafat was “forcing him to take responsibility.” A decision of the Israeli cabinet in December 2001 that “Force 17, one of Arafat’s security units, and the Tanzim, the militia wing of his Fatah Party, ‘terrorist organizations’ that will be acted against accordingly.” On December 12, the Israeli government announced its decision to cut off ties with Yasser Arafat. Ariel Sharon stated, “Yasser Arafat is no longer relevant to the state of Israel, and there will be no more contact with him.” Sharon tightened the Israeli military isolation of Arafat after this political statement, cutting him off from engaging in “normal” political relations with Israel and putting his political clout into question internationally.

Arafat’s command structure and security forces was severely disrupted, if not shattered. In fact, the IDF’s tactical victory was great that it raised serious questions about Israel’s real motive in isolating Arafat – to “win” a battle in the military struggle, try to force a new partnership for a peace process, replace Arafat, effectively end the peace process on the terms of Oslo and Camp David, and force a much more advantageous peace on the Palestinians, or pursue tactics that might displace many of the Palestinians living on the West Bank.

Israel’s treatment of the Palestinian security forces raised additional questions. Israel shelled Palestinian police stations across the West Bank and Gaza, even though it sought the reform of the security forces and held the policemen of the Palestinian Authority responsible for arresting militiamen and terrorists. During the first two weeks of December 2001, Israeli forces also fired missiles on the headquarters of the Palestinian Military Intelligence in the West Bank town of Safit and attacked police stations in Jenin, as part of the trend to attack the...
Palestinian Authority, its governing body, and its infrastructure\textsuperscript{260}. Israel linked its attacks on the infrastructure of the Palestinian Authority to Arafat’s lack of force in regulating terrorism.

Israel also continued to scout out Palestinian militants with special service units\textsuperscript{261}. In the villages of Tamon, Tibas, and Tiasir, Israeli Defense forces carried out “engineering operations” to “block potential terrorist routes leading into Israeli territory.” According to an IDF spokesperson, the IDF announced on December 15, that the “IDF Will continue to operate and thwart the terror as long as the Palestinian Authority does not do so.”\textsuperscript{262} It was unclear whether Israel was weakening the ability of the Palestinian Security forces to operate effectively as part of a military tactic to further weaken Arafat’s regime or punishing Arafat for clandestinely promoting terrorist organizations and countering the effectiveness of his own security forces. In any case, Israel labeled Arafat “directly responsible for the terror attacks” on December 13 and began taking a larger role in “policing” the Palestinian areas themselves\textsuperscript{263}.

Israel’s systematic pressure on Arafat and the Palestinian Authority provoked an inevitable response. Arafat fought back with political statements, claims to be seeking a ceasefire and peace, and appealed to the international community.

The Israeli government first cut off ties with Palestinian Authority leader Yasser Arafat after an attack on an Israeli settlement by Palestinian gunmen on December 12, 2001.\textsuperscript{264} On December 16, Arafat responded with a speech broadcast on Palestinian television, in Arabic, calling for “‘a complete cessation of any operation or actions, especially suicide attacks’” which provided Israel with a pretext for “‘military aggression.’”\textsuperscript{265} In his speech, Arafat repeatedly affirmed that the Palestinian Authority had always condemned suicide bombing attacks. Arafat noted that the Palestinian Authority had declared “groups that carry out terrorist activities” to be illegal and that the PA had promised to find and punish perpetrators.\textsuperscript{266}

The address on December 16 was the first time during the Second Intifada that Arafat had pleaded so broadly and visibly for an end to violence against Israel\textsuperscript{267}. Arafat was urgently responding to the latest military strategy of the IDF – that of placing him under isolation – and did so with a public speech to keep himself “above the fray” and as removed as possible from accusations of being associated with terrorist networks. Thus, without a conventional military force, Arafat used a political tactic to counter the new Israeli military strategy and minimize the political damage done to his role in the PA.
Arafat had also been under exceptional pressure from the international community when he delivered his speech on December 16. In a meeting in Brussels on December 10, the EU’s foreign ministers told Arafat that he must “arrest and prosecute all ‘suspects’ and appeal, in Arabic” for an end to the Palestinian’s armed struggle.  

Arafat also took some tangible action. As of December 21, Arafat detained at least 185 Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad members. However, only an estimated 5 were among the 36 on US envoy General Zinni’s most-wanted list and 180 were low-level Hamas and PIJ members. The high profile prisoners included bomb makers like Adnan al-Ghoul in Gaza, and Jassar Samaru and Nassim Abu Rus in the West Bank. Most of the 180 that were only considered low-level militants were placed under “loose ‘house arrest’.”

This followed a long-standing pattern. Arafat responded to Israeli and international pressure with moves to make arrests; but most key militants escaped Arafat’s law enforcement. He did so although most experts felt that Arafat’s forces were unable to operate with considerable effectiveness. As in the past, Arafat seemed to pursue a tactic of launching as little of a “crackdown” on terrorism as politically necessary to help restore his international credibility, while maintaining his popular support among the Palestinian people.

During Arafat’s crackdown on terrorists, in December 2001, both world opinion and the Palestinian people drove him to walk a fine line between exercising control over fundamentalist groups, and allowing the Intifada to continue. Sheik Ahmed Yassin, a religious leader of Hamas, dismissed a reporter when asked as to whether Arafat had placed him under house arrest: “If it were true, you wouldn’t be meeting me.” Following Yassin’s interview with Newsweek, Palestinian Authority Security forces moved to place the Hamas leader under strict house arrest – they cut his phone lines, seized his motor vehicle, stationed police and security officers in front of his home, and prohibited him from speaking to anyone not a family member of his.

Arafat responded to Yassin’s interview with a “crackdown” and an attempt to secure a tighter house arrest on Yassin. Yassin had been defending the cause of Hamas before reporters at a time when Arafat was under intense international pressure and so Arafat sent Palestinian Security forces to surround Yassin’s home.

However, the Palestinian public responded to Arafat’s crackdown with riots. 1,000 Palestinians responded by marching to Yassin’s home “denouncing the Palestinian Authority as
‘collaborators’” and supporting Yassin with pro-Hamas statements. One of Yassin’s personal guards was killed in a gun battle between Hamas gunmen and security officers, and Yassin, in the midst of the fighting, was able to escape with the assistance of Hamas members. After spending a night in hiding, Yassin was able to return home the next morning and Palestinian security forces were nowhere to be found. As groups like Hamas gained clout amongst the Palestinian people, the positions of Palestinian security forces have weakened in terms of their ability to arrest Palestinian terrorists when Arafat issues “crackdowns.”

Similarly, on December 12, Arafat had shut down Hamas and PIJ offices. Two days later, however, Arafat withdrew the order. Moreover, he not only did not keep their offices shut, he failed to confiscate the illegal weapons found in the hands of both “‘popular resistance committees,’ and Fatah-associated groups.” He seems to have made no attempt to dismantle the more extensive weapons systems, which include the mortar-manufacturing factories and the smuggling infrastructure established across the Egypt-Gaza border.

During the week of December 17, 2001, the Palestinian police reported closing an estimated thirty-three Hamas and PIJ offices, and some of these were connected to the Hamas social-welfare infrastructure – that is to say the dawa system. In 2001, the FBI released a report uncovering the connections between the dawa system and Hamas operations. A forty-nine page affidavit delineated the FBI case against the Holy Foundation for Relief and Development. At the time of the report, the FBI identified forty-one Hamas activists who were holding leadership positions in a number of charity committees in both the West Bank and Gaza, and detailed the ways in which these Hamas activists had been using both the charity committees and the benefiting social-welfare institution to further the agendas of Hamas.

Arafat has been balancing between the two groups placing pressure on his political authority. As a powerful figure among Palestinians, Arafat has been able to maintain his role as the singular most powerful leader of the Palestinian people despite the divisions existing in Palestinian society. The problem will be once Arafat passes on. Currently, reform is in a way being used as a political weapon by Arafat to say to the world that he is “reforming” to help the Palestinian people and create a partner for Israel to negotiate with. The extent to which Arafat’s reform policies will affect the much-needed changes is questionable. Moreover, he is the one planning the reforms when many argue that his rule in the PA is a large part of the problem.
The Second Intifada has created a situation for Yasser Arafat where Israel – and at times the international community – was calling on him to exercise control over the increasingly brutal fighting. At the same time, there were also internal disputes within the Palestinian Authority, involving on one side the two PA security chiefs, Muhammad Dahlan and Jibril Rajoub, and on the other side, Arafat’s Fatah movement. As of December 2001, the two security chiefs were echoing the words of the international community with calls for an end to the intifada – and reform. On the other hand, those within Arafat’s Fatah movement were urging that Arafat continue with the intifada, or risk losing whatever nationalist integrity he and they still maintained among the general Palestinian population.

As of December 2001, Dahlan and Rajoub argued that the survival of the Palestinian Authority – and their own positions within the authority – was of primary interest to the Palestinian people – even if the survival of the PA translated into a need to end the intifada and resume security cooperation with Israel. “They would prefer any ceasefire to be negotiated and the various Palestinian political and military factions . . . [and] they are ready to impose order by force – if only Mr. Sharon and his army would grant them latitude to do so by halting the assassinations and the bombardment of the authority and its security services.”

The other side is the “young guard” – the armed fighters securing a place for themselves in the political spotlight by continuing the intifada. Islamic fundamentalists belonging to Hamas and PIJ are included among the young guard. However, Fatah’s Tanzim organization, and militias’ such as the Al-Aqsa Brigades, leads the young guard grouping, and many of Tanzim’s members were or continue to be, PA security officers, which in part explains the IDF strategy of attacking police headquarters and PA police forces. Members of the young guard are without loyalty to the PA and without prominent positions within the authority – and are therefore, ready to sacrifice the infrastructure of the existing Palestinian government with the hope that they will be able to establish their own future government and leadership. A West Bank Fatah leader, Marwan Barghouti, arrested by the IDF in Operation Defensive Shield, served as a spokesperson for the “young guard” – according to him, the intifada is only to end with Palestinian independence.

Moreover, when Arafat called for a cease-fire on December 16 in a strong response to international pressure, many among his Palestinian constituency disapproved of the leader’s call for an end to the intifada. Members of movements loyal to his government disrespected his call for a cease-fire. After delivering his December 16 statement, Arafat visited the refugee camp of
 Rafah to ask that the residents honor his appeal. A leader of Arafat’s Fatah movement in the Rafah refugee camp, Abed al-Rauf Barbakh, publicly responded to Arafat’s appeal: “May the cease fire go to hell.” Arafat ordered for the arrest of Barbakh. However, a group of Palestinian youngsters loyal to Barbakh protested by burning a police station in the neighborhood. The Palestinian police officers then decided not to take Barbakh into custody to appease the group of Palestinian youngsters – who represented a Palestinian majority in favor of the escalating uprising. During Arafat’s December 2001 “crackdown,” “Palestinians spat on Arafat’s policemen when they came to arrest Hamas and Islamic Jihad activists.”

Within Arafat’s Fatah movement, young leaders criticized Arafat’s December 2001 “crackdown,” saying that the arrests were “unjustified” since the militants had suspended attacks inside Israel. The power struggle on the part of the young guard is for both independence from Israel, and a new Palestinian government free of corruption. A leader of the young guard, Marwan al-Barghouti noted that the young guard demands “‘new elections, transparency, and the incorporation of the new generation in decision-making bodies.’”

The process of reforming Fatah and the Palestinian Authority entails a considerable amount of difficulties given that within Fatah there is a lack of clarity regarding Fatah’s ideology as well as an absence of strong decision-making bodies. In fact, the last leadership elections took place in 1989 when the old guard was in exile.

**Israeli Reoccupation and Palestinian Response**

After March 2002, Israel pushed for Arafat’s sidelining or removal by accusing him of being the cause of the Intifada, of purchasing arms and shipments like the Karine A, and of directly sponsoring and funding violence – including suicide bombing. It also began to issue calls for Palestinian reform that would not only deprive Arafat of power but most of his immediate supporters, and force the Palestinians to create a unified security service that could suppress any Palestinian challenge to Israel. The fact that many of Israel’s criticisms of Arafat and the Palestinian Authority were valid, scarcely altered the fact that Israel was seeking to weaken or paralyze Palestinian military action:

- March 29 - The IDF encircles Arafat’s headquarters in the West Bank after entering into Ramallah. The Palestinian leader's offices are spared when buildings are demolished. This marks the beginning of Operation Defensive Shield.
• March 31 - Ramallah is declared a closed military zone and journalists are ordered to leave after an estimated 40 peace activists surround Arafat in his headquarters.

• April 4 - A meeting between a European Union mission and Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat is opposed by Sharon.

• April 13 – After a suicide attack in Jerusalem, Arafat condemns "all terrorists acts against civilians, whether Israeli or Palestinian."

• April 14 - US Secretary of State Colin Powell meets with Arafat, and then with Sharon.

• April 21 – The siege on Arafat’s offices is maintained even after Sharon announces “the end of the first phase of the military operation in the West Bank”

• April 25 - Four Palestinians are sentence to prison terms ranging from one to 18 years - by a military court in Arafat’s compound - for the assassination of Minister Zeevi. Sharon demands that the four Palestinians be extradited.

• April 28 - US consul to the Palestinian territories, Ronald Schlicher, leads a meeting between Arafat and US and British delegation. Both Israel and the Palestinians accept a US plan that calls for an end to the siege on Arafat under the condition that Israeli Minister Zeevi's killers are put under US and British custody in a Palestinian prison. The deal also calls for the imprisonment of Ahmed Sadaat, the head of the PFLP, and Fuad Shubaki, an advisor to Arafat accused of engineering illegal arms-running systems.

• April 30 - With intentions of ensuring that the siege on Arafat be lifted within 24 hours, US and British experts discuss the details of the deal.

• May 1 - After final discussions between Arafat and the security delegation, the six men wanted for Zeevi’s murder are transferred to a jail in the West Bank town of Jericho where they are to be supervised and held by international guard. Israel begins its withdrawal from Arafat's headquarters in the West Bank.

• May 2 - Israel completes its withdrawal from Arafat's compound early in the morning. Arafat makes his first comments to reporters denouncing the IDF for a late night gun battle with Palestinian militants who have been trapped in Bethlehem's Church of the Nativity for one month. Outside Arafat’s headquarters, a few hundred Palestinians celebrate. 280
At the start of Operation Defensive Shield, on March 29, 2002 Israeli tanks rolled into Ramallah to surround Arafat’s headquarters. The above chronology details the siege up to the day where Arafat was released from his headquarters on May 2. (***Update with more detail on the isolation of Arafat in Operation Defensive Shield***)

On May 2, 2002, the Israeli government lifted its physical siege on Arafat, but the political assails against the Palestinian leader persisted. At the close of Operation Defensive Shield, Israel moved to further isolate Arafat in the eyes of the international community by releasing evidence that linked Arafat with terrorist activity. In May 2002, the office of Sharon released a statement that Palestinian leaders under Israeli interrogation had implicated the Palestinian Authority leader in financing terrorist activity, asserting that Arafat had “approved money for operatives ‘with the knowledge that it would be used to finance terrorist attacks against Israeli civilians.’”

During Operation Defensive Shield, Israeli forces found munitions, pistol, automatic rifles, and empty suicide bomber belts in Arafat’s Ramallah compound. The IDF also found a number of RPG launchers, illegal for the Palestinian Authority to possess according to agreements previously reached with Israel. In addition to finding illegal caches of weapons, the IDF discovered counterfeit bills and documents linking Arafat and the Palestinian Authority to known terrorist activity.

Documents were found linking both Arafat and officials within the Palestinian Authority to terrorist movements. Two documents of note were requests for aid — signed by Arafat — which were to be given to known terrorists. The first request found was one for $2,500 to be given to senior Fatah/al-Aqsa members, including “Ra’ad el Karmi (on the wanted list Israel sent to the PA in June 2001), Zias Muhammed Dias (who perpetrated the bat-mitzvah attack in Hadera), and Amar Qadan.” The second request asked that resources of financial aid be given to twelve terrorists working in Tulkarem. The fact that Arafat signed these requests implicates that he knew of terrorist activities perpetrated by members of factions loyal to him.

Documents were also found marking official correspondence between Fuad Shoubaki in the office of PA’s chief of finance and procurement, and the Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades. “The correspondence included procurement requests for bombs and ammunition, revealing that the al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades is a bona fide group, with its own terrorist infrastructure and supply chain.” Moreover, Shoubaki had been the primary Palestinian Authority official behind the
Karine-A smuggling incident, and though the official Palestinian News Agency, WAFA, reported that Shoubaki had been arrested and interrogated, neither was true despite Arafat’s pledge to senior United States officials. 283

The announcement of Sharon’s government associating Arafat with terrorist activity was released as the United States and Saudi Arabia were both putting forth efforts to facilitate a movement towards negotiations and a resolution of the conflict. Thus, the Israeli government’s public statement was a political weapon disrupting the attempts of outside players to initiate a new round of negotiations for a possible cease-fire, and future peace. Furthermore, with political rhetoric against Arafat, Sharon created an open arena for Israel to escalate its assault on the Palestinian people.

(*** Update with Arafat’s response and a look at the public opinion polls of the Palestinian population ***)

Israel Rejects Arafat and Palestinian Reform

The sincerity of the motives Israelis and Palestinians release in their public statements is questionable and so the true motives driving both Israeli and Palestinian action will possibly never be known. Nonetheless, it is still important to note that the statements released by both sides because the escalating battle of rhetoric had a role to play in the escalation of the greater conflict. This remains a military account of the Second Intifada but political statements and strategies are not to be overlooked at as a factor in this asymmetric war as there is a certain point where military tactics and political strategies are intermingled. (***Update with information on Israel rejecting Arafat and the latest with Palestinian Reform. Also, use more quotes from Israeli and Palestinian website sources in getting good quotes on who said what in verbal “squabbles.” ***)

Uncertainties remain as to the goals which motivated Arafat’s calls for reform – whether his goals were to use reform as a tactical strategy to appease the international community, and answer the Israeli government’s rhetoric against him, while allowing Palestinian militant leaders to continue with the uprising, or whether his reforms were aimed at transforming the Palestinian
governing body into one that would be interested in a true peace process and would be seen as a “viable” partner in peace by the Israeli government. At the same time, it is uncertain as to whether Sharon’s calls for reforming the Palestinian government are aimed at creating a true peace partner in a future, reformed Palestinian leadership, or whether Sharon’s calls are empty challenges to Arafat, part of the escalating exchange of challenges that have defined the Second Intifada.

***Arafat’s 100 days reform policy***.

During the Second Intifada, Arafat also continued to respond to the Israeli assaults against him with a combination of blaming Israel for collapsing cease-fires plans and condemning suicide bombings. On July 25, 2002, Israeli forces dropped a bomb on a Hamas leader’s home in Gaza City killing the Hamas leader, Sheik Salah Shehada and 14 civilians, and injuring 140 others. Arafat responded to the attack with rhetoric – political fire. Palestinian Authority officials released a statement saying that Arafat had engaged in negotiations with Hamas leaders and that Hamas leaders would have cooperated in a cease-fire on certain conditions but Israel’s attack in Gaza had hampered hopes for continued negotiations. The statement of the Palestinian Authority following the July 25 Gaza attack arguably fostered a sense of freedom for another round of attacks on Israel.284

On July 31, a bombing attack perpetrated by Hamas killed seven and injured 86 at Hebrew University. In response, Arafat released a statement that condemned the bombing. And also mentioned in that statement that it considered Ariel Sharon “‘as being responsible for this cycle of terror.’” The bombing hit a cafeteria in the university frequented by international students, and it is also likely that Arafat expected the United States and others to react strongly to an attack against university students, and that as a consequence, Arafat chose to quickly release a statement as a means of damage control for his regime.

Moreover, as a response to the attack on Hebrew University, an official in Arafat’s Fatah movement, Hatem Abdel Khader, also blamed Israel’s attack on Sheadeh in Gaza for the incident. Blaming Israeli military action for an escalation in bombing, the Fatah leader also blamed Israeli military action for hindering the Palestinian reform process. According to Khader, “‘If Israel is interested in having Palestinians return to understandings with (Palestinian) opposition organizations, in particular with Hamas, Israel must undertake practical measures in the territories, such as a withdrawal in the territories and a prisoner release of Palestinians held in

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Thus, the fragile process of reforming the Palestinian Authority has also been used as a political device with Palestinian officials blaming Israel for not giving the PA an opportunity to reform, or the space for reform considering Israeli attacks against Israel.

There has been a growing Palestinian political consciousness since the start of the Second Intifada and much talk of reform – and not just on the part of Arafat, but on the part of many within Palestinian society as well.

The Palestinian Effort to Win the Battle for World Opinion.

Few asymmetric wars occur in which both sides can ignore the political economic consequences of the struggle for world opinion, and the struggle between Israelis and Palestinians has always been as much a battle of political perceptions as a military and security struggle. Both Israelis and Palestinians regard the other side’s goals as unfair and use of violence as excessive, and both exploit the other side’s excesses and apparent excess to try to gain the support of world opinion. Israel, however, has had much less success in this battle for world opinion, although it has strong support from the Bush administration, the US Congress, and a large share of the American people. In this regard, Israel suffers from political disadvantages that partially offset its military advantages.

In general, it is the side that is perceived as using the highest level of violence, inflicting the most collateral damage, and/or producing the most civilian casualties, is almost always the loser in this struggle. This sometimes is the Palestinians. For example, the series of Palestinian suicide bombings that culminated in an explosion in front of a Tel Aviv discotheque that killed 21 young Israelis on June 1, 2001, titled the balance of world opinion in favor of Israel. The unilateral cease-fire announced by Prime Minister Ariel Sharon ten days prior to the bombing, and Sharon’s decision not to take immediate military actions following the bombing contributed further to improved relations between Israel and the West in early June.286

In general, however, one irony of asymmetric warfare is that the side that suffers most, or appears weakest, that tends to have the “edge” in the battle of perceptions and the struggle for outside political support. Furthermore, the Palestinians has the advantage that far more of the world opposes Israeli settlements, and the Israeli presence in the West Bank and Gaza, than...
supports it. The UN Security Council resolutions largely endorse the Palestinian demand for Israeli withdrawal to the 1967 boundary, and most of Europe, Russia, China, Japan, and most of the developing world has long pushed for a return to the 1967 lines.

Television imagery tends to favor the Palestinians. Occasional coverage of suicide bombings favors Israel, but the fighting between well-equipped Israeli soldiers and Palestinian civilians using sniping, rock throwing, and small arms, is a political and media battle in which the IDF can only use decisive force at the cost of media images of Palestinian suffering that severely damage. As a result, Palestinian “martyrs” become political weapons that can be as effective in their own way as Israeli heavy weapons.

There are severe limits to what an IDF force seeking to minimize its casualties can do to avoid inflicting casualties on the Palestinians. “Non-lethal” force is highly limited in what it can do in most tactical situations other than crowd control, and the phrase “non-lethal” can be misleading. Weapons like CS gas and rubber bullets have limited range. They often are not effective in stopping large groups, but gas can be lethal in a small number of cases and rubber bullets produce serious trauma in 5-20% of actual hits even within their limited range. They are much more lethal at close ranges.

As a number of IDF experts have privately pointed out, the resulting problems were compounded at the start of the Second Intifada by Israel’s failure to develop large, well-trained and well equipped units dedicated to riot control and the non-lethal use of force, and the lack of joint training for such missions by both the IDF and Palestinian Security forces. Ironically, the climate of peace negotiations before September 2000, coupled to a heavy emphasis on classic counterterrorism, left both sides poorly prepared to both minimize violence during an uprising and enforce efforts to halt the violence. As became clear in Jenin, the IDF also had only moderate training for urban warfare, and did not prepare to deal with the inevitable political backlash from civilian casualties and collateral damage, a mistake it repeated in July 2002, when it fired a 2,000 pound guided weapon at a Hamas leader in Gaza and killed 14 civilians, and wounded more than 100.287

Israel’s acute sensitivity to its own casualties compounds the problems it faces, particularly in urban warfare and the risks involved are very real even when the Palestinians do not make use of weapons. Observers that have never been in a violent riot or watched clashes between violent civilian groups and troops often ignore the grim realities that often develop on
the ground. Troops cannot let mobs armed with stones or Molotov cocktails close in on their positions, or rely on the riot control gear used in dealing with civil disobedience. They must use lethal fire if they risk being overrun by an armed group that may kill. As the “battle of Jenin” has shown, these problems grow steadily more serious when there is a constant risk of sniping or small arms fire, where mortars and rocket launchers are used, where lethal and non-lethal force can easily become mixed, and where it is almost impossible to separate innocent civilians from Palestinians throwing rocks and Palestinians using lethal force.

Using these Israel weaknesses to exploit the media and world opinion is critical to any Palestinian ability to turn its almost constant tactical military defeats into a political and strategic victory. The Palestinian side can only “win” in terms of major gains in a peace process or settlement if it can capture world opinion, and uses Palestinian suffering and “martyrs” to gain political support.

At the same time, the fighting seems to have evolved far beyond the ability of Chairman Arafat and the Palestinian Authority leadership to exercise control over the political and media dimension of the war, if such a capability ever existed. Palestinian young men have never fought simply because they are part of some guiding direction by the Palestinian Authority, they have fought because of years of resentment and growing feelings of hatred. Almost inevitably, the fighting has also strengthened the hand of true opponents of peace like Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad, given outside movements like the Hizbollah more influence, and pushed elements of Arafat’s own supporters like the Fatah Hawks towards a firm commitment to armed struggle.

**The Tactics of Strategic Tragedy**

 Events since September 2000 have turned the Second Intifada into a strategic tragedy where neither side can be given the primary blame for the consequences. One side – Israel -- has a goal of creating security, of creating a new Palestinian state on terms as favorable to Israel as possible, of using force to threaten Israel’s security and to persuade it to withdraw, and of minimizing its casualties, and establishing control. The other side – the Palestinians -- has the goal of using their own suffering, if not actually encouraging their own casualties, to create political instability and tension. The end result is that Israel seems to use excessive force while the Palestinians seem to provoke it. This is a remarkably poor combination of strategy and tactics.
for ending violence, and one where both sides are confronted with the fact that the media images they want to create mean higher casualties, if for totally different reasons.

Israel initially sought to minimize the use of force against ordinary Palestinians and adopted the following rules of engagement: Tear gas and stun grenades were used first. Should these fail to disperse the protest rubber-coated metal bullets were used, which were supposed to be shot at the lower body from a distance of 25 meters or more. Live ammunition was used in response to firebombs or shooting at the lower body, and when encountering shooting and/or grenades, Israeli soldiers will shoot to kill.

The Second Intifada escalated far beyond this level of IDF action by late 2001. Even at the time, however, Palestinian sources claimed that Israeli forces were not abiding by these rules and made frequent use of lethal shots aimed at the upper body or head. Other observers claim that IDF troops deliberately aim at the legs of young men, seek to cripple them, and even prevent effective emergency medical services. For example, Palestinian sources were quoted as reporting that as of November 12, 21.4% of the 4,448 Palestinians admitted to hospital were shot in the legs, and the Physicians for Human Rights are quoted as saying that the existence of a similar pattern of injuries over time reflects an ongoing policy.

Many of these reports were extremely controversial, and some reflect a total lack of military experience. Leg wounds often occur when troops are trying to avoid hits to the head or body, and require the target to be exposed – making the target more difficult to acquire. Talking about the finer details of wound patterns implies a degree of accuracy in combat that no army has ever achieved, as well as a degree of control over individual soldiers in a firefight or close combat that at best is possible only with small cadres of elite forces. War is not a computer game, it is fought in a climate of emotion, fear, and misperception. No army in history has ever been able to create a force composed entirely of sharpshooters, or keep a significant percentage of its troops from panicking and over-reacting.

That said, the Report of the UN High Commissioner on Human Rights, on a visit to the occupied Palestinian territories during November 8-16, 2000, illustrates the real-world human cost of asymmetric warfare, long before major battles such as the struggle for Jenin, made such rules of engagement obsolete. The report notes a high number of rubber bullet hits on the eyes of Palestinians, and the risks inherent in using rubber bullets and tear gas. It quotes figures provided by the Minister of Health of the Palestinian Authority stating that some 6,958 people
(3,366 in the West Bank and 3,592 in Gaza)) had been wounded between September 29 and November 9, and that 1,016 Palestinians had been wounded in Israel. It also notes that 13 Arab-Israelis were killed following street demonstrations in late September and early October, and over 1000 were imprisoned.²⁹¹

According to these Palestinian figures, 40% of those wounded were under 18 years of age, and 41% of the wounds were caused by rubber bullets, 27% by regular ammunition, 27% by tear gas, and 11% by heavier weapons like rockets. At the same time, the report notes that the IDF has found that rubber (plastic coated) bullets, tear gas, and water cannons were not effective at ranges over 50-100 meters, and that “the IDF have over the last few months tested dozens of weapons but have concluded that less than lethal weapons effective to range of 200 meters do not currently exist.”²⁹²

The asymmetric nature of the casualties and effects of the fighting is illustrated by the fact that the UN reports notes that the Palestinian Red Crescent Society reported that 236 Palestinians had been killed, and 9,353 had been wounded, between September 27 and November 23. In contrast, Israel reported 30 Israelis killed and 375 wounded, although the IDF claimed there had been a total of 5,085 attacks on Israelis and 1,400 had involved live fire, including machine guns and the use of firebombs.²⁹³ The UN also reports that the Palestinians have suffered far more in terms of economic restrictions, curfews, and other civil and economic costs.

According to other recent statistics provided by the Israeli Human Rights organization B’Tselem (quoting Red Crescent sources for the Palestinian fatalities), between September 29, 2000, and June 3, 2001, 333 Palestinian civilians were killed by IDF gunfire in the West Bank and Gaza. In the same period, 71 Palestinian security forces personnel were killed by IDF gunfire, and six Palestinian civilians were killed by Israeli civilians. This contrasts with six Israeli civilians killed by Palestinian security forces in the West Bank and Gaza, and 34 Israeli civilians killed by Palestinian civilians. In addition, 15 members of the Israeli security forces were killed by Palestinian civilians, and eight members of the Israeli security forces were killed by Palestinian security forces gunfire. An additional 34 Israeli civilians were killed by Palestinian civilians in Israel proper, most of whom fell victim to suicide bombers.²⁹⁴

As regards Palestinian and Israeli wounded, the differences were also striking. According to the Red Crescent, a total of 13,625 Palestinians were injured between September 29, 2000 and
April 24, 2001. On the Israeli side, 294 Israeli civilians were injured in the West Bank, Gaza, and East Jerusalem between September 29 and May 28, 2001. 345 members of the Israeli security forces were injured in those areas until May 28. Within Israel proper, 30 military personnel and 512 Israeli civilians were injured in the time frame, 504 of them in explosions.295

While both sides disputed such statistics, it was clear from the start of the Second Intifada that every Israeli use of lethal force built Palestinian hatred and resentment. This fueled Palestinian extremism in societies that are extremely young. The Palestinian Authority, in turn, did far less to educate its population against violence and try to reduce such extremism between the Oslo accords and September 2000 than the Israelis, and helped lead to lethal violence against IDF soldiers and Israeli civilians that was not under the control of the Palestinian Authority. It also helped create a climate where suicide bombings and terrorism seemed both necessary and desirable. Tactics that produced a steady escalation to more lethal uses of force by the IDF. The Palestinians have reacted with more and more anger, and sometimes open hatred. Religious and cultural tension has increased on both sides. Israel has steadily moved to separate Israelis and Palestinians, various Israeli settler groups and many private Israelis have armed themselves, taking gun lessons and creating a climate were untrained civilians shoot at innocent Palestinians, carry out vigilant justice or take “revenge,” regardless of any real justification.296 The rise in popular violence on both sides has created escalating cycles of reaction and counter-reaction that are increasingly beyond the control of either side.

Violence does more than beget violence. It creates a climate in which extremists on both sides can exploit, and where incidents of terrorism or violence against the other side’s civilians can be used to lock efforts to bring ceasefires or any return to the peace process. Words are weapons in such asymmetric conflicts and so are political gestures. Both sides have a natural tendency to add a religious and ethnic dimension of the conflict. The risk of a secular Palestinian struggle becoming Islamic is particularly great, but the “Jew versus Jew” struggle inside Israel brings Judaism into such a struggle as well.

The escalating trend towards occupation, physical containment and economic warfare create further problems. Occupation and containment mean isolating Palestinians and crippling the economy of any area facing containment. Given the already weak economies in Gaza and the West Bank, this has an immediate and brutal human impact and affects all involved, not simply those who are violent. So does the destruction of buildings and facilities to clear lines of sight or
fire for the IDF, punish attackers, or prevent sniping – all of which inevitably becomes part of the political battle for media attention.

Israel’s virtual closure of the West Bank and Gaza, means well over 125,000 Palestinian workers have been unable to reach their jobs and unemployment has risen from 11 percent to over 40-50 percent. The Palestinian economy has virtually collapsed and the once lucrative tourist trade—including profits from the casino in Jericho—has ended. So has, foreign investment and foreign capital accounted for 70 percent of the funding for new economic ventures before the Second Intifada.

At the same time, Israelis suffer economically as well as Palestinians and the economic dimension of the conflict builds tension on both sides. So far the economic cost has been great to both sides. Some estimates indicate the Israeli economy will lose 2 billion dollars in exports and its forecasted growth rate has dropped from 7 percent to 5 percent. Especially hard hit is the agricultural industry that depends on Palestinians for 20 percent of its labor. In the end however, the continuation of the closings of the territories cost the Palestinians for more economically than their Israeli counterparts. Israel is only dependent on the PNA territories for one percent of its GDP, while the Palestinian economy is dependent on the Israeli economy for over 25 percent its GDP.297

Enforcing containment of hostile populations has made both the level of actual violence and the media images of the asymmetric character of that violence worse. It means the forward deployment of overwhelming force in the form of armor and artillery, the use of helicopters and strike fighters to reduce vulnerability and provide a platform for precision fire. It means IDF bunkers and deployments become natural targets. It has created a strong incentive for Palestinian bombings and “terrorism,” Palestinian efforts to kidnap or attack IDF soldiers and civilians anywhere along the perimeter of containment areas, and clashes between Israeli and Palestinian civilians. This has led on many occasions to overreaction by both sides, and each level of escalation has involved more innocent civilians.

Securing Israeli settlers presents another dilemma for Israel. It provokes the Palestinians, makes a return to a peace process less credible, and tends to further “institutionalize” such settlements as part of Israel. Settlers must be equipped for defense and armed accordingly, but they are not subject to military discipline and can easily overreact. Many of the more isolated settlers tend to be ideological extremists, which scarcely helps. In short, every step that continues
or escalates violence and Israeli-Palestinian clashes compounds the tragedy of conflict, makes peace or a ceasefire more difficult to reach, and makes any kind of peace or ceasefire more difficult to enforce.

**Asymmetric Weaponry and Rising Levels of Violence and Casualties**

In executing attacks on Palestinian cities, Israel has been using “advanced sensors, precision weaponry, chemical detection devices and long-range bullet-and mortar-trackers” according to outgoing chief of military research and development for the IDF, Major General Isaac Ben-Israel. Use of these weapons assist IDF soldiers in detecting the sources of gunfire and mortar attacks, the location of explosive supplies, and even that of armed individuals from long distances. However, sensors are also used to assist special operations Israeli soldiers on the ground and preclude them from being spotted. IDF soldiers also benefit from developments in protective gear and improvements in personal weaponry. Yet, while advances in IDF weaponry have helped curb the total count of casualties on both sides, the death toll from the fighting continues to rise\(^{298}\). (ADD STATS ABOUT HOW MANY LIVES HAVE BEEN TAKEN). According to a report by the Middle East Quarterly, 22 Palestinians – half of whom are females – have died as a consequence of medical complications after considerable delays at Israeli checkpoints\(^{299}\).

**The Actors in the Conflict: The Palestinian Authority Security Forces**

There is no military balance in the Second Intifada in any normal sense of the term, and so much depends on the role of outside actors and political events that there is no way to predict who would “win,” and how much both sides would actually lose. Normal measures of the conventional military balance have only limited meaning under such conditions. Conflicts in Afghanistan, Cambodia, Kashmir, Lebanon, Northern Ireland, the Sudan, Sri Lanka, Vietnam, and the Western Sahara have all shown that long, bloody, guerrilla wars and low-level conflicts can be fought by small, poorly-equipped extremist elements even when they face massively superior conventional armies. Even highly trained and well-equipped Israeli forces never entirely succeeded in enforcing security during the Intifada, just as similarly trained and equipped British forces were never able to halt the violence in Northern Ireland.
Many low-intensity wars have occurred where the “guerrillas” initially seem to be defeated. In many cases, however, the military or paramilitary capabilities of guerrilla forces evolved during the conflict, adapting and re-adapting to the military and internal security techniques used to suppress them. Thus, the balance at the beginning of such a conflict proved to be of little indication of the balance that will exist at its end. “Winning” the first round of battles only led to years of political and military struggle with constant changes in tactics, weapons, and levels of engagement. The paramilitary and guerrilla organizations that exist at the start of such conflicts also can change radically in leadership, tactics, and equipment under the pressure of events.

There are, however, clear differences between the Israeli and Palestinian forces involved in the Second Intifada that have shaped the military balance throughout the fighting. The IDF has maintained absolute conventional military supremacy on the land, at sea, and in the air. The only purely military restraints on its use of force have been a reluctance to take casualties, and the political consequences of any given pattern of attack on the Palestinians. All of the major restraints are political. As a result, it has been how the IDF chose to employ force, rather than how it is organized and deployed, which have been the primary tactical issue shaping the military aspects of Second Intifada.

The story is very different in the case of the Palestinian Authority security forces. They have never been conventional military forces and they are not the only Palestinian forces engaged in the Second Intifada. They have been caught between the need to challenge the IDF, the need to reestablish control over movements like Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and the increasing Israeli effort to shatter and “reform” Arafat’s power and authority.

