



Cauldron of Terrorism or Bowl of Kasha?

What Survey Data Say About the North Caucasus

July 6, 2006

Theodore P. Gerber and Sarah E. Mendelson¹

PLEASE DO NOT CITE WITHOUT PERMISSION OF THE AUTHORS

¹ The authors express their sincere thanks to the Levada Analytic Center, to participants of two sets of meetings at CSIS on social conditions and instability, and especially Daniel Benjamin, Karin von Hippel and Cory Welt for their help and insights, and to Alina Tourkova, Iryna Vidanova, and James Kelly for research assistance. Funding for this survey was made possible by subcontract No. S9040-06 from Aguirre International to CSIS. Aguirre International's funding for this project came from USAID under a Global Evaluation and Monitoring Indefinite Quantity Contract, No. FAO-I-00-99-00010-00. This report serves as the primary deliverable for the contract (along with a CD-Rom containing tabulations of survey results disaggregated by age, education, religion, locality, regional stratification).

Policy makers in Russia and elsewhere have good reason to worry that the North Caucasus has become a dangerous cauldron brewing extremism and terrorism. For well over a decade, the region has been the site and source of increasing levels of violence, instability, and terrorism. Following the ceasefire that ended the first Chechen war in late 1996, terrorist bombings and incursions in Dagestan provoked the Russian government to send in federal troops once again in October 1999. The ensuing military conflict, which continues to this day, has produced massive numbers of military casualties, civilian victims, and refugees, involved shocking brutality against civilians, and fostered a surge in terrorist actions in the south and elsewhere in Russia. In October 2002, 130 died after Chechen terrorists seized 900 hostages in downtown Moscow's "Dubrovka" theater. Guerrillas based in Chechnya pulled off a lethal raid in Ingushetia in June 2004. In September 2004, following two airplane bombings and a metro bombing in downtown Moscow, terrorists raided a school, holding over 1000 hostages, in Beslan, North Ossetia, resulting in the deaths of hundreds, many of them children. In October 2005, over 60 people died in Nalchik, capital of Kabardino-Balkaria, when local youths joined terrorists from Chechnya in an assault on police and security forces. Explosions involving both civilian and government casualties have occurred on a nearly daily basis for several years now in southern Russia, the vast majority of which are never reported in the Western press.² Apart from these overt manifestations of violence, longer term tensions between the many different ethnic groups that reside in the region, reportedly rampant police brutality, sustained poverty, and the possible radicalization of the many Muslims are additional grounds for concern.³

Despite these growing concerns, relatively little is actually known about the people who live in these regions. Just how poor are they relative to the rest of the country, and does poverty increase the risk of instability? Are conditions so bad that we detect the potential for violent social mobilization? With a significant Muslim population, are these regions profoundly different than other parts of Russia? Do we see the "chasm" and the "deep attitudinal divide" widely reported between "Western and Muslim publics"?⁴ Given the years of instability and dislocation stemming from the wars in Chechnya, how anti-Chechen and/or anti-Russian are the locals? Do we detect warning signs of potential ethnic conflict?

To explore these questions empirically, we commissioned the Levada Analytic Center to conduct a survey of males ages 16 to 39 in three regions of the North Caucasus: Dagestan, Kabardino-Balkaria and North Ossetia. We chose these regions because of their proximity to Chechnya, the high level of terrorist activity, reported ethnic conflict,

² For more details on the widespread terrorist attacks in Russia during the last 3-4 years, see Mark Kramer, "The Perils of Counterinsurgency: Russia's War in Chechnya," *International Security* Vol. 29, No. 3 (Winter 2004/05); Doug Birch, "Islamic revival stirs angry youths in six Russian republics," *Baltimore Sun*, July 17, 2005; Sarah E. Mendelson, "Anatomy of Ambivalence: The International Community and Human Rights Abuse in the North Caucasus," September 2005, forthcoming in *Problems of Post-Communism*.

³ For a compact statement of the various reasons for concern about stability and terrorism in the North Caucasus, see John B. Dunlop and Rajan Menon, "Chaos in the North Caucasus and Russia's Future," *Survival*, Vol.48, no.2 (Summer 2006).

⁴ The Pew Attitudes Project, "The Great Divide: How Westerners and Muslims View Each Other," June 22, 2006, www.pewglobal.org

and violence in them, the lack of other recent surveys there, and the impossibility of conducting surveys in Chechnya and Ingushetia. We decided to limit our study to males because we view them as more likely to become involved in extremist movements and because of concerns that in the traditional male-dominated culture that prevails in parts of these regions we would have difficulty eliciting the independent views of female respondents.⁵ The fieldwork was conducted between May 2 and June 5, 2006. The initial target sample size was 1200, but because the plan was over-fulfilled in North Ossetia, the actual sample included 1238 respondents.

The survey addresses several issues widely regarded as “push factors” in radicalizing individuals: poor socio-economic conditions, the failure of political institutions, abuse by authorities and corruption, and ethnic or national marginalization.⁶ We also included a series of questions about what kinds of issues concern respondents the most, how they view the political role of Islam in their region, and their orientations toward a variety of ethnic, national, and religious groups. Finally, we explored knowledge of and attitudes toward assistance from U.S., European, Muslim, and international sources.⁷ The data offer us a unique opportunity to describe the social and economic conditions experienced by young men in the region and explore how these conditions are correlated with various attitudes at the individual level.