On the one hand, the Palestinian Authority security forces have had to fight an asymmetric war in which the Authority has sought to use media coverage of the martyrdom and suffering of all factions of Palestinians, Israeli casualties to combat and terrorism, and to increase the economic and political strain on Israel to defeat a military force that is otherwise militarily superior in every way. On the other hand, they must seek to retain control over the Palestinian movement and preserve the option of reaching some kind of ceasefire or peace settlement.

Trying to find the proper balance presents an extremely difficult challenge for the Palestinian Authority security forces in dealing with the Palestinian people, other Palestinian groups, and Israel. Moreover, the fact that many aspects of the Second Intifada reflect a true
popular uprising limits the ability of both the Palestinian Authority and the Palestinian Security forces in acting in ways that do not have popular support. Terrorism and tactics like suicide bombings, hit and run raids with small arms, mortars, and remote control bombs, do not require large elements or cells and are difficult to control when they have popular support. At the same time, Israeli attacks have severely weakened their capability, and present the risk that control of the Palestinian side of the conflict might eventually come under the control of other factions.

**The Palestinian Authority versus Hamas and the PIJ**

The efforts of the Palestinian Security forces to “ride the tiger” were scarcely easy even before the crisis began in September 2000. The combined activity of Hamas and Islamic Jihad had a massive impact on Israeli public opinion, and threatened to bring an end to the peace process on several occasions before the start of the Second Intifada. Terrorist attacks during 1994 and the first part of 1995 steadily shifted Israeli opinion against further withdrawals. On January 22, 1995, two bombs exploded at a bus stop at Beit Lid, killing twenty-one and wounding sixty. The Palestinian Islamic Jihad claimed responsibility for the attack. On January 27, an unidentified assailant wounded three Israelis near Netzarim, in Gaza. On February 6, an unidentified gunman killed an Israeli in Gaza. On March 20, unidentified assailants fired on a bus near Kiryat Arba, killing two Israelis.

This violence escalated sharply in April 1995. In early April, several Hamas members were killed in Gaza when a bomb they were making exploded prematurely. Then, on April 9, a suicide bomber linked to the Palestinian Islamic Jihad drove an explosives-laden car into a bus near Kfar Darom in Gaza, killing seven Israelis and one American and wounding thirty-four. Another attack on the same day near Netzarim left eleven Israelis wounded. Hamas claimed responsibility for this second attack.300

A US State Department investigation of these events concluded that, “We have no information that incidents of terrorism were perpetrated or organized by PLO elements under Arafat's control during the period covered by this report.” Further, former Prime Minister Rabin stated during a speech on May 15, 1995 that, "Fatah groups under the Palestinian Authority headed by Arafat have not taken part in any murderous terrorist attacks against Israelis."

The State Department investigation also concluded that Palestinian and PLO officials had denounced these acts of terrorism as they occurred. For example, Chairman Arafat telephoned

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former Prime Minister Rabin to express his condolences in response to the Beit Lid attack on January 22, 1995, and called the attack a "criminal act that threatens the peace process." The Planning Minister of the Palestinian Authority, Nabil Sha'ath, called the act a "criminal deed which we resolutely condemn." The Health Minister of the Palestinian Authority reacted to the March 19, 1995 attack in Hebron by stating that that the Palestinian Authority "shares the grief of the families" of the victims, and stressed that no terror attack would stop the peace process. The Housing Minister called the attack on civilians "deplorable." Arafat responded to the April 9 bombings in Kfar Darom and Netzarim, by stating he would "make war on the perpetrators of terrorist attacks who seek to thwart the peace process."

Words, however, were not enough. Each attack by Hamas and Islamic Jihad undermined the peace process, and it took time for the Palestinian Authority to realize that it had to match its words with action. The particularly bloody terrorist incident on Israeli civilians on April 9, 1995, was a key catalyst in this process. The Israeli response made it clear that the peace process could only continue as long as the Palestinian Authority improved the quality of its security options and was seen to publicly and constantly crack down on violent movements like Hamas and Islamic Jihad. Israel threatened to enforce prolonged travel bans in Gaza and the West Bank that affected tens of thousands of Palestinian jobs and businesses -- and even partial bans cost Gaza at least $1.5 million a day.

This Israeli response cost Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad a considerable amount of popular Palestinian support because of the loss of jobs and trade. It also led the Palestinian Authority to take a much firmer line in reacting to attacks. Its security forces improved their cooperation with Israeli security forces, conducted ruthless interrogations and quick trials, and expanded their prisons. These actions reduced the number of terrorist incidents, and weakened Islamic Jihad, which also lost some of its leaders to assassinations overseas. They also showed that the Palestinian Authority and PLO could crack down effectively on the Hamas and Islamic Jihad without losing significant public support or major reprisals.

The Effectiveness of the Palestinian Authority Security Forces

The Palestinian Authority security forces have been shattered by the events of 2001 and 2002, and are certain to be "reformed" into a very different structure than they had at the beginning of the Second Intifada. Nevertheless, they did show that they could be reasonably effective when they had Arafat’s authority to act and suitable outside assistance. State
Department officials and US intelligence experts indicate that the Palestinian Authority continued to improve its performance during the period before the Second Intifada began, although none describe any element as well-trained, properly organized, or truly professional. At the same time, Israeli officials remain far more critical, and events have shown that the Palestinian Authority was still years away from developing fully effective internal security forces when the violence began in September 2000. In spite of assistance from the CIA, Palestinian Authority security forces continue to have problems with internal discipline, corruption, and human rights issues, and there was some infiltration by anti-peace elements. In addition, there was a significant risk that the loyalty of the security forces could be threatened or undermined by a collapse or delay of the peace process, by being asked to take action against fellow Palestinians that was too extreme, or by extreme Israeli security actions which sharply infringed on Palestinian rights.

Creating effective security forces is anything but easy even without the challenges posed by uncertain guidance from the top, and having to cope with outside demands and pressures from a state like Israel. The Palestinian Authority had to convert paramilitary elements that were anti-Israeli before the peace accords to an effective security force that can provide security and law enforcement for a secular Palestinian Authority. It had to expand its capability to conduct joint patrols with Israeli security forces, prevent attacks on Israelis, disarm and suppress violent extremist movements like the Islamic Jihad, and prevent conflict between Palestinians. At the same time, it had to preserve the support of the Palestinian people, and learn how to act in an environment where the Palestinian Authority was moving towards true sovereignty, and where the need to reflect more democratic methods, preserve human rights, and resist corruption and power brokering was becoming steadily more important.

It is important to note that cooperation between Palestinian and Israeli security forces did lead to a significant decline in terrorism before the clashes of September 2000. Even Israeli sources that have often been critical of the Palestinian Authority have generally recognized that this cooperation was a main reason why terror, especially Hamas activity, has declined since 1997. In 1996, there were sixty Israeli victims of terrorist acts. By 1997, the number was down to twenty-nine and there were only twelve in 1998. Furthermore, the Palestinian Authority is credited with thwarting a large-scale terrorist attack in Tel Aviv in February. Israeli officials say that previous ineffectiveness was due to inexperience, and they now recognize the improvement in the Palestinian security forces.
The CIA played a major role in the peace process after the mid-1990s by encouraging greater security cooperation and by assisting in the development of concrete means to implement joint security endeavors and other cooperative agreements. The agency’s critical role was further highlighted during the negotiations at the Wye Plantation in the fall of 1998 which culminated in a memorandum that set the stage for further Israeli redeployments from the West Bank and a strengthened commitment to joint Israeli-Palestinian security arrangements. This training and liaison not only improved the effectiveness and credibility of Palestinian operations, it also helped the Palestinian security forces reduce the use of arbitrary arrests and forces and to adopt more effective and modern methods of counterterrorism.

Prime Minister Barak initially sought to reduce the role of the CIA after his election in the spring of 1999 because he felt that Israel and the Palestinian Authority must learn to work together and the fear that this is creates independent ties between the US and the Palestinians that undercut US-Israeli ties and limit Israeli freedom of action. However, the CIA still played a role after Barak’s efforts, and played a significant role in trying to contain Palestinian-Israeli violence when the dashes began in September 2000. The CIA was charged with continuing this role as part of the October 17 summit agreement, and it is clear that the Palestinian Authority security forces will need continuing aid and liaison from the CIA or some similar outside group to effectively enforcing any ceasefire or peace agreement.

The role of the CIA diminished in the first few months following the inauguration of George W. Bush as U.S. President on January 20, 2001, and diminished, in conjunction with the new administration’s decision to seek a less active U.S. role in mediating between Israelis and Palestinians. The Bush administration urged the sides to cooperate directly with each other, despite Palestinian appeals to resume the agency’s role as a facilitator in the negotiations. In this respect, the Bush administration’s decision of early June 2001 to dispatch George Tenet, Director of Central Intelligence, to the Middle East was a reversal of this approach. George Tenet’s arrival in the Middle East came at a time when Israeli-Palestinian tensions were at a peak—a suicide bomber had killed himself and 21 young Israelis, and a powerful Israeli military response had been anticipated.

In any case, no amount of “reform” can be expected to produce perfection and “reform” will ultimately be meaningless without a just peace. A fundamentally unpopular peace or ceasefire will be unenforceable. Virtually any achievable agreement will now create an ongoing
risk that new terrorist attacks and low-intensity fighting between Palestinians and Israelis, or between Palestinians, will escalate to major proportions.

Security forces also cannot be better than their political leadership, or function without strong political support. Far too much of the Palestinian Authority political structure has been built around the influence of one man, Yasser Arafat, who may or may not survive and who may or may not even be able to make the difficult transformation from leader of an opposition in exile to someone who can both govern and be a statesman. Further, the Palestinian Authority’s ability to enforce security measures is highly dependent on Palestinian public support, progress in the peace process, progress in reducing Israeli control over the Palestinians, and belief that the peace will bring jobs and economic development. It will also be influenced by the extent to which pro-PLO and anti-PLO factions—both from within and probably from outside of the PA—will attempt and succeed to increase their influence inside the PA.

The Organization of the Palestinian Security Forces in Gaza and the West Bank

The structure of the Palestinian security forces at the start of the Intifada is now of more value as a case study than a picture of current and future capabilities. It still, however, lays important ground work in explaining the limits to the Palestinian ability to fight in the Second Intifada, and what may or may not happen with “reform.” The Palestinian Authority began by absorbing much of the Palestinian personnel and administrative structures that worked under the Israeli civil administration. At the same time, Arafat brought in many outside elements and created a Palestinian Security system with a total of thirteen different Palestinian Authority security forces, twelve of which were official. Ten of these were under the control of the Palestinian Police Force Directorate or General Security Service under the leadership of Nasr Yusuf. These were the Civil Police (Shurta), National Security Forces, Preventive Security, General Intelligence, Military Intelligence, Military Police, Local Governorate Security and Emergency Services, as well as small elements like the Air Guard and the Maritime Police in Gaza. The Presidential Security Detail (Amn al-ri-asas) and the Special Security (Al-Amn al-Khass) were both independent units that answer directly to Yasser Arafat. In addition to the officially recognized security forces, the Tanzim (“organization”) under the leadership of
Marwan al-Barguti formed an unofficial militia for Fatah, the primary base of political support for Palestinian Authority and Yasser Arafat’s original group.

These were at most paramilitary forces with negligible war fighting capabilities. Under the Oslo accords, the Palestinian Authority could deploy 12,000 men on the West Bank, out of a total Palestinian Authority security force of 30,000 men -- including the 18,000 men in Gaza. This force could have a total of 5,000 men recruited from Palestinians abroad. A total of 6,000 could be deployed initially to Area A and limited parts of Area B, with the other 6,000 to be deployed later. The force could have a total of 4,000 rifles, 4,000 pistols, 120 machine guns of .30 to .50 caliber and 15, light unarmed riot vehicles.

Under the initial deployment schedule, the Palestinian Authority was allowed to deploy up to 6,000 men, and increase this total as it took control over the seven largest Arab cities. The Palestinian Authority could deploy 1,000 men in the Jenin District, 400 men in the Tulkarm District, 1,200 men in the Nablus District, 400 men in the Qalqilyah District, 1,200 men in the Ramallah District, 850 men in the Bethlehem District, and 950 men in the Hebron District (including 400 men in the zone under Palestinian Authority control within the city limits). It could deploy up to 600 men in the Jericho District, which are counted as part of the 18,000 men who can be deployed in Gaza.307

In practice, the Palestinian Authority built up substantially larger numbers of men and weapons than the accords formally permitted. There was substantial smuggling of weapons like AK-47s from Iraq through Jordan into the West Bank, many of which went into private hands or were given to Fatah, the Palestinian Authority militias like the Tanzim, as well as other militant groups such as Hamas and the PIJ. In March 2001, a Jordanian trucker was caught with 130 guns and 27 ammunition clips at the Sheikh Hussein border between Jordan and Israel. The trucker had apparently conducted at least four successful smuggling missions prior to his arrest.308

The Palestinian Authority seems to have obtained some unauthorized artillery rockets, mortars, anti-tank rocket launchers, and bomb-making materials. It may have acquired a few anti-tank guided missiles, and man portable surface-to-air missiles like the SA-7, but had little real weapons strength in September 2000. As a result it had to try to smuggle in weapons. For example, on May 6, 2001 an Israeli naval patrol intercepted a shipment of around 40 tons of modern weapons on its way to Gaza. The weapons included 50 China-manufactured 107mm
Katyusha rockets, two Russian 60mm light mortars with 98 rounds; 70 Russian fragmentation mines; and 20 RPG-7s with special sights and 120 anti-tank grenades. 30 AK-47 assault rifles with 13,000 round of standard 7.62mm ammunition were also confiscated. The shipment’s most problematic weapons included four Strela-2 (SA-7 ‘Grail’) SAM launchers capable of threatening civilian aircraft during take-off or landing.  

This inventory provides a good picture of what the Palestinian Authority wanted, but not of what it had when the fighting began.

It is impossible to separate Israeli charges and Palestinian denials regarding such arms and establish the truth. What is known is that some heavy weapons were present from the start and Fatah and Tanzim activists used anti-tank weapons against IDF tanks and armored personnel carriers (APCs) in Gaza on October 31, 2000, although their fire was largely ineffective.

At the same time, the agreements made during the peace process did lead to progress in creating effective internal security forces. They established national, regional, and district security liaison offices that were manned on a 24-hour basis and have special communications links. These agreements also established a Joint Security Committee (Joint Coordination and Cooperation Committee for Mutual Security or JSC) with five to seven members from each side, which were to operate on the basis of agreement by both sides, and to develop the comprehensive plans for the transfer of regional authority. Joint Regional Security Committees (JRSCs) were created for the West Bank and for Gaza, and joint District Coordination Offices (DCOs) for each district.

The DCOs were set up with six officers from each side, a commander, and five duty officers. They coordinated affairs in the individual districts, and report to the JRSCs and the JSC. They directed the Joint Patrols and Joint Mobile Units that were to ensure “free, unimpeded, and secure movement” along key roads and provide a rapid reaction to any incidents. Each Joint Patrol had an Israeli and a Palestinian vehicle with an officer and three guards. The JRSCs, DCOs and joint patrols were supposed to share intelligence, and support joint liaison bureaus at the key crossing points along the border with Jordan. The Palestinian Police Forces and Israeli Security Forces are to cooperate fully in the areas of security and forensics. The PFF was also to submit a complete list of its policemen to Israeli forces.

This policy of joint patrols was terminated on November 23, 2000, however, after a grenade or mortar shell killed an Israeli officer at a DCO in the Gaza Strip. Suspecting that Palestinians within the DCO had cooperated with the attack, Palestinian forces were instructed to
leave the security office. Within hours the IDF had submitted a formal request for the Palestinian Authority to remove all of its security forces from all of the DCOs in the territories. The next day, Barak and Arafat agreed via telephone to the re-implementation of the security patrols, however the patrols never resumed in any meaningful way because of the continuing violence. The following months witnessed a complete halt to the Israeli-Palestinian joint security patrols and an end to the Israeli-Palestinian security cooperation. Although Israeli and Palestinian security officials met from time to time to discuss a renewal of the security cooperation, these attempts were overshadowed, and eventually rendered fruitless, by the escalation of violence.

For example, a first serious attempt to renew security cooperation between the sides came in the early summer of 2001, when DCI George Tenet’s cease-fire proposal was reluctantly accepted by the sides. The proposal called on the Israeli government and the Palestinian leadership to immediately resume security cooperation. Concrete steps were to include the formation and weekly gathering of a joint senior-level U.S.-Israeli-Palestinian security committee and the reinvigoration of the DCOs. The Tenet plan called on the security committee to identify ‘key flash points’, for which joint Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) would be developed, which in turn would address how the sides would handle and respond to security incidents. The collapse of the ceasefire discussed earlier in Table One blocked real progress, but repeated attempts were made until the fighting reached the point in the spring of 2002 where it was clear that the Palestinian security forces were shattered and Israel would not resume cooperation with their existing leadership and a force with so many divisions and rivalries.

Joint patrols do, however, offer a proven way to improve internal security if a serious ceasefire can be resumed and other aspects of the accords gave Israel advantages in helping achieve security that might have value in the future. They specified that the IDF and Israelis should continue to move freely on roads in the West Bank and Gaza. In Area A, Israeli vehicles were accompanied by joint patrols. Israelis could not, under any circumstances, be arrested or placed in custody by the Palestinian police, and may only be required to present identity and vehicle documentation. On roads that were jointly patrolled, only the Israeli side of a joint patrol shall make any request for identification. Both sides were called upon to cooperate, lend assistance to one another in the search for missing persons, and share pertinent information. Such arrangements also effectively gave Israel -- the side with armor, heavy weapons, and helicopters -- a major advantage in the Second Intifada. The Palestinians could still operate from urban cover and survive, but the accords never equipped the Palestinian Authority to challenge the
IDF’s ability to seize and secure lines of communication outside of urban areas. These asymmetries in military strength have hurt the Palestinians in war, but continuing them seems critical to any Israeli acceptance of a cease-fire and peace.

One of the greatest single problems the Palestinian security forces faced, however, had nothing to do with Israel’s strength. Arafat used divide and protect tactics, and personal control, and obsessive management to ensure his own rule and survival. This gravely weakened the security forces in supporting the peace process and limited any role they could play during the Second Intifada. His light control over budgets, arms orders, and every other activity limited their initiative and ability to organize and train for any kind of military activity. They were never given consistent direction in dealing with security issues, and could never make any coherent effort to prepare for clashes with the IDF.

The end result was an organizational nightmare and sometimes committed significant abuses. The services in Gaza and the West Bank were placed under the direction of the General Security Service (GSS), an umbrella organization that coordinates and maintains ten Palestinian security services, as well as nine administrative departments, from two separate headquarters. The GSS, together with the Special Security Force (SSF) and the Presidential Security Force (‘Force 17’), constituted the Palestinian Security Services (PSS).

The National Security Force (NSF) became the largest security service and is responsible for missions along the borders of Area A and inside cities, including Israeli-Palestinian Joint Patrols and checkpoints at city limits. Key elements of the force were formed largely out of the elements from the Palestinian Liberation Army (PLA) and Fatah forces, based throughout the world. The force consists of four brigades (three of which are based in Gaza), numbering 8,500 personnel. The force has 3,500 personnel stationed in the West Bank, divided into eight units stationed in different cities. The NSF’s commander-in-chief, Abd el-Razek el-Majiada, was headquartered in Gaza. General Hajj Ismail, who operated autonomously, was the West Bank commander of the NSF.311

The Civil Police Force became the main law enforcement tool in the Palestinian Authority (PA) and responsible for ordinary police functions such as directing traffic, arresting common criminals, and keeping public order. At the same time, the Second Intifada began, it employed some 12,200 officers in both the West Bank and Gaza and can deploy its forces in twenty-five selected villages in the areas of the West Bank known as Area B+. The Civil Police
also headed a 700-man special police unit to handle complex crises, such as severe riots and counter-terrorism operations. The commander of the Police Force was General Ghazi Jabali.

The constituent elements of these forces presented problems from the start. The remnants of the PLA and Fatah that formed the NSF had little cohesion, and little training for their new mission – either in dealing with extremists like those in Hamas or the PIJ or dealing with crowd and riot control. The forces included a large number of men who were aging bureaucrats living on a PLO income rather than official paramilitary personnel. Both forces initially had little money, equipment or training. Many members of the forces had little or no training, but some received training in Jordan or Egypt. These training efforts only involved limited numbers of personnel and were slow to develop. They did not create the kind of force that could find the best balance between necessary operations and human rights, and corruption was sometimes a problem.

The regular police force combined volunteers from Gaza and the West Bank, including some former violent opponents of Israel like the Fatah Hawks and Black Panthers. It is scarcely surprising therefore that members of al-Fatah militia have exchanged gunfire with IDF forces during the recent clashes and its leaders declared that they strongly support the need for continued uprising of the Palestinian people. Some elements in the security forces have divided loyalties and this makes the prospects for enforcing a ceasefire or peace more fragile. 312

These problems were compounded by internal difficulties and problems in the command structure of the forces involved. Within the PSS, responsibilities of several units often overlapped, leading to street clashes, confusion, inefficiency, and sometimes battles over blurred jurisdictions. Rivalries within the various security and paramilitary forces were sometimes tied to longstanding rivalries within the PLO and Arafat’s immediate entourage. Coordinating the services to prevent such problems was complicated by Arafat’s insistence on personally directing and arbitrating between the groups, and use of their divisions to ensure that no rival could emerge.

In addition, three groups of generals were represented in the security establishment. The first group consists of “outsiders”- generals who arrived in the territories in 1994 as part of the Oslo accords and did not actively participate in the Intifada. A second group was made up of
prominent figures in the Palestinian struggle for independence during the Intifada. This group enjoyed far more popular support. A third group consisted of officers brought to the territories by Arafat from abroad to command the most sensitive security bodies, primarily intelligence services.

By placing the security forces under the command of a heterogeneous group of generals who are often at odds with each other, Arafat managed to prevent the formation of a cohesive general staff with authoritative power. In this way, he reduced the possibility that his power will ever be challenged by a united military coup, as has occurred in several Arab regimes in the Middle East. However, he also greatly compromised the efficacy and utility of the PSS.313

While the Palestinian security structure was supposed to be professional, Arafat also created overlapping groups that were highly political in character and spy on each other. In many cases, there has been considerable corruption, internal violence, and feuding within the security services. The security services were as subject to family and clan interests as every other aspect of the Palestinian Authority. While the security forces have been accused of preparing for war for expanding beyond the Oslo limits, they also had to try to co-opt young Palestinians into the security forces to keep them from joining the opposition. This hiring of low-grade personnel to create jobs and offer positions for patronage purposes may have helped ensure their loyalty, but it has also made corruption, feuding, and human rights abuses worse. Furthermore, it was scarcely a recipe for maintaining loyalty and control once the Second Intifada began.

Israel too faced problems. It was able to rapidly adapt its forces to the problem of controlling Palestinian movement in and out of Gaza, and securing its access to Gaza, key lines of communication, Israeli settlements, and mixed areas. At the same time, it had to develop and enforce extremely complex arrangements with the Palestinian Authority to define the right of hot pursuit, and secure key roads inside Gaza, as well as the perimeter of several key settlements. Israel’s concentration on security and counterterrorism also led it to underestimate the political, economic, and social pressures inside Gaza and the West Bank that led to the outbreak of mass violence on September 29, 2000.
Israel was slow to address the potential causes of violence, and it did not prepare to deal with a mass popular uprising, as distinguished from terrorism. It failed to train and prepare effectively for riot control and the outbreak of a Second Intifada, and act in ways that minimized the use of lethal force. It often pressured the Palestinian security forces to take hard-line action without sufficiently considering the fact that the Palestinian Authority had to keep its popular support and it often delayed implementing the Oslo and follow-on accords on security grounds without fully considering the linkage between such delays and the lack of Palestinian support for the peace process.

Yet, progress did take place until the Second Intifada began. Members of the IDF and Israeli security forces that dealt with the new Palestinian security forces initially had serious reservations about whether the Palestinians could become effective in and conducting counter-terrorism operations. Over time, however, they felt that the various Palestinian security and police forces gained experience, improved their training and equipment, set up intelligence and informer networks, and improved their cooperation with Israel.

Some of this improvement was forced on the Palestinian Authority by the growing risk that tolerance of Palestinian terrorism would lead to a breakdown of the peace process. The Palestinian security forces only began to take decisive action after the April 9, 1995 suicide attack on Israelis. Nevertheless, the Palestinian security operation in Gaza and Jericho built up total forces of 9,000 regular police and 12,000 security police by late 1994, and demonstrated that a number of its cadres had at least moderate effectiveness.  

The new “Oslo II” peace accords signed by Israel and the Palestinian Authority on September 13, 1995 further strengthened the role of the Palestinian security forces in Gaza. They allowed the Palestinian Authority to deploy 18,000 men in Gaza out of a total security force of 30,000, and to recruit up to 7,000 men from Palestinians abroad. The agreement allowed them to be armed with rifles and pistols, and possess a total of 7,000 light personal weapons, 120 machine guns of .30 to .50 caliber, and 45 wheeled armored vehicles. In practice, the Palestinian Authority built up significantly larger forces than the accords permitted by 1997, and continued to maintain them until it began to suffer from the result of intensifying IDF tactics in 2002.

Additional new agreements between Israel and the Palestinian Authority, which were made as part of the Wye Accords in 1998, built on the experience both sides had gained since
They expanded regional and district security liaison offices that are manned on a 24-hour basis and have special communications links. The agreements called for the sharing of intelligence, joint patrols on key roads, joint mobile units for rapid response to disturbances and terrorist attacks, and joint liaison bureaus at the key crossing points.

The new Wye Accords strengthened the role of the CIA in training the Palestinian Authority, and led to more stringent Palestinian Authority action in dealing with extremists and terrorists. They also created a more formal role for the CIA as an arbiter and buffer between the two sides. The CIA was not, however, supposed to be involved in an operational role and claims that it has not departed from advisory and liaison functions.

The Sharm el-Sheikh Memorandum of September 4, 1999 did not involve much public detail about new security arrangements. It did, however, remove a number of causes of friction between the Palestinians and Israel, and did call for full implementation of the Wye Accords. It also called for the two sides to act to ensure the immediate, efficient, and effective handling of any incident involving a threat or act of terrorism, violence or incitement by either Israelis or Palestinians. It also called for the Palestinians to fully implement their responsibilities for security, security cooperation, ongoing obligations and other issues – particularly those called for in the Wye River Memorandum. Specifically, it called for a continuation of the Palestinian program to collect all illegal weapons, provide reports on the apprehension of suspects, and for forwarding a full list of Palestinian policemen to Israel no later than September 12, 1999. A revitalized Israeli-Palestinian Monitoring and Steering Committee was to review this compliance.

The end result, however, was to demonstrate that security forces are no substitute for a peace that both sides regarded as acceptable and just. The clashes between IDF forces and Palestinian security forces since September 2000 were scarcely the first sudden outburst of violence. In September of 1996, Netanyahu refused to close the tunnel to the Temple Mount/Al-Aqsa complex, an area in Jerusalem holy to both Jews and Muslims. Fighting between the Palestinians and Israelis broke out for three days, leaving 72 people dead. This event was particularly notable, because it was the first time Palestinian forces turned against Israeli forces and began to fire on the Israeli forces. It is also important to note that the Palestinian security forces all did relatively little to train and organize for riot control before September 2000 and the
risk of a Second Intifada. They concentrated on counterterrorism. As a result they lacked the riot equipment, security posts, communications equipment, and experience to deal with a major Palestinian uprising.

**The Actors in the Conflict: The Palestinian Actors That Challenge the IDF**

There are a wide range of other Palestinian military and paramilitary forces that have helped shape the course of the Second Intifada. These forces include different factions with shifting alignments, almost all of which make grandiose claims about their active manpower, their combat equipment, and the size of their combat formations.317

Some of these forces supported peace and counterterrorism operations before September 29th, are deployed in Gaza and the West Bank, and are controlled by the Palestinian Authority. These forces are summarized in Figure 7.1 and described in detail in Table 7.1, which lists the total pro-peace forces as of mid-2001 – before they were shattered by Israeli attacks. The totals are substantially higher than in 1995, when there were some 16,500 to 18,000 police officers and security personnel, including 7,000 men in the Public Security Force, 4,000 men in the Civil Police, and 2,500 men in the Preventive Security Force.

As Figure 7.2 shows, there were additional pro-Palestinian Authority/PLO forces at the time the Second Intifada began, including the security, military and paramilitary elements of Fatah, Palestine Liberation Front (PLF), Arab Liberation Front (ALF), Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP), and Palestine Popular Struggle Front (PPSF). Some forces like the Palestine National Liberation Army (PNLA) were little more than cadres whose manpower had been largely incorporated in the forces of the Palestinian Authority.

Most of the pro-Palestinian Authority/pro-peace forces outside Gaza and Jericho lost much of their strength and income since the Gulf War. Syria and the Lebanese Army partially disarmed many of the pro-PLO Palestinian factions in Lebanon in 1991, and took away their heavier arms like tanks, APCs, and artillery -- although Syria and the Lebanese Army left pro-Syrian factions like the PFLP-GC (General Command) alone. The Lebanese Army has continued these efforts since 1991, and conducted new operations against the Fatah Revolutionary Council
in 1994. Syria and Iraq maintain tight control over the operations and weapons of all Palestinian forces based on their territory.

Some Palestinian factions within the PLO, and most factions outside the PLO, opposed the peace process before September 29th. These factions are also shown in Figure 7.3. At least ten organizations with some kind of military, paramilitary, or terrorist element have rejected the peace process, and declared themselves part of the “opposition front” at a meeting in Damascus in September 1992. At that time, this list included the Hamas-Islamic Resistance, elements of the Palestine Popular Struggle Front (PPSF), the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), the Revolutionary Communist Party, DFLP, elements of the People’s Liberation Front (PLF), al-Saiqa and Fatah-Intifada in 1999. This list has changed substantially in organization and strength since the beginning of the Second Intifada, but reliable data is not available.

Palestinian forces that are not aligned with the PLO included forces belonging to the Fatah dissidents, Fatah Revolutionary Council/Abu Nidal Organization (FRC/ANO), Fatah Intifada (Abu Musa), Palestine Liberation Army (PLA), PFLP-GC (General Command), and PFLP-SC (Special Command). Some of these forces are based in, and under the direct control of Syria.

The post-September 2000 military strength of these various factions is impossible to estimate, and changes constantly with the tides of Palestinian politics and because of Israeli military action and changes in outside funding and support. Table 7.1 and Figure 7.3 provide a rough estimate of their manpower strength. Even where such units have significant manpower strength, however, they have little conventional military strength and cannot use most of the medium and heavy weapons (if any) they possess. Their capabilities are limited to terrorism, unconventional warfare, and low-intensity combat in built-up areas and mountainous terrain. Most such radical Palestinian forces have recently had low levels of activity in terms of casualties, although no meaningful incident account seems to be available. In fact, many such forces are now little more than political tools or ideological sinecures.\(^{318}\)

Current holdings of arms are equally impossible to estimate. Some aspects of the Palestinian effort to obtain arms have already been discussed, and they have steadily increased in scale. On January 4, 2002, the Israeli Navy seized the Karine-A – a ship carrying at least fifty tons of arms – about 300 miles off the coast of Israel in the Red Sea. On board the ship were “tens of millions of dollars worth of Iranian-made rockets and anti-tank missiles\(^{319}\).” According
to a company that tracks ship ownership worldwide, Lloyd Register, a Lebanese company, Diana K, sold the Karine-A to an unknown buyer back in August 2001. The captain of the Karine-A says he received instructions in December 2001 from Adel Mughrabi – a man Israel identifies as a weapons buyer associated with the Palestinian Authority – to pick up about 80 large crates of weapons at a position off the coast of Iran, near the Qeys islands. Israel held Arafat responsible for being involved in the arms smuggling operation while Palestinian leaders and the Iranian government denied any connection to the illegal arms shipment.  

According to a study by the Washington Institute, the number of weapons on board the Karine-A and the various types of weapons both indicate that senior officials in the Palestinian Authority have acted with an interest in overcoming Israeli intrusion into the territories. It is clear that the PA not only is interested in acquiring weapons for defensive purposes, but for the purpose of changing the PA-Israel military balance as well. The discovery of anti-tank and far-ranging missiles on board the Karine-A introduced the possibility of the PA – and Palestinian military factions – organizing to obtain weapons even more powerful than grenades and mortars, hinting at a possible future shift in the Palestinian willingness to engage IDF forces – particularly in urban warfare.

In any case, current estimates of the size and capabilities of Palestinian factions are only rough indicators of the kind of forces that may eventually become involved in a future escalation of the conflict. The key issue shaping this aspect of the Arab-Israeli military balance is not the current size and activity of Palestinian military and paramilitary forces. It is rather the future actions of various extremist groups that use terrorism and random violence, and the new forces that might emerge as a result of a breakdown of the peace process.

The Role of Hamas and the Islamic Jihad

Hamas and the Islamic Jihad are the two Palestinian organizations that have been most active in attacks on Israelis and pro-peace Palestinians in recent years. The fact that many elements of these organizations have been “freed” since September 29th, or given more military freedom of action, constitutes a continuing threat to efforts to rebuild the peace process and means they could become a far more serious threat in a “Second Intifada.” Their acts of terrorism before September 29th showed that lightly armed insurgents inside the West Bank, Gaza, and Israel can conduct acts of terrorism and extremism, and can strike successfully against their fellow Palestinians and the West, as well as Israel. While they have not yet been able to block

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the peace process, they have repeatedly shown that they can sometimes slow its pace and weaken both Israeli and Palestinian support for the process.

There has been a long history of Israeli-Palestinian violence. The causes of this violence, and the rights and wrongs on each side are not the subject of this analysis, but some of the recent history has direct relevance to a military assessment. Since Oslo, a total of 140 Israeli civilians and soldiers were killed between the signing of the Declaration of Principles between Israel and the PLO on September 13, 1993, and September 13, 1995. These deaths included 27 civilians and soldiers in Judea, Samaria and the Gaza Strip, and 62 civilians and 26 soldiers within the Green Line. Palestinian extremist groups killed a total of 73 Israeli soldiers during 1994, and wounded more than 100 additional Israelis -- a slightly higher total than in 1993. At least 20 additional Palestinians were killed, and well over 100 were wounded. Hamas and Islamic Jihad were the source of virtually all of this violence.

After 1994, most terrorist attacks were sporadic and occurred largely as reaction to political events. A record high of 87 Israelis were killed around the time of the inauguration of former Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu. In 1997, there were only 31 reported Israeli fatalities as a result of terror attacks. Nevertheless, the Israeli Foreign Ministry claimed in September 1998 that,

“Although peace talks between Israel and the Palestinians have been taking place over the last five years, terrorism still remains a major threat. Since the exchange of letters of mutual recognition between Israel and the PLO on September 9, 1993, the threat of terrorism against Israelis has dramatically increased. In fact, more Israelis have been killed by Palestinian terrorists in the 5 years since the Oslo Accord, than in the 15 years preceding it.

…While five years have passed since the first agreement was reached with the Palestinians, and the framework of PA responsibilities was adopted, terrorism remains, and the number of its victims has grown. The Israel Government Press Office has recently released figures showing that during this 5-year period, 279 men, women and children have been killed in 92 lethal attacks carried out against Israelis by Palestinian terrorists. This is 50 percent more than the number of Israelis killed in the six years of the Intifada (‘87-’93), and surpasses the number of those killed in the entire 15 years preceding the signing of the agreements.”

In 1998, President Yasser Arafat made overtures to include Hamas and Islamic Jihad in the new Palestinian Authority administration. Both parties refused to join the new cabinet on the grounds that they would not participate in any government that approved of agreements limiting Palestinian sovereignty, including the Oslo accords. Hamas leaders did express approval of Arafat’s desire to consult with opposition groups, but this approval in no way signifies warm relations between Hamas and the Palestinian Authority. It now seems doubtful that Hamas and the
Islamic Jihad will truly renounce violence unless the peace process offers the Palestinians far more rewards than it has to date, such as a complete Israeli withdrawal from the occupied territories and dismantlement of all Israeli settlements.\textsuperscript{324}

A study by the Washington Institute, published in October 1999, helps put the history of such violence in perspective. The study compared a period of 69 months before the signing of the Oslo Declaration of Principles in September 1993 (December 9, 1987-September 13, 1993) with the 70-month period that followed (September 14, 1993-July 6, 1999). It found that there were 152 lethal incidents in the earlier period, or 2.2 a month. There were a total of 973 lethal incidents involving Palestinians killed, or 14.1 per month. The totals dropped strikingly after the Declaration. In the 70 months that followed, there were 116 lethal incidents involving Israelis, or 1.6 a month. There were a total of 254 lethal incidents involving Palestinians killed, or 3.6 per month.\textsuperscript{325}

Drops in the number of incidents did not lead to similar cuts in fatalities, largely because of the use of larger bombs in attacks against Israelis and a reduction in intra-Palestinian feuds and killings. There were 212 Israelis killed in the earlier period, or 3.1 a month. There were 1,236 Palestinians killed, or 17.9 per month. The totals dropped strikingly after the Declaration. In the 70 months that followed, there were 287 Israelis killed, or 4.1 a month. In contrast, there were 391 Palestinians killed, or 5.6 per month. The percentage of Israelis killed by bombs rose from 2.1% under the Shamir government to 47.2 under Rabin/Peres and 33.8% under Netanyahu. In contrast, well over 90% of the Palestinians who died were killed by gunfire under all three governments.\textsuperscript{326}

The other patterns revealed in the Washington Institute study show the impact of the crisis in terrorism following the Declaration, and the rise in anti-peace Palestinian terrorism. This was followed by a sharp drop in incidents as the Israeli government pushed for stronger security measures and the security efforts of the Palestinian Authority improved.\textsuperscript{327} These cycles of violence are another indication of the risk of the sudden outbreak of new tensions and conflict:

- The number of Israeli fatalities per month rose from 2.7 per month under the Shamir government to 6.0 under the Rabin/Peres governments, then dropped to only 1.9 under the Netanyahu government, and finally rose again to 3.4 under the Barak government.\textsuperscript{328}
• The number of Palestinian fatalities per month dropped from 18.7 per month under the Shamir government to 10.1 under the Rabin/Peres governments, then dropped to only 3.3 under the Netanyahu government, and rose to 17.4 under the Barak government.

• Terrorist bombings killed 2.4% of the Israelis killed before the Oslo Declaration and 54% after the Declaration, reflecting the impact of anti-peace terrorist groups.

• The number of Israeli civilians killed dropped from 70.5% of the total under the Shamir government (103) to 66.2% under the Rabin/Peres governments (188), and then to 64.3% (45) under the Netanyahu government. Under the Barak government, the number sank to 57.4%.

• The number of Israeli military killed rose from 22.6% of the total under the Shamir government (33) to 33.1% under the Rabin/Peres governments (92), and then to 35.7% (26) under the Netanyahu government. It then increased to 42.6% under the Barak government.

These pre-Second Intifada patterns show that the Palestinian Authority did steadily improve its security efforts until late September 2000—and that the main cause of violence before the Second Intifada was anti-peace Palestinian movements trying to block further progress in the peace process. It is also clear that stronger Palestinian and Israeli security measures sharply limit the capabilities of extremists, and that it proved possible to have both peace and a high degree of security. However, it is equally clear that none of these rules apply if the Palestinian Authority security forces overtly or covertly support extremists or insurgents, turn a blind eye on attacks or preparations of attack by Palestinian extremists, or are even willing to fight the IDF. The clashes in 1996 showed that this was a very real possibility long before September 2000. Moreover, the clashes in 2000/2001 have shown that there can be alliances between the Palestinian Authority forces or groups like Fatah on the one hand, and far more hostile groups like Hamas, the Islamic Jihad, and even the Hizbollah, on the other.

These trends have been reversed by the Second Intifada recent outbreak of violence on September 29th, and the result has been far more brutal than the outbreak of the previous Intifada. The number of people killed in the first two weeks following Sharon’s visit to the Temple Mount/Sharam Al-Sharif was the same as the number killed in the first four months of the 1987-1993 Intifada.

Hamas

The Hamas organization is the most politically powerful of the two organizations and has been a major target of Israeli security sweeps, assassinations, and air strikes. Hamas is both an

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acronym for "Harakat Al-Muqawwama Al-Islamia" -- Islamic Resistance Movement -- and a word meaning “zeal” or “courage and bravery”. Hamas has several other names, including the Islamic Stream ("Al-Tiar Al-Islami"), or the Islamic Trend ("Al-Athja Al-Islami"). Hamas is a radical Islamic fundamentalist organization that has stated that its highest priority is a Jihad (holy war) for the liberation of Palestine and the establishment of an Islamic Palestine "from the Mediterranean Sea to the Jordan River". Hamas has stated that the transition to the stage of Jihad "for the liberation of all of Palestine" is a personal religious duty incumbent upon every Muslim, and rejects any political arrangement that would relinquish any part of Palestine. Its central goal is the establishment of an Islamic state in all of Palestine.³³⁰

Hamas first became active during the early stages of the Intifada. It was formed in early 1987, out of the religious-social "Al-Majama Al-Islami" (Moslem Brotherhood) association in the Gaza District. Many senior members of "Al-Majama" helped form Hamas, and used the existing infrastructure of Al-Majama as a basis for semi-covert activity once the Intifada began. Hamas then expanded its activity into the West Bank and at least some cells in Israel proper, becoming the dominant Islamic fundamentalist organization in the occupied territories. Its elements have used both political and violent means, including terrorism, to pursue the goal of establishing an Islamic Palestinian state in place of Israel.

The US State Department reports that Hamas is a loosely structured organization, with some elements working clandestinely while others working openly through mosques and social service institutions to recruit members, raise money, organize activities, and distribute propaganda. Its strength is concentrated in the Gaza Strip and a few areas of the West Bank. It has, however, engaged in peaceful political activity, such as running candidates in West Bank Chamber of Commerce elections.

Hamas’s operations in Gaza and the West Bank currently consist of a combination of regional and functional organizations. It has several identical, parallel frameworks that operate in each region. Hamas has a well-organized fundraising apparatus in Gaza, the West Bank, and Jordan, as well as outside the region. It has a framework called "Dawa", literally "call" or “outreach”, which engages in recruitment, distribution of funds, and appointments. It has another framework called security ("Amn"), which gathered information on suspected collaborators during the Intifada. This information was passed on to "shock committees", which interrogated and sometimes killed suspects. Amn is now a key element in Hamas’s rivalry with the Palestinian Authority and in intelligence gathering operations.
The paramilitary elements of Hamas have played a major role in violent fundamentalist subversion and radical terrorist operations against both Israelis and Arabs. Its "shock troops" ("Al-Suad Al-Ramaya" -- the "throwing arm") were responsible for popular violence during the Intifada, and still play a role in violent opposition to the peace process. Hamas also has two paramilitary organizations for more organized forms of violence. The first is the Palestinian Holy Fighters ("Al-Majahidoun Al-Falestinioun") -- a military apparatus that includes the “Iz al-Din al Qassam Brigades”. The second is the Security Section ("Jehaz Amn").

According to Israeli government sources, the "Al-Majihadoun Al-Falestinioun" was established by Sheik Ahmed Yassin in 1982. It procured arms, and began to plan an armed struggle against both Palestinian rivals and Israel. This activity was uncovered in 1984, and Yassin was sentenced to 13 years in prison but was released shortly afterwards as part of the Jibril prisoner exchange (May 1985). Yassin then resumed his effort to set up a military apparatus. He began by focusing on the struggle against 'heretics' and collaborators, in accordance with the view of the Muslim Brotherhood that Jihad should come only after the purging of rivals from within. At the same time, he prepared a military infrastructure, and stockpiled weapons for war against Israel. Shortly before the outbreak of the Intifada, operatives were recruited to carry out the military Jihad and regular terrorist attacks. The new military apparatus carried out a large number of attacks of various kinds, including bombs and gunfire, mostly in the northern part of the Gaza District.

The Security Section ("Jihaz Amn") of Hamas was established in early 1983. Its function was to conduct surveillance of suspected collaborators and other Palestinians who acted in a manner which ran counter to the principles of Islam (drug dealers, sellers of pornography, etc.). In early 1987, it began to set up hit squads, known as "MAJD -- an Arabic acronym for "Majmu’at Jihad wa-Dawa" - Holy War and Sermonizing Group) -- which became the operational arm of the Security Section. Its purpose was to kill 'heretics' and collaborators. Yassin instructed the leaders of these sections that they must kill anyone who admitted under interrogation to being a collaborator, and reinforced this instruction with a religious ruling.

After the outbreak of the Intifada, Hamas began to organize military action against Israeli targets as well. The "MAJD" units then became part of the "Al-Majahadoun" network. At the same time, the military apparatus of Hamas underwent several changes as a result of preventive measures and exposure by the Israeli forces following major terrorist attacks. The military apparatus formed the "Iz al-Din al Qassam" Squads or “Brigades”, which have been responsible
for most of the serious attacks carried out by Hamas since January 1, 1992. These squads were formed out of dozens of proven personnel from Gaza who later began to operate in the West Bank as well. Palestinians from the West Bank were recruited to carry out attacks inside the Green Line. Since the peace accords, these groups have been formed into cells that sometimes recruit young Palestinians, and form smaller cells to carry out attacks and suicide bombings.

During the first Intifada, Hamas used its overt political operations to recruit members into the units that engaged in riots and popular violence. Those who distinguished themselves were then recruited into the military apparatus, which carried out attacks against Israelis and Palestinians.

While the source of some terrorist incidents is unclear, the military wing of Hamas (the Izz al-Din al-Qassam) claimed responsibility for the April 6, 1994 bus bombings in Afula and Hadera, which killed 14 Israelis and wounded nearly 75. It also claimed responsibility for the kidnapping of Israeli Corporal Nachshon Wachsman, the shooting of people on the streets of Jerusalem on October 9, a suicide bombing of a commuter bus in Tel Aviv on October 19 that killed 22 Israelis, an April 9, 1995, suicide bombing that killed seven Israelis and an American tourist, a July 24 suicide bombing on a commuter bus in Ramat Gan that killed six people, and an August 21 bomb explosion on a bus in Jerusalem that killed five and injured more than 100.\(^{331}\)

There is no way to know exactly how many Arabs Hamas has killed between the signing of the Oslo Declaration of Principles in September 1993, and September 2000, but the Israeli government estimates that Hamas killed 20 Israelis and one Jewish tourist from the beginning of the Intifada (December 9, 1987) until December 1992, and assassinated close to 100 Palestinians. It also lists the following incidents of violence as having been caused by the Hamas:\(^{332}\)

- April 6, 1994 - Car bombing in Afula - 8 killed and 44 injured.
- April 13, 1994 - Suicide bomber on bus in Hadera - 5 killed.
- October 19, 1994 - Suicide bomber on No. 5 bus in Tel Aviv - 21 killed.
- April 9, 1995 - Car bomb in Kfar Darom - 8 killed.
- July 24, 1995 - Suicide bomber on bus in Ramat Gan - 6 killed and 32 injured.
- August 21, 1995 - Suicide bomber on No. 26 bus in Jerusalem - 4 killed.

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• February 25, 1996 - Suicide bomber on No. 18 bus in Jerusalem - 26 killed.
• March 3, 1996 - Suicide bomber on Jerusalem bus - 19 killed.
• July 30, 1997 - Two terrorists carried out suicide bombing in Mahane Yehuda Market, Jerusalem - 16 killed and 170 injured.
• September 4, 1997 - Three terrorists carried out suicide bombing in Ben Yehuda pedestrian mall, Jerusalem - 5 killed and 164 injured.
• January 1, 2001 - Car bomb exploded near a bus stop in central Netanya - 60 injured
• March 27, 2001 – Suicide bomber at a Jerusalem junction - 28 injured
• March 28, 2001 – Suicide bomber at a gas station east of Kfar Saba – 2 killed, 4 injured
• April 22, 2001 - Suicide bomber at a bus stop in Jerusalem - 1 killed, 39 injured
• Apr 29, 2001 - Car bomb exploded near a school bus traveling near Nablus – no injured
• May 18, 2001 - Suicide bomber blew himself up outside a Netanya shopping mall – 5 killed, over 100 wounded
• June 1, 2001 – Suicide bomber outside a Tel Aviv nightclub – 21 killed, 120 wounded

A separate analysis by the Washington Institute indicates that Hamas was responsible for 27.7 percent of the deaths that occurred between the signing of the Oslo Declaration of Principles and June 2001, versus 9.8% for the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), 6.3% for the Palestine Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), 0.9% for the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP), and 0.0% for Fatah. These figures indicate that 49.1% of the killings cannot be attributed, and 6.3% have to be assigned to smaller splinter groups and individuals.  

This violence caused a considerable backlash within the Palestinian community, during the period before the start of the Second Intifada, and gave Hamas a reason to limit its violent actions. A combination of the Palestinian desire for peace, and the loss of jobs and income as a result of Israeli economic retaliation, led to a steady drop in Hamas’s public support. Public opinion polls show that support has dropped from nearly 40% in 1993, to 18% in June 1995, and 11% in some polls in October 1995. As a result, Hamas began to hold talks with the Palestinian Authority in the summer of 1995.  

By late May 2001—at the height of Palestinian suicide attacks against Israelis—Palestinian support for Hamas, which was responsible for most of those attacks, rose to 18.5%.  

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There were reports in late 1995 that a meeting in Khartoum might have produced an accord between Hamas and the Palestinian authority, and that Hamas might either convert to a peaceful political party or form such a party under a separate name. In October 1995, the Palestinian Authority released Dr. Mahmoud al-Zahar -- the main Hamas spokesman in Gaza -- from three months in prison after Hamas indicated that it might become a peaceful political party. Hamas was also allowed to resume the publication of its newspaper, although it declared in October 1995 that its willingness to resume a dialogue with the Palestinian Authority did not mean it had rejected its armed struggle against the Jewish state.

Hamas, however, continued its terrorist and paramilitary operations. Like the Hizbollah in Lebanon, it always maintained a distinction between the overt and covert aspects of activity of its various sections. It always had strong civil elements that perform charitable roles and have little or no direct connection to violence. At the same time, it used its charity committees -- and the ideological instruction, propaganda and incitement it delivered in the mosques and other institutions and through leaflets -- as a recruiting base for violence and terrorism. The first step seems to involve young men in organized elements that engage in riots and popular violence. Those who prove loyal and active are then recruited into the paramilitary cells. The civil side of Hamas also supports their families and relatives if they are killed or arrested. In short, even if Hamas makes a formal public commitment to peaceful political action, it may simply make its violent elements more covert without changing its real nature and behavior.

It is interesting to note in this regard that Hamas issued a leaflet after Rabin’s assassination, “congratulating the Palestinian people for the assassination...” and stating that, “The assassination proves that the Zionists are not ready for real peace and the next period of time will prove the Zionists want the Palestinian to give up more and more...Our people have to be happy for the assassination of Rabin.” Another leaflet issued shortly afterwards called for a “serious national dialogue” with the Palestinian Authority, but also announced that Hamas would not give up the “struggle against occupation.” In December 1999, Hamas was caught preparing major new terrorist attacks against Israelis and Americans in Jordan, and it is scarcely surprising that it has played an active role in the new violence that began in September 2000.

Hamas has received extensive monetary support from Islamists outside Israel, and has received significant funding from various Islamists in Saudi Arabia, Europe, and the US. Israeli sources estimate that the government of Iran contributes approximately three million dollars per
year for all Hamas activities but these estimates may well be exaggerated.\textsuperscript{341} Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and other Arab governments have made major contributions to Hamas charities and indirectly to its ability to commit terrorist acts, and have increased these contributions since the beginning of the Second Intifada.

There are at least four central Hamas charity funds in the West: The Palestine Relief and Development Fund - “Interpal” in Britain; the “Holy Land Foundation” in the US; the “Al Aqsa Foundation” in Germany, with branches in Belgium and Holland; and the “Comite de Bienfaisance et Solidarite avec la Palestine” in France. Hamas also receives funding from other Islamic organizations. These include non-governmental charitable organizations in the Gulf states that collect charity for Muslims throughout the world, and support Hamas’s support of social and welfare institutions. They also include aid groups in the West like the Muslim Aid, and the Islamic Relief Agency - ISRA. The Muslim Brotherhood established the “Muslim Aid Committee to the Palestinian Nation” in the 1980s in order to aid Hamas. Only a relatively small portion of Hamas funds come from a limited number of profitable economic projects: sewing and weaving centers, cattle farms, and symbolic payment for services, but it does conduct fund-raising activities throughout the occupied territories.

Hamas has had considerable support from Syria, which extends to allowing it to train and operate in Lebanon, and Iran. A report on Syria’s role in terrorism by Dr. Reuven Ehrlich (Avi-Ran) of the International Policy Institute for Counter-Terrorism in Israel notes that, \textsuperscript{342}

“The “Islamic Jihad” and Hamas maintain a propaganda and political presence in Lebanon alongside of which they also carry out military activities. The founding of these organizations in Lebanon, while cooperating with the Iranians and the Hizbollah, was made possible by the approval of Syria, which controls what takes place in Lebanon. It is our opinion that the Syrians view the activity of these organizations in Lebanon to be advantageous as it blurs the Syrian connection with these organizations somewhat “diverts evidence” from Syria. We believe that this will be an even greater consideration as political pressures on Syria increase to terminate the presence and activity of these terror organizations on its soil. One may assume that the Palestinian Muslim organizations reciprocate on the operational level by assisting the Hizbollah in its operations in Israel through the infrastructure which exist in the Palestinian population in Judea, Samaria and Gaza.

“Lebanon is an important arena for these organizations. They perceive Lebanon as an additional important arena from which operational activities in Israel and the “territories” can be conducted, with the assistance of friendly organizations, mainly the Hizbollah. The presence of a large population of Palestinian refugees, the position of Lebanon as an important communication and financial center in the Arab world and the freedom prevailing there (in comparison to Syria) make it also a more convenient political, organizational
and propaganda center for these organizations. The senior official of Hamas in Lebanon is Mustafa Lidawi. The senior official of the “Islamic Jihad” is Ziad Nahaleh, Dr. Shalah’s deputy. Alongside, lower-ranking activists work in the region of Beirut and South Lebanon in the political-propaganda sphere and in the military-operational field.

“In the framework of operational cooperation between the “Islamic Jihad” and the Hizbollah, the latter enables the “Islamic Jihad” to operate in south Lebanon; and in some cases, there were even joint operations by both organizations. Since 1990, the “Islamic Jihad” has carried out 9 terrorist attacks in the Security Zone, the last one on October 24, 1997 (attempted assault on South Lebanese Army post in the central sector, with the assistance of the Hizbollah).

“Likewise, Hizbollah has publicly announced that with it is training Hamas and “Islamic Jihad” members in Hizbollah bases in the Lebanese Bekaa region. Furthermore, a prisoner of the “Islamic Jihad”. Shkaki faction who was captured by the IDF following a clash with a terrorist squad north of Netua (October 30, 1991), admitted during the investigation that the members of the squad were trained at a Hizbollah base near Janata, in the Bekaa region.”

Hamas has gradually developed ties to Iran. Initially, it ignored or rejected the Iranian revolution as Shi’ite -- although a few leaders of Al-Majama quoted leading Iranian revolutionaries -- and focused almost exclusively on Sunni groups and issues. It also took a relatively ambiguous position on the Gulf War because of its dependence on rich Gulf donors and its rivalry with the PLO. Iran actively began to court Hamas after the Gulf War, and meetings took place between a Hamas delegation, and Iran’s foreign minister in October 1992. While it is unclear just how much Iranian support Hamas actually obtained, Hamas did set up a small office in Iran and its leaders began to visit there regularly. The leaders of Hamas also began to meet regularly with the leaders of the Hizbollah in Lebanon. Iran seems to have begun to provide Hamas with up to several million dollars a year from 1993 onwards, and some Israeli estimates go as high as $20 to $30 million. Palestinian police reported that Hamas might have already received $35 million to carry out sabotage operations against Israelis in the Gaza Strip. However, it is doubtful that Iran has provided Hamas with large amounts of arms and military training in spite of a slow improvement in ties and the Second Intifada. It is also doubtful that there is extensive cooperation between Hamas and Hizbollah in training or operations, although there certainly is some coordination.

Closer cooperation between the two movements has taken place since September 2000, and may steadily increase as the Second Intifada continues. The hard-liners in Iran also remain key players in trying to unite Islamic forces in the struggle against the Jewish state. In late April 2001, “The International Conference on the Palestinian Intifada” was convened in Tehran, and was attended, among others, by Sheikh Hassan Nasrallah of Hizballah, KhalidMeshal of Hamas, and the PIJ’s Ramadan Shalah. At the conference, Meshal stressed the linkage of the
brotherhood between the Palestinian and Lebanese resistance movements. Iran has been making some progress in its efforts to maximize cooperation between the movements. Hizballah’s TV channel Al-Manar has begun to focus on the Palestinian issue, and the beginnings of a Hizballah network are apparent in the West Bank and Gaza.

These contacts between Hamas and Iran did not stop after President Khatami’s election in Iran, and Iranian claims that it was not supporting terrorism have always excluded such movements on the grounds they were freedom fighters rather than terrorists. The US State Department reported in April 1999 that, “Iran continued to provide support to a variety of terrorist groups, including the Lebanese Hizbollah, Hamas, and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad, which oppose the Middle East peace process through violence. Iran supports these groups with varying amounts of training, money, and/or weapons. In March 1998, a US district court ruled that Iran should pay $247 million to the family of Alisa Flatow, a US citizen killed in a PIJ bomb attack in Gaza in April 1995. The court ruled that Iran was responsible for her death because it provided funding to the PIJ, which claimed responsibility for the act. Palestinian sources said Iran supported the PIJ’s claimed attack in Jerusalem in early November 1998, in which two suicide bombers injured some 21 persons.”

Hamas also made an attempt to launch a new series of bombing in early September 1999, just after Israel and the Palestinian Authority met and signed the Sharm el Sheik memorandum.

It is scarcely surprising that Hamas stepped up its activities against Israeli civilians beginning no later than early November, 2000. According to the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the group claimed responsibility for at least five suicide bombings and two car bombs that killed at least 28 Israelis and injured some 350, and could be responsible for several other car explosions and suicide bombings for which no group has claimed responsibility. Among the attacks it has claimed responsibility for a June 1, 2001 suicide bombing in front of a Tel Aviv beachfront club packed with Israeli teens, many of whom were immigrants from the former Soviet Union. The attack, in which 21 Israelis were killed and over 120 were injured, and the international condemnation it brought about, prompted Arafat to announce a cease-fire on the following day. Hamas made it clear, however, that it did not see itself bound by a cease-fire. A Hamas official told reporters in Gaza shortly after the attack that “We are not changing our policy. Resistance means to attack the Israelis everywhere by all means.”

A report by the International Policy Institute for Counter-Terrorism on Iran’s role in terrorism notes that,
“The Palestinian organization most loyal to the Iranian revolutionary ideology is the Palestinian Islamic Jihad. In spite of it being a Sunni organization, the Iranian revolution sees it as an example to be followed. After the deportation of its leader, Fathi Shqaqi, from the Gaza Strip, the ties between Iran and the organization have been strengthened, particularly in the field of Iranian military assistance. Instructors of the Guardians of the Revolution give regular military instruction courses to the organization’s activists from the Territories and abroad, as well as in the Hizbollah camps in Lebanon and Iran. Iran also provides the organization’s activists with logistic support, including Iranian identification papers.

“….Iran also aided The PIJ in laying the groundwork for terrorist attacks abroad. At the beginning of 1996, the organization’s representative in Iran visited Turkey to prepare for the training in Iran of several of the organization’s activists. These activists were due to infiltrate back into Israel in order to carry out terrorist attacks. The Turkish security authorities arrested some of the PIJ militants and one of them, Khalil ‘Atta, was arrested in Israel. ‘Atta was one of nine PIJ militants who underwent training in Iran in the period of July - September 1995.

“Since 1992, Iran has drawn closer to Hamas, which it perceives as the leading Islamic movement in the Territories. At the foundation of their relationship lies their common interest in the disruption of the political process, and their efforts to undermine the PLO. These common goals transcend the ideological variance between them due to religious differences between the Sunni Hamas and the Shi’ite Iran. These ties are manifest themselves in frequent high-level meetings between the two sides, and the relative importance of the Hamas representative in Tehran. For example, a Hamas delegation headed by two top activists, ‘Imad ‘Alami (Chairman of the Internal Committee) and Mustafa Qanu’ (the representative in Syria) visited Iran in October 1995 and met with high ranking Iranian officials.

“In addition to political ties, Iran also provides Hamas with military assistance. The movement’s activists train on a regular basis at the camps of Hizbollah and the Guardians of the Revolution in Lebanon, as well as in Iran. This includes training for suicide attacks. Several Iranian-trained militants succeeded in infiltrating back into the Territories under Palestinian Authority control. Israel has arrested Hamas activists who admitted that they were trained by Iranian instructors in the Beka’a Valley, in Lebanon, and in Iran. The training included the use of light weapons, photography and sabotage. Iran also gives Hamas financial assistance…including money originating from the Iranian “Fund for the Martyrs”, which grants assistance to victims of the “Palestinian Uprising”.

While Israeli commentary on a Palestinian terrorist group must always be considered with some reservations, Hamas also had growing problems with Jordan before the outbreak of violence on September 29th. King Hussein had extended Hamas the same tolerance he showed to the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood. Ever since 1993, Hamas had been allowed to keep an office in Jordan as long as there was no tie between the Hamas presence in Jordan and any acts of violence. In November 1998, however, Jordan began to warn Hamas that its efforts to build up a support base and network in Jordan would not be tolerated. In August 1999, the Jordanian government shut down many of its offices, arrested a number of its leaders, and issued arrest warrants for three leaders who were visiting Iran – Khaled Meshal, Ibrahim Ghosheb, and Abu Marzook. Khaled Meshal and Ibrahim Ghosheb were arrested when they returned from Iran on September 22nd, and Abu Marzook was deported.
The Jordanian security services acted partly because of evidence that Hamas was planning acts of terrorism in Israel from its bases in Jordan, partly because it was smuggling arms through Jordan from Iraq to Gaza and the West Bank, and partly because it supported hard-line Islamists opposed to King Abdullah. According to Jordan, Jordanian security officials also found that Hamas had stockpiled arms in warehouses in Jordan, had developed massive computer files on Jordanian officials and political contacts – including many Jordanian Palestinians – and had managed to raise some $70 million during the last five years.350

Hamas had also expanded its operations in Jordan to use it as a base to develop contacts and cells among Israeli Arabs in Israel proper – leading to strong new Israeli objections to the Hamas presence in Jordan.351 This was one reason that Israeli Prime Minister Barak praised the arrests and said, “The very attitude of King Abdullah to Hamas is an example of security awareness, an anti-terror approach, and of courageous standing that puts a limit on the operational latitude of an extremely dangerous organization.”352 It is far too soon to determine whether Hamas will work out some compromise with Jordan, but it seems likely that King Abdullah will continue to show little tolerance of any efforts to prepare and stage acts of terrorism against Israel, or create the kind of political network that might affect Jordan’s internal security.

It is difficult to determine how popular Hamas will be in the future, and much depends on the course of the present fighting and success of ceasefire efforts and any future peace process. Many Palestinians made it clear before the start of the Second Intifada that they were sick of violence and constant economic disruption even during the period when former Prime Minister Netanyahu seemed to have halted the peace process. The election of former Prime Minister Ehud Barak had probably further eroded Palestinian support for terrorism and violence before the crisis erupted in September 2000. By the end of 2000, however, with Palestinian casualties running into the hundreds, and the spiral of violence continuing unabatedly, public Palestinian support for armed attacks against Israelis—including suicide bombings—was on the rise. By late May 2001, some polls indicated that about three quarters of the Palestinian population supported armed attacks against Israeli civilians, including suicide bombings.353 At the same time, Hamas’ spiritual leader Sheik Ahmed Yassin does seem to retain considerable personal popularity among Palestinians.354
His ability to raise millions of dollars in funds for Hamas and his virulent anti-Israel stance have led many to fear that he will eventually rival Arafat for power over the Palestinian Authority, despite his frail health and physical disabilities, as well as his denials of such rumors.\textsuperscript{355}

The Palestinian Authority has always been careful to keep Yassin under close observation and scrutiny. Following the signing of the Wye Accords, hundreds of Hamas activists were detained and Yassin was placed under house arrest in November 1998. This spurred an angry response from Hamas members and other Palestinians, vowing violent retaliation against Arafat and the Palestinian Authority.\textsuperscript{356} Although Yassin was released in late December 1998, relations between Hamas and the Palestinian Authority remained strained. After that time, both sides remained political rivals. The fighting since September 2000, however, has shown that any major incident can suddenly make Hamas and pro-Arafat forces allies in fighting the IDF.

**Islamic Jihad**

The Islamic Jihad movement has a different history and character from Hamas. Like Hamas, it began as an ideological element within Sunni Islam, primarily within the Moslem Brotherhood, and was formed in reaction to the Brotherhood’s loss of militancy. It is committed to violence in the struggle to establish an 'Islamic alternative'. Like Hamas, its struggle is directed against both non-Muslims, and Arab regimes which have 'deviated' from Islam and which have attacked or suppressed the Moslem Brotherhood.\textsuperscript{357}

Islamic Jihad is not, however, simply a Palestinian group. Elements of the Islamic Jihad have appeared in almost all the Arab states and in some parts of the non-Arab Islamic world under various names. These groups have been influenced by the success of the revolution in Iran, and by the growth of Islamic militancy in Lebanon and in Egypt. According to Israeli sources, the Palestinian factions of the Islamic Jihad are part of the Islamic Jihad movements that appeared in the Sunni part of the Arab world in the 1970s. These movements are characterized by a rejection of the Brotherhood's 'truce' with most of the existing regimes in the Arab world. They see violence as a legitimate tool in changing the face of Arab societies and regimes.

Unlike the Islamic Jihad movements in Arab countries, the Palestinian factions of the Islamic Jihad see the 'Zionist Jewish entity' embodied in the State of Israel as the foremost enemy and their primary target. They see 'Palestine' as an integral and fundamental part of the
Arab and Moslem world, where Muslims are 'subjected' to foreign rule. The fact that Israel is seen as foreign and non-Moslem allows the Islamic Jihad to use different methods of resistance than those adopted by similar groups operating against Moslem and Arab regimes. The Palestinian Jihad calls for armed struggle against Israel through guerrilla groups composed of the revolutionary vanguard. These groups carry out terrorist attacks aimed at weakening Israel and 'its desire to continue its occupation'. These attacks lay the groundwork for the moment when an Islamic army will be able to destroy Israel in a military confrontation.

The Islamic Jihad movement is divided into factions, and various cells and splinter groups have appeared over time. It has become even harder to track since September 2000, but the dominant faction that has emerged after the signing of the Declaration of Principles between Israel and the PLO is that headed by Dr. Fathi Shekaki until his assassination in Malta on October 26, 1995. Shekaki had succeeded in pushing aside Abd al-Aziz Ouda, the co-founder of the organization and its spiritual leader.

Shekaki and Ouda were both from Gaza, and founded their faction because of the influence of similar political groups in Egyptian universities. They began to coordinate similar groups in Gaza when they returned from their studies, and may have had some responsibility for the grenade attack on an Israeli army induction ceremony at the Wailing Wall in October 1986, which killed one person and wounded 69. They were deported from Gaza to Lebanon in 1988. They then reorganized their faction to establish a military unit to carry out attacks against Israeli targets, alongside the existing political unit. These forces seem to have played a role in the assault on an Israeli tourist bus in Egypt in February 1990 that killed nine Israelis and two Egyptians, and wounded nineteen. They also seem to have been responsible for killing two people and wounding eight in a knifing attack in Tel Aviv in March 1993.

Islamic Jihad made no secret of its commitment to violence after the peace accords, or of its close ties to Iran. It distributed propaganda material and tapes, and used the mosques as centers of its activity. It also created a newspaper called 'Al-Istiqlal,' which appeared in the area under the jurisdiction of the Palestinian Authority and was edited by Ala Siftawi.

Until his assassination, Dr. Shekaki resided in Damascus, and his organization remains one of the ten Palestinian opposition factions based in Syria. Shekaki often boasted of his ties with Iran -- which, according to him, were strengthened following his first visit to Teheran in December 1988. (He visited Iran again in October, 1993 -- following the signing of the Israeli - PLO peace
accords) Unlike Hamas, his faction also had close ties to the Hizbollah. Shekaki praised the Islamic Republic, and its political and spiritual support of the Palestinian people's efforts to continue the jihad and to achieve independence. In 1994, he stated that Islamic Jihad did not receive Iranian military aid and did not have a base in Iran, but claimed that Iranian support for his organization and Hamas amounted to $20 million a year.

Islamic Jihad intensified the tone of its anti-Israeli statements after the murder of Islamic Jihad activist Hani Abed in Gaza on February 11, 1994. Shekaki said: “The continuation of the jihad against the Zionist occupation is our primary concern and the center of our lives,” and, “We shall raise arms against the criminal Israelis wherever they may be in the autonomous territory and outside it. We have a new reason which justifies the continuation of our struggle.” In another statement, he announced the establishment of a group of seventy people prepared to commit suicide “in order to carry out attacks against the occupation forces in the self-governing areas. Such attacks in the Gaza Strip will cease only when the Israeli settlements in the area will be disbanded... If this will occur, the suicide attacks will be transferred to other areas, because our fight against the occupation will continue.”

The Shekaki faction of the late Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) killed at least 30 Israelis between the 1993 peace accords and 1995. It claimed responsibility for killing two Israelis at a bus stop in Ashdod in April 1994 and for 17 other attacks on Israelis. These included killing an Israeli soldier on foot patrol in Gaza on September 4, 1994, killing three Israeli officers in a suicide bombing at the Netzarim junction in Gaza on November 11, 1994, and a bombing that killed twenty Israeli soldiers and a civilian at a bus stop in Beit Lid near Netanya in central Israel on January 22, 1995. Both the Palestinian Islamic Jihad and Hamas claimed responsibility for a suicide bombing on April 9, 1995 where two Palestinians blew themselves up on buses near Kfar Darom, a Jewish settlement in the Gaza strip. Seven Israeli soldiers and an American student were killed, and 40 other Israelis were wounded. Eleven other Israelis were hurt in two suicide bombings on November 1, 1995 that were conducted as revenge for Shekaki’s assassination.

The Palestinian Islamic Jihad was less successful until the beginning of the Second Intifada, but it scarcely abandoned violence. Like Hamas, it also changed the character of its operations, focusing heavily on suicide bombers. This emphasis on the use of suicide bombings was clear almost immediately after the Second Intifada began. On October 26, 2000 the PIJ claimed responsibility for a suicide bombing in Gaza that injured one Israeli soldier.
Additionally, on November 2, 2000, a car bomb exploded in the Jerusalem marketplace killing, inter alia, the daughter of National Religious Party leader Rabbi Yitzhak Levy.

Between November 2, 2000 and early June, 2001, the PIJ claimed responsibility for at least four additional car bomb attacks in which two Israelis were killed and at least 110 injured. These include a car bomb that exploded in Jerusalem’s Talpiot industrial zone on March 27, 2000; a car bomb that exploded at the central bus station of Hadera on May 25; and another car bomb that exploded outside of a Netanya school on May 30.

Shortly after 9.00 AM on May 27, a bomb that exploded in central Jerusalem on May 27 contained several mortar shells, some of which were propelled hundreds of meters from the site of the explosion. The Israeli police conducted extensive searches for the shells, and found six mortars intact in a 300-meter radius. The Israeli police expressed concern about the attack, stressing that the PIJ has adopted a new form of attack—one involving mortars apparently smuggled into the West Bank and Gaza from areas outside Israel.

Ironically, a quarter of a century of Palestinian paramilitary training and “terrorist” training camps has had only a limited impact on Israel. Untrained youths, however, had a major impact during the Intifada, and the period of the peace process. Since that time, Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad have found that using Islamic organizations to locate idealistic ‘true believers,’ giving them a short indoctrination to prepare them, and then sending them out on suicide missions gives the Palestinian Authority and Israel far less warning than using trained personnel.

In addition, the Second Intifada has given the PIJ and Hamas cells on suicide or other missions have more freedom than ever before to plan the time of their attacks and choose their targets. In spite of constant Israeli crackdowns and attacks, their loose, decentralized, and compartmentalized organization lacks the transparency and vulnerability of hierarchical structures and thus makes it more difficult for Israeli anti-terror units and the Palestinian Security Service to detect and penetrate those cells.

Like Hamas, the Islamic Jihad also has important foreign support. While Iran is often seen as its key foreign sponsor, Syria is also a major sponsor. When Islamic Jihad joined in the protests of the Jordanian crackdown against Hamas in September 1999, it did out of its office in Damascus and in cooperation with the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), the
Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command (PFLP-GC) and Fatah Uprising.\textsuperscript{365}

The US State Department summarizes this aspect of Syria’s role in terrorism as follows,\textsuperscript{366}

“There is no evidence that Syrian officials have engaged directly in planning or executing international terrorist attacks since 1986. Syria, nonetheless, continues to provide safe haven and support to several terrorist groups, allowing some to maintain training camps or other facilities on Syrian territory. Ahmad Jibril’s Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command and the Palestine Islamic Jihad, for example, have their headquarters in Damascus. In addition, Syria grants a wide variety of terrorist groups—including Hamas, the PFLP-GC, and the PIJ—basing privileges or refuge in areas of Lebanon’s Bekaa Valley under Syrian control.

“...Although Damascus claims to be committed to the Middle East peace process, it has not acted to stop anti-Israeli attacks by Hizbollah and Palestinian rejectionist groups in southern Lebanon. Syria allowed—but did not participate in—a meeting of Palestinian rejectionist groups in Damascus in December 1998 to reaffirm their public opposition to the peace process. Syria also assists the resupply of rejectionist groups operating in Lebanon via Damascus. Nonetheless, the Syrian Government continues to restrain the international activities of some groups and to participate in a multinational monitoring group to prevent attacks against civilian targets in southern Lebanon and northern Israel.”

A report on Syria’s role in terrorism by Dr. Reuven Ehrlich (Avi-Ran) of the International Policy Institute for Counter-Terrorism in Israel notes, however, that,\textsuperscript{367}

“...Islamic Jihad” began operating in Syria upon the arrival of Fathi Shkaki in 1989 and the establishment of his headquarters in Damascus. Permitting Shkaki to operate from Syrian territory, marked Damascus’ transformation into the center of Palestinian-Islamic activity in the 90’s, as it was the center for Palestinian left-wing organizations in the 70’s and 80’s. Unlike Hamas, which has military and political infrastructure in various countries, the “Islamic Jihad’s” infrastructure outside Judea, Samaria and Gaza is concentrated mostly in the area of Damascus, from where operational activity is being directed.

“In this framework, Dr. Ramadan Shalah, Secretary-General of the organization, currently resides in Damascus. Also in Syria is the operational leadership of the organization. Outstanding among the organization’s leadership are Ziad Nehal, Shalah’s deputy, responsible for the “Lebanon arena” and Ibrahim Shehadeh, a senior figure responsible for operations in the organization. These operational activists initiate, plan and carry out terror attacks in Israel and Judea, Samaria and Gaza, an activity that found its expression in five lethal suicide bombings of the last three years. In addition to directing the operational activity, the organization’s leadership in Syria maintains contact with other terrorist organizations (mainly the Hizbollah and the PFLP-GC).