When assessing the survey results, the issue often arises of how to interpret certain figures. What is an appropriate benchmark for evaluating whether a given percentage is large or small? One way to deal with this dilemma is to compare the results to results from other contexts. Accordingly, wherever possible we compare our findings from these three regions in the North Caucasus to findings from other surveys we have conducted in Russia. In particular, we look at the data from the male respondents aged 16 to 39 from a July 2004 nationally representative sample and also data from the male respondents in a nationally representative survey of youths under 30 conducted in June 2005.⁸ These surveys are not perfect benchmarks: the first one took place two years

⁵ A Russian sociologist and interviewer reports that it is very hard to interview women in Dagestan without at least one male present, a practice that violates the principle of confidentiality in surveys. See V. Iu. Remmler, “Razmyshleniia posle issledovaniia – kommentariy k metodicheskomu otchetu oprosa: Dagestan,” *Vestnik Obshchestvennogo Mneniia* Vol. 1, no.81 (Ianvar’-Fevral’ 2006), pp. 72-75.

⁶ There is a vast literature on this topic and much debate as to which variable is the necessary and sufficient driver for radicalism. See for example, Philip Keefer and Norman Loayza, editors, “Terrorism and Economic Development” (Unpublished Manuscript, 2006); Marc Sageman, *Understanding Terror Networks* (Philadelphia, Pa: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004); Anne Speckhard and Khapta Akhmedova, “The Making of a Martyr: Chechen Suicide Terrorism,” *Journal of Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* (2005); Mia Bloom, *Dying to Kill: The Allure of Suicide Terror* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005).

⁷ On the potential for assistance to play a role in countering radicalization, see Karin von Hippel, “Counter Radicalization Development Assistance,” DIIS Working Paper, no 2006/9; Kim Cragin and Peter Chalk, *Terrorism and Development: Using Social and Economic Development to Inhibit a Resurgence of Terrorism* (Rand, 2003).

⁸ The 2004 survey was funded by a grant from the Ford Foundation and included probabilistic samples of the adult population 16 to 64 years old. For our comparisons, we consider only the 413 males under 40 in the sample. The 2005 survey of youths was funded by grants from the Charles Stewart Mott Foundation and the Glaser Progress Foundation. We consider the 991 male respondents from that sample.

earlier and the second, while more recent, does not include 30 to 39 year olds. But they nonetheless give us some basis for assessing how distinctive the situation and attitudes of the males in the North Caucasus are relative to the rest of Russia. We must, after all, consider the possibility that overall the situation does not differ that much; rather than a seething cauldron of terrorism, the North Caucasus regions resemble instead a bowl of kasha, more similar to the rest of the country than different.

Caveats

Before reporting our results, we want to make clear a few limitations of our study. To begin with, time constraints associated with the funding mechanism for this project prevented us from conducting focus groups or consulting extensively with experts on the region prior to writing the survey. As a result, we were not able to develop questions or response categories on the basis of conversations in local idiom about the issues we surveyed on. We have no way of knowing for sure, but we suspect that in some cases we might have used different formulations had we had focus group or interview materials at hand. However, most questions were either derived from earlier focus groups conducted elsewhere in Russia by CSIS and the Levada Center, or they are standard questions that appear on Levada surveys. We did have the survey instrument pre-tested in late April 2006 in the three regions, and the pre-test results gave us no basis for concern that the questions were not comprehensible to respondents. We considered whether it would be worth considerable expense to translate the questionnaire into local languages other than Russian, but ultimately we decided not to, because most of the young men in these regions speak Russian and translation would have required too much time.

In designing the survey, we also faced some substantive constraints. The Levada Center staff indicated that we could not include “political” questions on issues relating to state sovereignty or the legitimacy of federal, regional, or local government authority, as such questions might attract suspicions on the part of local authorities and jeopardize the safety of interviewers. Given what we have heard about the level of police coercion in these regions and previous experiences of the Levada Center in conducting polls there, we were especially concerned to neither raise the ire of local authorities nor spark suspicion on the part of survey respondents. At one point, we sought partnership with an international organization in order to potentially minimize the risk of alienating the local authorities. The international organization declined. While the Levada Center has decades of experience surveying in Russia, they have only recently begun to survey in these regions. The high security threats have kept them away for many years – and indeed, they still do not survey in Ingushetia or Chechnya. We therefore want to underscore the extreme difficulty in fielding this survey, and how in many ways it should be regarded as a pilot project even though we have surveyed nearly a dozen times in Russia.

Main Findings

The most important and surprising general finding that emerges from our survey is that, apart from the region’s unusually high poverty and unemployment and with a few other exceptions, *the young males of this region in many ways resemble males of the same age*

group in other parts of Russia in terms of their attitudes and concerns. We do not find much evidence that the socio-economic environment of this region has, to this point, generated unusual levels of hostility towards government institutions, Russians, or Westerners, nor has it produced a widespread desire for the Islamization of politics, support for the Chechen cause, or animosities among local ethnic groups. Despite a high proportion of Muslims and non-ethnic Russians in this survey, we do not find much of a “values gap” between these regions and other regions of Russia. The survey does point to considerable dissatisfaction with social services, which extremists could exploit to destabilize the region. On the other hand, the situation is not so bleak that donors who wish to improve the economy should be deterred from investing in these regions. The results point to some specific areas that are in need of investment.