“The interrogation of “Islamic Jihad” recruits arrested in Judea, Samaria and Gaza in recent years revealed that most of them maintain some direct or indirect link to Islamic Jihad operational headquarters in Damascus. Some of them confessed to having been recruited in Syria, from where they were sent for training in Iran or Lebanon. Further, specific guidelines govern communications between these recruits and headquarters in Syria. Upon returning to the territories, these men regularly received operational orders from Damascus.

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Outside Actors: Palestinians in Lebanon, the Hizbollah, and Iran

Israel faces potential threats from Palestinian movements in Lebanon, as well as from the Hizbollah. A report by Dr. Reuven Ehrlich (Avi-Ran) on hard-line Palestinian activity in Lebanon tracks closely with the estimates of many US intelligence experts: 368

“…the destruction of the Palestinian military infrastructure during the Lebanon war and the imposition of the “Syrian order” in the framework of which the Syrians encourage the Lebanese government to establish its control and sovereignty over considerable parts of Lebanon and confine the military organizations of the Palestinians within the refugee camps. This has weakened the Palestinian left-wing organizations, which are subject to close supervision by the Lebanese army and intelligence agencies. The exception is the PFLP-GC that, under Syrian supervision, enjoys relative freedom of action in organizing and carrying out terrorist attacks.”

Dr. Ehrlich analyzes the role of each organization as follows: 369

- **P.F.L.P.-GC** - Of all the left-wing organizations in Lebanon, this has the most highly developed infrastructure. It has several hundred active members in Lebanon, among them more than one hundred fighters. The organization has bases, camps, and offices in Lebanon from which it carries out terror activities against the IDF in Southern Lebanon (in close cooperation with the Hizbollah and with other Palestinian terror organizations). It has training camps and arsenals containing both light and heavy weaponry. In addition, the organization has a marine unit in Lebanon.

- **D.F.L.P. \ Na’if Hawatmeh** - The Democratic Front has been operating in Lebanon since the 1970s. In the 1990s there has been a gradual decline in the organization’s scope of activities in Lebanon as a result of the general weakening of the left-wing organizations among the Palestinian public, restrictions placed on it by the Lebanese Army, the organization’s financial difficulties, and repeated failed attempts at acts of terror. Today, the organization has several hundred active members in Lebanon, several dozen of which are “fighters” and the rest involved in the political-propaganda and logistic-organizational fields. A number of bases and offices serve as arsenals and launching points for the organization’s operational activities. Because of reduced operational capability, members are often assisted by their counterparts, particularly the Hizbollah and Habash’s “PFLP.”

- **P.F.L.P. / George Habash** - This organization has a few dozen military activists and other members involved in the areas of politics, propaganda, and logistics. The organization has offices and bases in Lebanon, including arsenals, training camps, and operations bases.

- **“Fatah - Revolutionary Council” / Abu Nidal** - Since the beginning of the 1980s, Abu Nidal’s organization has had an operational infrastructure in Lebanon (originally secretly and later openly). In the ‘80s the organization’s ranks numbered several hundred operatives, with camps and bases at its disposal in Beirut, Beka’a, and Northern and Southern Lebanon. In the 1990’s the organizations infrastructure in Lebanon was damaged and weakened because of loss of prestige with the Syrians and various additional reasons: internal disputes, violent conflict with “Fatah”/Arafat, and vigorous efforts against it by the Lebanese army and the Lebanese intelligence agencies (particularly after the 1994 murder of the First Secretary of the Jordanian Embassy in Lebanon, which was ascribed to the organization). The organization continues to maintain an operational infrastructure in Beirut and in refugee camps throughout Lebanon, however, in the past few years it has kept a low profile and conducted its activities in utmost secrecy. According to the annual US State Department report (as of April 1998), the organization has refrained from attacking Western targets since the end of the 1970s.

- **“Fatah” / Abu Mussa faction** - The organization numbers a few dozen military activists in Lebanon, and has several offices and bases in Lebanon including weapons arsenals and training camps.”

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The Hizbollah in Lebanon is an actor that has helped lead to the creation of a new, Palestinian Hizballah, and has come to play a significant role in a Second Intifada. The Lebanese Hizbollah has concentrated on the ‘liberation’ of Southern Lebanon” in the past, and has not been a major player in the Israeli-Palestinian struggle, but it easily could become one in the future. The Hizbollah’s defeat of the IDF and South Lebanon Army in Southern Lebanon in May 2000 made it a regional force, and the visit of Ariel Sharon to the Muslim holy sites in Jerusalem that triggered the fighting in September 2000, seems to have also helped unite the Hizbollah and the Palestinians. Sharon organized the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982, and is widely held responsible for creating the climate that led to the massacres of Palestinians in the Sabra and Shatilla refugee camps by Christian militias.

The Hizbollah reacted strongly to the fighting that began in September 2000. Its television and radio station in Lebanon broadcast speeches by its leader, Sheik Hassan Nasrallah, deliberately designed to inflame Palestinian hatreds and which included a call to stab Israelis to death: “If you don't have bullets, who among you doesn't have knives? Hide the knife, and when he comes close to the enemy let him stab him. Let the stab be fatal.” Sheik Nasrallah appeared on the independent satellite television station al-Jazeera, in Qatar, and addressed the Palestinians as “holy war comrades-in-arms” and proposed a strategy of gradually escalating the Intifada from stones to daggers to firearms and other means of military combat.370

Press reports indicate that the Hizbollah flag has been used in many Palestinian demonstrations in the Gaza strip since Israel’s withdrawal from Lebanon and is sold at the Palestine Liberation Organization flag shop. They also indicate that Palestinian protesters in Ramallah shouted slogans like, “Hizbollah our beloved/Destroy, destroy Tel Aviv.” The Hizbollah's victory is seen as a model by some Palestinians, even though virtually all are Sunni Muslims or Christians. There are reports that Sheik Nasrallah and other Hizbollah leaders went to Iran after the Israeli withdrawal and Iran’s religious leader, Ali Khamenei, told them they should now struggle for the Muslim liberation of Jerusalem.371
There were unconfirmed reports in October 2000 that the Hizbollah was seeking to find ways of sending arms to Fatah, to the police force as well as to Hamas and Islamic Jihad. Other reports indicated that the younger street fighters in Al Fatah -- Fatah Hawks and the Tanzim -- distributed a leaflet declaring a "popular war" against Israel, and were cooperating to Hamas and the Hizbollah. This was particularly important because Marwan Barghouti, the head of the Tanzim, was a key hardliner who called for prolonged violent struggle against Israel.

On October 7, 2000, the Hizbollah seized three IDF soldiers in a disputed part of the Israeli-Lebanese border, and kidnapped an Israeli reservist a few days later. The three soldiers were seized by Hizbollah forces allegedly disguised as UN soldiers with a mock UN vehicle. The necessary uniforms, badges, decals and license plates for the operation can be bought at a number of souvenir shops throughout the region. The kidnapping was performed in the disputed region of Chebaa Farms in the foothills of Mount Hermon. The United Nations and Israel used a border demarcation based on the French and British Mandate division of territory which places the Chebaa Farms in Syria, therefore a withdrawal from Lebanese territory does not include a withdrawal from Chebaa. However, Hizbollah, the Lebanese and Syrian governments claim Chebaa belongs to Lebanon and not Syria. This makes the Chebaa Farms a potential point of conflict in the future.\textsuperscript{372}

The kidnapping of the Israeli soldiers created an early crisis in the Israeli-Palestinian violence and threatened to expand the conflict beyond Israel’s northern borders. It prompted Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak to issue an ultimatum to the Palestinians to halt assaults on Israeli military outposts and civilian settlements. Should the PA fail to do so, Barak warned, “we shall direct the IDF and the security forces to use all means at their disposal to halt the violence.”\textsuperscript{373}

Violent Incidents continued in the Israel-Lebanon border are in spite of Barak’s ‘ultimatum speech’ of October 7, 2000:

- October 10, 2000: Infiltration attempt near the Hatzbani river. Two infiltrators are killed, one wounded
- November 16: The Hizballah planted an explosive charge near an IDF convoy. There were no casualties

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November 26: An explosive charge planted by Hizballah kills one Israeli soldier and wounds two

January 3, 2001: Six mortar bombs are fired in the area of the Sion river outpost. There are no casualties

January 26: Infiltration attempt near the Shabaa Farms. Two infiltrators are killed, one wounded

February 16: Hizballah militants shoot toward an IDF convoy near Shabaa Farms. One soldier is killed, three additional soldiers are wounded

April 14: An IDF soldier is killed by an anti-tank missile fired at a position near Shabaa Farms

The April 14 incident that killed an IDF soldier in the disputed Shabaa farms illustrated the continuing tension on Israel’s northern border. More importantly, it demonstrated how quickly the Second Intifada could escalate and lead to a regional conflagration. Israel responded to the Hizballah’s April 14 attack by firing at least 40 tank and artillery shells into suspected Hizballah hideouts in the Lebanese hills near Israel’s northern frontier. The Israeli Air Force (IAF) then dispatched airplanes that struck targets in South Lebanon. It was the first time that fighter jets attacked Lebanon since Ariel Sharon had taken office.374

Israeli officials had made the Syrian and Lebanese governments responsible for Hizballah attacks, long before September 2000, accusing the former of supplying the group and permitting them to operate from Lebanese territory, while charging the latter with refusing to deploy Lebanese army troops along its border with Israel and thus giving Hizballah free reign in the southern part of Lebanon. It had also threatened numerous times to retaliate against interests of both countries.

On April 16, Israeli warplanes attacked Syrian radar sites in the Dar al Baidar region, in Lebanon’s central mountains. The attacks killed one Syrian soldier and wounded four others, and were the first strikes against Syrian military installations in five years. In 1996, Israeli gunships had hit Syrian Army positions near Beirut airport during a bombing campaign against Lebanon.

The Israeli attack against Syrian interests led to fierce criticism of Israel among Arab and Islamic leaders, as well as fears of an escalation of the Israeli-Palestinian violence into a possible regional conflict. The Syrians and the Hizballah, while refraining from immediate retaliatory measures, vowed to respond in due course. Hizballah’s deputy leader, Sheikh Naim Kassem,
pledged vengeance against Israel at an “appropriate time and manner…contrary to Israeli expectations,” while Syrian foreign minister Farouk al-Sharaa pledged that Israel would “pay a heavy price…at the convenient and appropriate time.”

In practice, however, Hizballah’s attacks on Israel’s northern borders decreased after the April 2001 attacks against the Hizballah and Syrian targets in Lebanon. It is possible that Syrian president Bashar al-Asad applied some pressure on the Hizballah to reduce its attacks, in particular when such attacks are perceived to increase the likelihood of a military confrontation. Syria may want tension and clashes to keep up the pressure on Israel, but it is doubtful that Syria feels an escalation from a low-intensity, Israeli-Palestinian intra-state conflict to an inter-state war against a militarily and economically superior Israel is in its interest.

Iran has also played a hand. Iranian foreign minister, Kamal Kharazi, consulting in early October 2000 with Sheik Nasrallah, told reporters that “the issue of Jerusalem is not only important for the Palestinians, but all the Muslims of the world. This indicates how deep the Israeli provocation was in its attack on the Al Aqsa Mosque.” The Iranian foreign minister also met with UN Secretary General Kofi Annan in October. Mr. Kharazi is reported to have asked Annan to deliver a warning against an Israeli retaliatory attack against Lebanon or Syria: “Please convey this warning to Israel The counter reaction will be extremely violent, and no one will be able to stop Lebanon's Islamic resistance movement from retaliating.”

Since the eruption of the Second Intifada in late September, 2000, Iran has consistently used Hizbollah as a method of supporting extremist Palestinian elements while urging them to step up their fight against Israel. In the “International Conference on the Palestinian Intifada” that took place in Tehran on April 24-25, 2001 and was organized by the Iranian parliament (majlis), anti-Israeli vituperation was featured prominently. President Muhammad Khatami called for an international tribunal to try Israeli leaders “like war criminals.” U.S. officials have charged Tehran with setting out to coordinate the ‘rejectionist front’ more tightly since the outbreak of the Second Intifada, and with facilitating the smuggling of arms and funds via land and sea into Palestinian territories.
According to the U.S. State Department’s publication “Patterns of Global Terrorism, 2001,” released in May 2002, “Iran remained the most active state sponsor of terrorism in 2001. Since the outbreak of the Second Intifada, “Patterns” continues,

“Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS) continued to be involved in the planning and support of terrorist acts and supported a variety of groups that use terrorism to pursue their goals . . . [and] support has intensified for Palestinian groups that use violence against Israel. . . . During 2001, Iran sought a high-profile role in encouraging anti-Israeli activity by way of increasing its support for anti-Israeli terrorist groups. Supreme Leader Khamenei continued to refer to Israel as a ‘cancerous tumor’ that must be removed. Matching this rhetoric with action, Iran continued to provide Lebanese Hizbollah and the Palestinian rejectionist groups – notably HAMAS, the Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and the PFLP-GC – with varying amounts of funding, safe haven, training, and weapons. It also encouraged Hizbollah and the rejectionist Palestinian groups to coordinate their planning and to escalate their activities.”

In early May 2001, the United States convinced Turkey to revoke permission for Iran to fly planes carrying military and other hardware to Syria over Turkish airspace. It had thus closed off the primary supply route that Iran had used for over twenty years to distribute weaponry to various groups—including Iranian Revolutionary Guards deployed in Lebanon since 1982—through Syria. Although the United States may have slowed down one form of transfers to Lebanon, Iran has found other routes to move materiel into Lebanon and, by extension, to the Palestinian Authority. In fact, on January 4, 2002, Israel intercepted the Karine-A, a freighter, transferring an illegal delivery of arms to the Gaza Strip via the Mediterranean Sea. The shipment included Iranian-made rocket and anti-tank missiles, and according to Israel, Iran was responsible for the intended shipment of arms to the Palestinian territories. Furthermore, Iran has given no indications that it would stop supplying rejectionist organizations with money and funds in the future, thus exacerbating the Arab-Israeli conflict.

It is important to note, however, that the Hizbollah scarcely has a free hand. Syria and the Lebanese government have been very cautious about provoking Israel in the past. The Lebanese Army, and Palestinian refugee camp officials in Lebanon, made an effort to limited demonstrations in October 2000. The army strengthened its control points on the roads going into the south, along the coast road between Sidon and Tyre, and near Palestinian refugee camps. This had an impact on Palestinian activity as well. The Lebanese army controls most of the arms once held by the Palestinians and maintains particularly tight control over the Rashidiye camp

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near Tyre. In fact, the Fatah commander in Lebanon – Sultan Abu Alaynen – is forced to remain in the camp because he is under sentence of death by the Lebanese Army.

**Palestinian Hard-Line Movements in Syria and Jordan**

Syria has not permitted any Palestinian activity in the Golan, but it has allowed a variety of hard-line and extreme groups to operate from elsewhere in Syria. These have included four major categories of groups:

- Hizballah;
- Palestinian Islamic organizations: Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad/Shkaki);
- Radical left-wing Palestinian organizations: the PFLP-GC/Jibril, the PFLP/Habash, the DFLP/Hawatmeh, The Palestine Liberation Front, the Fatah Revolutionary Council/Abu Nidal, Fatah/Abu Musa and an extremist faction of the Popular Struggle Front;
- Other Middle Eastern and International terrorist groups: Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), Japanese Red Army and other terrorist organizations.

The Palestinian groups in Syria that have the most impact on the Palestinian aspects of the Arab-Israeli balance in a Second Intifada include hard-line organizations like the Palestine Liberation Front (PLF - Abd al-Fatah Ghanim faction), Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command (PFLP-GC), Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-Special Command (PFLP-SC), Hamas, and Palestinian Islamic Jihad. Iraq supports Palestinian extremist groups like the ANO, the Palestinian Liberation Front (PLF). It also permits Abu Abbas and Abu Ibrahim to live in Iraq. The Sudan and Libya also give these groups at least some support.

A report on Syria’s role in terrorism by Dr. Reuven Ehrlich (Avi-Ran) notes that,

“Syria currently serves as a center for eight Palestinian terror organizations which reject the peace process and the peace accords and oppose Arafat. Five of these Palestinian terror organizations are among the most radically leftwing: the “Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine - General Command (PFLP-GC)”/Ahmed Jibril, the “Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP)”/Na’if Hawatmeh, the “Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP)”/George Habash, “Fatah”/Abu Musa, and the radical segment of the “National Struggle Front”/Khaled Abd al-Majid faction. Three of the eight organizations belong to the pro-Iranian Islamic stream: “Islamic Jihad in Palestine”/Shkaki faction, “Hamas” and “Hizbollah in Palestine”/Ahmed Mah’anah faction. Damascus and its vicinity provide a haven for most of the leadership and the political and military infrastructure of these eight terror organizations, as well as for other Palestinian terrorist groups. Furthermore, these organizations have established - with Syrian approval of course - representations and operational infrastructures in the Syrian controlled area of Lebanon.

“…Damascus is the primary center of left-wing Palestinian organizations opposed to the Palestinian Authority and the Oslo Accords. Syria serves as an important area of activity for Hamas outside of Judea, Samaria and Gaza, and senior Hamas officials carry out operational, political and propaganda activities
from Damascus. The infrastructure of the “Palestine Islamic Jihad” outside of Judea, Samaria and Gaza is primarily located in the vicinity of Damascus, from where its operations and activities in the “territories” are directed.

“The leaders of most of these terrorist organizations reside in Syria, from where they oversee and direct the military, political and propaganda activities of their organizations against Israel and other Arab states. Among the senior leaders and activists of the terror groups residing in Damascus are: Dr. Ramadan Shalah, Secretary-General of Islamic Jihad and his deputy Ziad Nehaleh; Imad al-Alami, chairman of Hamas’ “Interior Committee”, who is a dominant figure in activating the organizations’ military apparatus for carrying out attacks; Ahmed Jibril, George Habash and Nayef Hawatmeh, leaders of the three main left-wing Palestinian terrorist organizations. Also active in Syria are middle- and low-ranking military activists of all the above mentioned groups.

“The Syrians permit these groups to maintain their military and political infrastructure in areas under their control in Lebanon. The most widespread infrastructure belongs to Hizbollah, which is also the leading group that concentrates attacks in southern Lebanon. The Syrians also permit some limited activity by the left-wing Palestinian terrorist groups. With Syrian approval, the Bekaa Valley continues to serve as an organizational and training center for Middle East and international terrorist groups.

…Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine - GC/ Ahmed Jibril - perceived in the 1990’s by the Syrians as the primary Palestinian left-wing organization. The organization’s headquarters, its main offices and training camps are located in Syria. In these bases, activists from other terror groups undergo training. For example, Sami Kamel al-Habib, an “Islamic Jihad” member arrested by Israel and interrogated in March 1995, said that he had gone to Syria in 1992 with other “Islamic Jihad” members to undergo military training at a camp run by PFLP-GC leader Ahmed Jibril. Jibril lives in Syria and bases his activity from there. A PFLP-GC aerial unit of gliders is also active in Syria. A radio station is at the organization’s disposal (“Radio Al-Quds”), operated in southern Syria, aimed at the residents of Judea, Samaria and Gaza, whose broadcasts often sharply attack Arafat and the Palestinian Authority.

“In the 1970’s and 1980’s the Syrians often used Jibril’s organization as a “terrorist subcontractor” for terror missions abroad. But following the exposure of the organization’s operational activities in Germany (the “Dalkamuni affair”, October 1988) when Syria’s “fingerprints” were exposed and after the explosion of the Pan Am aircraft, imputed to the organization (December 1988), Syria imposed a series of restrictions on its members and ceased activating it as a “terrorist subcontractor” abroad. Since then, the PFLP-GC focuses its activities in Lebanon, Israel and the “territories” and avoids carrying out terrorist operations abroad - constituting clear evidence of Syria’s ability to influence the terror policies of the groups under its aegis, when it is in the Syrian interest to do so.

“In addition to the PFLP-GC, the following left-wing Palestinian organizations are active in Damascus:

- Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine/ George Habash - the leadership’s institutions are located in Syria as are its leaders: George Habash, the organization’s Secretary General; Abu Ali Mustafa, another senior official who was involved in the past in directing operational activities; and Abu Ahmad Fuad, in charge of terrorist attacks, all of whom maintain permanent residence in Syria. The organization has a number of offices in the Damascus area; arsenals and military camps in which activists from the “territories”, among others, are trained, are located in Syria as well.

- Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine/ Na’if Hawatmeh - The political and military infrastructure of the organization is located in Syria. Na’if Hawatmeh, Secretary-General of the organization, and Khaled Abd al-Majid, in charge of terrorist operations, maintain permanent residence in Syria. The organization has a number of offices in the Damascus region, as well as arsenals and training camps in which activists from the territories, among others, are trained.
Other Palestinian organizations - The operational and political infrastructure of other Palestinian terrorist organizations are located in Syria, including that of the “Palestine Liberation Front”, Fatah/Abu Mussah and the Popular Struggle Front/the rebel faction (faction headed by Khaled Abd al-Majid, who oppose the peace process). The Syrians have not allowed Abu-Nidal’s organization to operate in Syria since its expulsion in 1987 (but have allowed it to operate in Lebanon while maintaining a low profile).

Jordan has allowed a number of Palestinian rejectionist groups to operate offices within Jordan. At various times, these groups have included the PFLP, PFLP-GC, DFLP, PIJ, and Hamas. Jordan has, however, restricted the actions of such groups. Jordan arrested thirty Palestinians, including fifteen members of the Abu Nidal Organization (ANO), on February 25, 1994, and an Islamic extremist for stabbing tourists on February 27. Jordan declared Hamas to be an illegal organization in April, and arrested another twenty-five Islamists, or Arab “Afghans,” during 1994 for planning the assassination of Jordanian officials. More than twenty other Palestinians Islamic extremists suspected of planning terrorist acts against Israel were arrested after Jordan signed a full peace treaty with Israel on October 26, 1994. Jordan launched a similar crack down on Hamas in January 2000.

Iraq and Libya serve as a base for hard-line Palestinian elements. Iran has some links to the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), as well as to the Hizbollah, PIJ, and Hamas. It continues to provide regular shipments of funds and arms to the Hizbollah. A report by the International Policy Institute for Counter-Terrorism on Iran’s role in terrorism notes that,

“The Palestinian organization most loyal to the Iranian revolutionary ideology is the Palestinian Islamic Jihad. In spite of it being a Sunni organization, the Iranian revolution sees in it an example to be followed. After the deportation of its leader, Fathi Shqaqi, from the Gaza Strip, the ties between Iran and the organization have been strengthened, particularly in the field of Iranian military assistance. Instructors of the Guardians of the Revolution give regular military instruction courses to the organization’s activists from the Territories and abroad, as well as in the Hizbollah camps in Lebanon and Iran. Iran also provides the organization’s activists with logistic support, including Iranian identification papers.

“….Iran also aided The PIJ in laying the groundwork for terrorist attacks abroad. At the beginning of 1996, the organization’s representative in Iran visited Turkey to prepare for the training in Iran of several of the organization’s activists. These activists were due to infiltrate back into Israel in order to carry out terrorist attacks. The Turkish security authorities arrested some of the PIJ militants and one of them, Khalil ‘Atta, was arrested in Israel. ‘Atta was one of nine PIJ militants who underwent training in Iran in the period of July - September 1995.
Table 7.1

Military and Paramilitary Strength of Key Palestinian Factions and The Hizbollah
Before the Second Intifada Began

Palestinian Authority
- 35,000 Security and paramilitary pro-PLO forces enforcing security in Gaza and Jericho, including:
  - Public Security (14,000) – 6,000 in Gaza and 8,000 in West Bank
  - Civil police (10,000) – 4,000 in Gaza and 6,000 in West Bank
  - Preventive Security (3,000) – 1,200 in Gaza and 1,800 in West Bank
  - General Intelligence (3,000),
  - Presidential Security (3,000),
  - Military Intelligence (500), and
- Equipment includes 45 APCs, 1 Lockheed Jetstar, 2 Mi-8s, 2 Mi-17s, and roughly 40,000 small arms. These include automatic weapons and light machine guns. Israeli claims they include heavy automatic weapons, rocket launchers, anti-tank rocket launchers and guided weapons, and man portable anti-air missiles.
- The PA wants 12,000 more security forces after further withdrawals. Israel has proposed some 2,000.

Pro PLO
- Palestinian National Liberation Army (PNLA)/Al Fatah - 5,000-8,000 active and semi-active reserves that make up main pro-Arafat force, based in Algeria, Egypt, Iraq, Lebanon, Libya, Jordan, Sudan, Syria, and Yemen under the tight control of the host government.
- Palestine Liberation Front (PLF) - Abu Abbas Faction - 300-400 men led by Al-Abbas, based in Syria.
- Arab Liberation Front (ALF) - 300-400 men based in Lebanon and Iraq.
- Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP) - 400-600 men led by Naif Hawatmeh, which claims eight battalions, and is based in Syria, Lebanon, and elsewhere.
- Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) - 800 men led by George Habash, based in Syria, Lebanon, West Bank, and Gaza.
- Palestine Popular Struggle Front (PSF) - 600-700 men led by Samir Ghawsha and Bahjat Abu Gharbiyah, based in Syria.

Anti-PLO
- Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) - 350 men in various factions, led by Assad Bayud al-Tamimi, Fathi Shakaki, Ibrahim Odeh, Ahmad Muhana, and others, based in the West Bank and Gaza.
- Hamas - military wing of about 300 men, based in the West Bank and Gaza.
- As-Saiqa - 600-1,000 men in pro-Syrian force under Issam al-Qadi, based in Syria.
- Fatah Revolutionary Council (FRC)/Abu Nidal Organization (ANO) - 300 men led by Abu Nidal (Sabri al-Bana), based in Lebanon, Syria, and Iraq.
- Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine - General Command (PFLP-GC) - 600 men led by Ahmad Jibril, based in Syria, Lebanon, and elsewhere.
- Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine - Special Command (PFLP-SC) - 50-100 men led by Abu Muhammad (Salim Abu Salem).
- Palestine Liberation Army (PLA) - 4,500 men, based in Syria.
- Fatah Intifada – 400-1,000 men led by Said Musa Muragha (Abu Musa). Based in Syria and Lebanon.

Hizbollah (Party of God),
- Several hundred actives with several thousand men in support, Shi’ite fundamentalist, APCs, artillery, MRLs, ATGMs, rocket launchers, AA guns, SA-7s, AT-3 Saggars.


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Figure 7.1

Palestinian Authority Paramilitary Forces in September 2000 at the Beginning of the Second Intifada

Source: Prepared by Anthony H. Cordesman, based upon the IISS Military Balance and discussions with US and regional experts

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Figure 7.2

Other Pro-PLO/Palestinian Authority Palestinian Paramilitary Forces in September 2000 at the Beginning of the Second Intifada
Palestine National Liberation Army: Arafat (Alg., Eg., Leb., Libya, Jordan, Iraq, Sud., Yem.)

Palestine Liberation Front: Tal al Yaqub (Syria)

Palestine Liberation Front: Al Abas (Iraq)

Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine: Hawatmah (Syr., Leb, etc.)

Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine: Abd Rabbu (Jor.)

Popular Struggle Front: Samir Ghansha (Syr.)

Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine: Habash (Syr., Leb., WB, Gaz.)

Arab Liberation Front: (Leb., Irq.)

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Source: Prepared by Anthony H. Cordesman, based upon the IISS Military Balance and discussions with US and regional experts

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Figure 7.3

Anti-PLO/Palestinian Authority Palestinian Paramilitary Forces in September 2000 at the Beginning of the Second Intifada

Source: Prepared by Anthony H. Cordesman, based upon the IISS Military Balance and discussions with US and regional experts

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The Actors in the Conflict: The Israeli Defense Forces

The Israeli Defense Forces have had to make major redeployments and changes in their tactics since the beginning of the Second Intifada. The units deployed against the Palestinians have also had to be specially trained and manned, and sometimes reequipped and reorganized to deal with the new types of low-intensity conflict that have developed in Palestinian areas as well as the special requirements of urban warfare, securing lines of communication in Gaza and the West Bank, isolating Palestinian towns and cities, creating new security barriers and fences between the two peoples, and using advanced weapons for assassinations and strikes against Palestinian targets in urban areas. Securing Israeli civil areas against suicide and other bombings, mortar and sniper attacks, and infiltration, has also been given a major new mission priority. There are few details as to the exact scope and cost of such changes, but they have certainly reduced the IDF’s training activity for conventional warfare and cost it hundreds of millions of dollars.

What is not yet clear is whether the Second Intifada has had the same demoralizing impact as the first. The IDF found in both the first Intifada and in Lebanon that conscripts and many officers were not prepared for the strain of dealing with civilian riots and protesters. Some over-reacted and were careless in inflicting collateral damage and causing civilian casualties. Discipline and moral problems emerged and the IDF often found it difficult to determine the circumstances under which units and individuals used lethal force and whether this was justified.

During the first Intifada, this led to significant retraining and placing mature officers, sometimes experienced reservists, in sensitive positions to ensure the use of lethal force was kept to a minimum. Similarly, units involved in Lebanon required extensive special training to operate effectively in an environment where it was extremely difficult to distinguish the enemy from hostile civilians. The IDF had to revise its targeting and command and control systems extensively to reduce the risk of both ambushes of IDF troops and incidents involving IDF fire on civilians. At least some of the techniques it now uses against the Palestinians, such as the
extensive use of RPVs, and precision strikes against given vehicles or houses, were refined or developed to help deal with these problems.

At the same time, the IDF found during the first Intifada that many conscripts did not want to become engaged against Palestinian youths, or become involved in a struggle which they did not see as a major threat to Israel, and/or become involved in a struggle where many did not feel Israel’s position was fully justified. Morale was sometimes a serious problem, and duty dealing with the first Intifada was anything but popular. It took the IDF several years to work out training, rotation, and leadership systems, and suitable tactics, to deal with the ongoing clashes with Palestinian youths and the problems resulting from such security duty.

There have been some Israeli conscripts and reservists that have refused or protested against service in the West Bank and Gaza. The Second Intifada, however, is far more clearly a “war” than the first Intifada. The Palestinian use of force creates a different environment and set of Israeli perceptions. While duty may not be popular, it seems to be perceived as necessary and justified. If anything, the Second Intifada seems to be a struggle where many in the IDF favor escalation and the use of decisive force, not one where there is much sympathy for the Palestinians.

Until late 2001, the IDF was also able to avoid reoccupation, and mix containment with precision strikes. This limited casualties, and helped the IDF avoid the kind of tactical engagements which force troops to fight in urban or built-up areas in ways where their superior equipment and training is offset by superior Palestinian knowledge of the ground and the short ranges imposed in street fighting. The use of tanks, bulldozers, and clearing of security perimeters normally provided both protection and separation from the Palestinian threat.

This changed in April 2002, when the IDF carried out an extensive reoccupation of most Palestinian cities in the West Bank. The IDF generally only met with limited resistance. However, in Jenin, the IDF was forced to engage in over a week of urban warfare when carrying out an incursion into the refugee camp in accordance with the IDF policy of containment. Though Israeli forces claim to have warned residents of Jenin before entering the camp, many
remained in the camp rather than evacuate\textsuperscript{387}. Moreover, a number of Palestinian fighters from outside Jenin moved into the area to assist Jenin fighters in carrying out organized resistance to the IDF. In nine days of fighting, IDF forces had 22 soldiers killed, including 13 in one attack\textsuperscript{388}.

In order to prepare the Israeli forces for the challenge of such organized Palestinian resistance, the IDF launched a multimillion-dollar program in June 2002 to upgrade the Army’s national training center and provide Israeli soldiers with an “urban warfare” training facility\textsuperscript{389}. As of August 2002, the expansion of such urban battle training facilities was still underway, but the manager of the upgrade-program stated that Israeli forces already practice “abbreviated urban warfare operations at a few bases around the country”\textsuperscript{390}. An urban battlefield facility was also opened nearly a year earlier at the Lachish base in the Negev desert where “soldiers practice approaches, surveillance techniques and maneuvers among loosely constructed facades of buildings, homes, and roadways”\textsuperscript{391}. This facility is equipped with laser identifying markers in addition to voice and data recording devices.

Such training, better media management, and closer attention to civilian casualties and collateral damage can help, and Palestinian resistance in the West Bank and Gaza was far less determined after the Palestinian defeat in Jenin, and the IDF attacks on the Palestinian Authority than many IDF officers feared. However, improved and high-tech training facilities can only prepare soldiers to a certain extent. Urban warfare is brutal, destructive, and produces casualties. It also confronts IDF soldiers with almost impossible decisions in determining who their enemies are in a densely crowded environment where it is hard to distinguish militant from civilian.

Much will depend on how long the Second Intifada lasts and the level of escalation it reaches. It probably has already cost the IDF close to $1 billion in terms of special training, deployments, operational expenses, and equipment. The 2002 upgrade of the Israeli Training Center is for one, a multimillion-dollar project, being launched with funds from a supply of annual US military aid to Israel,\textsuperscript{392} yet, there are also a substantial amount of other costly Israeli military expenses which are adding up. It is also already clear that the IDF also faces many of
the same problems that US forces did in Vietnam and British troops face in Ireland. Even the best rules of engagement still force constant judgment calls about what level of force is really justified and what level of risk to civilians is justified. Civilian casualties and collateral damage are virtually inevitable, and even the best sensors, targeting, and clearance procedures cannot avoid serious mistakes.

The “fog of war” that covers conventional battlefields is almost transparent in comparison with the problems of trying to operate in an environment where there are constant clashes with unarmed youths, ordinary civilian life goes on, Urban “clutter” is the operational norm, and enemies are so mixed in character and hard to identify. It is equally difficult to enforce precise discipline and rules of engagement under conditions where the situation on the ground is so uncertain and complex, and troops must constantly decide whether to use extensive or lethal force to protect themselves or accomplish their missions.

There is a natural tendency to overreact under these military conditions and no army in history has been able to keep its troops from using excessive force, or inflicting unnecessary casualties in such combat. At the same time, Palestinian charge’s that the IDF has used excessive force -- whether valid or not – are a vital political and media weapon for the Palestinian cause. The end result, that the fog of war is certain to be accompanied by a “fog of charges,” some justified, some not, and many caught up in the real-world uncertainties surrounding the true tactical situation.

The Actors in the Conflict: The Israeli Security Forces

The Israeli security forces face many of the same dilemmas as the Palestinian security forces in dealing with both Second Intifada. Although the Israeli security forces are under much tighter central government control than their Palestinian counterparts, and are less prone to arbitrary human rights abuses, they often have had to choose between a strict interpretation of the law and effectiveness. They have done so with the knowledge that effectiveness can suffer when both Israeli security and political support for a peace process need to be maintained simultaneously.
More broadly, Israeli security forces have long operated against extremist and terrorist forces that have learned to cloak their activities under “respectable” political cover, in order to manipulate the rhetoric of human rights and democracy, as well as human rights groups and the media, and to exploit every weakness in the law and legal procedures. This is why former Prime Minister Rabin once described such Israeli security operations as “war without quarter” shortly before his assassination; why former Prime Minister Netanyahu gave the issue so high a priority; and why Israeli counter-terrorist activity was often swift and violent even before the fighting in the fall of 2000 and thereafter.

Nevertheless, Israel faces the same basic challenges as the Palestinian security forces in avoiding excessive measures, and actions that simply add to the cycle of violence by creating added opposition and willingness to use terrorism. Israeli officials like former Attorney General Michael Ben-Yair also stated publicly before the tensions of the Second Intifada began that security organizations like the Shin Bet have used violence during interrogations and have sometimes killed those being interrogated. Such measures not only tend to be ineffective in any given case, but they breed more violence than they eliminate.

A War of Assassinations

One key issue is the role of both Israeli military and security forces in targeting Palestinians directly involved in attacks on Israelis. Israeli intelligence fought such a form of asymmetric warfare by killing or assassinating terrorist leaders long before the beginning of the Second Intifada. A probable list of such assassinations includes:

- **April 1973:** Israeli commandos land on Beirut beach and drive into city to kill PLO officials Kamal Nasser, Mohammed Najjar, and Kamal Adwan.
- **January 1979:** PLO special forces head Abu Hassan, A.K.A. Ali Salameh, who was involved in 1972 Munich Olympics massacre of 11 Israelis, killed in car bombing in Beirut.
- **July 1979:** Zuhayr Mohsen, PLO operations wing chief, killed in Cannes, France.
- **December 1979:** Samir Tukan, second secretary in PLO office in Nicosia, Cyprus, and Abu Safawat, another top PLO official, are murdered.
- **October 1981:** Majed Abu Sharar, head of the PLO information office, killed by bomb at Rome Hotel.
- **June 1982:** PLO deputy Kamel Hussein killed by bomb in Rome.
- **July 1982:** Fadel el-Daani, deputy of the PLO representative in France, killed by car bomb.
- **August 1983:** Mamoun Muraish, aide to Abu Jihad, No. 2 in Yasser Arafat's Fatah movement, shot to death in car.
June 1986: Khaled Ahmed Nazal, of the Marxist Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine, gunned down at Cyprus hotel.

October 1986: Munzer Abu Ghazala, PLO navy commander, killed in Athens.

February 1988: Three senior PLO officers killed by car bomb in Limassol, Cyprus.


December 1988: Israel kidnaps Hizbollah leader Jawad Kaspi from south Lebanon.


February 1992: Israeli helicopters kill Hizbollah chief Abbas Musawi, firing rockets at his car in south Lebanon.

May 1994: Mustafa Dirani, head of the Believers Resistance Group, kidnapped from home in Lebanon.

October 1995: Dr. Fathi Shakaki, head of Islamic Jihad, shot and killed in Malta by gunman on motorbike.

January 1996: Yehya Ayyash, Hamas's bomb-maker, known as the “engineer,” killed when a cellular phone packed with fifty grams of explosives detonates near his head.

Two other Palestinians have sometimes been added to this list, although they seem to have been killed by Abu Nidal. These include Said Hamami, a top PLO official who was murdered in London in January, 1978; and Nayim Kader, a PLO representative in Belgium who was killed on a Brussels street in June 1981.