The main findings from the survey are as follows:

- The three regions are quite diverse in their ethnic and religious composition, as well as in many economic measures, suggesting we should avoid making sweeping generalizations about “the North Caucasus.” The distributions on nearly all variables of interest differ statistically across these three regions. Accordingly, in every case we report separate sets of findings for each region.
- Poverty and unemployment are widespread in all three regions. Unemployment rates among the survey respondents were 35% in Kabardino-Balkaria, 33% in Dagestan, and 29% in North Ossetia. In each region, fewer than half of the respondents earn enough money to sustain themselves and more than half live in households with total incomes below the most recent official “subsistence minimums.”
- Economic issues are paramount among the concerns of young men in all three regions – more so than elsewhere in Russia.
- At the same time, measures of subjective economic distress are near the national averages in our sample regions.
- Substantial if varying proportions of respondents voice dissatisfaction with local and regional authorities, as well as local health, education, police, and youth services. In each region roughly two in five respondents have directly experienced corruption in higher education, medical facilities, and the police.
- Yet, trust in President Putin and in regional governors is high throughout the region, and trust in the military, the courts, and the police is about the same as the national average.
- Respondents report somewhat lower levels of experiences with police abuse than we observed in this demographic in our July 2004 national survey. About 44% fear arbitrary arrest and about the same fear being physically mistreated by the police, but only about 8% report this happening to them or someone they know in the last three years.

- Nearly 20% of respondents in Dagestan believe Islam should play “a very important role in the political life of the republic.” About 16% in Kabardino-Balkaria believe this; only 3% in North Ossetia. However, agreement with this statement is not systematically related to other attitudes and probably does not reflect support for Islamic radicalism. Our survey does not provide any evidence in support of the view that radicalized Islam is becoming popular in these three regions.
- Despite the diverse ethnic composition in these regions, ethnic tensions and animosities (including animosity toward Russians) are low, and reported experiences of discrimination are relatively infrequent. There is one important exception, which pertains to Ingush in North Ossetia.
- Anti-American sentiment is relatively rare, and less prevalent than anti-Chechen and anti-Gypsy feelings. Hostility towards Danes, Swedes, Catholics, and Muslims is negligible.
- More general suspicion regarding the West is fairly widespread in the regions, but no more so than elsewhere in Russia.
- Most young men in these regions would support foreign funding for schools and hospitals from multiple sources – Western or Muslim, nongovernmental or governmental, or from international organizations like the United Nations.

Basic Demographic Characteristics and Ethnic Composition

The distributions of our samples by age, marital status, education, and locality type are presented in *Table 1*, along with the corresponding distributions from our July 2004 national sample of males 16 to 39. The distributions show that our regional samples include fairly balanced distributions across age categories, which reassures us that differences across regions do not reflect differences in the age distributions in the regional samples. Compared to the national averages, young males in Dagestan and Kabardino-Balkaria are somewhat more likely to be married, and in all three regions, they are less likely to be cohabiting. We assume these findings reflect the more socially conservative nature of these regions. The education distributions in our three regions of interest are somewhat more polarized than the national average for males under 40, with larger numbers of respondents who did not complete secondary school and also (aside from Dagestan) larger numbers reporting that they have a university degree. Our samples were designed to include residents from the oblast capital, from other towns and cities, and from rural villages in proportion to the relative proportions in the population.

The composition and size of the households in which our respondents live deserve special mention. We speculate that young males living alone or exclusively with other males would be more likely to become involved in extremist activity. There does not seem to be much systematic evidence to test this. But if it is so, then the typical household formations in these regions serves as a deterrent to extremism. In all three regions, our young male respondents are substantially more likely to live with their parents than the national sample of young male respondents. They almost universally live with at least

one female in the household, be she a mother, grandmother, sister, wife, daughter, cousin, or aunt. Thus, nearly all of the young men in these regions have routine contact with females. While they are no more likely to live with their grandparents, the young men in these regions are more likely than young men elsewhere in Russia to live in larger households. Only a very few live by themselves, and 60% to 75% (more in Dagestan, fewer in North Ossetia) live with at least three other people. This undoubtedly reflects the higher fertility and the prevalence of more traditional extended family arrangements in these regions. Of course, young males living in large households can also become involved in extremist activities, but generally we think that they are less likely to do so than males living alone, particularly if their parents and/or at least one female also live in their household. At the very least, we think the relationship of family structure and extremism is an additional variable that cries out for more research.

The ethnic diversity of these regions is captured in *Table 2*, which shows all the ethnic groups that constitute at least 1% of the population in each republic, along with their associated proportions based on the 2002 Census and the survey samples. Our survey samples come fairly close to duplicating the official proportions. In some cases the population percentage falls outside the confidence interval around our survey estimate; however, the population data pertain to the overall population while our survey population is males 16 to 39. Thus, it would not be appropriate to use the population data as a strict benchmark. These figures demonstrate the degree to which ethnic Russians represent ethnic minorities in these regions, particularly in Dagestan.

In several analyses below we find it useful to distinguish three ethnic groups in each region: the majority ethnicity, ethnic Russians, and other minority ethnicities. In both Kabardino-Balkaria and North Ossetia, the majority ethnicities are proportionately represented in the survey data. In Dagestan, no group has majority status. We combine the three largest ethnic groups – Avars, Dargins, and Kumyks – into a single “majority” category, since together they constitute roughly 60% of the population and they apparently share the most access to positions of political or administrative authority. The sample sizes of other specific ethnic groups that would be especially interesting to analyze separately – Chechens and Azeris in Dagestan, Ingush in North Ossetia – are too small for the data to offer reliable information. The Chechens and Ingush are under-sampled, but even if they were sampled proportionately to their population weight there would be too few of them for meaningful analysis given our overall sample sizes. They would have to be purposefully over-sampled in order to study their experiences and attitudes separately.