Since the outbreak of the Second Intifada, Israelis have resumed a policy of selectively assassinating Palestinians it held responsible for attacking or planning attacks on Israelis. A probable list of such assassinations include:

November 9, 2000: Hussein Abayat, head of Fatah’s armed militias in the southern West Bank, is killed when a missile was fired on his vehicle.

November 22: The IDF ambushes and kills Jamal Abdel Razeq, along with three other Palestinians. Razeq was suspected of involvement in a series of attacks.

November 23: Ibrahim Beni Ouda, a leader of Izzadin al-Qassam Brigades, is blown up in a car in Nablus.

December 10: Mahmoud Yusef Moghrabi, a Fatah militant accused by Israel of having planted a bomb, is killed on a bypass road.

December 11: Anwar Mahmoud Hamran, a member of Islamic Jihad, was shot near an army post in Nablus.
December 12: Fatah militant Yusef Ahmed Abu Suwai was gunned down by IDF soldiers while standing outside his West Bank village home near Bethlehem.

December 13: Hamas militant Abbas Osman Awidi was killed outside his home in Hebron.

December 31: Thabet Thabet, head of Fatah in Tulkarem, was shot to death. December 1988: Israel kidnaps Hizbollah leader Jawad Kaspi from south Lebanon.

February 13, 2001: Massud Ayyad, a high ranking official of Force 17 and suspected of heading a militant cell of Hizballah, was killed.

February 19: Mahmoud el-Madani of the Izzadin al-Qassam Brigades, is shot and killed in a refugee camp near Nablus

April 5: Iyyad Hardan, the military leader of the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) in Jenin is blown up while standing in a public telephone booth, apparently by a booby-trapped telephone.

April 14: Mohammad Yassin Nassar, a Hamas activist, was killed in an explosion in a house in Gaza City

April 28: Imad Daud Karake, a Fatah activist, was shot dead while driving near Bethlehem

April 30: Two Hamas militants, Hamdi Madhoun and Mohamed Abu Khaled, were killed by the explosion of a booby-trapped car in a garage in Gaza City

May 5: Ahmad Khalil Issa Ismail, a member of the PIJ, was gunned down outside his ship in the village of Artas in the West Bank

June 24: Osama Jawabri, a member of the Al Aqsa Martyrs Brigade, a group that has claimed responsibility for the killings of Jewish settlers during the Second Intifada, and who was on Israel’s list of most wanted terrorists, was killed when a booby-trapped public telephone he was often using exploded.

Security Methods and Tactics

Another key issue is the kind of methods and tactics the Israeli security forces imply. Recent US State Department reporting on human rights provides further insight into this aspect of Israeli security operations, and gives what seems to be an accurate picture of the trade-offs Israel has made between security operations and human rights:

“Internal security is the responsibility of the General Security Service (Shin Bet), which is under the authority of the Prime Minister’s office. The police are under the authority of a different minister. The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) is under the authority of a civilian Minister of Defense. It includes a significant portion of the adult population on active duty or reserve status and plays a role in maintaining internal security. The Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee in the Knesset reviews the activities of the IDF and Shin Bet.

“The Government generally respects the human rights of its citizens, who enjoy a wide range of civil and other rights. Israel’s main human rights problems have arisen from its policies and practices in the occupied territories and from its fight against terrorism. The redeployment of the IDF from most major Palestinian population areas in the West Bank in December 1995 and its previous withdrawal from Gaza and Jericho have significantly reduced the scope of these problems.

“Nonetheless, there continued to be problems in some areas. Security forces abused Palestinians suspected of security offenses. During the year, the High Court of Justice heard 46 abuse-related cases (almost all
asking for an injunction to halt the torture of a specific individual). In no case did the High Court issue an injunction prohibiting the use of “moderate physical pressure.” The Government continues to detain without charge numerous Palestinians. Detention and prison conditions, particularly for Palestinian security detainees held in Israel, in some cases do not meet minimum international standards. However, new legislation took effect in May that set tighter limits on the length and grounds for pretrial detention. During the year, discussion continued on proposed legislation to define the basis for and limits of GSS activities after a 1996 version was widely criticized by human rights groups and legal experts because it authorized the Government to use force during interrogation and to issue secret guidelines defining the methods of interrogation. The revised legislation, which had not been formally submitted to the Knesset by year’s end, omits this clause. Although there continues to be no explicit legal basis for the use of “special measures,” i.e., force during interrogation, the Government justifies such practices as necessary in “special circumstances” when thought necessary to save lives in the fight against terrorism.

“The Government responded to terrorist and security incidents by periodically tightening existing restrictions on movement across borders with the West Bank and Gaza and between Palestinian Authority-controlled areas inside the West Bank, detaining hundreds of Palestinians without charge and demolishing the homes of some suspected terrorists and their families in the occupied territories.

“Israeli security forces abused, and in some cases tortured, Palestinians suspected of security offenses. Human rights groups and lawyers say that abuse and torture is widespread and that Israeli security officials use a variety of methods designed to coerce confessions that threaten prisoners’ health and inflict extreme pain, including the use of violent shaking. Prison conditions are poor, and Israeli authorities arbitrarily arrest and detain persons. Prolonged detention, limits on due process, and infringements on privacy rights remained problems. In some cases, Palestinians were able to challenge successfully the length of their administrative detentions and in July the Israeli High Court of Justice ruled that judges, rather than senior Israeli military officers, are authorized to extend a detainee's administrative detention order. Israeli authorities placed some limits on freedom of assembly. The Israeli Government places limits on freedom of movement.

“Although laws and administrative regulations prohibit the physical abuse of detainees, they are frequently not enforced in security cases. Interrogation sessions are long and severe, and solitary confinement is used frequently for long periods. The GSS systematically uses interrogation methods that do not result in detectable traces of mistreatment of the victims, or which leave marks that disappear after a short period of time. Common interrogation practices include hooding; forced standing or squatting for long periods of time; prolonged exposure to extreme temperatures; tying or chaining the detainee in contorted and painful positions; blows and beatings with fists, sticks, and other instruments; confinement in small and often filthy spaces; sleep and food deprivation; and threats against the detainee's life or family. Israeli interrogators continued to subject prisoners to violent "shaking," which in at least one past case resulted in death. In 1997 B'tzelem, a respected Israeli human rights group, found that a large percentage of Palestinian detainees whom it surveyed had been tortured while in Israeli detention.

“The GSS was responsible for the widespread abuse of Palestinians suspected of security offenses. The head of the GSS is empowered by government regulation to authorize security officers to use “moderate physical and psychological pressure” (which includes violent shaking) while interrogating detainees. These practices often led to excesses.

“Despite repeated challenges, the High Court of Justice has avoided ruling on the legality of the practices of "shaking" and other forms of coercion. The Government claims that these practices are justified as "special measures" to be used in “special circumstances” in the fight against terrorism. During the 1997, the High Court of Justice heard 46 abuse-related cases (almost all asking for an injunction to halt the torture of a specific individual).

“In 1987 the Israeli government-appointed Landau Judicial Commission condemned torture but allowed for the use of "moderate physical and psychological pressure" to secure confessions and obtain information. In addition, although the Israeli Penal Code prohibits the use of force or violence by a public
official to obtain information, the GSS chief is permitted by law to allow interrogators to employ "special measures" that exceed the use of "moderate physical and psychological pressure" when it is deemed necessary to obtain information that could potentially save Israeli lives in certain "ticking bomb" cases. The Government has not defined what might constitute a "ticking bomb" case. At roughly quarterly intervals, the Government has approved the continued use of "special measures." In November 1998, Israel's ministerial committee on GSS interrogations reauthorized the use of "special measures," including shaking. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) declared in 1992 that such practices violate the Geneva Convention. Human rights groups and attorneys challenged the use of "special measures," especially shaking, before the Israeli High Court a number of times during the year. In each case, the court either rejected the petition or ruled in favor of the GSS.

“In addition, the High Court dropped numerous cases before beginning formal hearings when the GSS announced that it no longer needed to use “special measures.” Human rights groups believe that the great majority of cases alleged to involve torture do not reach the court. In some cases, the High Court of Justice issued injunctions prohibiting the use of certain forms for physical pressure after hearing evidence presented in secret by the GSS and not made available to defense attorneys; however, according to Israeli human rights advocates and legal experts, it routinely lifted them at the request of the GSS. In no case did the High Court overrule a GSS decision to use “moderate physical pressure.”

“Since the closure in 1995 of the main IDF detention camps in the occupied territories, all security detainees (i.e., those detained and held without charge by security forces) from the occupied territories who are held for more than a few days are transferred to facilities within Israel. Security detainees in 1997 were usually held in IDF camps in Israel, but also in IPS facilities and in special sections of police detention facilities. Prisoners incarcerated for security reasons are subject to a different regimen, even in IPS facilities. They are often denied certain privileges given to prisoners convicted on criminal charges. Security detainees include some minors. Detention camps administered by the IDF are limited to male Palestinian detainees and are guarded by armed soldiers. The total number of Palestinian prisoners and administrative detainees held by Israel, approximately 3,800 at the beginning of the year, fell to 3,565 by year’s end. The number of administrative detainees (held with neither charge nor trial) varied between 293 and 573 during the year, and stood at 382 at year’s end. Some of these detainees have been held for periods exceeding 2 years.

“Conditions in IDF detention camps have been criticized repeatedly over the years. Conditions at the Russian Compound in Jerusalem (which houses a combination of security and common-law prisoners and detainees) were criticized as “not fit to serve as lock-up” by the High Court of Justice President Aharon Barak after an August visit to the facility. Conditions in other IDF facilities improved in some respects, with inmates given more time for exercise outside their cells. Nevertheless, recreational facilities remain minimal, and there are strict limitations on family visits to detainees. Visits were prevented for long periods during closures of the borders with Gaza and the West Bank.

“Conditions at some national police detention facilities can fall below minimum international standards. Such facilities are intended to hold criminal detainees prior to trial but often become de facto prisons. Those held include some security detainees and some persons who have been convicted and sentenced. Inmates in the national police detention facilities are often not accorded the same rights as prisoners in the IPS. Moreover, conditions are worse in the separate facilities for security detainees maintained both in police facilities and in IPS prisons.

“Conditions vary in incarceration facilities in Israel and the occupied territories, which are administered by the Israeli Prison Service (IPS), the Israel Defense Forces (IDF), or the national police. IPS prisons, which generally house Israeli citizens convicted of common crimes, usually meet minimum international standards. Generally, IPS inmates are not subject to physical abuse by guards, food is adequate, and prisoners receive basic necessities. Inmates receive mail, have television sets in their cells, and receive regular visits. Prisoners receive wages for prison work and benefits for good behavior. Many IPS prisons have drug treatment, educational, and recreational programs. The IPS has established an investigatory committee to look into charges of violence by guards against inmates.

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“In 1996 the Government began a reform program for the country’s detention facilities. Thus far, improvements in prison conditions have been limited in scope, and dilapidation and overcrowding (the latter aggravated by the closure of IDF detention facilities in the occupied territories in 1995) are still problems. New legislation that took effect during the year provided for: The right to live in conditions that would not harm the health or dignity of the detainee; access to adequate health care; the right to a bed for each detainee; and access to exercise and fresh air on a daily basis. While the legislation is a positive step, authorities expect implementation to require time and additional resources; there was little immediate improvement in 1997.

“All incarceration facilities are monitored by various branches of the Government, by members of the Knesset, and by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and other human rights groups. While monitoring is judged to be effective overall, in some instances human rights groups and diplomatic officials were denied timely access to specific detainees, usually Palestinians held without charge or trial for alleged security offenses.

“Israeli authorities arbitrarily arrest and detain persons. Any Israeli policeman or border guard may arrest without warrant a person who has committed, or is suspected of having committed, a criminal or security offense in the occupied territories, except for areas under exclusive PA control.

“Israeli soldiers also may arrest without warrant Palestinians and hold them for questioning for the same reasons. Most of these arbitrary arrests and detentions are for alleged security offenses. Persons arrested for common crimes usually are provided with a statement of charges and access to an attorney and may apply for bail. However, these procedures sometimes are delayed.

“Israeli authorities may hold persons in custody without a warrant for 96 hours; they must be released unless a warrant is issued. Pre-arraignment detention can last up to 11 days for Palestinians arrested in the occupied territories and up to 8 days for minors and those accused of less serious offenses. Authorities must obtain a court order for longer administrative detentions—up to 6 months from the date of arrest. At hearings to extend detention for interrogation purposes, detainees are entitled to be represented by counsel, although the defense attorney often is not allowed to see or hear the evidence against his client. Detainees either are released at the end of the court-ordered detention or sent to administrative detention if they are not indicted. If there is an indictment, a judge may order indefinite detention until the end of the trial. Israeli regulations permit detainees to be held in isolation during interrogation. Detainees have the right to appeal continued detention.

“The law prohibits arbitrary arrest of citizens, and the Government generally observes this prohibition. Defendants are considered innocent until proven guilty and have the right to writs of habeus corpus and other procedural safeguards. However, a 1979 law permits detention without charge or trial, which is used in security cases. The Minister of Defense may issue a detention order for a maximum of 1 year. Within 24 hours of issuance, detainees must appear before a district judge who may confirm, shorten, or overturn the order. If the order is confirmed, an automatic review takes place after 3 months.

“Detention orders were confirmed in all cases during the year. Detainees have the right to be represented by counsel and to appeal detention orders to the High Court of Justice; however, the security forces may delay notification of counsel with the consent of a judge. According to human rights groups and legal experts, there were cases in which a judge denied the Government the right to delay notification of counsel. At detention hearings, the security forces may withhold evidence from defense lawyers on security grounds. The Government may also seek to renew administrative detention orders. However, the security services must “show cause” for continued detention, and, in some instances, individuals were released because the standard could not be met.

“In felony cases, a district court judge may postpone for 48 hours the notification of arrest to the detainee’s attorney. The postponement may be extended to 7 days by the Minister of Defense on national security grounds or by the police inspector general to conduct an investigation. Moreover, a judge may postpone notification for up to 15 days in national security cases.
“Israeli authorities claim that they attempt to post notification of arrest within 48 hours. Nevertheless, Palestinian suspects often are kept incommunicado for longer than 48 hours. Even if an arrest becomes known, it is often difficult to get information on where a detainee is being held or whether he has access to an attorney. Palestinians generally locate detained family members through their own efforts. Palestinians can check with a local ICRC office to determine whether it has information on the whereabouts of a family member. A senior officer may delay for up to 12 days notification of arrest to immediate family members and attorneys. A military commander may appeal to a judge to extend this period in security cases for an unlimited time. In a change from past practice, the Israeli High Court of Justice ruled in July that judges, rather than military officials, can renew administrative detention orders beyond the initial 6-month period.

“New legislation took effect in 1997, defining more narrowly the grounds for pretrial detention and reducing to 24 hours the length of time a person may be held without charge. Children’s rights activists have recommended separate legislation to define when and how a child may be arrested and how long children may be detained.

“Most of the protections afforded by law are not extended to Palestinian detainees, who fall under the jurisdiction of military law even if they are detained in Israel. With IDF redeployment on the West Bank, detention centers there were closed in 1995. As a result, all Palestinian detainees held for longer than 1 or 2 days are incarcerated in Israel.

“The Government detains 80 non-Palestinian Arabs. This total is a mixture of common prisoners, administrative detainees, and security detainees. The Government continues to deny ICRC access to two Lebanese citizens, Sheikh Mustafa Dirani (held without charge since 1994) and Sheikh Obeid (held without charge since 1989). These two cases appear linked to government efforts to obtain information on Israeli military personnel believed to be prisoners of war or missing in Lebanon. In addition, the Government detains 19 other Lebanese citizens without charge, including 11 who have completed prison sentences of up to 10 years but are still being held without charge.

“At the end of 1998, the Government held 101 non-Palestinian Arabs in detention. Those held were a mixture of common prisoners, administrative detainees, and security detainees. The Government continues to deny the ICRC access to two Lebanese citizens, Sheikh Mustafa Dirani (held without charge since 1994) and Sheikh Obeid (held without charge since 1989). The High Court of Justice ruled in May that the Government is entitled to continue holding them for use in a possible exchange of hostages to obtain the return of an Israeli who may still be held by hostile forces. The High Court's ruling stressed that national security needs take precedence over the detainees’ individual rights under Israeli and international law. In addition, the Government detained 57 other Lebanese citizens, 21 without charge or trial. Eleven have completed prison sentences of up to 10 years but still are being held without charge. Twelve Lebanese detainees were released from Israeli prisons during the year, 10 in exchange for the remains of an Israeli soldier.

“According to the Government, as of December 26, 1998, 83 Palestinians were in administrative detention in Israel, compared with 382 at the end of 1997. Severel have been held for more than one year. Human rights organizations say that the decrease is due largely to the fact that there were no major terrorist attacks during the year; in past, Israeli officials arrested hundreds of Palestinians suspected of terrorist links after major terrorist attacks. Many Palestinians under administrative detention during the past 2 years have had their detention orders renewed repeatedly without meaningful chance of appeal. However, in January Adnan Abdallah Yusuf Dhiyab successfully challenged his administrative detention order and was released from prison. In his ruling, the judge said that the evidence against Dhiyab, a Palestinian who had been held in administrative detention for over a year for allegedly belonging to HAMAS, was not sufficient to warrant continued detention over and above the time already served.

“The legal system often hands out far stiffer punishments to non-Jewish persons than to Jewish citizens. For example, human rights advocates claim that Palestinians and Arab Israelis convicted of murder usually receive life sentences, while Jewish Israelis often receive significantly shorter sentences. To the extent that Palestinians are tried in Israeli courts, they receive harsher punishments than Jewish Israelis. Noam
Freidman, a Jewish extremist who lightly wounded six Palestinians after opening fire in a crowded Hebron market on January 1, had charges against him dropped after a military court ruled that he was not mentally fit to stand trial. This ruling was reached despite a decision by a psychiatric board that he was mentally competent to stand trial. On February 11, Israel released 30 Palestinian women prisoners, 5 of whom were serving sentences for murder or for being an accomplice to murder, as part of the accord on Hebron redeployment. On October 1, Sheik Ahmed Yassin, founder of the HAMAS movement, was released by Israel from a maximum-security prison and flown to Jordan.

“During the 1998, three Palestinians died in attacks perpetrated by Israelis while Israeli civilians, including settlers, continued to harass, abuse, and attack Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. In general, settlers are not prosecuted for these acts and rarely serve prison sentences when convicted of a crime against Palestinians.

“During the 1998, violent clashes between Palestinian demonstrators and Israeli security forces resulted in 16 Palestinian deaths and scores of wounded. IDF regulations permit the use of both rubber-coated metal bullets and live ammunition only when a soldier's life is in immediate danger, to halt fleeing suspects, to disperse a violent demonstration, or to fire on an "individual unlawfully carrying firearms." According to policy, soldiers should direct fire at the legs only and may fire at a fleeing suspect only if they believe that a serious felony has occurred and they have exhausted other means to apprehend the suspect. It is forbidden to open fire in the direction of children or women, even in cases of severe public disorder, unless there is an immediate and obvious danger to a soldier's life. Israeli soldiers and police sometimes used live ammunition or rubber-coated metal bullets, which can be lethal, in situations other than when their lives were in danger and sometimes shot suspects in the upper body and head. During the year, Israeli soldiers shot in the head and killed, with rubber-coated metal bullets, three Palestinians under the age of 18.”

The State Department cites a very real list of human rights problems, and many actions that are almost certainly ultimately counterproductive in terms of the Palestinian reaction and in terms of preserving any peace. The other side of this reporting, however, is that no one should ignore the level of violence on the other side, and often by groups that have long attempted to claim they are purely political organizations or which have tried to exploit civil rights as a political weapon.

Israel had to deal with very real problems and threats even when there was little sign of a Second Intifada. On March 21, 1997 a suicide bomber killed 3 Israelis and wounded 48 in an attack on a Tel Aviv cafe. On July 30, two suicide bombers killed 16 persons and wounded 178 in an attack on a Jerusalem market. On September 4, 3 suicide bombers killed 5 persons and wounded 181 in an attack on a Jerusalem pedestrian shopping mall. During 1998, 8 Israelis were killed and over 100 were wounded in terrorist attacks carried out by Palestinian groups or individuals seeking to halt the Middle East peace process. In September 1999, there were two bombings by Hamas on the same day that Israel and the Palestinian Authority reached a new agreement to move forward with the Wye Accords.
Israel also did make progress in improving its internal security methods before the Second Intifada began. The Israeli Supreme Court voted 9-0 to place important new constraints on Israeli use of force against suspected terrorists in a decision on September 6, 1999. The Court concluded that the Shin Bet or General Security Service had misused a variety of torture-like techniques like violently shaking interrogees, sleep deprivation, beatings, and violent disorientation techniques.

As a result, Israeli security forces face the same dilemma that is inherent in virtually every intensive internal security effort that must take place in a climate of extremism, terrorism, and social violence. Israel must seek to preserve its immediate security but cannot hope for future stability in Gaza, the West Bank, or Jerusalem if it ignores the need to preserve Palestinian dignity and create a security climate that promotes economic cooperation and an improvement in Palestinian living conditions. History has shown that Israeli security forces can only have mid- and long-term effectiveness if they do not constantly consider the broader political implications of their actions and remember that any excesses undermine outside support for Israel, breed Palestinian hostility and violence, and undercut Palestinian and Arab support for the peace process and Palestinian security operations. In short, both Israel and Palestinian security forces must try to walk the same narrow line in a climate of crisis and uncertainty in which neither can hope to be fully successful.
Map 7.3

The West Bank
### Table 7.5

**Key Incidents of Terrorism Since the Oslo Accords in September 1993 and prior to the Second Intifada**

- **September 12, 1993** A Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) suicide bomber crashes an explosives-laden car into a bus carrying soldiers at Sheikh Ajlun in Gaza. The car failed to explode, and the only casualty was the driver of the car.

- **October 4, 1993** A Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) car bomb is detonated in proximity to a bus on the no. 173 line. Thirty people are lightly injured.

- **October 24, 1993** Two small explosive charges detonate near the French embassy in Tel Aviv. There was no damage or casualties. A member of the Jewish extremist Kahana Hay movement claimed responsibility for the explosions, saying the attack was carried out to protest PLO leader Yasser Arafat’s visit to France and agreements he signed there.

- **January 29, 1994** A Jordanian diplomat was shot and killed outside his home in Beirut. The government of Lebanon arrested and prosecuted Abu Nidal Attacker terrorists for the attack.

- **April 6, 1994** Car rigged with explosives detonates next to a bus in Afula in Northern Israel. 9 Israelis killed and 45 wounded. Hamas claims responsibility.

- **April 13, 1994** A Palestinian suicide bomber triggers bomb in bus in Hadera in central Israel. 6 Israelis killed and 45 wounded. Hamas claims responsibility.

- **April 16, 1994** A Hamas (Islamic Resistance Movement) car bomb is detonated at the road-side kiosk at Mehola, Israel in the Jordan valley. One person is killed and nine injured.

- **July 18, 1994** A car bomb explodes at the Israeli-Argentine Mutual Association (AMIA), killing 100 persons and wounding more than 200 others. The explosion causes the seven-story building to collapse and damaged adjacent buildings.

- **July 19, 1994** A commuter plane explodes in flight over the Santa Rita Mountains in Panama, among the 21 victims are Israeli nationals, dual Israeli-Panamanian citizens, three US citizens and 12 Jewish persons.

- **July 23, 1994** Two unknown Palestinians stab and seriously injure an American woman in the Arab quarter of the Old City of Jerusalem. The assailants escape unharmed.

- **July 26, 1994** A car bomb explodes at the Israel Embassy in London, injuring 14 persons. The bomb is planted by a woman who was driving an Audi car.

- **July 27, 1994** A car bomb detonates outside a building that houses Jewish Attackers in London. Five persons are injured in the attack.

- **October 9, 1994** Hamas (Islamic Resistance Movement) terrorists opened fire with automatic weapons in Jerusalem’s Nahalat Shiva’s business district. An off-duty soldier and an Israeli Arab were killed in the attack. One of the attackers was shot by bystanders and the other captured. Fourteen are injured.

- **December 25, 1994** Palestinian suicide bomber triggers bomb in bus in Jerusalem. 12 Israelis wounded. Hamas claims responsibility.

- **January 22, 1995** Two Palestinian suicide bombers trigger bomb in Beit Lid junction in central Israel. 21 Israelis killed. Palestinian Islamic Jihad claims responsibility.

- **April 9, 1995** Two Palestinian suicide bombers trigger bombs outside two Israeli settlements in Gaza Strip. 7 Israeli soldiers and one American killed. Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad claim responsibility.

- **June 25, 1995** A Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) activist detonates an explosives-laden cart near an I.D.F. vehicle, injuring 3 soldiers.

- **July 24, 1995** Palestinian suicide bomber triggers bomb in bus in Tel Aviv. 6 Israelis killed and 28 wounded. Hamas claims responsibility.

- **August 21, 1995** Palestinian suicide bomber triggers bomb in bus in Jerusalem. 4 Israeli soldiers and 1 American killed. More than 100 wounded. Hamas claims responsibility.

- **February 25, 1996** Palestinian suicide bombers trigger bombs in bus in Jerusalem and at a soldier’s hitch-hiking post near Akkelen along the coast. Kill 23 Israelis, 2 Americans, and 1 Palestinian. Wound more than 80. Hamas claims responsibility.

- **February 26, 1996** American Arab drives rental car into Jerusalem bus stop. 1 Israeli killed and 23 wounded. Driver is shot and killed. Seems to have acted on own but Hamas claims responsibility.

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• March 3, 1996 Palestinian suicide bomber triggers bomb in bus in Jerusalem. 18 Israelis killed and 10 wounded. The Students of Yehiye Ayyash, a splinter group of Hamas, claim responsibility for the attack.

• March 4, 1996 Palestinian suicide bomber triggers bomb outside shopping center in Tel Aviv. 12 Israelis killed and more than 100 wounded. Both Hamas and the Palestine Islamic Jihad (PIJ) claim responsibility for the bombing.

• May 13, 1996 Hamas (Islamic Resistance Movement) gunmen open fire on a bus and a group of Yeshiva students near the Beth El settlement, killing a dual US/Israeli citizen and wounding three Israelis. No one claims responsibility for the attack, but Hamas is suspected.

• June 9, 1996 Unidentified gunman opens fire on a car near Zekharya, killing a dual US/Israeli citizen and an Israeli. The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) is suspected.

• Feb 23, 1997 A Palestinian gunman opens fire on tourists at an observation deck atop the Empire State building in New York City, killing a Danish national and wounding visitors from the United State, Argentina, Switzerland and France before turning the gun on himself. A handwritten note carried by the gunman claimed this was a punishment attack against the “enemies of Palestine”.

• March 21, 1997 Palestinian suicide bomber killed 3 Israeli women in Tel Aviv.

• July 30, 1997 Two Palestinian suicide bombers trigger bombs inside the Mahane Yehuda bazaar, the central produce market in Jerusalem. 13 Israelis killed, and 170 wounded. Hamas appears to claim responsibility.

• September 4, 1997 Three Palestinian suicide bombers trigger bombs on the Ben Yehuda pedestrian mall in Jerusalem. Four Israelis are killed and nearly 200 wounded. Hamas claims responsibility.

• November 20, 1997 Unknown gunmen shoot and kill a Hungarian Yeshiva student and wound an Israeli student in the Old City of Jerusalem. No one claims responsibility.

• January 14, 1998 A booby-trapped videocassette explodes at Israel-Lebanon border near Metulla. Intended target was a senior Israeli intelligence officer. 3 Israelis and 3 Lebanese wounded. Amal claims responsibility.

• Apr 2, 1998 An Israeli vehicle was fired upon near Telem, Israel. There are no casualties.

• Apr 30, 1998 A firebomb is thrown at the parking lot of the Jerusalem hotel in Amman, Jordan. The Jordanian authorities arrest eight members of a foreign-backed Islamic group, accusing them of being behind a wave of recent arson attacks.

• May 3, 1998 A pipe bomb explodes in front of the apartment of three Arab students in the Musrara neighborhood of Jerusalem. A fire in the stairwell is the only damage caused. Israeli police suspect right-wing extremists.

• Jun 1, 1998 Two terrorists ambush and fire six shots at an Israeli vehicle. No casualties are reported.

• Aug 20, 1998 Rabbi Shlomo Raanan is stabbed to death by a Hamas terrorist in his home in Tel Rumeiyda, Israel. The attacker enters the house through a window and escapes after throwing a Molotov cocktail which sets fire to the house.

• Sep 24, 1998 An IDF soldier was injured when a Hamas (Islamic Resistance Movement) bomb explodes in a bus station near the Hebrew University in Jerusalem. The explosion destroys the bus shelter.

• Sep 30, 1998 Fourteen IDF soldiers and 11 Palestinians are wounded when a Hamas (Islamic Resistance Movement) terrorist hurl two grenades at a border police jeep in Hebron. The patrol shoots the attacker in the leg and pursued him into the Palestinian-controlled part of Hebron, but he manages to escape.

• Oct 1, 1998 Thirteen soldiers and five Palestinians are injured in a Hamas (Islamic Resistance Movement) grenade attack in Hebron. A Palestinian from the Palestinian-controlled H-1 area lob two grenades at the soldiers. One explodes close to where the men were standing, injuring several Palestinian passers-by, soldiers, and border policemen. The second hits two cars parked on a sidewalk and injures nearby Palestinians. Two border policemen and one soldier suffer moderate injuries, while ten others were only slightly hurt. Five Palestinians were taken to Hebron hospitals. The soldiers give chase to the assailant and one of them opens fire and apparently hits him in the leg. However, he manages to escape back into the H-1 area.

• Oct 19, 1998 Two grenades are hurled into crowd at Central bus station at Be’er Sheva, Israel during rush hour. At least 59 people are wounded. Most of the injured are lightly or moderately wounded, though two were seriously hurt. The attacker is overwhelmed by several bystanders, who turn him over to civil guard policemen. Hamas claims responsibility.

• October 27, 1998. Mohmoud Majzoub, a senior member of the Islamic Jihad Attacker in Lebanon, is seriously injured in a car bomb assassination attempt. The car bomb also injures his wife, their nine month-old son and a Syrian passerby.

• October 29, 1998 A Hamas suicide bomber targets a school bus carrying children from the community of Kfar Darom to a regional school near the Gush Katif Junction. The bus is escorted before and aft by army jeeps, and is transporting children. A suicide bomber driving an explosives-laden vehicle attempts to collide head-on with the bus. The driver of the leading jeep moves to block the suspicious car from reaching the bus, and the bomber detonated the explosives near the jeep. At least one person in the jeep is killed, along with the suicide bomber. Two passengers of the jeep are seriously injured. Six people sustain light-to-moderate injuries, including three young people and three children.

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• **October 31, 1998**  Khaled Kurdiyeh, a Fatah activist, survives an assassination attempt in Lebanon. The car bomb explodes at a Palestinian refugee camp. No one is injured.

• **November 6, 1998** Two suicide bombers drive car bomb into Mahane Yehuda market in Jerusalem. 20 people injured. Palestinian Islamic Jihad claims responsibility.

• **September 5, 1999:** Two car-bomb explosions occur within minutes of each other in Tiberias and Haifa at around 5:30 p.m., killing three terrorist bombers and seriously wounding a 73-year-old woman. The car-bomb attacks occurred less than 24 hours after the signing of the Sharm e-Sheik Memorandum.

The Actors in the Conflict: Israeli Hard-Line Movements and Extremists

Both Israelis and Israel’s supporters need to remember that Israeli terrorism is a problem as well as Palestinian terrorism. Israeli extremist violence against Palestinians and Israeli Arabs broke out in the fighting in the fall of 2000. Even when Israeli extremists do not use violence, however, Israeli and pro-Israeli extremists operate in a climate where their verbal violence can be as deadly as the use of bombs and weapons.

Israeli extremists use rhetoric that is as violent and extreme as that of the Palestinian extremists. They have charged leaders like Yitzhak Rabin and Shimon Peres with “treason,” and one of their members murdered Yitzhak Rabin on November 4, 1995. Similar charges were made about former Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu after the Wye Accords and about Israeli moderates during the 1999 election campaign. Israeli extremists have threatened to kill Palestinians who interfere with their actions and drive them out of their homes or the entire West Bank. A few have beaten or murdered innocent Palestinians.

Before the Second Intifada, groups like the Action Committee for the Abolition of the Autonomy Plan, Kach, Kahane Chai, Eyal, radicals in the more extreme settlements such as Hebron and Kiryat Arba, and the more extreme members of settler groups have committed occasional direct acts of terrorism, and have played a role in provoking extreme Palestinian actions. 399

Baruch Goldstein, a Kach member, killed twenty-nine Palestinian worshipers and wounded more than 200 in a Hebron mosque on February 25, 1994. Israel declared Kach and Kahane Chai to be terrorist organizations, and arrested eleven Jewish extremists for planning attacks on Palestinians in September 1994. 400 This, however, did little to halt the activities of Israeli extremists whose rhetoric grew progressively more violent as the peace accords were implemented. Their verbal and physical attacks came to include Israel’s leaders, and created a major problem for the peace process.

Yigal Amir, an Israeli with ties to an extreme right-wing group, assassinated Israel’s Prime Minister, Yitzhak Rabin, on November 4, 1995. Although he only killed one man, his target was so critical to the peace process that he may have done as much to delay it and create the conditions that led to the Second Intifada as all of the Palestinian suicide bombings.
The Second Intifada now will be creating a different and broader threat. Israeli public opinion polls issued in June 2001, found that only 30% of Israelis still believed in the peace process, and 70% believed another war was likely. Some 72% of Israelis said they had more negative views of the Palestinians as a result of the Second Intifada versus 53% who said the same thing about the first Intifada in 1988. For some Israelis, these feelings are an incentive to commit acts of violence. There is a small growing minority that feels that all Palestinians should be expelled from Israel, that far more violent action should be taken to deter Palestinian violence, and that private acts of violence against the Palestinians are justified.

On the far right, Israel’s tourism minister, Rehavam Zeevi – who was assassinated by the PFLP on October 17, 2001 – referred to the estimated 180,000 Palestinians working and living illegally in Israel as “lice,” and stated that, “They arrived here and are trying to become citizens because they want social security and welfare payments. We should get rid of the ones who are not Israeli citizens the same way you get rid of lice. We have to stop this cancer from spreading within us.” While Ze’evi was on the margin of Sharon’s center-left coalition, he is scarcely alone.

The drift towards extremism is interactive. Every new Palestinian act of violence tends to push some Israelis towards vigilante action or towards overreaction. There have been many serious incidents of Israeli violence against Palestinians, and these included attacks on Israeli Arabs during the fighting in September-October 2000 that produced significant casualties. Since that time, there have been many incidents in which Israelis have assaulted and sometimes killed Palestinian civilians who played no role in the Second Intifada, or used potential lethal force with little or insufficient justification.

So far, the Second Intifada does not seem to have created new Israeli paramilitary groups or underground organizations. While there are no reliable statistics, most such acts of violence have also taken place largely near settlements, roads, or other areas where Israelis and Palestinians already clash. At the same time, it seems likely that Israeli extremists will become far more active the moment they believe the government is not taking decisive steps against the Palestinians, and will resist any ceasefire or peace moves far more actively than they did before the Second Intifada began.

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The Course of the Conflict in Gaza

The division of Gaza and the West Bank creates a different set of security problems in each area for both Israel and the Palestinians. The Gaza Strip has an area slightly more than twice the size of Washington, DC. The current political status of the Gaza Strip is defined by a number of agreements between Israel and the Palestinian Authority. The Israel-PLO Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements (the DOP), which was signed in Washington on September 13, 1993, provides for a transitional period of Palestinian interim self-government in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank that does not exceed five years. Under the DOP, Israel agreed to transfer certain powers and responsibilities to the Palestinian Authority, which includes a Palestinian Legislative Council elected in January 1996, as part of interim self-governing arrangements in the West Bank and Gaza Strip.

The security arrangements made before the Second Intifada gave the Palestinian Authority extensive control within Gaza, but have also left Israel with extensive security capabilities. A transfer of powers and responsibilities for the Gaza Strip and Jericho took place pursuant to the Israel-PLO Cairo Agreement on the Gaza Strip and the Jericho Area of May 4, 1994. It took place in additional areas of the West Bank pursuant to the Israel-PLO Interim Agreement of September 28, 1995, the Israel-PLO Protocol Concerning Redeployment in Hebron of January 15, 1997, the Israel-PLO Wye River Memorandum of October 23, 1998, and the Sharm el-Sheikh Agreement of September 4, 1999. The DOP provided that Israel would retain responsibility during the transitional period for external security and for internal security and public order of settlements and Israeli citizens. Permanent status was to be determined through direct negotiations. These resumed in September 1999 after a three-year hiatus but did not resolve any issues before the Israel-Palestinian clashes that began in September 2000.

Fighting in an Economic and Demographic Time Bomb

Since that time, the geography and demography of the Gaza Strip has virtually ensured that an Israeli-Palestinian conflict takes different forms in the Gaza and West Bank. Gaza is an area of about 360 square kilometers, sharing a 51-kilometer border with Israel, an 11-kilometer border with Egypt, and 40 kilometers of coastline. These borders are relatively compact and easy for the IDF to secure, provided that Egypt enforces the control of its borders with the same
strictness as Israel. Even without Egyptian cooperation, the Gaza’s southern border can be secured with considerable effectiveness.

As a result of the September 13, 1993 accords between Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), and the Cairo Agreement of May 4, 1994, it was divided into a mix of common roads, Israeli controlled entry points and roads, Israeli settlements, Palestinian Authority controlled areas, and other areas. Unlike the West Bank, however, the Gaza is an almost totally Palestinian entity. There were 1,132,063 Palestinians in the Gaza at the end of 1999, but only 6,500 Israeli settlers. These were, however, scattered in 24 Israeli settlements and civilian land use sites. The Palestinian population is overwhelmingly Muslim, and the religious composition of the Gaza Strip is 98.7% Muslim, 0.7% Christian, and 0.6% Jewish.