The overall response rate among respondents identified as eligible for the survey was 94.5%. If we include in the denominator households who were included in the sample but whom the interviewers could not contact after three tries, the response rate was 89.4%. Whichever the measure, the response rate was exceptionally high for this survey, which probably reflects, in our view, the relative novelty of survey research in this part of Russia. As quality control measures, a randomly-selected 20% of the respondents were contacted -- 211 by telephone and 42 by return visits -- in order to verify the work of the interviewers. These contacts revealed 13 cases of mistakes by interviewers. In each of these cases, there were multiple eligible respondents (males 16-29) in the household, and the interviewer chose the wrong one to interview (in such cases, the sample design

required interviewers to choose the eligible respondent with the closest birthday). These 13 interviews were re-done with the proper respondent. Based on the quality control results, we might suspect that about 6% of the interviews among the remaining 1027 were conducted with the incorrect respondent. However, this is a minor violation of sampling procedure that is unlikely to affect the results in any way. Overall, the high response rate and the very positive results of the quality control suggest that the survey was carried out with diligence and professionalism.

Socio-Economic Conditions: Poor But Not in Total Despair

The Russian government has experienced an enormous windfall in the last several years due to the ever increasing prices of gas and oil on the global market. The Kremlin in late June announced it would pay off its foreign debt by the summer of 2006.⁹ According to other sources, it has set aside “\$50 billion in a domestic ‘stabilization fund.’”¹⁰ Whatever the windfall, such good news has apparently had relatively little impact on the economic situation of the majority of respondents in these regions.

Employment, earnings, and poverty

The most direct measures of the economic standing of respondents are presented in *Table 3*. Our survey confirms the prevalence of unemployment in these regions. In each republic about 44% of the respondents are either working for hire or employed as their main activity – compared to 70% in the national sample from July 2004. The official unemployment rate (the unemployed as a percentage of the active labor force) ranges from 29% in North Ossetia to 35% in Kabardino-Balkaria, compared to 11% of young males nationally in July 2004.¹¹ Clearly, unemployment is a major problem for young men in these three regions, and much more of a problem there than elsewhere in Russia. Supplementary or irregular work is also hard to come by: fewer than one fifth of the respondents in each of the republics report having such work in the previous month.

The most recent available official Goskomstat wage data (from March 2006) suggest that even if young men in these three republics find jobs, those jobs are not likely to pay very well. The mean monthly wage in each region stood at roughly half the national average wage – less than half in Dagestan. The survey data tell a similar story, though they suggest that wages are actually lowest in Kabardino-Balkaria. Whether we consider the arithmetic mean, the median, or the geometric mean (the anti-log of the mean logged wage, which is less sensitive to influence by positive outliers), the reported incomes are substantially below the national average for March 2006. In fact, among those who reported incomes, 84% in Dagestan, 91% in Kabardino-Balkaria, and 80% in North Ossetia said they earned less than that average.

⁹ <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/5109362.stm>

¹⁰ Dmitri Trenin, “Russia Leaves the West,” *Foreign Affairs*, July/August 2006, p. 93.

¹¹ We calculated the unemployment rate using the conservative approach of treating those currently serving in the military as if they are currently employed.

Of course, prices may well be lower in these regions, and that could offset the income gaps relative to the rest of Russia. To assess the extent of poverty implied by our data, we thus consider two more direct measures. Regional governments calculate region-specific poverty lines (“subsistence minimums”) by determining the cost of a basic set of foodstuffs. Separate poverty lines are computed for children, working age adults, and pensioners. The most recent updates of these subsistence minimums are from the fourth quarter of 2004 for Dagestan, the first quarter of 2006 for Kabardino-Balkaria, and the fourth quarter of 2005 for North Ossetia. We apply these figures in two ways. First, we compare the total income earned by the respondent (from both primary employment and supplementary jobs) to the poverty line for a working age adult, treating the earnings of those who are not currently working as zero. Using this benchmark, about three in five respondents from each region do not earn enough to sustain themselves, based on the official poverty lines.

Second, we compute the implied poverty line for the respondent’s household, using the information we have on its size and the ages of each of its members.¹² Comparing each household’s implied poverty line to the total household income from all sources (as reported by the respondent), we find that 65% of the households in Dagestan and about three-quarters in the other two regions have total incomes that put them below the poverty line. When we consider the same measures for respondents 21 and older (on the grounds that younger respondents may not accurately know the total income of their household), we find only slightly smaller figures. In short, by both measures our data suggest that unemployment is widespread in these three regions, with rates about triple the national average, and that half or more of males under 40 live in households that are below the official poverty lines.

Main concerns: economic

Given the prevalence of poverty and unemployment evident in our data, it is not surprising that economic issues rank at the top of the concerns expressed by the young men in our survey (*Table 4*). We have two different questions that attest to this. First, at the outset of the survey we asked respondents which of a set of 23 specific problems facing the country trouble them the most, asking them to choose no more than six from the list. In each region, unemployment was chosen by more respondents than any other problem. Rising prices and poverty came in third and fourth -- except in North Ossetia, where the threat of a terrorist act and the growth of drug abuse occupied these positions. Generally, respondents in North Ossetia appear to be somewhat less affected by and worried about economic issues. Also strikingly, corruption and bribery came in second place in all three regions.