At the same time, Gaza became an economic and demographic time bomb long before the Second Intifada. According to CIA estimates, the economy has deteriorated steadily since the early 1990s. Real per capita GDP for the West Bank and Gaza Strip (WBGS) declined 36% between 1992 and 1996 owing to the combined effect of falling aggregate incomes and robust population growth. The CIA estimates that this downturn in economic activity led to a nearly two-year decrease in life expectancy and a significant increase in child mortality between 1997 and 2000. The population growth rate was an extremely high 3.97%, in spite of economic conditions and gross overcrowding in the available housing. The population is extremely young: 50% is 14 years of age or younger. The CIA described Gaza’s economic situation at the beginning of the Second Intifada as follows:

“largely the result of Israeli closure policies - the imposition of generalized border closures in response to security incidents in Israel - which disrupted previously established labor and commodity market relationships between Israel and the WBGS. The most serious negative social effect of this downturn has been the emergence of chronic unemployment; average unemployment rates in the WBGS during the 1980s were generally under 5%; by the mid-1990s this level had risen to over 20%. Since 1997 Israel's use of comprehensive closures has decreased and, in 1998, Israel implemented new policies to reduce the impact of closures and other security procedures on the movement of Palestinian goods and labor. In October 1999, Israel permitted the opening of a safe passage between the Gaza Strip and the West Bank in accordance with the 1995 Interim Agreement. These changes to the conduct of economic activity have fueled a moderate economic recovery in 1998-99.”

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The GDP of the Gaza was only $1.17 billion in 1999, even when measured in purchasing power parity terms. The per capita income was $1,060. In spite of major water, desertification, and sewage problems, roughly one-third of the economy was still tied to agriculture. Another 25 percent worked in light industry, the rest in “services,” largely consisting of temporary work.\textsuperscript{408} Most water and electricity are imported from Israel and are under Israeli control. Israel has the ability to shut off most power and water, as well as cut most communications. The Israeli company BEZEK and the Palestinian company PALTEL are responsible for communication services in the West Bank. There is a total of a little over 100,000 telephone landlines in the entire WBGS area, although there are many cellular phones.\textsuperscript{409}

Table 7.2 provides a profile of the geographic, economic, and population profile for the Gaza, West Bank, Jordan, and Israel, although much data dates back to the period before intensive fighting began.

The Gaza Strip would present a continuing risk of internal instability even if no Second Intifada were underway. Peace and sovereignty alone cannot feed its people. Gaza has no natural resources, and no significant internal industrial activity or exports except souvenir production, a few showpiece factories, and citrus fruits -- many of which are grown by Israelis.\textsuperscript{410} Gaza’s economy has been highly dependent on Israel and will remain so if it is ever to develop. In the past, Gaza provided most of the roughly 50,000 Palestinian workers who worked in Israel during 1994, and over 43 percent of all Gazan employment came from Israel during the peak employment year of 1992.\textsuperscript{411} Remittances accounted for roughly 40 percent of the Gaza’s GNP.\textsuperscript{412} Israel accounted for about 90 percent of Gaza’s external trade.

Unemployment is a massive problem even in peacetime. Total Palestinian unemployment rose by as much as 10 percent per year during the mid-1990s and unemployment and disguised unemployment in Gaza varied from 35 to 40 percent during 1995-1999.\textsuperscript{413} The official figures ranged from 20 to 30 percent, but only because nearly 80 percent of the Palestinian Authority’s expenditures went to wages for civil servants and the security forces.\textsuperscript{414} Unemployment was particularly high among young Gazans, who accounted for over half of the total of the unemployed Palestinians on the West Bank and Gaza.\textsuperscript{415} The Gaza’s unemployment problems are certain to remain critical unless there is heavy outside investment and/or Gaza can develop close economic ties to Israel.
Gazan employment in Israel dropped sharply after 1992, because of Israeli actions to halt terrorism. Palestinian employment in Israel was only about one quarter of its peak level in mid-1995, and remittances accounted for only about 20 percent of Palestinian GNP. Changes in Israeli policy in 1998 did allow Palestinians to find new jobs in Israel and contributed to a drop in unemployment. Nevertheless, the GNP per capita remained at only $1,100 – even using the purchasing power parity method.\textsuperscript{416}

Israeli control of access to the Gaza Strip is a powerful economic weapon, and Israel did use this weapon wisely or with proper regard for the human costs of its actions, even before the fighting in September 2000 created new problems. The Gaza is an enclave that requires a high volume of peacetime traffic across its borders for the Gazan economy to function. Some 30,000 Palestinian workers with work permits, and 500 trucks, crossed the border daily before violence began in September 2000.\textsuperscript{417} This regular traffic takes place at known checkpoints, but it is still possible to smuggle in some small arms, explosives, and manportable weapons through other areas.

The Second Intifada has had a devastating impact on the Palestinian economy. Early in the Second Intifada, Israeli prevention of Palestinian movement of goods and people has disrupted trade and agriculture and roughly 120,000 Palestinian employees have been unable to get to work in Israel. By early November 2000, over $3.4 million a day was been lost in remittances from Palestinians working in Israel, while in trade, over $6 million a day has been lost from tax receipts and customs fees. Meanwhile, the World Bank estimated a shortfall in gross national income of $210 million from an annual $6.1 billion.\textsuperscript{418}

By late March 2001, the crisis halved Palestinian incomes and tripled the unemployment rate.\textsuperscript{419} A study conducted by the Palestinian Bureau of Statistics in mid-April 2001 showed that 64 percent of the roughly 3 million Palestinians living in Gaza and the West Bank had fallen into poverty, compared to 23 percent before the outbreak of the violence in September 2000. Poverty was defined by the study as earning a monthly income less than 1,800 NIS ($434) for a household of two adults and four children.\textsuperscript{420} The violence also reduced the income of the Palestinian Authority. According to Assistant Deputy Finance Minister Muhamad Jaradeh, the PA’s income dropped from $90 million a month before the Second Intifada to $20 million a month in early May 2001.\textsuperscript{421}
It is also unclear how much development Israel will permit without a secure peace. It might prevent any resumption of air traffic and plans to create a port and transit route between Gaza and the West Bank would complicate the IDF’s capability to isolate the Gaza Strip in this situation if the peace process is restored. There is also a past history of Israeli attempts to delay clearance procedures, and use searches and other missions to put political pressure on the Palestinian Authority.

Gaza’s future is bleak if the fighting goes on, and uncertain even if it halts. Few are likely to invest in an area with so much instability, there have been major losses of agricultural investment and infrastructure, local savings are exhausted, and Israel is likely to focus more on separation than integration.

At the same time, Israel did begin to use more sophisticated security procedures to minimize some of the problems and delays in the ability of Gazans to work and trade in Israel before the fighting began in September. More advanced technology is also available which could handle greatly increased volumes of traffic with equal or greater speed and equal or greater security. These tools include UAVs, unattended ground sensors, ground-based radars, and night vision and surveillance equipment. No set of tools and procedures can perfectly secure the Gaza in a time of peace in the sense of preventing all arms smuggling and infiltration, but there are a wide range of technical measures that can improve security without extensive physical searches and delays.

**Fighting in the Gaza Strip**

The Palestinian Authority security forces were able to maintain a high degree of control in Gaza as long as they remained under the direction of leaders who supported the peace process, and as long as most Gazans either supported the peace process or at least opposed violence. The events of September 2000 have shown, however, that this situation can change with little warning unless a peace is popular and/or efforts to reduce Palestinian violence address Gaza's human and economic problems.

Hamas and the PIJ can scarcely be counted out simply because there is another ceasefire or some kind of peace agreement, and young Palestinians may take events into their own hands. The fact that Hamas and the PIJ defied the Palestinian Authority’s acceptance of the Tenet
cease-fire, and initially pledged that their activities would continue, is another example of the growing ‘independence’ of these groups from the Palestinian Authority.

There is no way to predict the Gaza’s future even if Arafat remains in power. The replacement or death of Arafat and the inevitable struggle over who would succeed him, may well lead to either a new leadership in Gaza, or to a violent, broad-based popular uprising in which the Palestinian Authority might divide. Containment, however, is not an issue. Almost regardless of what happens within the Gaza Strip, the IDF has the military strength to quickly seal it off from the rest of Israel, and control its coasts and border with Egypt. The IDF can also use technology like UAVs to increase the security of the Israeli settlers within Gaza and the necessary lines of communication; full protection, however, cannot be guaranteed. The IDF has shown it can also improve security by fortifying strong points, clearing fields of fire, and securing key roads. Nevertheless, the IDF is still trying to find an answer to scattered sniper attacks, mortar shell firings, and terrorist attacks, including suicide bombings, which are extremely difficult to defend against when this involves narrow roads and Israeli settlements so close to Palestinian urban areas.

The primary problem that Israel would face in trying to isolate the Gaza after the Second Intifada, is the same problem it faces during the Intifada: the political reaction of the world to any prolonged isolation and containment of the Palestinians in Gaza, all of which compounds their suffering. Israel has been subjected to (and will continue to be subjected to) particular strong international condemnation of any IDF incursion into the Gaza Strip, even in the case of a limited, short-term operation, and even in response to an attack that originated in this very area.

Late at night on April 16, 2001, for example, IDF troops took up positions in a small segment of the Gaza Strip, knocked down houses and military posts, and uprooted trees. The incident was the first Israeli incursion into territory under Palestinian control and sparked international protests, including from the Bush administration. Secretary of State Powell released an unusually harsh condemnation, saying that “the Israeli response was excessive and disproportionate.” Apart from the international condemnation, the incursion had also provoked disputes within the Israeli military and government itself, after the battalion commander of the force, Brig. Gen. Yair Naveh, told reporters during a news conference that the IDF intends to stay in the Gaza Strip “as long as necessary.”

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Even today, the IDF faces growing problems in protecting Israeli settlers in the Gaza Strip. In fact, a number of Israeli military experts feel that securing the remaining Israeli presence in Gaza is extremely costly, and a needless source of provocation. Even in peacetime, the defense of the settlements often required one soldier to be stationed for every two settlers. Furthermore, the IDF’s problems may have just begun. If the Palestinians gradually acquire significant numbers of long-range rocket launchers, mortars, and anti-tank guided weapons, the IDF would have to either occupy most Palestinian or try to enforce deterrence by a constant series of air or artillery strikes or targets in urban areas. Some IDF experts privately believe that Israel should fully withdraw from the Gaza, and others believe that at least a temporary evacuation might be necessary.

In a worst case, there are several possible evacuation routes that the IDF could use for Israeli settlers in Gaza. The most desirable would be to evacuate the settlers directly into Israel by land. However, other routes remain a possibility. One route moves directly along the Israeli-Egyptian border, rather than through the heart of Gaza like more traditional evacuation routes. Another route uses a combination of air and naval forces to rapidly extract the population in the event of a very sudden and dangerous escalation.\(^424\) The settlement of Netzarim, south of Gaza City, was unable to be reached by land for two weeks, and visitors unfortunate enough to be caught in the 400 person settlement were evacuated by helicopter. However, the settlers themselves do not seem to have any intention of leaving. They have erected electrical warning fences, paved patrol roads around the settlement, improved the observation system and fortified its outposts with new roofs to prevent damage from incendiary weapons.\(^425\)

There are also scenarios in which the Palestinians might become more effective in opposing the IDF by conducting concerted operations in Gaza and the West Bank. Yuval Steinitz has raised a scenario in which armed Palestinians, particularly those security forces with military training, infiltrate into Israel to disrupt mobilization against another Arab enemy and to force Israel to disperse its forces. Such infiltration would be easier from the West Bank than Gaza, and the IDF has an excellent record in blocking infiltration by sea, but Palestinian forces in Gaza might be able to penetrate deeply enough to disrupt at least some mobilization activity and/or threatening movement along Israel’s main north-south routes (Highways 1 & 4) during a critical point in Israeli troop movements. The Palestinians in Gaza might also attack the settlements simultaneously to force the IDF to deploy. If such attacks should precede major attacks from
within the West Bank or from other Arab states, they might lead the IDF to over commit forces to Gaza.

It is more likely, however, that Palestinian attacks will continue to have a limited effect of short duration even if they were initially successful. The IDF could probably re-secure settlements relatively quickly with limited amounts of force. As recent IDF operations have shown, they could also probably re-secure many of the Palestinian areas in Gaza in a matter of days if the IDF chose to do so – although isolating these areas might be a more likely IDF tactic. The main problem for the IDF is that it would have to be willing to take casualties and would face political problems in dealing with world public opinion. As Jenin has shown, these casualties could be serious if the IDF had to fight prolonged urban warfare in Gaza in the middle of a hostile population, and/or if the IDF had to confront most of the Palestinian Authority security forces. Any initial IDF victory could prove illusory, however, and lead to Gazans regrouping, reorganizing, and shifting to the kind of low-level war that took place in Lebanon and Ulster.

In spite of its success to date, street by street fighting is the worst case for the IDF, and one it would almost certainly seek to avoid by containing Gaza, rather than occupying it. The Palestinian Authority forces in Gaza are now relatively well armed for urban warfare, and an effort to suppress a sustained, armed popular uprising would be far more difficult than defeating the known elements of the Palestinian Authority security forces. IDF studies and exercises show that any prolonged form of low-level urban warfare in the Gaza could be bloody, difficult, and lead to high casualties, although the Palestinian Authority forces are not well trained to fight this kind of conflict.

The IDF is likely to retain the ability to interdict Gaza even under worst case conditions. However, it might face growing problems in maintaining control over the border areas of Gaza if the Palestinians adapt to hit and run tactics, ambushes, booby traps, and the use of rocket launchers. Fighting the urbanized equivalent of the Hizbollah in a war of attrition confronts the IDF with major problems since its technical advantages would often provide little tactical superiority and the Palestinians could choose the time and place of their attacks. The IDF has also lost much of its former intelligence network and access to informants in Gaza.

On December 13, 2000, a battle took place that illustrates many of the issues involved. It escalated to the point where hundreds of armed combatants engaged one another, from both
sides, with the Israelis supported armor and mechanized infantry. The IDF believed that an earth embankment on the edge of the Khan Yunis refugee camp had been used the previous night to shoot at the community center in the Neve Dekalim settlement. The IDF, therefore, resolved to bulldoze the embankment with armored support. The Palestinians perceived this as an invasion of their sovereign territory and soon hundreds of armed Palestinians were resisting the Israeli advance. After seven hours and the use of tank shell and heavy machine gun fire the IDF forced a Palestinian withdrawal and demolished the embankment. Four Palestinian police were killed and two dozen were wounded in the engagement; there were no Israeli casualties.\footnote{426}

Despite its seeming success of its current operations, cost and manpower would also be a problem for Israel. If Israel had to defend the settlements in Gaza for weeks or months under such low-intensity warfare conditions, the IDF would have to expand its presence to create a series of complex security zones. At the same time it would have to enforce a wide range of security measures to defeat violent elements within the Palestinian population in Gaza while pacifying the rest. It would probably also have to make further improvements to the security of key lines of communication, and almost completely substitute other workers for the Palestinians. The other side of this issue is Israel’s control over electricity and water and ability to seal off the Gazan economy.

Intelligence would be a critical issue. In the first three months of the Second Intifada, Israel stepped up its intelligence war against the Palestinians by giving funding priority to a Field Intelligence Corps established in early 2000. According to some IDF commanders, the new corps produced “impressive results” and was “vital in identifying targets for Israeli troops as well as providing alerts of Palestinian attacks.” The corps uses UAVs, radar, reconnaissance outposts and helicopters to acquire information, which is then fed to the IDF’s Ground Forces Command and subsequently to commanders in the field.\footnote{427}

Nevertheless, intelligence will remain a problem for Israel. The IDF and the Israeli General Security Services (GSS), or Shin Bet, have lost a considerable amount of their intelligence on Palestinian activities in Gaza, and the Palestinian towns and cities in Gaza could become places of refuge.\footnote{428} Once again, UAVs sensors, radars and other devices can help. They are not, however, a substitute for human intelligence. They also cannot eliminate the risk of civilian casualties and collateral damage. Targets do not remain fixed in war. Threats change location, and so do innocent civilians. As a result, strikes and raids can fail and/or have high costs in terms of media coverage and world opinion, while even successes can breed more
resentment and counter-violence than they are worth. Precision weapons do not mean precision tactics or precision consequences.

The security along the Gazan border with Egypt has also deteriorated since the start of the Second Intifada, and there are reports of tunnels and arms smuggling. In spite of a major Jordanian effort to halt such activity, there is still a flow of smuggled arms from Iraq through Jordan to both Gaza and the West Bank. The opening of both an airport and seaport in Gaza has created further opportunities for smuggling, and the creation of safe passage routes between Gaza and the West Bank could make this situation worse in the future.

As has been mentioned earlier, arms smuggling in Gaza has already become a serious problem for Israel. The Israeli Navy managed to intercept a number of weapon shipments to Gaza. On May 7, 2001, the Israeli Navy intercepted a fishing boat off the coast of Haifa dispatched by Ahmed Jibril’s PFLP that contained missiles, mortars, grenades, and katyusha rockets. Israeli security officials believed that the boat had been on its fourth such mission before it was intercepted. Following the Israeli interception of that boat, Ahmed Jibril stated that “it wasn’t the first time that we sent arms and it won’t be the last time. We will send arms to anyone who takes part in the campaign (against Israel) no matter who it is.”

Much will depend on just how sophisticated the flow of arms into Gaza becomes. Israeli reports may be exaggerated, but there do seem to be substantial numbers of unauthorized arms in Gaza, and a considerable amount of military explosives. Most sources agree that the Palestinian Authority forces are amassing stocks of light anti-armour weapons, rocket-propelled grenades, anti-tank missiles, and SAM-7 anti-aircraft missiles -- all of which are forbidden under the Oslo Accords. The Palestinian Authority now seems to have an ability to use anti-tank weapons. Moreover, the Fatah and Tanzim militia forces in Gaza, and Hamas and PIJ cadres, can be given large numbers of small arms, automatic weapons, and explosives and the Tanzim are reported to already have thousands of small arms. Furthermore the Tanzim and Fatah forces have demonstrated a willingness to engage IDF forces with small arms fire and have made use of anti-tank weapons.

Further, Israel cannot plan in the mid to long-term to deal with Palestinian Authority forces and other Palestinian elements in Gaza as if they will remain under the control of a popular secular leader like Arafat. The IDF must now plan for a future where Arafat and/or pro-peace secular leaders in the Palestinian Authority may lose control of Gaza or the Palestinian
Authority’s security forces. The armed clashes between the IDF and Palestinian Authority security forces that took place in 1996 and since the beginning of the Second Intifada show that Israelis must also plan for a future where large elements of currently pro-PLO/pro-Palestinian Authority Gazans could turn firmly against the peace process and/or Israel. Israeli contingency plans must also pay closer attention to the growing link between Palestinian rejectionist groups with each other, as well as between them and groups outside the Palestinian Authority, including Hizballah, the PFLP, and the DFLP.

In short, it is not clear that either side can achieve a lasting strategic victory through asymmetric warfare in the Gaza, or even that either would be notably wiser and more able to achieve a secure peace after prolonged fighting. At best, there would be a high price tag in memories, suffering, distrust, and blood. At worst, both sides could become locked into endemic violence or some kind of ceasefire arrangement that would do nothing to address Gaza’s need for development and acceptable living standards.

As is the case with fighting on the West Bank, the ultimate irony surrounding fighting between the IDF and Palestinians in Gaza is that both sides may end up almost exactly where they began in September 2000, but with even more problems in reaching a peace. One thing is certain. They will eventually have to deal with virtually the same issues affecting Gaza that they were negotiating at Camp David. This means the following issues will still be of major concern to both parties with or without a Second Intifada:

- Future security arrangements within Gaza and between the Palestinian Authority in Gaza and Israel.
- Israel’s ability to secure its access to Gaza and to control Palestinian movement in and out of it.
- Arms smuggling and infiltration into Gaza.
- The future of around 6,000 Israeli settlers in 24 different settlements.
- Coping with Palestinian population growth.
- Palestinians support of religious extremist groups.
- Poor economic conditions and high unemployment for Palestinians.
- Gaza’s economic dependence on Israel.
Map 7.1

The Gaza
### Table 7.2

CIA Profile of Gaza and West Bank - Part One

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<th>West Bank</th>
<th>Israel</th>
<th>Jordan</th>
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<td>(% 15-64 years)</td>
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<td>(% 65+ years)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Birth Rate (per 1,000)</td>
<td>43.14</td>
<td>36.73</td>
<td>19.32</td>
<td>26.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fertility Rate (Per Woman)</td>
<td>6.55</td>
<td>5.02</td>
<td>2.60</td>
<td>3.44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Net Migration Rate (per 1,000)</td>
<td>0.83</td>
<td>1.51</td>
<td>3.63</td>
<td>7.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Death Rate (per 1,000)</td>
<td>4.31</td>
<td>4.49</td>
<td>6.22</td>
<td>2.63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infant Mortality (per 1,000)</td>
<td>25.97</td>
<td>22.33</td>
<td>7.90</td>
<td>21.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Life Expectancy (yrs.)</td>
<td>70.82</td>
<td>72.08</td>
<td>78.57</td>
<td>77.36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic Divisions</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arab</td>
<td>99.4</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>19.9</td>
<td>98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armenian</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Circassian</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jew</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>80.1</td>
<td>-</td>
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<tr>
<td>Religion</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Christian</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jew</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>80.1</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslim</td>
<td>98.7</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>14.6</td>
<td>96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3.2</td>
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</table>

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Table 7.2

CIA Profile of Gaza and West Bank - Part Two

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Gaza</th>
<th>West Bank</th>
<th>Israel</th>
<th>Jordan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Literacy</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>86.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labor Force</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2,300,000</td>
<td>1,150,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction (%)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>10.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture (%)</td>
<td>13.0</td>
<td>13.0</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>7.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industry (%)</td>
<td>21.0</td>
<td>13.0</td>
<td>20.2</td>
<td>11.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commerce (%)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>12.0</td>
<td>25.9</td>
<td>10.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Services (%)</td>
<td>66.0</td>
<td>54.0</td>
<td>13.1</td>
<td>52.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Services (%)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>31.2</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP (PPE in $billion)</td>
<td>1.17</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>105.4</td>
<td>16.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Real Growth Rate</td>
<td>4.62</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP Per Capita ($US)</td>
<td>1,060</td>
<td>2,050</td>
<td>18,300</td>
<td>3,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inflation Rate (%)</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment Rate (%)</td>
<td>26.8</td>
<td>17.3</td>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>20-30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Budget (SB)</td>
<td>(1.6-----------------1.6)</td>
<td>40.0</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Revenues</td>
<td>(1.73------------------1.73)</td>
<td>42.4</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expenditures</td>
<td>(1.6-----------------1.6)</td>
<td>40.0</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade ($M)</td>
<td>(62-------------------6821)</td>
<td>23,500</td>
<td>1,800</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exports</td>
<td>(2,500---------2,500)</td>
<td>30,600</td>
<td>3,3900</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Imports</td>
<td>(2,500---------2,500)</td>
<td>30,600</td>
<td>3,3900</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>External Debt ($M)</td>
<td>(108---------------108)</td>
<td>18,700</td>
<td>8,400</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic Aid ($M)</td>
<td>(800---------------800)</td>
<td>1,100+</td>
<td>850</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transportation</td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Railroads (km)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>610</td>
<td>677</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roads (km)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>4,500</td>
<td>15,464</td>
<td>8,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paved (km)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2,700</td>
<td>15,464</td>
<td>8,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>Airports</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Runways 1,500M+</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Runways 3,000M+</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Telephones</td>
<td>95,229----------------95,279</td>
<td>2,800,000</td>
<td>402,600</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Cellular</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2,500,000</td>
<td>75,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>Televisions</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1,690,000</td>
<td>500,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stations</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Radios</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3,070,000</td>
<td>1,660,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>AM Stations</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FM Stations</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Short-wave</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* In addition, there are 171,000 Jewish settlers in the West Bank and 172,000 in East Jerusalem, and 6,500 in Gaza.

Source: Adapted from CIA Internet database as of October, 2000 by Anthony H. Cordesman

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The Course of the Conflict in the West Bank

The West Bank presents some of the same problems as Gaza but the West Bank has far more strategic importance to Israel. It also involves many differences in terms of military challenges. It consists of scattered urban areas rather than one large entity, has borders that make it more open to infiltration, mixes Arab and Jew far more closely and in many areas, is far harder to contain, and has settlements that are far more valuable and important to Israel.

The West Bank is normally defined to include the West Bank, Latrun Salient, and the northwest quarter of the Dead Sea, but to exclude Mt. Scopus; East Jerusalem and Jerusalem. It is slightly smaller than Delaware. It has 5,860 square kilometers, and 5,640 square kilometers of land area. It has 307 kilometers of boundaries with Israel and a 97-kilometer border with Jordan. This compares with an area of 20,700 square kilometers for all of Israel within its 1967 borders. Its highlands are a main recharge area for Israel's coastal aquifers.

The West Bank is also a significant military barrier to any attack on Israel from the East. Its north-south ridge may only reach heights of about 3,000 feet, but the Jordan River and Dead Sea descend 1,200 feet below sea level -- resulting in an incline of 4,700 feet over a space of 15 miles. There are only five major east-west routes connecting the Mediterranean to Jordan, which makes any route of armored advance across the West Bank predictable and easier to target.

The Second Intifada has also shown that a struggle for the West Bank, unlike a struggle for Gaza, cannot be based on a war of containment. The problem of maintaining security and reaching a secure peace for both sides is complicated by a greater intermingling of the two populations, the existence of a significant population of Israeli-Arabs, settlements in the West (some by Israeli extremists), the problem of Jerusalem, population growth issues, problems in dividing key resources like water, problems in dealing with Israeli and Palestinian immigration. There are far greater difficulties in implementing the final settlement issues, and in deciding how much territory will be traded for peace (an issue that includes Jerusalem).

There are different ways to count the number of Palestinians and Israelis involved. The CIA estimates that the total Palestinian population in the West Bank was around 2,020,298 in mid-2000. There were 171,000 Jewish settlers in 231 settlements and land use sites in the West Bank, and another 172,000 Jewish settlers in 29 areas in East Jerusalem. Table 7.3 shows the growth in Israeli settlement in Gaza and the West Bank during the period from 1990-2000. As is the
case in Gaza, the Palestinian population has an extremely high birth rate. It was 3.38% in 2000, and 45% of the total Palestinian population was 14 years of age or younger.

The religious and ethnic composition of the West Bank is significantly more complex than that of Gaza. The population is 83 percent Palestinian Arab and 17 percent Jewish, and the religious distribution is 75 percent Muslim (predominantly Sunni), 17 percent Jewish, and 8 percent Christian and other. There is a significant shift within the Palestinian population towards the Muslim faith because of a lower Christian birth rate and high rates of emigration.\(^{435}\) There are another 1,051,641 Palestinians and other Arabs within Israel’s 1967 boundaries -- about 18-20 percent of the total population. This population growth, however, has blurred the geographic separation of Israelis and Palestinians in many areas of the West Bank, the greater Jerusalem area, and in Israel proper.

**The West Bank Version of the Economic and Demographic Time Bomb**

Once again, economic and demographic conditions combine to create a time bomb in the Palestinian population. The GDP of the West Bank was only $3.3 billion at the start of the Second Intifada, even in purchasing power parity terms, and this compared with $14.5 billion for Israel. The per capita income was about twice that of Gaza, at $2,050. However, this compares with $18,300 for Israel. The total unemployment rate in the West Bank and Gaza was at least 15 percent before the fighting, but this figure is almost totally misleading. Much of the employment was very sporadic and large numbers of Palestinian youths were not counted in these figures even though they sought jobs. The true figure for direct and disguised unemployment was at least 25 percent and probably exceeded 30 percent.\(^{436}\) At the same time, Palestinian labor was highly dependent on Israel: Some 120,000 Palestinians worked in Israel or Israeli-occupied areas before the fighting began in September 2000 – roughly 60,000 had work permits and 60,000 worked there illegally.\(^{437}\)

As in Gaza, most water and electricity services are under Israeli control, and electricity is imported from Israel. The East Jerusalem Electric Company buys and distributes electricity to Palestinians in East Jerusalem and its concession in the West Bank. The Israel Electric Company directly supplies electricity to most Jewish residents and military facilities. Some Palestinian municipalities, such as Nablus and Jenin, do generate their own electricity from small power

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plants, and most cities – like Ramallah – have some generators. Israel has the power to shut off most power and water, however, as well as cut most communications. The Israeli company BEZEK and the Palestinian company PALTEL are responsible for communication services in the West Bank. There are a total of a little over 100,000 telephone landlines in the area, although there are many cellular phones.\textsuperscript{438} Israel has repeatedly used this control as economic leverage during the Second Intifada.

Israeli settlements are a major source of tension, and the steady growth of both the Palestinian and Israeli population has pushed both peoples closer together. Tables 7.3 and 7.4 show the increase in settlements and settlers after the signing of the Declaration of Principles. Israeli settlements have always been a contentious issue. Even though the Oslo accords bar Israel and the Palestinians from taking unilateral action that would alter the status quo, Israel has continued to expand its settlements on the West Bank and to settle new areas. Settlement growth has accelerated since 1991, when the peace process began.\textsuperscript{439}

Between the signing of the Oslo Accords and the beginning of the Second Intifada, the number of settler houses and apartments increased by 52 percent. As a result, the settler population in the West Bank and Gaza grew from 115,000 in 1993 to about 203,000 in 2001—figures that do not include the 180,000 settlers who live in East Jerusalem.\textsuperscript{440} There were roughly 146 Israeli settlements. In contrast, the Gaza Strip contained approximately 6,500 Israeli settlers living in 16 settlements, while the West Bank contained approximately 196,500 Israeli settlers living in about 130 settlements.\textsuperscript{441}

According to Peace Now, there was a 52.49 percent growth in housing in settlements between September 1993 and July 2000, and construction was begun on an additional 17,190 units. There was also an approximately 72 percent growth in the settler population, reflecting an annual growth rate of around 8 percent over the last ten years, compared to an annual average growth rate of about 3 percent of the Jewish Israeli population in Israel proper. Between 1993 and 1999, settlers established 42 ‘unofficial’ settlements, only four of which were subsequently dismantled. Since the
outbreak of the Second Intifada until the end of 2000, work was begun on 954 new publicly-funded housing units in settlements.\(^{442}\)

More than a dozen new settlements have been established since the 1998 Wye Accords, although former Prime Minister Netanyahu supposedly promised Clinton that he would halt expansion.\(^{443}\)

Prime Minister Barak pledged to curtail settlement building, but he did not promise to completely halt activity, and his efforts were far more symbolic than real.\(^{444}\) In July 1999, Barak suspended financing for the construction of new factories in the West Bank and Gaza.\(^{445}\) On the other hand, he insisted that most, but not all, existing settlements would remain under Israeli sovereignty after final status negotiations.\(^{446}\) As a result, the number of settlers during Barak’s tenure (June 1999 – December 2000) increased by 22,419. Between June 1999 and September 2000, the Barak government issued tenders for the construction of 3,499 units. Between January and October 2000, the Ministry of Housing and Construction issued building permits for 1,184 units, and public construction in the West Bank and Gaza throughout 2000 was at 1,943 units.\(^{447}\) The end result is steady Israeli demographic pressure that matches Palestinian pressure. It has both contributed to the risk of a Second Intifada, and has made any military, political, and economic separation of the two peoples more difficult. At the same time, it has created a growing security incentive for Israel to use forced separation in the event of a conflict.

In his inauguration speech as Israel’s prime minister, Ariel Sharon stated that although his positions regarding the importance of the Golan Heights, the Jordan Valley and other security zones, in which Jewish settlements were established during the various Israeli governments were well known, he was also aware that “in the new government there are other viewpoints, and the guidelines of the government state that during the term of this government no new settlements will be established.”\(^{448}\) Still, construction has scarcely come to a halt under Israel’s eleventh prime minister. According to Peace Now, 6,000 housing units are being built in the West Bank and Gaza. In March 2001, the Jerusalem municipality approved the construction of 2,832 additional new houses at Har Homa.\(^{449}\)
In May 2001, the Mitchell Commission report urged a complete cease-fire to be followed by a complete freeze on continued Israeli settlement building, including construction in existing settlements. Sharon responded by saying that a way could be found to accommodate the ‘ongoing needs’ of the settlements while allaying Palestinian fears that continued construction could shut the door on negotiation options. According to Sharon, no new land needed to be requisitioned for further home-building, but should the government decide that bypass roads needed to be built for security reasons, then land would be taken.\footnote{450}

**Major Security Issues on the West Bank**

Unlike Gaza, any future fighting cannot be based simply on sealing off the West Bank, and few in Israel are unprepared to accept anything like a total withdrawal from the area. There are far larger and more important Jewish settlements and Israel will seek to maintain control of all of greater Jerusalem and significant territory across the 1967 lines. Israel would lose much of its present strategic depth if it returned all of the Occupied Territories (It would then be only 14 kilometers wide from West to East in its narrowest area near Tel Aviv.)

This helps explain why the fighting has led Israel to attempt a form of forced separation over much of the West Bank. Israel was reported to be studying such a separation plan as early as October 2000 if the fighting continued to escalate. According to a report in the *New York Times*, former Prime Minister Barak directed Ephraim Sneh, then the Israeli deputy defense minister, to develop contingency plans to deal with a total breakdown of the peace effort. These plans could be executed in the event of either a prolonged low-intensity war over months or years, or in reaction to a unilateral Palestinian declaration of statehood under war or near-war conditions.\footnote{451}

Plans for a full-scale ‘unilateral separation’ are still on the Israeli table. Israel has begun to “deport” some Palestinian activists to Gaza, and a few Israelis talk of major relocations and even pressuring large numbers of Palestinians to go to Jordan. Nevertheless, Prime Minister Ariel Sharon stated repeatedly that he does not find such plans to be desirable. Answering to a question on unilateral separation posed by a Washington Post columnist, Sharon said that “one should look at realistic plans. Until 1967, the length of the border of Judea and Samaria was 309
kilometers, and we never managed to control it. If we were to make the separation Barak mentioned, the length of the border would be over 700 kilometers. Who could patrol this border? It is not realistic. There should be an interim agreement or a situation of non-belligerency. I know the Palestinians are suffering from lack of contiguity [between the areas under the Palestinian Authority's control]. They don't want Israeli check points.\textsuperscript{452}

The idea of a more limited unilateral separation does get support from large parts the Jewish population of Israel. A Peace Index Survey conducted on May 29 and 30, 2001 showed that some 60 percent of Israeli Jews support unilateral separation, with another 34 percent of respondents opposing, and 6 percent having no opinion on the issue. Among pro-Sharon voters, 53 percent supported a unilateral separation that would include a withdrawal from certain areas, while 42 percent of these voters are opposed. In contrast, slightly more than 76 percent of Barak's supporters back such a solution and 17 percent oppose it.\textsuperscript{453}

While such a separation plan would also affect Gaza, what the Israelis call "unilateral separation" primarily affects the West Bank. It could mean halting all Palestinian labor movement, while relocating some exposed settlements and making others Israeli territory. A combination of security and economic measures would be coupled to Israeli efforts to create its own "borders." This would initially mean an extended close of the "border" areas to seal off Palestinian areas, the IDF would create or strengthen checkpoints on the border area and severely limit any movement of goods and labor across the borders.\textsuperscript{454}

It is hard to judge how serious Israel really is about reacting to a unilateral Palestinian declaration of statehood, but some sources indicate that this could lead Israel to formally annex the large blocks of settlements and protect them with troops, check points, border fences, sensors, mines, and surveillance systems like UAVs and ground-based sensors. Such a move might also lead to Israel severely curtailing delivery of electric power and water, and using separation as a form of economic warfare to counter the Intifada.

According to the \textit{New York Times} report, then-Prime Minister Barak directed Avi Ben-Bassat, staff director for the Finance Ministry, to assemble an "inter-ministerial task force and
assess the feasibility and cost of a "separation" strategy.” This task force is said to have concluded that Israel could sharply reduce the need for Palestinian laborers in agriculture and construction, and that this would produce higher base wages and lower unemployment for unskilled Israeli workers. 455

Such a plan presents major problems at present because there are large Israeli settlements and land holdings in areas that are distant from Israel’s 1967 boundaries, and Israelis and Palestinians intermingle or live in close proximity in many areas, particularly in and around Jerusalem. It is important to note, however, that Israel has given at least some contingency study to even more Draconian plans involving forced Palestinian deportations out of East Jerusalem, greater Jerusalem, Bethlehem, and Nablus areas, and away from the 1967 border areas and Jewish settlements, and pushing the Palestinian population towards the West Bank.

The most serious longer-term problem for both Israel and the Palestinians is that any Israeli separation effort almost certainly means that a Second Intifada would continue indefinitely, and that Israel would face massive hostility from much of the world. At the same time, any alternative means both sides must ultimately deal with the same basic West Bank security issues they faced before violence broke out in September 2000. Any future agreement must ultimately deal with Palestinian sovereignty or non-sovereignty, demographics, water rights, future boundaries, security measures, the Israeli settlement and Palestinian refugee problem, creating new security arrangements, and the political, physical, and religious aspects of Jerusalem and the other holy areas.

**Fighting on the West Bank**

It was clear long before the fall of 2000 that the security of the West Bank hinged on a delicate and unstable relationship between the Palestinian Authority and the Israeli government. Any number of changes in the political and economic structure could potentially upset the balance and provoke conflict. The Palestinian urban areas on the West Bank could quickly become a sanctuary for extremist military groups operating within Palestinian areas.
The IDF planned for this possibility from the start of the Oslo accords. It knew it would retain the military strength to quickly seal off urban areas on the West Bank in a conflict and to secure key routes and junctions in all of the greater Jerusalem area. It also planned to secure the Israeli settlements outside the greater Jerusalem area. As was the case with Gaza, a number of IDF experts privately felt that securing small, exposed settlements would not be worth the effort because it would be too costly and dangerous. They felt that it would be a needless source of provocation, and would present growing problems if the Palestinian Authority acquires significant numbers of long-range rocket launchers and anti-tank guided weapons. Many privately believed that Israel should fully withdraw from such settlements and a number of Israeli experts believed that the Israeli presence in Hebron is a particularly serious problem. Nevertheless, Israeli politics have so far forced the IDF to plan to secure the entire West Bank.

**Israeli Tactics in a West Bank Conflict**

Since the beginning of the Second Intifada, the IDF has shown its very real military options and it is clear it prepared to exercise them long before the fighting began. The IDF spokesman provided some of the possible details of such Israeli contingency plans to reoccupy large parts of the West Bank in a statement June 1997. Many of these details tracked closely with the plans tested in “Operation Field of Thorns,” a plan the IDF spokesman had made public in September 1996, and Israel began to apply many of these measures in September 2000. They include:

- Mobilization and deployment of armored and other land forces in the face of a massive Palestinian rising.
- Massive reinforcement of IDF troops at points of friction.
- Use of armor and artillery to isolate major Palestinian population areas, and to seal off Palestinian areas, including many areas of Zone A.
- Use of other forces to secure settlements, key roads, and terrain points.
- Use of helicopter gunships and snipers to provide mobility and suppressive fire.
- Use of extensive small arms, artillery, and tank fire to suppress sniping, rock throwing and demonstrations.
- Bombing, artillery strikes, and helicopter and combat aircraft strikes on high value Palestinian targets and infrastructure, to punish Palestinian elements for attacks.
• Search and seizure interventions and raids into Palestinian areas in the Gaza and West Bank to break up organized resistance, capture, or kill key leaders.

• Penetrations into Palestinian-controlled territory to destroy buildings and houses from which attacks have originated or to prevent future attacks, and to uproot trees from which mortar attacks have originated.

• Selective assassinations of suspected leaders and instigators of conflict, including, through stand-off tactics such as drones and remote-controlled explosive devices.

• Use of military forces trained in urban warfare to penetrate into cities if necessary – most probably in cases where there were Jewish enclaves like Hebron.

• Arrest PA officials and imposition of a new military administration.

• Isolation of key Palestinian cities and towns and use of surrounding IDF troops to turn them into military cantonments.

• Introduction of a simultaneous economic blockade with selective cuts offs of financial transactions, labor movements, and food/fuel shipments.

• Selective destruction of high value Palestinian facilities and clearly of strong points and fields of fire near Palestinian urban areas.

• Use of Israeli control of water, power, communications, and road access to limit the size and endurance of Palestinian action.

• Regulation and control of media access and conduct a major information campaign to influence local and world opinion.

• Carrying out “temporary” withdrawal of Israeli settlers from exposed and strategically low value isolated settlements like Hebron.

• Creation of fences, security zones, bypasses, and other measures to separate Israelis and Palestinians.

• Forced evacuations of Palestinian from “sensitive areas.”

Israeli exercises and studies after the Oslo accords did conclude that Israel might suffer hundreds of casualties in using some of these tactics to deal with any prolonged Palestinian and Israeli Arab uprising, but that the Palestinians would suffer thousands. They also concluded, after clashes with the Palestinians in 1996, that new security measures were needed to be taken to protect lines of communication and Israeli settlements. The IDF requested $90 million in additional funds for the 1997 budget to improve defenses around West Bank settlements. The Israeli treasury granted only $19 million but roughly $53 million had been granted earlier in 1994-1995 and many of these measures were implemented.
Yet, these costs and those Israel has undertaken since September 2000 should not be exaggerated. Israel began to develop many of the capabilities it concluded it needed long before the Oslo Accords. After the Six Day War in 1967, Israel also built an extensive road network connecting the coastal plains to the strategic Jordan Valley, including many high-speed roads that bypass Palestinian towns and cities. However, roads are still vulnerable to attack. Many of these network roads link the Palestinian townships of Jenin, Nablus, Ramallah, Bethlehem and Hebron, which now contain most of the Palestinian Arab population. Hebron became a particularly difficult problem since roughly 500 hard-line Israelis insisted they had a religious right to live in a city of some 120,000 Palestinians. However, the IDF still controls the interconnecting territories and could cut the vital lifelines to these cities in the event of conflict. 457

As has been touched upon earlier, Israel has established and is expanding an extensive net of new security roads that bypass Arab cities, to help secure the settlements, and allow the IDF to redeploy into the West Bank and reinforce its positions at the Jordan River. At least 12 new bypass roads were constructed under the Wye Accords, at a cost of $70 million.458 This road net protects many settlements on the West Bank area. Hebron is the exception, not the rule. Hebron was a city where 415-450 Israelis—including a number of radical Jewish militants—lives in an overwhelmingly Palestinian city of 120,000, with a large number of Islamic fundamentalists.459

As a result, since the Second Intifada began, the IDF has also shown it can establish a dominating military presence in all the Palestinian areas in the West Bank within 48-96 hours if it is willing to pay the cost in casualties and hostile media coverage and public opinion. It also has shown it can avoid serious casualties even if it has to establish strong points inside hostile Palestinian towns and cities and if the IDF has to confront the Palestinian Authority security forces in urban wildfires.
The Palestinian Response

Israel’s main problem, however, is not dealing with short-term threats. Once the Israelis “win” an initial “victory” in containing the West Bank, the real danger for the IDF lies in becoming involved in a prolonged, ongoing low-level war. This type of more prolonged war allows the Palestinians to organize and to use ambushes, sniper fire, mortar and rocket attacks, terrorism, and urban clashes to exploit the vulnerabilities of the IDF, whose technical advantages would be much less of a tactical advantage in an urbanized guerilla war.

The Palestinians cannot really plan for armed struggle or warfare in the West Bank in the conventional sense of military planning. They must improvise and evolve, and the essence of asymmetric warfare is to find Israeli political, military, and economic vulnerabilities in the face of superior military force and exploit them as effectively as possible.

The quality and nature of political leadership and control over the fighting on the Palestinian side will be a major variable in determining how well the Palestinians can do this. Much will depend on whether the Palestinians in the West Bank remain under the control of a popular secular leader like Arafat or devolve into disparate elements that may be more innovative and harder to control. The Palestinian militias in the West Bank and Gaza have exhibited a considerable degree of independence early in the fighting since September 2000 and have increased their independence as the conflict evolved in 2001. Much of the actual struggle was managed by two emergency committees – one in each area – that included senior members of Fatah, but also included some radical elements and younger and more aggressive Palestinian leaders like Marwan Barghouti, who commands the Tanzim forces in the West Bank.  

It is easy for Israel to attack Arafat and call for Palestinian reform, but the situation on the West Bank could become much worse for Israel if the Palestinian Authority security forces come under radical religious leaders violently hostile to Israel, divided so that major elements were violent and hostile, and broke down into large-scale armed violence with no central direction.

As Table One has shown, the fighting has already escalated to the point where future levels of conflict are unpredictable. The resulting level of conflict is now a function of (a) the level of arms and military supplies available to Palestinian forces, (b) the unity within the Palestinian side, (c) which key elements of the PLO and security forces of the Palestinian Authority joined the conflict, (d) the amount of territory already ceded to Palestinian control in
the peace process, (e) the level of violence Israel was willing to use in suppressing Palestinian attacks, and (f) real or perceived support—or lack thereof—from outside countries, especially in the Arab world.

In the West Bank, the Second Intifada has reached the point where the Palestinian “armed struggle” is now a serious low-intensity war in which Israel is forced to make extensive use of the IDF and use methods like reoccupation, expulsion, and/or creating security zones that would isolate Israelis from the Arabs, and some fighting has led to bloody urban warfare. Much depends on just how much more light weaponry the Palestinians will be able to obtain, and the amount of anti-tank weapons, light artillery, and light anti-aircraft weapons they can obtain. Even a relatively limited number of major weapons could allow a Palestinian force to make the IDF fight some initial battles on a “house by house” basis.

**Fighting in Jerusalem and Urban Areas**

Another key “wild card” in this asymmetrical warfare will be the level of the problems the IDF actually encounters in securing greater Jerusalem and the other heavily populated areas where Israelis and Palestinians either intermingle or live in such close proximity that it would be difficult to separate them or isolate the Palestinians. Israel’s use of helicopters, precision-guided missiles and bombs, and precisely directed radars – coupled to its use of UAVs –gives it the ability to acquire and strike targets in any purely Palestinian area with negligible Israeli casualties and to do so in both day and night. Greater Jerusalem, however, has an intermingled population and any use of major weapons has special religious and political sensitivities.

Securing the area and East Jerusalem could force Israel to (a) rely on a combination of police and paramilitary operations on a community-by-community -- and sometimes house-by-house basis, (b) rely on curfews and strict limitations on local movement, (c) return to demolitions and limited expulsions, (d) suppress all signs of violence or protest with force, often deadly force, (e) hunt down and seize or kill suspected enemies, and/or (f) expel large blocs of Palestinians from such areas. Such tactics would benefit the Palestinian side in terms of world political reactions, although not necessarily in terms of any practical advantages on the ground. Furthermore, any prolonged low-intensity conflict involving Jerusalem will raise serious questions about the future of the Palestinians living in the old city and suburbs. If a conservative, hard-line party controls the Israeli government, there is also a danger that the Israeli government will simply continue to escalate, and that the Second Intifada will take place under conditions
where both sides turn firmly from a peace process to a war process without moving towards any resolution beyond sporadic ceasefires.

Similar problems have already been caused by fighting outside the greater Jerusalem area. Bethlehem, Ramallah, Hebron, Nablus, Jericho, and Jenin are already examples of how the Palestinians can create a multi-front approach to an uprising on the West Bank, and they are all possible Palestinian centers for urban warfare. The Tul Karm and Kalkilya areas could present serious problems in terms of possible firebases for rocket attacks on Israel. Depending on the final settlement, even Tel Aviv could come within range of artillery rockets. (It is only about 22 kilometers from the 1967 boundary at its narrowest part). Fighting an urban war of attrition in such areas tends to favor the Palestinians, for the same reasons discussed earlier in analyzing a similar war in the Gaza Strip.

Systematic armed Palestinian infiltration of Israel proper from the West Bank has also presented a problem, and had some support from Israeli Arabs, and in cooperation with some other Arab states like Syria. As is the case with Gaza, it seems unlikely that this infiltration could do more than disrupt limited aspects of the IDF’s activities or conduct occasional attacks on civilians, but more serious fighting in Israel proper is possible. Any coordinated series of Palestinian attacks could also make it more difficult for the IDF to concentrate its forces, and one logical Palestinian tactic might be to try to pin down as much of the IDF as possible by launching sporadic, low level attacks on a wide range of Israeli settlements.

The extent of the day-to-day flow of unauthorized arms to the West Bank has also become a factor. It is unclear how large and sophisticated this flow has been, but arms have been smuggled into the West Bank across Jordan from Iraq, and there are certainly far more arms in both the West Bank and Gaza than are publicly reported. The Tanzim seems to have thousands of unauthorized small arms in reserve.

This flow began long before September 2000. A Palestinian human rights group (LAW) charged that a flood of unlicensed weapons had led to the death of 12 people in the areas of the West Bank under Palestinian control in 1999. The same group also charged that the use of unlicensed weapons by Palestinian security forces without the authority to use them or inadequately trained to use them was “alarmingly frequent.” It complained that rivalries between the nine Palestinian security agencies led to shootings in densely populated areas, militia-style violence, armed family feuds, and using guns to settle scores. Once such incident included
Osama al-Keilani, the Attorney General in Jenin. The group was protesting. This was intra Palestinian violence, but its protest reflected the fact that arms had become far more common and the growing risk they might be used against Israel.461

Other Tactics and Methods of Conflict in Gaza and the West Bank

Many of the other aspects of the Second Intifada involve changes in tactics and methods of conflict that do not apply to a given region in the conflict, and some apply to Israel proper. Most are familiar from other low intensity and asymmetric wars, but most have been employed in new or different ways.

Roadside Attacks and Retaliation

At the start of the crisis, Palestinian tactics centered on limited violence, largely consisting of the use of rock throwing teenage boys encouraged to risk their lives by their peers, the Palestinian media and a deep desire to assist in the liberation of Palestine. These groups seem to primarily target military outposts and settlers as they travel. This created tense situations in which the probability for errors in judgment and misassessment of threats was very high for both sides. The stone throwers were also sometimes accompanied by armed Fatah activists who increased the underlying tension and risk in already volatile and potentially tragic situations and made the IDF more likely to use lethal ammunition. On the one hand, this created a political and media environment that influenced international public opinion through the martyrdom of Palestinian young men that served the interests of Palestinian Authority. On the other hand, it pushed both sides toward higher levels of violence.

The end result was that the traditional rock throwing clashes began to create a low intensity conflict. Palestinian forces began to make an effort to deny the use of roads to the settler community and had some successes. As previously mentioned, the Gaza settlement of Netzarim was denied vehicular access for two weeks in October of 2000. Furthermore, the use of roadside bombs and ambushes has increased fears among the settlers that the army could not fully ensure their safety when they travel. For example, on November 13, 2000 in two separate incidents unarmed Israeli female civilians were shot while driving. On November 20, a roadside bomb killed two adults and wounded seven children, dismembering some, on their way to
school. On December 10, Palestinian gunmen ambushed an important rabbi—he, however, escaped unharmed. These incidents demonstrate that the IDF cannot control all of the access routes all of the time, and serve to highlight the potential vulnerability of the Israeli settlers, especially those in more isolated settlements.

**Attacks on Settlements and the IDF Response**

The Palestinians also began to conduct low-level attacks on settlements themselves, primarily at night. According to IDF officials, there had been 600 such incidents by December 5, 2000. These attacks did not pose any significant threat of actually overrunning Israeli settlements and did not inflict as many casualties on the settlers or the IDF as did attacks on the access routes. The Palestinian attacks did, however, become better coordinated. The IDF expressed its concern over a “very well coordinated and orchestrated attack” on December 4, 2000 against Rachel’s Tomb that was the “most dangerous” event thus far in the conflict. The attack involved a coordinated attack from three directions on the settlement from 1 a.m. to 4 a.m., and was on such a scale that the Israeli forces called in air support. Palestinians disputed the claim that any such attack was made, and instead claimed that the gunfire was from an Israeli offensive against Palestinians in Bethlehem.

One area particularly affected by such low-level attacks was the Gilo neighborhood on the southern edge of Jerusalem. Beginning in early October, Palestinian gunmen regularly fired shots from the adjacent Arab village of Beit Jala, hitting targets inside the homes of Israeli families.

Israel also escalated. IDF troops increasingly fired back, frequently using helicopter gunships, machine-gun fire, and tank shells, as it did for the first time on October 22-23. In the process, the IDF hit several private Palestinian homes in Beit Jala. After week-long shooting in mid-February, 2001, Israeli shelling for the first time killed a Palestinian resident of Beit Jala.

In early May, the IDF conducted its first incursion into Beit Jala to battle Palestinian gunmen. Israeli troops killed one Palestinian militia officer and injured twenty other Palestinians, saying it pushed into the village to stop Palestinian gunmen who were firing on Israeli army positions and on nearby roads used primarily by settlers. Several settlers had been killed by fires and drive-by shootings since the outbreak of the Second Intifada. Another round of fierce
fighting on the Gilo-Beit Jala flashpoint occurred May 14, when four residents of Gilo were wounded by shooting that originated in Beit Jala.\textsuperscript{465}

After Palestinians and Israelis agreed to the ceasefire brokered by DCI George Tenet in mid-June, 2001, the PA deployed security personnel to keep gunmen out of Beit Jala. As long as the cease-fire remains uncertain and tensions remain high, however, the risk of a renewed outbreak of the cycle of violence at the Gilo/Beit Jala region and elsewhere remains high.

\textbf{Mortars Enter the Conflict}

Another element was introduced into the Israeli-Palestinian crisis in early 2001, when Palestinians fired mortars at IDF outposts, as well as Jewish settlements, first in the Gaza Strip, and eventually reaching targets in Israel proper. On January 3, 2001, six mortar shells were fired at an IDF base near the disputed Shabaa Farms on the Israel-Lebanon border. The IDF did not rule out that a Palestinian organization was responsible for the attack, whose relatively unprofessional nature was deemed atypical of Hizballah.\textsuperscript{466}

On January 30, 2001, the first incidence in which a mortar was fired by Palestinian elements in Gaza took place, when a mortar landed on the roof of a house in a neighborhood close to Netzarim junction. The IDF established that in the early phases, standard 82mm Soviet mortars of improvised nature as well as 60mm rounds of shorter range were used, and labeled the new trend in Palestinian warfare “a clear escalation.” The 82mm mortars were believed to have been smuggled into Gaza from Egypt through underground tunnels near Rafah, or underwater by sea. The 60mm mortars appeared to be manufactured in the Gaza Strip, possibly with the help of Hizballah. On June 21, a 120mm mortar round with a range of 4-5 kilometers—the largest of its kind since the beginning of the Second Intifada—was fired on the Karni industrial zone. The mortar was apparently made in Gaza. The IDF attributed the introduction of mortar capability in large part to Massoud Ayyad, a lieutenant colonel in Arafat's Force 17 security force. Israelis suspected him of leading a Gaza-based cell of Hizballah, and assassinated him in Gaza on February 13th.\textsuperscript{467}

These mortar attacks added to a number of other significant trends that emerged during the Second Intifada, including the use of roadside bombs against Israeli vehicles, several new methods of detonation, and the growing use of anti-tank missiles, rocket propelled grenades and rifle anti-tank grenades used to target buildings and IDF vehicles.\textsuperscript{468}
While mortars attacks have not caused serious injuries or harm to buildings to date, they are strong psychological weapons and have the potential to escalate the crisis. On April 17, 2001, for example, the IDF responded to Palestinian mortar fire targeted at Sderot—a town near the Gaza Strip and only a few miles away from a farm owned by Prime Minister Sharon—by mounting a 24-hour invasion of Palestinian-ruled areas in Gaza, destroying houses and military posts, and uprooting trees. It was also the first time that mortars landed on a town in Israel proper. In an interview with the Los Angeles Times on April 10, a Palestinian leader of a unit that carried out mortar attacks against Israeli targets, described the rationale of Palestinian mortar attacks. Using his nom de guerre, Abu Jamal, the interviewee said that “it's true that it is not a very accurate weapon, but we don't actually care that it's not 100% accurate. Whether or not it hits the target, we want to create confusion and terror. We want the Israelis to think that their army cannot protect them.”

Mortars have also been used in more direct attacks, such as in an attack in central Jerusalem on May 27, 2001. In that attack, 52mm mortar shells shot out of a vehicle and landed unexploded on a porch and in a public park hundreds of yards away. Mortar shells had been used before in bombs, but had all taken place in or near the Gaza Strip. The mortars used in the May 27 attack, on the other hand, were feared to have originated in the West Bank. Israelis had long feared that mortars might reach extremist Palestinian groups in the West Bank, because the proximity of the West Bank to Israeli population centers would pose a significant number of Israelis at risk.

Cyber-Conflict on the Web

The use of cyber-attacks against web sites on both sides of the conflict is another new aspect in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict since the outbreak of violence in September of 2000. This so-called “cyber-war” is now really a minor cyber-low-intensity conflict, but it still illustrates the changing nature of war. This struggle began when pro-Israeli hackers crashed the Hizbollah web site on October 6, 2000 by causing the site to reload itself several times every minute, making the site inoperable. This was followed by the defacing of the site with Israeli flags, Zionist information and a recording of “Hatikva,” the Israeli national anthem. Since then pro-Palestinian hackers have attacked and crashed the sites of the IDF, the Knesset and the Israeli Foreign Ministry. Other sites have been hit in retaliation such as the Palestinian National Authority and Hamas.

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The trend, especially with the Pro-Palestinian hackers, has been to broaden the scope of their attacks over late October and early November. More recent attacks have hit targets that are more “civilian” in nature. These include the sites of the National Bank of Israel and the Tel Aviv Stock Exchange. Unity, the largest pro-Palestinian group has threatened to escalate the conflict further by attacking Israeli e-commerce sites. This conflict has also spread to the United States. The primary pro-Israeli lobby group, the American-Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC), was attacked and 3,500 credit card numbers and many confidential emails were stolen, as well as the site itself being defaced. 471

According to iDefense, an international private intelligence outfit monitoring hacker activities for private and public-sector clients, Israeli hackers employ a variety of tactics such as site defacements, system penetrations, misinformation campaigns and the use of viruses or Trojan horses to wage their cyber war. 472

The cyber-war of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict differs from that seen during the Kosovo bombings in that far more internet users—some of which have little or no hacking experience—have participated in the attacks. Israel has 1.1 million Internet hookups, more than all of the 22 Arab states combined. On the one hand, this gives Israel a manpower and technological advantage in the conflict. On the other hand, such wide use of the World Wide Web also entails increased liability in terms of Internet infrastructure and actual web sites. Ultimately, it is impossible to determine if this conflict will continue to escalate; recent attacks have only had the effect of denying possible outlets of information to the Internet community. Neither side has attacked critical infrastructure thus far; were such developments to take place, they would represent a new development in asymmetric warfare.

**Suicide Bombings**

Suicide bombings were a serious problem even during the years following the Oslo Accords and they have now become a key tactic in the Second Intifada. Five weeks after Sharon’s visit to the Temple Mount and the ensuing riots in the compound in Jerusalem’s Old City, an additional element was introduced into the Second Intifada in the form of car bombings.
and suicide bombings. On November 2, 2000, a car bomb explosion near Jerusalem’s Mahane Yehuda market, and marked the beginning of a new wave of fatal bombings. By early June, 2001, extremist Palestinian groups had carried out at least nine suicide and ten car bombing attacks, and had left several explosive devices on roadsides. Their attacks had killed a total of 51 Israelis and injured at least 630.473 Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) claimed responsibility for the majority of these attacks. The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) claimed responsibility for a car bomb attack in the center of Jerusalem on May 27, 2001. In addition, there were several car and suicide bombings for which either no group claimed responsibility, or for which several groups claimed responsibility.474

The exact extent to which the Palestinian Authority has encouraged, turned a blind eye to, or attempted to prevent suicide bombers from perpetrating attacks is under dispute. What is known is that in the first days of the Second Intifada the PA leadership released substantial numbers of prisoners known to have planned or have been involved in attacks against Israeli targets in the past, including suicide bombings. According to Israeli sources, the released prisoners—dozens of Hamas and PIJ activists—including Muhammad Deif, one of the most wanted men responsible for several bombings in Israel; Adnan al-Ghul, apparently the top expert in bomb-making who was responsible for several suicide bombings that swept Israel in February to March 1996, killing 59 Israelis; and most likely Mahmud Abu-Hannud, another wanted man whose whereabouts remained unknown. Israeli officials immediately charged that such a mass release would create an atmosphere for future bombings.475

There are a number of possible explanations: The PA may have released the prisoners for internal reasons—to unify Palestinians of various political streams in light of an anticipated long-term confrontation with Israel—or simply in order to increase the pressure on the Israeli public and leadership, and there may well have been several reasons. It is also not clear whether such bombings can be classified as an ‘official’ Palestinian Authority tactic per se. Much depends on the degree of coordination between the Palestinian leadership on the one hand, and the organizers and perpetrators of the attacks on the other hand, and the evidence is mixed.

Those who argue that the Palestinian Authority gave a ‘green light’ to suicide bombers to carry out attacks point to the fact that the number of attacks early in the Second Intifada have gone down after early June 2001, when international pressure on Yassir Arafat intensified following the suicide bombing in a Tel Aviv discotheque that killed 21 young Israelis. Arafat had then called for an immediate ceasefire.
Others point to statements made by Hamas and other organizations following that suicide bombing to the effect that they would not be adhering to a ceasefire and would continue with their attacks. They argue that those statements proved that Hamas and other groups not associated with the PLO were defying Arafat’s orders and concluded that those organizations are not receiving orders from the PA, or might have grown more independent in the course of the Second Intifada.

Suicide bombings are clearly used by individual Palestinian groups for their own political purposes. It is conceivable that a group attempts to gain popularity or legitimacy by using suicide bombings or other extreme means, especially when such actions enjoy wide popular support, and when other groups are perceived as too moderate.

The determination of suicide bombers—and those who sponsor, organize, and equip them—makes it extremely difficult to either deter or defend against suicide attacks. At the same time, suicide bombings often succeed in causing physical destruction and psychological damage to their targets, and can therefore serve as a powerful tool to inflict damage to any group of people, particularly a society such as Israel, which is very sensitive to the loss of human life.

The IDF has attempted to find a number of different solutions to the problem of suicide bombings, from closures to increased patrolling of border areas, and from large-scale retribution and assassinations to a policy of restraint. Following the June 2 bombing of the Tel Aviv discotheque, Sharon ordered the IDF to exercise restraint, while keeping the military option open. To that end, Israeli politicians released several statements in which the PA was warned that the IDF had concrete plans to embark on a powerful military operation against Palestinian targets. In the words of Israeli Defense Minister ben-Eliezer, the IDF had its “fingers ready on the trigger,” but was giving the Palestinians a little more time to impose a cease-fire on all groups in the areas under its control.  

Yet, the wave of suicide bombings in Israel has highlighted the ‘effectiveness’ of such actions in asymmetric warfare. Confronted with a heavily armed conventional army such as the IDF, some Palestinian groups believe they have found suicide bombings to be at least one way of how to circumvent the conventional advantages of a militarily superior force.
Continuing Hope for Peace: The Report of the Mitchell Commission and the Search for a Lasting Ceasefire

There is no way to predict the course of the Second Intifada or its outcome. Given its history to date, it is all too possible that it will degenerate into a long-term conflict and a battle of attrition lasting for years, even if there are sporadic ceasefires and periods of “peace.” The struggle could become a combination of asymmetric warfare, political warfare, and economic warfare where attempts at mediation, ceasefires, and negotiations are often used more as an extension of war by other means than as a serious effort to halt the fighting. If so, the Second Intifada will continue to be a struggle in which many outside Israel, Jerusalem, the West Bank, and Gaza take sides in ways that help sustain the conflict. The “blame game” has already made the Second Intifada both a regional conflict and one that polarizes outside states and factions.

The Impact of the ‘Sharm el-Sheikh Fact-Finding Committee’ (Mitchell Commission)

At the same time, there have been signs of hope. Both Israel and the Palestinian Authority continue to negotiate, and the US and other nations continue to seek to find ways to put an end to the fighting. The most successful effort to date has been the ceasefire that has grown out of the report of the five-member ‘Sharm el-Sheikh Fact-Finding Committee’ established under the leadership of former Senate majority leader George Mitchell following the Sharm el-Shiekh negotiations in October 2000. The report of the Sharm el-Sheikh Fact-Finding Committee’ was finalized on April 30, 2001. Besides Mitchell, the panel consisted of Former Turkish President Suleyman Demirel, Norwegian Foreign Minister Thorbjoern Jagland, former U.S. Senator Warren Rudman, as well as the High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy of the European Union Javier Solana.

As instructed by then-President Clinton, the Sharm el-Sheikh Fact-Finding Committee’, or ‘Mitchell Commission,’ refrained from assigning blame to either the Palestinian or the Israeli side. Its objective, as outlined in a letter by Clinton to Mitchell, was to “provide an objective study of the events since late September…. The Committee should focus on the problem of violent confrontations…and the policies and practices of the two sides during the crisis. It should, in particular, provide an assessment of exactly what has happened, why it has happened,
and how to prevent its recurrence. The Committee should not become a divisive force or a focal point for blame and recrimination but rather should serve to forestall violence and confrontation and provide lessons for the future.”

This guidance proved to be vital in giving the ‘Sharm el-Sheikh Fact-Finding Committee’ efforts any hope of success. It avoided the trap of taking sides and pinpointing blame, and provided two separate, and markedly distinct, ‘perspectives’ of the respective sides as to the reasons for the outbreak of violence. It concluded that Ariel Sharon’s visit to the Temple Mount—though poorly timed and provocative—did not cause the “Al Aqsa Intifada”. At the same time, it rejected Israel’s allegation that the PA had planned the violence in advance.

The report also focused on the future rather than the past, and made a number of positive recommendations. It recommended that the parties recommit themselves to the ‘Sharm el-Sheikh spirit’ and implement the decisions made there in 1999 and 2000. In accordance with their principal recommendation, the committee recommended that steps be taken to end the violence, rebuild confidence, and resume negotiations. To end the violence, the report suggested that Israel and the PA reaffirm their commitment to existing agreements and implement an unconditional cessation of violence, including through the resumption of security cooperation. To rebuild confidence, the report recommended that the sides establish a “meaningful cooling-off period” and establish confidence-building measures. To that end, both sides were called upon to “identify, condemn, and discourage incitement in all its forms.”

The committee called upon the PA to “make clear through concrete actions…that terrorism is reprehensible and unacceptable,” to prevent Palestinian gunmen from using Palestinian populated areas to fire upon Israeli populated areas and IDF positions, and to renew cooperation with the IDF. At the same time, it called upon the government of Israel to freeze all settlement activity—including the ‘natural growth’ of existing settlements. Israel should also ensure that the IDF “adopt and enforce policies and procedures encouraging non-lethal responses to unarmed demonstrators,” and to lift closures, transfer tax revenues owed to the PA, and permit
Palestinians who had been employed in Israel to return to their jobs. The IDF was also called upon to withdraw to positions held prior to September 28, 2000.

The committee also took issue with organizational aspects of the security forces of Israel and the PA. In another recommendation designed to increase trust between the parties, the report proposed that in order to minimize casualties, the IDF should deploy more senior and experienced soldiers to sensitive points of friction. The report noted that young, “often teenager” aged active duty personnel, noncommissioned officers, and junior officers are the “categories most likely to be present at friction points.” As far as the Palestinian Security Services are concerned, the Mitchell Commission report described “disturbing ambiguities in the basic areas of responsibility and accountability.” The lack of control exercised by the PA over its own security personnel and armed elements associated with the Palestinian leadership was described as “very troubling.”

Finally, the committee established that the deployment of an international force to in the Palestinian areas would be ineffective unless supported by both parties. Israel had long opposed any deployment of such a force in areas under Palestinian control—or in Israel proper, for that matter—attempting to stem what it believed to be Palestinian efforts aimed at ‘internationalizing’ the conflict. The PA, on the other hand, had called for the deployment of such a force from the very outset of the crisis, saying such a force would help “protect Palestinian civilians and their property from the IDF and from settlers.”

The parties were given one week to submit their official responses. Both sides used this opportunity to emphasize those parts of the report that seemed to support their positions, but both also expressed their reservations. Neither side was entirely unified in its position. On the Israeli side, Prime Minister Sharon—who had earlier criticized Barak’s consent to the inquiry, calling it a “historic mistake”—stressed the deficiencies of the report as he viewed them, while Shimon Peres described the report as being “balanced and fair.”

The Israeli position was especially critical of the report’s call for a ‘settlement freeze’ as a confidence-building measure (CBM). Accordingly, the Sharon government accepted the
Mitchell report, including its proposed sequence of events—a cessation of violence, CBMs, a cooling-off period, and resumption of negotiations—but without the settlement freeze recommendation. PA officials were reluctant about the report at first, but then expressed their support of the recommendations, noting that “the findings and recommendations of the Report offer Palestinians and Israelis a sensible and coherent foundation for resolving the current crisis and preparing a path to resuming meaningful negotiations.” The Palestinians rejected the proposed sequence and demanded that the ceasefire, settlement freeze, and the return to negotiations occur simultaneously.

The Ceasefire of June 13, 2000

As might be expected, both sides treated the Mitchel Committee as a political weapon as well as a new opportunity for peace. The weeks following the acceptance of the Mitchell Committee report were followed by an increase in violence that culminated in a suicide bombing in which 21 young Israelis were killed. This attack occurred although the Israeli government had already begun to implement a unilateral ceasefire, the continued adherence to which was now in question.

In an effort to ward off an anticipated Israeli military response, the Bush administration dispatched the Director of Central Intelligence, George Tenet, to the region. Tenet’s week-long stay had both sides try to manipulate the situation to their own advantage, but eventually produced a “Palestinian-Israeli Security Implementation Work Plan” that was agreed upon by both sides shortly after midnight on June 13, 2001.

The plan—according to an unofficial version published in the Israeli daily Ha’aretz the following day—called on the Government of Israel and the Palestinian Authority to:

1) immediately resume security cooperation;

2) take immediate measures to enforce strict adherence to the declared cease-fire and to stabilize the security environment;

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3) use the security committee to provide information on terrorist threats, including information on known or suspected terrorist operation in—or moving to—areas under the other party’s control;

4) move aggressively to prevent individuals and groups from using areas under their respective control to carry out acts of violence and to take steps to ensure that areas under their control will not be used to launch attacks against the other side nor be used as refuge after attacks are staged;

5) forge, within one week of the commencement of security committee meetings and resumption of security cooperation, an agreed-upon schedule to implement the complete redeployment of IDF forces to positions held before September 28, 2000; and

6) develop—within one week of the commencement of security committee meetings and resumption of security cooperation—a specific timeline for the lifting of internal closures as well as for the reopening of internal roads, the Allenby Bridge, Gaza Airport, the Port of Gaza, and border crossings. ¹⁴⁸

At this writing, these plans remain on the table but are nothing more than good intentions. Both violence and political maneuvering continue on both sides. There is no way to predict whether this particular ceasefire can ever be achieved, will hold together if it is, collapse, or simply be the first round in what one negotiator called a “fourteen round” ceasefire – a series of ceasefire efforts which each become one more political weapon in fighting the Second Intifada and which each side agrees to largely as a tactical maneuver. There also is no way to know whether a successful ceasefire will become a true peace. Other ceasefires in the Arab-Israeli conflict have lasted for decades, and many not only have not brought peace, they have not been true ceasefires. They have simply acted to limited the conflict or have ended in establishing new rules for continuing low-level asymmetric warfare.

If Peace Does Come: The Cost of Living with “Peace with Violence”

Israeli and Arab Palestinian opinion polls reflect the fact that asymmetric warfare has led both sides to increasingly regard the other as an irreconcilable and immoral enemy. As was the case in the Balkans – and many other earlier asymmetric wars – this will greatly complicate efforts to create a ceasefire and to resume peacemaking. Any peace settlement that can be reached in spite of the Israeli-Palestinian fighting that began in September 2000, will still leave major problems and the near certain threat of at least low-level continuing violence.

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At this stage, any compromise acceptable to both sides must leave Jerusalem and the West Bank deeply divided. Much of the West Bank would remain under Israeli control and at least the greater Jerusalem area would remain open for Israeli settlement. No peace now seems likely to be able to meet the economic and political expectations of the younger Palestinians for years to come. It was young Palestinians, however, that created the first Intifada, and that turned the events that began in September 2000 into something approaching a popular uprising. The Israelis, in turn, will have to live with the uncertainty that a peace would give the Palestinian Authority steadily growing power, without necessarily bringing lasting security and peace, and with the specter of some kind of uprising by Israeli Arabs.

Such a peace will be “peace with violence”, and signing an agreement will only be the first step. Any peace based on such divisions will be the prelude to years of further agonizing tension over the situation in the West Bank and Gaza, and Palestinian rights to full sovereignty. Israelis and Palestinians could be faced with a new political and military struggle for power even after such a “peace.” Alternatively, peace could proceed in a way in which Israel continued to deal with a Palestinian entity that supported the peace process, but where extremist elements within the Palestinian community continue to attack and murder pro-peace Palestinians and Israelis, while Israeli Jewish extremists opposed movement towards compromise, the creation of a Palestinian state, a halt to and/or roll-back of settlements, economic integration to aid the Palestinians and Jordan, with equal violence.

Regardless of whether a Second Intifada continues, or a cold peace occurs, leadership problems and internal disputes will affect both the Palestinian Authority and Israel. It is possible that Arafat’s death and the struggle for the succession could create a low-level civil war among Palestinians that could spill over into attacks on Israel or bring an anti-peace Palestinian leader to power. It is equally possible that Israeli opposition to the peace process, and anti-government extremism, would grow in response to the transfer of territory in the West Bank and negotiations over the Golan, Jerusalem, and the future of the settlements. The bitter internal tensions in both the Palestinian movement and Israeli society will be equally troublesome.

Israeli politics could bring a government that opposes peace to power, or one that would not take the risks necessary to make a peace work. It could couple the deep divisions in Israeli society and politics to the debate over peace and turn every effort to implement and improve a peace into a bitter partisan political debate in Israel that increased the risk of Israeli extremism and terrorism and/or delayed or blocked the implementation of given aspects of a peace
agreement. It is one of the tragedies of current events that “peace”, or any interim security agreement that brings an end to violence, may be a two-edged sword.

One thing does seem clear. Even if a peace can be reached, both sides will be forced to conduct aggressive security operations for years to come. These operations not only will be the price for peace; they will also be essential to prevent any new crises and confrontations from escalating to large-scale violence or war. At the same time, such operations can have a high price tag in terms of human rights and will present risks of their own.

“Peace with Abuses” verses “Peace with Violence”

Given this background, even a successful ceasefire or peace might enforce its own continuing tragedies in both Palestinian and Israeli security efforts. Both sides will have to learn to live with the bitterness of a cold peace and continuing violence. At least for several years, they will have to choose between acting decisively and sometimes violently and having terrorists or extremists succeed. There will be the constant specter of having to choose between threats to peace and security, and the kind of counter-terrorism that relies on interrogation methods that border on psychological and/or physical torture, arrests and detentions that are “arbitrary” by the standards of civil law. If “peace” means that extremists and terrorists go on with levels of violence that approach low intensity combat, then it will be difficult to establish the norms of civil society.