To put these figures in perspective, it is worth comparing them to the concerns voiced by male respondents in our June 2005 youth survey (*Figure 1*). For the most part, the degrees of particular concerns in the three republics are quite similar to the national averages: there are few differences of more than 10 percentage points. The most noteworthy exception is that compared to the national averages, respondents from the

¹² We only know the ages for up to seven household members. For households with more than seven members, we assign the mean poverty line to each member about whom we lack the requisite information.

three republics analyzed herein are much more concerned about unemployment. They are also somewhat more concerned about corruption and bribery (especially in Dagestan), rising prices and poverty (except for in North Ossetia), and the threat of a terrorist act in their locality (especially in North Ossetia). In all three republics there is less concern about the spread of AIDS and about ecological problems than there is among young males in the rest of Russia. Young men in Dagestan and Kabardino-Balkaria evince substantially less concern about the growth of drugs and crime, while those in Dagestan and North Ossetia are less likely than average to cite police brutality or the cost of education.

Of the factors that have often been cited as possible stimulants for extremism, poor economic performance and official corruption stand out as the most salient in the minds of the survey respondents in the three regions of concern. Given what we have read and heard about violent, heavy-handed tactics on the part of local authorities, rampant crime, and rising ethnic tensions, it is surprising that relatively few respondents identify police brutality and the growth of nationalism or crime as one of the most pressing problems. Given reports of frequent terrorist activity, we are also surprised that fear of terrorist attacks is not more widespread. It is, however, substantially more pronounced in North Ossetia (and also among the residents of all three provincial capitals), as we would expect in light of the Beslan attack in 2004. Also, the somewhat higher concern over police brutality in Kabardino-Balkaria is consistent with reports that this problem is particularly acute there – but even there it is no greater than the national average. Chechnya barely registers among the concerns of young men in these regions, even though the conflict is nearby.

The primacy of economic issues also appears when we ask respondents which problems from a list complicate their own lives the most. Substantial majorities cite low income/lack of money. “Everyday troubles,” which can encompass a wide range of problems, rank second, followed by unemployment. Here too we find somewhat less concern about economic issues in North Ossetia.

Subjective Economic Standing

Although objective measures indicate that unemployment and poverty are major issues in the region and the questions regarding the respondents’ main concerns tell the same story, we get a slightly different picture when we examine subjective measures of economic well-being (*Table 5*). In light of the findings we have just seen, it is surprising that fewer than 20% of respondents in each region characterize their household’s economic situation as either “bad” or “very bad,” and that each region closely resembles the national average on the distribution of answers to this question. The large number of “average” responses suggests that impoverished residents of the North Caucasus regions may have become accustomed to poverty; that is, they have come to view it as a normal, if lamentable state of affairs.

We see more evidence for this interpretation in assessments of change in the last year: in each region, respondents are more likely to note an improvement than deterioration in their household’s economic standing. Improvement is especially common in North Ossetia. Moreover, optimism regarding the future far outweighs pessimism in all three

regions, with 14% in North Ossetia expecting a significant material improvement in the next year. Very few in all three regions anticipate that their economic status will worsen, but substantial numbers find it hard to predict the future. Asked to characterize the general economic situation, most respondents in all three regions say that life is bearable or even “not so bad,” while only 12%-15% say the situation is unbearable. These numbers are very close to the national average. But when asked to assess conditions in their town or village, respondents tend toward more negative responses. This is especially the case in Kabardino-Balkaria, where 60% describe their local situation as bad or very bad. Dagestan and North Ossetia respondents do not differ from the national averages.

In sum, the subjective measures of economic well-being that we have at hand suggest that economic problems, while salient and serious, do not translate into absolute despair or widespread pessimism – at least no more in the North Caucasus than elsewhere in Russia. Perhaps residents in these impoverished regions have grown accustomed to economic difficulties, which are long-standing.

Firm type, occupation, and job satisfaction

We can get some sense of the particular economic development challenges facing the region from the distributions of employed respondents across firm type and occupation categories (*Table 6*). Relative to the rest of Russia, industry and construction are quite under-developed in all three regions. The sector that claims a disproportionate share of the workforce is that of security organs, which employ a full 23% of the working respondents in North Ossetia.¹³ Small businesses appear relatively more prevalent in these regions than elsewhere in Russia, particularly in Dagestan and Kabardino-Balkaria, where sole-proprietor firms account for 26% and 21% of employment. However, this implies a relative under-development of larger enterprises and employers. The survey suggests there are very few foreign-owned companies working in these regions. While the absence of foreign-owned companies in Dagestan is not surprising, only 1% in Kabardino-Balkaria and 2% in North Ossetia report working in a company with foreign capital. As for occupation, our sample includes a balanced distribution across broad occupational groups, though there are few agricultural laborers. It is worth noting that earnings do not vary significantly by either occupation or education, implying that the economic infrastructure that provides returns to human capital is lacking in the area.

We asked employed respondents about their level of satisfaction with three aspects of their jobs: wages, job security, and opportunities to use their skills (*Table 7*). In each of these aspects, workers are more satisfied in North Ossetia than in the other two regions, yet another sign that economic conditions are generally better in North Ossetia. Dissatisfaction is greatest over wages and especially strong in Kabardino-Balkaria. Unease over job security is most pronounced in Dagestan.

Phone and computer access

¹³ We checked a number of attitude measures to see if employees of the security organs have distinct views or experiences, and we found that they express more confidence in the army, Putin, and the police.

Finally, we close this section on material standing by noting that these populations are not especially well wired to the outside world. Only one quarter of the Dagestan respondents have a phone at home, versus about two-thirds in Kabardino-Balkaria and North Ossetia. On the other hand, mobile phone ownership is quite high: from 51% (in North Ossetia) to 58% (in Kabardino-Balkaria). About 64% in all three regions never use a computer, while 82% of respondents in Kabardino-Balkaria and Dagestan, as opposed to 70% in North Ossetia, never use the internet. Daily use of the internet is at single digits: 4% in Dagestan, 8% in Kabardino-Balkaria and 7% in North Ossetia.

Performance of institutions

How well do public institutions function in this region? We have seen that corruption and bribery rank second among the concerns of the young men in all three of these regions, a first indication that there are problems in public institutions. In this section, we present a series of findings that reinforce this impression: the poor performance of local institutions, in particular, appears to be a major issue in these regions.

To start with, consider the responses when we asked how often local and regional governments address the needs of the respondents' locality (*Table 8*). Nearly two-thirds of the young men in Dagestan and Kabardino-Balkaria say this happens "rarely" or "never" with respect to local government, while 44% say this in North Ossetia. The numbers are similar with respect to regional governments. Only single digits in each region believe that either local or regional governments address their needs often. This is one indication of broad dissatisfaction in the performance of local and regional government institutions, a topic which we will explore in greater depth momentarily.

First, however, we note considerably greater confidence in certain federal institutions and even in the republic presidents. We posed a standard series of questions ascertaining the extent to which respondents believe certain institutions deserve confidence or trust. Despite the high unemployment and concerns over corruption and the economy, President Putin enjoys surprisingly high levels of trust throughout these regions: 77% in Dagestan, 83% in Kabardino-Balkaria and 75% in North Ossetia say that he deserves at least some confidence. These figures are no lower than the national average for young males in July 2004. Regional leaders also record high levels of trust despite possible concerns over the appointment rather than election of these leaders and the general sense that regional government does not address local needs: 71% in Kabardino-Balkaria trust the president of the republic, Arsen Kanokov; 64% in Dagestan trust Mukhu Aliyev and 52% in North Ossetia trust Taymuraz Mamsurov. Confidence in the army is also relatively high – as high or higher than the national average from July 2004 – among young males in these regions, ranging from about half the respondents in Dagestan to nearly three quarters in Kabardino-Balkaria. Although employees of the security services are, not surprisingly, especially likely to voice trust in these institutions, when we look only at respondents who are not working in the military or police we find essentially the same patterns – that is, the overall averages are not driven by the relatively large numbers of security service employees in the samples.

One federal institution does not enjoy much confidence: the courts. In Dagestan, mistrust of the courts is more widespread (63%) than the national average of 45%, which is about

the level of distrust in the other two regions. Perhaps the courts are especially corrupt and ineffective in Dagestan. Elsewhere mistrust in them only slightly predominates over trust in them. We also asked about trust in the police and in local religious leaders, and we address these topics below.

Local Institutions

Turning back to local institutions, we asked respondents to evaluate how six different social service institutions perform in their locality (*Table 9*). The results should be of interest to donors because they help identify needs that can be addressed. Respondents were especially negative about programs for youth and social welfare services for poor families. We found that 40% in Dagestan, 63% in Kabardino-Balkaria and 38% in North Ossetia report that local programs aimed at addressing the problems of young people are bad or very bad. In Dagestan, 30% view them as at least satisfactory, while 21% in Kabardino-Balkaria and 48% in North Ossetia report the same. We speculate that this higher sense of satisfaction in North Ossetia is related to programs that were developed in the aftermath of Beslan. Only 6% in Dagestan, 7% in Kabardino-Balkaria and 8% in North Ossetia report that the local social service programs are good or very good. Thirty-three percent in Dagestan, 47% in Kabardino-Balkaria and 44% in North Ossetia report they are bad or very bad. Higher education, health care, and the protection of minority rights did somewhat better, though the latter evoked a large number of “hard to say” responses.

Medical care seems in need of attention, especially in Dagestan, where 32% respond that the medical services are bad or very bad (19% in Kabardino-Balkaria and 26% in North Ossetia respond that way). At least 65% in all these communities respond that the medical care is satisfactory or better. Another question tells a similar story. We also asked respondents whether they would be able to obtain proper medical if they or their family members became seriously ill: 44% in Dagestan, 43% in Kabardino-Balkaria, and 38% in North Ossetia did not think they would. Of those people, 63% in Dagestan about half in North Ossetia said quality care is not accessible, while in Kabardino-Balkaria the main reason given (60%) was inability to afford care.

One reason why residents in these regions may be dissatisfied with local services could be corruption. We asked whether and how frequently during the past 2-3 year respondents personally encountered corruption (including bribery, or abuse of the position of authority) in their dealings with six institutions (*Table 10*). Journalists have written about how doctors in Russia often demand supplementary payments from patients in order to provide treatment.¹⁴ Excluding respondents who said they had not had any dealings with each institution, we find that from 40% (in Kabardino-Balkaria) to 45% (in North Ossetia) experienced corruption at least once when dealing with hospitals and clinics. Indeed, hospitals and clinics in North Ossetia appear to be perhaps the most corrupt of public institutions in the region (compared to universities, schools, federal or local authorities and even the police).