In the case of such a “peace,” both sides – and world opinion – will have to decide whether extreme security measures will sometimes be necessary. The key issue will be how many such acts occur, how targeted they are on those who directly commit terrorism and, therefore, how justified they appear to be in terms of their near-term effectiveness and long-term impact on all forms of human rights, including peace and physical security as well as civil liberties.

There are three possible ways to reduce these dilemmas:

First, make a much more massive effort to improve the quality of the Palestinian security effort and create effective communication between Israeli and Palestinian security forces, of the kind the CIA, as well as elements of the EU and other advisory groups, have already carried out. In general, every improvement in the quality of each side’s security
forces and the cooperation between them, should reduce the need for tradeoffs between
effectiveness and civil liberties.

Second, recognize that no security effort is likely to succeed if it is not based on the
mutual perception of the vast majority of Israelis and Palestinians that any compromise
resulting in a ceasefire or peace is better than continued fighting. New words or lines on a
map will not be enough. Similarly, even the best compromise will probably fail if both
sides do not address the demographic and economic problems of the Palestinians in Gaza
and the West Bank.

Third, find some way of injecting a third party into the security process that both sides
feel they can trust, and do so in a way where the third party can avoid being seen as an
enemy by either side, and can avoid being used as yet another tool in the conflict.

In the past, Israel has demanded that the Palestinian security forces succeed in
maintaining an almost perfect order among a population with significant elements that strongly
oppose the peace process and deny the legitimacy of the Palestinian Authority and PLO. As
events have shown since the June 2001 ceasefire, this will be “mission impossible” in the near to
mid-term without a massive reform and rebuilding of the Palestinian Security forces.

Any peace settlement will confront even “reformed” Palestinian security forces with
many of the same contradictory goals they faced before the fighting began in September 2000. If
Palestinians want to reintroduce trust into Israeli-Palestinian relations after more than twenty-
three months of low intensity conflict, they will have to demonstrate to Israel that they will act
immediately and decisively to prevent violence and will arrest and punish terrorists.
As has been discussed earlier, Israeli pressure and Palestinian politics led the Palestinian Authority security forces to emphasize security over human rights long before the crisis that began in September 2000, although they often did so to maintain the present ruling elite rather than to preserve the peace process. The three main Palestinian security forces had six prisons by 1998. The civil police, under Nasir Yusef and Brigadier General Ghazi Jabali, has two prisons. The chief of the preventive security force in Gaza, Mohammed Dahlan, has two prisons. In addition, the director of military intelligence, Mousa Arafat, has two prisons.

Suspects in these prisons have been subject to long detentions without trial, and there are reports of torture and violent interrogations. For example, Mahmoud Zohhar, the chief spokesman of Hamas, was arrested in June 1995 and held at the military intelligence prison at Saraya for 105 days. His head and beard were shaved, and there were reports that he was beaten and had several broken bones.

Critics of Palestinian Authority security forces must understand that such problems may remain the rule, not the exception. If the Palestinian security forces do not react quickly and decisively in dealing with terrorism and violence, there probably will be no future peace, or stable peace process. This will be essential if they are to preserve the momentum of future Israeli withdrawals, the expansion of Palestinian control and sovereignty, and the stability of the peace process.

In this context, the Palestinian Authority security forces will probably use excessive force by the standards of Western police forces. Efforts to halt terrorist and paramilitary action by Hamas and Islamic Jihad may involve interrogations, detentions, and trials that are too rapid and lack due process by Western standards. Conversely, the failure to act effectively could have a high net cost to both peace and the human rights of most Palestinians. Israeli leaders have clearly focused on the very issue of terrorism as a means of evaluating the Palestinian Authority’s commitment to the peace process.

Table 7.5 shows that decisive security measures do tend to work. It shows the record of such incidents of terrorism since the Oslo Accords and up to the fighting that began in September 2000. This table shows the problems that the Palestinians encountered in dealing with terrorism during the critical period before the election that brought former Prime Minister Netanyahu to office. However, there was a significant drop in terrorism since 1997 and until a few weeks into the Second Intifada.
and Israeli sources cite security cooperation between the Palestinian and Israeli forces as the major reason for this decline. Israeli officials say that the Palestinian Security forces were ineffective at first because they were inexperienced, but improved significantly with time. Even former Prime Minister Netanyahu gave Chairman Arafat and the Palestinian Authority credit for foiling a terrorist attack in Tel Aviv, for the decline in Hamas activity, and for the decline in terror in general.  

At the same time, the Palestinian Security forces will have to try to maintain popular support from the Palestinians and meet the demands of human rights activists. The contradictions involved are illustrated by the fact that Colonel Jibril Rajoub, the West Bank commander of the security service who reports to Arafat, was often attacked for laxness by Israelis before the fighting in 2000, and has been accused by white Palestinian extremists of being, “a big agent of the Israeli police.”

These are not new problems. Both the Palestinian and Israeli security forces have already encountered severe criticism over human rights issues when they acted decisively, and equally severe political and partisan criticism from the other side or hard-liners on their own side when they freed suspected terrorists or pardoned convicted ones. Both the Israeli and Palestinian security services have also taken excessive and extreme action instead of decisive and effective action. The Palestinian Preventive Security forces have often been accused of the arbitrary arrest and torture of Palestinians – in many cases Palestinians whose business interests conflicted with those of Palestinian Authority officials, or who publicly criticized Arafat and the Palestinian Authority.

It is easy to minimize the costs and risks involved in choosing between effective counterterrorism and peace enforcement, and the preservation of civil liberties. It is easy to ignore the violent nature of some political movements and focus solely on state abuses of human rights, or to claim that international norms can be applied in spite of the level of violence and hatred involved and the potential cost to peace security. Important as civil liberties are, they are only one of the human rights that nations and the world must try to protect.

Any valid assessment of human rights cannot consist solely of an indictment of the violations of governments, no matter how important or valid. It must explicitly consider the level
of overall violence involved, the role of various non-governmental groups in using violence and terrorism, and the level of risk to civilians, peace, and civil order. It must examine the military, paramilitary, and overall security conditions involved, and specifically assess the options open to governments and how well they deal with the trade-offs between civil liberties and other human rights. They must also address the extent to which both governments and their opponents attempt to use claims about law, democracy, terrorism and human rights as political weapons in a world where such efforts have become a routine aspect of asymmetric warfare. Every effort should be made to preserve human rights and make the best possible trade-offs between peace, physical security, and civil liberties. However, it is dangerous to assume that no dilemma exists and that civil liberties must always have first priority. Peace and security from terrorism are also human rights.

It is also important to note that human rights have also become a political weapon in asymmetric warfare. Israel’s supporters often view the problem solely in terms of counterterrorism and the right to security. The supporters of the Palestinians often see the issue almost solely in terms of the rule of law and human rights, while the opponents of both Israel and the Palestinian Authority tend to issue blanket condemnations of both while ignoring the overall security conditions, and the violent nature of many of the political movements and groups involved. A similar gap emerges in outside reporting on violence and terrorism and human rights. For example, the annual State Department report on terrorism tends to ignore civil liberties and state abuses of human rights, while the annual report on human rights tends to minimize or ignore the problem of civil violence and terrorism. The reporting of the UN Commissioner on Human rights has striven for more balance, but focuses far more on civil liberties than security.

Reasonable people can disagree in assessing the situation and the kind of trade-offs each side will have to make between civil liberties and security. At the same time, any valid assessment must come fully to grips with the issue and not simply consist of a focus on one aspect of the issue. Any ceasefire or “peace” between Israelis and Palestinians is likely to involve years in which a cold peace cannot be distinguished from a cold war, and in which new violence and terrorism is a constant threat.

Both sides may find that there are no solutions that are both pleasant and workable. No security force in history has been able to do a perfect job facing similar threats. The British forces in Ulster are perhaps the most successful example of a security force working with similar
problems. By and large, the British security services did an excellent job of balancing the conflicting problems of effective security and a concern for human rights. At the same time, there were still many incidents of violence and terrorism, and many cases where the British used excessive force, abused human rights, and used extreme interrogation methods and torture in ways that simply exacerbated the situation. It is scarcely surprising, therefore, that the Palestinian Authority often failed.

**Israeli Criticisms and the Art of the Possible**

A workable peace cannot be a perfect peace, or there will be no peace at all. Israel will have to revise its standards for judging the Palestinian Authority. Israeli diplomats, military officials, and intelligence analysts have repeatedly criticized the Palestinians in the past for their lack of effort, neglect in pursuing terrorists and extremists, and release of such persons after detention or serving a limited portion of their sentence. A senior serving Israeli security official once stated, “Arafat has long had a policy of containing Hamas and the PIJ and making them part of his camp...Whenever he knows of any specific case of an attack that is planned by Hamas or the PIJ, he is going to do his best in order to foil it. But he knows, and we know also, that you cannot know about every single attack.”

Typical Israeli charges against the Palestinian Authority security forces before the Second Intifada included:

- The actual size of the security forces totals 45,000 and is 27,000 more than permitted in Oslo Accords.
- Palestinian police cooperated in operations to kill Israeli settlers in the West Bank during 1997. Intercepts and the confession of one of the policemen involved confirmed this.
- Brigadier General Ghazi Jabali, the Commander of the Police in Gaza, provided a car and weapons for this operation. State Department spokesman says on August 2, 1997, that US has no intelligence to confirm this charge.
- The Palestinian Authority has far more weapons than authorized, including anti-tank missiles.
- The Palestinian Authority may have Katyusha rockets and SAM-7 anti-aircraft missiles.
- Arms’ smuggling is continuing.
- Arafat has used the diplomatic immunity of his car and helicopter to smuggle in arms.
- Palestinian security forces have systematically attacked the network of informers that Israeli intelligence had developed before the transfer of the territories.

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- The Palestinian Authority tacitly tolerates recruiting and training operations by Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad.
- Arafat has often freed known terrorists, including some 120 in the spring of 1997 and additional dozens after September 2000.
- The Palestinian Authority is not doing everything in its power to crack down on Palestinian militants, including suicide bombers.
- The Palestinian Authority often fails to condemn large-scale attacks on Israelis.

The calls the Israeli government issued for the “reform” of Palestinian Security forces in 2002 called for integrated and far better trained Palestinian Security forces, but Israeli security officials have long differed over the seriousness and accuracy of such charges in ways that reflect the divisions in Israeli politics. For example, Carmi Gillon, a former chief of Shin Bet, put some of the blame on Netanyahu and his lack of support for the peace process. In contrast, Gidon Ezra, a former Deputy Shin Bet chief and Likud legislator, blames Arafat for putting good relations with Hamas and PIJ before security cooperation. Any new efforts to deal with these issues, however, will have to deal with far more serious Israeli doubts about both Arafat and whether the Palestinian Authority will really give up violence as an option. If Israel must learn to tolerate some violence, the Palestinian Authority must learn this is one option it cannot preserve without giving up hope for a serious negotiated peace.

The Role of Neutral Observers in a Hot Ceasefire and Cold Peace

Given this background, no one can predict when or if Israeli-Palestinian peace negotiations can now have a real hope of succeeding, or limit Israeli-Palestinian violence to sporadic confrontations and civil unrest. It is all clear that any full peace settlement will take months or years. It is equally clear that the full implementation of any such accords will then likely to take years or even decades longer and to involve many further incidents of violence.

Issues such as the right of return, repatriations, water, definitions of sovereignty, security arrangements, the future of Jerusalem, and the fate of the Israeli settlements are simply too controversial to firmly resolve with one set of accords and any compromise is too likely to provoke extremists on both sides. Even under the best conditions, there is little near-term prospect that either Palestinians or Israelis can avoid living with “peace with violence” and “peace with abuses.”

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The recommendations of the Mitchell Committee do, however, offer a possible precedent for creating a “third party” to help implement a peace by recommending the creation of a neutral body of international monitors and observers that can assess the causes of violence and the nature of the military response on both sides without being seen as biased in favor of one side or the other, and turning the assessment of the actions of each side and its use of force into a political extension of asymmetric warfare by other means.

It is important to recognize the validity of Israeli and Palestinian fears that such efforts will become a “weapon” for the other side in a war of perceptions, and the grim reality that both sides have long used “human rights” issues as political weapons against the other. This creates a serious risk that any effort to monitor violence and the actions of both sides to counter it can become more of a problem than a solution. This is particularly true if such an effort becomes involved in both sides’ efforts to use history and law to make purely partisan arguments, rather than focusing on helping to create a just and secure peace and future for Palestinians and Israelis. The issue is the future and not the past, and one should remember the famous historical indictment of the Bourbon rulers of France: “They forgot nothing and they learned nothing.”

Yet, both sides may still be able to benefit from having some neutral body to turn to, if one can be created and sustained that is acceptable to each side, both during periods of violence, and during efforts to create a lasting ceasefire or peace. Both sides can benefit from transparency in executing the terms of a ceasefire or peace agreement, and in conducting their security efforts and improving their effectiveness while reducing the cost to civil liberties. Objective, mutual criticism will still be painful, but it can also be constructive. Ideally, Israelis and Palestinians should be able to communicate without any such neutral third party. In practice, they have not done well to date, and a body or commission might be useful if one can be created that both sides trust. In practice, this virtually forces heavy US participation although it scarcely precludes a role for other states.

The use of any kind of military cadres to actively enforce a peace or ceasefire is far more controversial. At this point, Israel feels – and not without reason – that many such calls for such forces are simply a call for UN security efforts that will aid the Palestinians. Certainly, this is an area where the UN’s political record may make it difficult for the UN to play such a role. At the same time, Palestinians have equal reason to question whether any such enforcement group that is acceptable to Israel will be truly neutral and even handed in dealing with the Palestinians. Peacekeeping too can become an extension of war by other means.
The end result is the greatest challenge to finding new approaches to peacekeeping since Bosnia and Kosovo. Nothing useful can come out of efforts that attempt to re-fight the past, and debate either the Holocaust or every event since the 1967 war. Nothing good can come out of efforts that take sides or efforts that divide along pro-Israeli or pro-Palestinian lines. The Balkans and Somalia have already demonstrated the cost of demonizing one side while sanctifying another, and the attacks on French and US barracks in Lebanon have shown how quickly perceptions of a humanitarian intervention can change, and make it the target of terrorism. At the same time, abandoning the use of international commissions and some form of military observer force, because the mission is extremely difficult, means abandoning tools that might well help create a more stable ceasefire and peace and speed the transition from a cold peace that is virtually undistinguishable from cold war to one that offers Israelis and Palestinians a secure future.

**The Central Role of Economics**

One further issue must also be addressed. As the previous analysis has shown, the Oslo accords tacitly assumed that peace would somehow address the economic and demographic crisis in Gaza and the West Bank. Peace is a desirable end in itself, but it does not, in and of itself, bring economic growth and development; neither will any foreseeable solution to the final settlement issues. Furthermore, any peace or ceasefire based on “separation” risks permanently crippling Palestinian economic development and severely hurting the economic development of Jordan.

No form of peace settlement that only deals with political and security issues will be enough to secure a peace. Israel, the Palestinians, and the world will have to address the extent to which any peaceful outcome of the Israeli-Palestinian struggle can be made stable without a massive exercise in economic aid, development, and nation building, and some deliberate effort to develop Israeli, Palestinian, and Jordanian economic cooperation, if not partial integration. Like peace, security, and civil liberties, the “right” to economic well-being can never be perfectly implemented. Economics, however, are ultimately as critical to security as any treaty.

**Peace Should Fail: “Violence Without Peace”**

It is painfully clear that the balance of political power could just as easily shift firmly in favor of a prolonged war, and that the Palestinian and Israeli opponents of peace could make any
stable ceasefire and peace negotiations impossible. Israel’s defense minister Binyamin Ben-
Eliezer expressed such pessimism in early July 2000. He stated in a speech over Israeli army
radio that: "We are heading towards a long conflict with the Palestinians, to my sorrow, until the
Palestinian side recognizes that actually there is no sense in going on with this conflict as it is."
The only optimism in Ben-Eliezer’s speech was that he stated there was little chance that the
Second Intifada would become a regional conflict: "No. No, no, no. I think that is far from us...I
don't think Egypt is interested in that today, I don't think Jordan is interested in that today...I
don't think Syria is guiding itself towards war."494

On the day that Eliezer spoke, some 473 Palestinians, 121 Israelis and 13 Israeli Arabs
had been killed since the violence erupted in September 2000. Eliezer was also scarcely alone in
predicting a prolonged war. A number of senior Israeli and Palestinian officials expressed much
the same the view of the future, and even an Arafat statement rejecting violence and supporting
the ceasefire contained a warning of the deep divisions between the two peoples. Arafat gave an
interview in which he told the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung he condemned all forms of
violence and terrorism "whoever is responsible. We must give radical and violent groups on both
sides no chance." Arafat also said that, "I am sorry that mortars were brought into the country
from abroad," He announced that his security forces had made several arrests, including
members in his own Fatah security forces, that the Palestinian Authority was complying with the
plan negotiated by U.S. Central Intelligence Agency director George Tenet, and stated that that
he had ordered the trial of those responsible for recent attacks and mortar fire. He stated that he
rejected the “myth” that the Palestinians would not of sign a peace treaty and accept the "end of
conflict…Of course I would do that."495

At the same time, Arafat attacked Israel for its actions in the West Bank and Gaza Strip:
"Above all, I reject violence against my own people. Occupation is violence. Illegal settlements
are violence. Blockades are violence…So I can't just say to my people they should endure daily
distress and carry the heavy burden of an unjustified and unnecessary occupation… Sharon is
allowed both -- violence and occupation." He also noted that Sharon had recently called him a
"pathological liar" and a "Palestinian Osama Bin Laden…Isn't that incitement?"

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express written permission. Quotation or reference is permitted with proper attribution.
As Table One has shown, nothing since that time has provided much that the search for a stable ceasefire will succeed, much less the effort to create a stable peace. It may take months or years of additional fighting and killing, and sheer exhaustion, to move both sides forward. Such a prolonged Second Intifada already threatens to create a hostile or divided Palestinian Authority—one that tolerated the creation of significant extremist forces and cadres, encouraged constant low-level violence, and resorted to large-scale violence when it thought this would influence world opinion.

Efforts to “reform” the Palestinian Authority without a credible peace plan may give Palestinian extremists -- like the military wing of Hamas and Islamic Jihad -- the equivalent of sanctuaries and better access to weapons and explosives. It will also lead Palestinian extremist groups outside the West Bank and Gaza -- like those listed in Table 7.1 -- to supply and train new cadres of Palestinians.

Human intelligence will be a growing problem for Israel. Israeli officers and officials indicate that Israel lost much of its former intelligence gathering network when it gave up the Palestinian occupied areas on the West Bank, and that UAVs, communications intelligence, and other technical aids are not a full substitute for HUMINT. Lt. General Amnon Shahak, former Chief of Staff of the IDF, stated that the Oslo II accords would make an effective counter-terrorist strategy, “...far harder than it is now, particularly in the field of intelligence.” Brigadier General Ya’akov Amidror, then head of the analysis section of Israeli military intelligence, has said that, “Israel’s intelligence capability in the Gaza Strip has dropped to zero, and a similar situation could develop in Judea and Samaria, when we transfer control to the Palestinian Authority.”

At the same time, Israel is also likely to move towards extremism and the settlements issue will become steadily more serious and provocative. Any such prolonged low-intensity war could trigger some serious form of the Israeli separation plan. At the same time, it would force Israel to expand its presence in the West Bank and to enforce a wide range of security measures in order to defend all of the settlements. The IDF would be forced to find a difficult balance between a long-term effort to defeat the violent elements of the Palestinian population and trying to pacify the rest. Striking selectively against an increasingly better organized and shelter force in urban and built up areas is likely to be especially difficult because the IDF has lost much of its
intelligence capability to cover Palestinian activities in the areas under control of the Palestinian Authority.\footnote{497}

Israeli public opinion polls have repeatedly shown that many Israeli settlers would give up their settlements for a true peace. However, some Israeli settlers have demonstrated more extremist behavior and rhetoric since the beginning of the Second Intifada. For example on October 7, 2000 Israeli settlers ransacked 8 villages in the Qalquilya area of the West Bank, killing two Palestinians and kidnapping two others. On December 6, 2000 an Israeli settler and school teacher was killed in a drive-by shooting by Palestinian gunmen, this to demands from the settlers that Palestinian cars should not be allowed to drive on the highways. Furthermore, protests were sparked when the son and daughter-in-law of deceased Israeli extremist leader Meir Kahane was killed in a Palestinian ambush on December 31, 2000. Not only did his supporters call for more Arab blood to be spilled, but denounced Barak as traitor. This rhetoric is similar in tone from what was seen just before the assassination of Prime Minister Rabin. Baruch Goldstein, the Jewish extremist who killed 26 Muslims in a Hebron mosque was also part of this movement.\footnote{498}

The longer the fighting goes on, the more areas are likely to become extremist sanctuaries. Long before September 2000, there were also examples of Palestinian extremists using the Palestinian Authority-controlled areas as a lasting sanctuary. When two Israelis -- Ohad Bachrach and Ori Shavord -- were killed in Wadi Kelt on July 18, 1995, the suspects -- Yussef and Shaher Ra’ii -- took refuge in Jericho. The Palestinian Authority claimed the two were imprisoned after a rapid trial, and were not subject to a “transfer of suspects.” At least one of the suspects may, however, have then been released from prison.\footnote{499}

A prolonged Second Intifada will continue to raise many of the same basic issues regarding the conduct and morality of modern warfighting and asymmetric warfare as Kosovo. The methods of attack/defense used by Israel and the Palestinian are so different, however, that many have tried to demonize the methods used by one side and sanctify the methods used by the other. The most general criticism of the Palestinians is that they rely on “terrorism.” The most general criticism of the Israelis is that they use “excessive force” and advanced modern weapons against “civilians.”

Both sides will continue fight with the best methods they have, and both will be equally “legitimate” to the extent that force can be legitimate at all. Neither side is prepared to accept
this, however, and neither is most of the international community. The fact is that neither direct belligerents nor non-belligerents are really prepared to deal with the political, moral, and practical warfighting implications of complex asymmetric wars, particularly ones where there is no clear aggressor or “good” side versus “bad” side.

One thing is clear: Peace cannot be reached by deciding that one side’s conduct is legitimate and the other side’s is not. The Second Intifada is not Kosovo, and taking sides in support of either the Israeli or Palestinian approach to fighting an asymmetric war can only reinforce the tendency to escalate and lock each side into an enduring process of conflict.

### Possible Israeli Tactics in a Prolonged Conflict

There is no consensus among Israelis as to the exact tactics that Israel should employ in a prolonged Second Intifada that lasts several more years, or in a “no peace” scenario. However, various Israeli experts have suggested the following possible approaches to dealing with such problems:

- **Isolating the Gaza Strip** -- Israel would seal the borders with Gaza, and use the crisis as a rationale to remove any remaining Israeli settlements in the Gaza Strip. These settlements currently cost more to protect in military and economic terms than they contribute to the Israeli economy.

- **Walling or sealing off the Palestinian areas** – Israel would seal off Palestinian areas to ensure they could not cross into Jewish areas and Israel proper, effectively creating a series of walls or security fences to prevent or restrict Israeli-Palestinian contact. The concept of an elevated secure superhighway between Gaza and the West Bank is a variation on this theme.

- **Ending remaining dependence on Palestinian labor** -- Israel would use labor permits largely as a political weapon, having imported Asian and East European labor as a substitute for Palestinian labor.

- **Removing or marginalizing small Israeli settlements in the middle of Palestinian populations that do not serve security purposes** -- Like the Israeli settlements in Gaza, IDF experts feel many of these settlements are an expensive ideological liability.

- **Securing lines of communication** -- Israel would fully secure its strategic lines of communication and major routes into the area, and use travel permits as a lever to push the Palestinian Authority to crack down on violence and extremism.

- **Using economic infrastructure as a lever** -- Similarly, Israel would use international phone links, power generation, international postal services, external water flow, and similar levers to pressure the Palestinians into ending attacks on Israel.

- **Secure the perimeter of Palestinian cities and towns** -- The IDF would stay out of populated areas wherever possible, but would seal off the perimeter of towns where violence took place and punish towns felt to be centers of violence or extremism.
• **Mobilize “border” defenses of Israel proper, the greater Jerusalem area, and Israeli settlements on the West Bank** -- Israel would create strong security defenses that tightly controlled entry and movement into Israeli areas. It would seal off Palestinian areas felt to be centers of violence and effectively halt all economic activity until such violence ceased. Such efforts would be highly selective and would seek to rely largely on non-violent means.

• **Use trained security forces** -- The IDF and security forces would avoid mass call-ups or the use of troops without special training. It would emphasize the identification and tracking of actual threats, and the use of the GSS and Border Police, and officers and forces with counter-insurgency training. It would utilize the improved equipment it obtained during the Intifada.

• **Use non-intrusive surveillance methods** -- Israel would use its UAVs and SIGINT capabilities to provide surveillance of Palestinian activity without sending IDF forces into Palestinian areas except to deal with known targets or in hot pursuit. Although Israel’s network of informers and covert operatives in Palestinian areas has been sharply reduced, use would still be made of such techniques where possible.

• **Emphasize a willingness to continue the peace process and good relations with Arab states** -- Israel would seek to politically and diplomatically isolate the violent and extremist elements within the Palestinians.

• **Reward Palestinians who support the peace process and/or are non-violent** -- Restrictions would be minimized in any area or case where the Palestinian Authority or some town or company did not present security problems. Labor permits and investment would be encouraged in such areas.

• **Expel hostile Palestinians** – Deport them into Gaza, push them out of sensitive areas in the West Bank, or drive them into Jordan.

Israel can steadily apply powerful economic weapons no matter what happens in the currents fighting. It will retain long-term control over movement, utilities, transport, and water. It will be able to set the terms by which Palestinians can work in Israel, if at all. Israel has already demonstrated that it will try use low cost Asian and East European labor as a substitute for Palestinian labor. Israel issued labor permits to over 55,000 non-Palestinian foreign workers in 1994, and nearly 70,000 in 1995, versus less than 5,000 a year during 1992 and 1993. In 1998, the Israeli government issued 80,000 permits to non-Jewish foreign workers, a cut back of 23% in the past two years. Only 38,000 Palestinian workers are legally allowed to work in Israel.

The economic outcome of the fighting that began in September 2000 has also shown that any Palestinian political advantage in terms of media and world support is offset by economic costs as well as the cost in blood. UN estimates indicate that that only two months of violence following the outbreak of fighting on September 29th cut the Palestinian gross domestic product by 10 percent, and the projected rate of growth in the GDP for 2000 from +4% to –10%. They also indicate that the violence, and the measures Israel imposed as security measures and
diplomatic pressure, cost the Palestinians more than $500 million in lost wages and sales.\textsuperscript{503} This is equal to roughly $9 million a day, and the estimates do not include the impact of the bulldozing of hundreds of acres of Palestinian orchards by the Israeli army to clear the line of sight in security areas, or the destruction of Palestinian buildings, homes, infrastructure and property. Furthermore, the average Palestinian worker supports four other persons and the loss of income forces all of these individuals to cut back consumption dramatically, thus effecting the income of other segments of the economy.\textsuperscript{504}

Recent reports indicate that Israel is also paying an economic cost. In the final quarter of 2000, the economy witnessed its steepest three-month downfall in a decade. The GDP shrank by 12 percent, led by a 58 percent drop in tourism income. Farm exports fell by 32 percent, and dozens of construction projects were abruptly suspended. The reports have also projected a drop of between three and six percentage points in its growth estimates for the year, which is a two-four billion dollar correction.\textsuperscript{505} These reports also show a major cut in tourism, problems for Israeli farmers, contractors who depend on Palestinian workers, and cutbacks in activity in the technology sector. Meanwhile, foreign investment has plummeted by half.\textsuperscript{506}

As has been discussed earlier, however, the Palestinian economy is only about 5 percent the size of Israel’s, and estimates indicate that normal economic activity was cut by as much as 50%. The UN report estimated that there was a $388 million drop in local economic output, plus another $117 million in the lost wages of some 110,000 workers who had jobs in Israel. (Direct unemployment in Gaza and the West Bank rose from 70,000 (11%) to 260,000 (30%). These costs are two and a half times greater than the total foreign aid received by Palestinians from all sources. This totaled $183 million during the first six months of 2000.\textsuperscript{507}

Aid does help: A December 2000 report in the \textit{New York Times} indicated that the World Bank pledged to provide a $15 million grant. The European Union pledged to provide emergency aid to help pay Palestinian Authority employees. In early June, the European Union agreed to deliver a further $50 million in emergency aid to prevent the PA from falling into bankruptcy. The aid pledged by the EU was intended to pay salaries, fund pensions, and basic
services, and was, however, to be delivered only after the International Monetary Fund confirmed that the PA adhered to an austerity budget. The EU also demanded that salary and pension payments be disbursed by the PA Ministry of Finance, and not by Palestinian security or political leaders, in order to raise fiscal transparency and accountability in the PA. 508 The United States continues to allocate more than $75 million annually to the Palestinians under a long-term aid commitment, but most of the programs it underwrites have been paralyzed since 2001. 509 Gulf businessmen have donated more than $20 million for a special Palestinian unemployment fund. Arab governments have pledged $693 million in new economic aid to the Palestinians since the fighting began, with most of it coming from Saudi Arabia ($250 million), Kuwait ($150 million) and the United Arab Emirates ($150 million). In late March 2001, Arab leaders approved a $240 million emergency aid packet to the PA, and two months later. Little of the money pledged during the Arab Summit in October 2000, however, was actually disbursed by early summer 2001.

However, aid is scarcely enough and the prolonged struggle is steadily more costly and damaging to Palestinian economy with few reserves. According to the previously discussed UN report, the poverty rate is estimated to have climbed an additional 33 percent to 43.8 percent by the end of 2001. Aid is often promised but not delivered, spends years in a pipeline, or is wasted through corruption. For example, the World Food Program asked wealthy donor countries in November 2000 to provide $3.9 million in additional funding for food for impoverished Palestinians and the request was not met. Israel can take far more serious steps in the form of economic warfare. It can cut off the flow of aid deliveries, and take steps like imposing a near total economic embargo, limiting war and electricity, freezing finances, and limiting access to communications.

Given this background, there is no way to predict which mix of military, political, and economic tactics Israel will use if the conflict proceeds for years or lasts indefinitely, or the long-term effectiveness of any given mix of such tactics. At the same time, it is equally difficult to predict how the Palestinian response will evolve under pressure. It is important to remember, however, that past low-level conflicts have shown that hatred can be remarkably creative. In fact,
the worst outcome of a prolonged Second Intifada would probably be that it institutionalized the levels of hatred exhibited in Bosnia.

**Prolonged Conflict, “Separation,” and Evacuation**

The worst-case outcome for both sides would be for Israel to combine harsh tactics with some versions of a “separation” program that took on the character of “ethnic cleansing.” Some Israeli analysts believe that Israel could permanently re-secure the West Bank through a combination of further separation between Israelis and Palestinians, limited reoccupation of key areas, improved security measures, selective deportations and economic and political pressures on the Palestinians. They believe that this would entail Israeli casualties, and some continuing low-level problems with terrorism, but this might well be enough to restore something approaching a lasting cold peace at a political, military, and economic cost that would eventually be lower than that of the Intifada.

Some Israeli analysts have privately proposed large-scale deportations and/or the idea of building a series of walls or a continuing security “wall” with the Old City and greater Jerusalem area to separate Jews and Palestinians – a concept that might aid security in the physical sense but which would do much to prevent the development of stable social and economic relations and which might undermine security in other ways. Others have quietly raised the issue of forced large-scale deportations of Palestinians from the greater Jerusalem, East Jerusalem, Bethlehem, and Nablus areas, but it is unclear that the IDF has ever translated conceptual studies of such options into even preliminary contingency plans.  

The efforts now underway already are implementing a more modest separation of the Palestinians into large containments. At the same time, Israeli experts and some IDF analysts privately agree that Israel might have to evacuate some of its more exposed settlements. On October 7, 2000 the IDF “temporarily evacuated” Joseph’s Tomb in Nablus after five days of fighting, and after brokering a deal with PA security forces to protect the site. The PA forces were either unwilling or unable to defend the site and were overrun by Palestinian protesters who set it on fire. The images of Palestinians burning prayer books appeared on Israeli televisions prompting increased public pressure not to evacuate more settlements under similar conditions.
Still, it is extremely costly to secure and defend the necessary roads, particularly if the Palestinians develop sophisticated hit and run tactics. Maintaining a large force to secure the small outlying Israeli enclaves in the West Bank takes men and resources. These are areas where the only alternatives for the IDF are to either have to maintain a major continuous presence and Draconian security checks, get rid of the settlements, or forcibly relocate large numbers of Palestinians. There have already been examples of such activity. On May 25, 2001, Israeli Defense Minister ben-Eliezer has ordered the IDF to remove 15 isolated settler outposts in the West Bank. Ben-Eliezer said that those settlements constituted a security risk. If necessary, ben-Eliezer was quoted, he would order the IDF to move against the outposts.

The most provocative case could be for Israel to try to deal with the situation through large deportations of Palestinians, relocations of some small Israeli settlements, creating and strengthening new IDF strong points to enforce separation much deeper in the West Bank, and the creation of electronic “fences,” physical fences, mined areas, and deployment of sensor systems and UAV day and night surveillance of “border” areas in both the countryside and built-up areas. This would require forced clearing of boundary areas to create free fire zones and improve line of sight and create a broad buffer between the relocated Palestinians and Israelis. It could also involve changes in economic laws and regulation to block the use of Palestinian labor and make Palestinian economic growth and development difficult or impossible.

The problem with this approach to separation is that it would leave the Palestinians with no options other than war, living in large concentration camps with no real economic future, or immigration.

One thing is certain. Each new level of prolonged conflict will make it progressively harder for both sides to reach either a “cold” or “warm” peace, and pushes Israel towards more active consideration of the separation option. Each level of conflict will also be a test of the political costs Israel is willing to pay for giving up parts of the West Bank, and how long it is willing to fight a prolonged low-level or anti-terrorist conflict that is much more violent than the Intifada.

**The Role of Egypt, Syria, Jordan, Iran, Iraq, and Hizbollah in a Longer Conflict in Gaza or the West Bank**

A prolonged Second Intifada poses yet another risk. Arab states are fully aware of Israel’s conventional military superiority and that it possesses nuclear weapons. Even so, both
the short and long versions of a Second Intifada create the risk that Israeli action against large numbers of Palestinians in either Gaza or the West Bank would threaten Israel's peace with Egypt and Jordan, and create a lasting block on further progress in the peace negotiations with Syria.

Egypt has withdrawn its ambassador, Muhammad Bassiouny “indefinitely” in protest over Israeli actions. By June, 2001 he had still not returned to Israel, but had instead resigned his post to accept an appointment to serve in the Egyptian government's consultative Shura council. As a result, the highest-ranking Egyptian diplomat in Israel in the summer of 2001 was a charge d'affaires. This damaged a key communication line between the Israeli government and the Palestinian Authority and disrupted the US ability to place pressure on Arafat through its ties with Egypt. However, President Mubarak has remained active in attempting to broker a peace between the two sides regardless of the current odds of success.512

Jordan, the only other Arab state with full diplomatic relations with Israel, has delayed appointing a new ambassador to Israel since September, despite the obvious prominence of the post to Jordanian foreign policy. On top of that, on November 21, 2000 an Israeli missile attack damaged the official residence of the Jordanian representative to the Palestinian Authority.513 Internal pressure against the peace process is building in the Hashemite Kingdom as well. This is evident by the repeated protests in Amman that have threatened the US and Israeli embassies and forced the Jordanian army to deploy troops for their protection.514

Things could escalate further. A truly bloody conflict over and within Gaza would present problems for Egypt, and might eventually be serious enough to affect the original Camp David Accords. A major struggle between Israel and Palestinians on the West Bank might end the peace between Jordan and Israel as well as impact Jordan’s internal stability. In fact, some Israelis again are arguing that the solution to the Palestinian problem is to make Jordan a Palestinian state—a notion that ignores the fact that Israel would then face a last enemy with a common border with Syria and Iraq. Either war would probably trigger new action by Iran and Shi’ite extremists in Lebanon like the Hizbollah or Sunni extremists such as Islamic Jihad. It also could make Israel’s Arabs shift to a much more active political and military role in opposing Israel.

As a result, what might start as a low-level war between Israeli and Palestinian extremists could produce longer-term and more serious shifts in the regional military balance. An escalation

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to involve Arab states would, in fact, almost certainly become the goal of Palestinian extremists if they were given the opportunity.

This does not mean that outside Arab support would succeed in helping the Palestinians win a conflict or sustain a long-term low-level war against Israel, or be able to give them enough additional military strength to force a better peace settlement. Israel can defeat its neighbors, and there are severe limits to how many arms or other forms of military support outside states could give to the Palestinian forces as long as Israel controlled the security of its borders and could seal off Gaza and access to the West Bank.

Palestinian forces might, however, gain significant additional political leverage if they could broaden their struggle to include Israel's Arab neighbors, dominate the Palestinian community and defeat the Palestinian supporters of the peace process, and/or obtain major supplies of arms, money, and training from extremist nations and movements outside the West Bank and Gaza.

**Dead Ends And A Peace of Exhaustion**

The ultimate irony behind all of these options and uncertainties is that neither side seems to have any military alternative to eventual peace negotiations that would allow it to truly “win” a Second Intifada. It is far from clear that the short-term military advantages to the IDF of even a successful separation of Israeli and Palestinians could offset longer-term, the political cost in terms of lasting Palestinian hatred and resentment. Even a much more drastic option, like turning Jordan into a Palestinian state would only create a permanent enemy on Israel’s border. One way or another, any probable outcome of future fighting will leave Israel and Palestinian extremely close neighbors and often intermingled, and any mass deportations might trigger a broader regional war. The Palestinian economy on the West Bank, in Jerusalem, and Gaza cannot be separated from the Israeli economy, and Jordan’s economy can only develop and ensure internal stability in Jordan if there is growing integration of the Jordanian, Palestinian, and Israeli economy.


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