¹⁴ Peter Baker and Susan Glasser, *Kremlin Rising: Vladimir Putin's Russia and the End of Revolution* (New York: Scribner, 2005), p. 190.

We have confidence in these findings because we asked doctors about supplemental payments in a 2005 survey. Our results suggest that this form of corruption does take place: 13 percent of the 800 hospital doctors surveyed said that a few doctors in their establishment demand such payments and another 2 percent say that more than half do.¹⁵ Taking into account that doctors may well understate the prevalence of this practice out of loyalty to their colleagues (and perhaps out of their own guilt, if they themselves take extra payments), these numbers suggest that supplementary payments enter into a non-trivial number of doctor/patient relationships.

In the North Caucasus survey, we also find a fair amount of experience with or witness to corruption in universities and institutes: 35% in Dagestan, 46% in Kabardino-Balkaria and 44% in North Ossetia. Corruption seems relatively less prevalent in secondary schools and local and federal government organs.

Police abuse and corruption

As for the police: among those who had dealings with them, 32% in Dagestan, 45% in Kabardino-Balkaria, and 34% in North Ossetia experienced corruption. Thus, the organization that is most directly responsible for enforcing the laws is rife with corruption, especially in Kabardino-Balkaria.

In our 2004 national survey, we found that both police violence and police corruption are widespread in Russia, though our estimates of their prevalence are somewhat lower than figures reported by others. Given the particularly high concerns over police brutality in the North Caucasus, we devoted a number of other questions to experiences and views about police and the courts (*Table 11*). Although respondents report numerous experiences of police corruption, our results suggest that violent abuse by the police is actually less widespread in these regions than it is elsewhere in Russia.

In all three regions, fear of police violence is lower than the national average for young males in 2004: 41% in Dagestan, 42% in Kabardino-Balkaria, and 36% in North Ossetia, fear abuse by the police “a great deal” or “somewhat,” compared to 60% nationally. Correspondingly, substantially larger proportions in the three North Caucasus regions do not fear police violence at all. Fear of arbitrary arrest is also somewhat lower in the regions of present interest. As for fear of being convicted of a crime they did not commit, young men in North Ossetia are markedly less worried at this prospect than the national average, those in Kabardino-Balkaria are pretty close to the national average, and Dagestan respondents are more worried – yet another suggestion that suspicion of the courts is especially elevated in Dagestan.

Perhaps most striking of all, respondents in our North Caucasus survey reported fewer incidences of police violence directed against themselves or their family members than the young men in our national sample reported in July 2004: 6% of respondents in Dagestan, 9% in Kabardino-Balkaria and 11% in North Ossetia reported abuse of themselves and/or a family member, compared to 14% in our 2004 survey. Respondents

¹⁵ Theodore P. Gerber and Sarah E. Mendelson, “A Survey of Russian Doctors on HIV/AIDS,” January 2006 (unpublished manuscript).

in Dagestan were three times less likely in this 2006 survey to report being a victim of police abuse than the national 2004 survey data (4% versus 12%).

We checked to make sure that the surprisingly low level of concerns over and experiences of police abuse in the North Caucasus is an artifact of the relatively large number of security service employees in our samples. We found that, as expected, security service employees are less likely to report such concerns and experiences. Nonetheless, the same basic conclusions hold for the rest of the samples analyzed separately: these concerns and experiences are lower than the national averages from our 2004 study. It may be that respondents in the North Caucasus are more likely to underreport police abuse than respondents elsewhere in Russia, or that the national situation has improved dramatically in this respect during the last two years. But it is also possible that the prevalence of police abuse is actually less widespread than conventional wisdom suggests – a view informed by media coverage and other less systematic inquiries.

At the same time, the numbers we saw above suggest that corruption and bribery among the police are very serious problems in these regions. These phenomena, rather than police violence and arbitrary arrest, may explain why mistrust of the police is high: 65% in Dagestan and Kabardino-Balkaria, 60% in North Ossetia do not trust the police. Only 24% in Dagestan, 28% in Kabardino-Balkaria, and 29% in North Ossetia have some trust in the police. But these numbers are very similar to the national averages. Moreover, we saw earlier that police brutality ranks lower in the concerns of young men in Dagestan and North Ossetia than it does among young men elsewhere in Russia, while in Kabardino-Balkaria the level of concern is similar to the national average.

Overall, our findings suggest that police violence and arbitrary arrest are perhaps less salient problems in the North Caucasus than many accounts indicate. Instead, corruption among the police – as with other local institutions – emerges as a more common experience and a more pressing concern.

Religion and Politics

Clearly, the possible emergence of Islamic extremism in the North Caucasus is an important concern. Some observers assert that radical Islam is gaining ground there, specifically in Dagestan.¹⁶ Some politicians in the region make this claim to justify cracking down on Muslim populations, especially in Kabardino-Balkaria.¹⁷ Certain Russian officials place the number of Russian Muslims that identify as Wahhabi at 500,000 although no research apparently backs that claim. Russian law enforcement is

¹⁶ See Sergei Markedonov, head of interethnic relations department of Moscow's Institute of Political and Military Analysis," interviewed by RFE/RL, "Analyst Warns of Rising Radical Islam," May 5, 2006 <http://www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2006/05/3a1dac8b-4d1d-488a-bbe0-36749afa816a.html>. See also Dunlop and Menon, "Chaos in the North Caucasus."

¹⁷ "Kabardino-Balkaria's Young Want to Immigrate to Avoid Harassment," August 31, 2005, RFE/RL, <http://www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2005/08/322ab34b-c4c9-4797-97bb-5f1f8d17199a.html>

alleged to believe that up to 10% of Muslims in Russia are extremist.¹⁸ We know that jihadist websites, and indeed Osama Bin Laden himself, often invoke the need to support the “jihadists cause” in Chechnya.¹⁹

The religious composition of our regional samples corresponds to what we would expect: Muslims predominate overwhelmingly in Dagestan (85%), less overwhelmingly in Kabardino-Balkaria (62%), and represent a minority in North Ossetia (8%), where Orthodox Christians are the slight majority and one-quarter are non-believers (*Table 12*).

We asked respondents what they perceive is the actual role of Islam in the political life of their republic and how large a role they want for Islam. Not surprisingly, given the different sizes of the Muslim populations in the three regions, the assessment of Islam’s actual political role as “very important” or “important” was most widespread in Dagestan (50%), followed by Kabardino-Balkaria (41%) and North Ossetia (25%). It is perhaps worthy of note that in North Ossetia the percentage who make this assessment is considerably higher than the percentage of Muslims, which could point to a widespread concern about the political role of Islam in that region.

Three quarters of those in Dagestan and Kabardino-Balkaria believe Islam *should* play at least *some* role while only 48% in North Ossetia believe that. Undoubtedly, some observers will interpret this as evidence that radical Islam is taking hold. However, the number who respond it should play a “very important” role is much smaller, with the highest responses in Dagestan with 20%, and 16% in Kabardino-Balkaria and only 3% in North Ossetia.

Another way to analyze these results is to compare the actual and desired role of Islam. To do this, we distinguished those who want a greater role for Islam than they currently see, those who want a lesser role, and those who currently see precisely the role they wish find it hard to say. Presumably, an Islamic extremist would want Islam to play a greater role than currently, and someone concerned about the growth of Islam’s political role would want a lesser role. By this measure, it appears that 23% of respondents in Dagestan and Kabardino-Balkaria would like a greater role, compared to only 9% in North Ossetia. However, this sentiment is about equally shared by Muslims and non-Muslims in Dagestan, suggesting that there Islam might be generally perceived as a moderating or cleansing force in politics rather than a radicalizing force. In Kabardino-Balkaria and in North Ossetia we see larger gaps between Muslims and non-Muslims. At the same time, relatively few non-Muslims in all three republics say that want Islam to

¹⁸ Paul Goble, “500,000 Russian Muslims are Wahhabis, Moscow Official Says,” *Window on Eurasia*, August 8, 2005.

¹⁹ “Transcript: Bin Laden Accuses West,” April 23, 2006. <http://english.aljazeera.net/NR/exeres/F9694745-060C-419C-8523-2E093B7B807D.htm> FBI officials have elicited “sworn statements” from alleged jihadists on support for Chechnya. See Tim Golden, “Jihadist or Victim: Ex-Detainee Makes a Case,” *New York Times*, June 15, 2006. Four Russian diplomats were killed in Iraq in June allegedly because the Russian government failed to respond to the al-Qaeda related terrorist requests to withdraw from Chechnya. (Reported on June 26, 2006, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/5115768.stm)

play less of a role in the republic's political life, which suggests that there is not widespread alarm about the supposed emergence of politicized Islam in these regions.

We ran a series of bivariate and multivariate analyses to see if support for a greater political role for Islam correlates with other variables that might be associated with Islamic extremists: anti-American and anti-Russian sentiment, support for the withdrawal of federal forces from Chechnya, and various anti-Western attitudes. In no case did we find a clear-cut relationship. Thus, we do not think our data provide much evidence of a surge in support for radical Islam in these republics.

Finally, we thought we might find evidence of growing Islamic radicalism in the form of especially high levels of confidence in religious leaders among Muslims. We found the highest level of trust in the region with the fewest Muslims: North Ossetia (81%). At 52% in Dagestan and 44% in Kabardino-Balkaria, trust in religious leaders among Muslims may seem high, but it is substantially lower than their levels of trust in Putin (77% and 85%) and the republic governor (65% and 77%). Of course, the relatively low trust in religious leaders could reflect dissatisfaction with those appointed by the government.²⁰ But given that the federal government has appointed regional political leaders and we do not find large amounts of distrust in them, we are skeptical that the low numbers for religious leaders reflects this unhappiness. In sum, our survey does not provide any evidence in support of the view that radicalized Islam is becoming popular in these three regions.

Chechnya and jihad

We have two other measures that might be taken as indirect measures of support for Islamic extremism in the region (*Table 13*). First, we asked respondents which of a series of policies they would like to see the Russian government pursue in Chechnya, a question we have posed on seven different surveys since Fall 2001. It is reasonable to assume that an individual who supports Islamic radicalism would want to see Russian federal forces withdraw. Instead, the most typical response in all three regions is "hard to say." While support for intensifying Russian military action in Chechnya is lower in all three regions than it was among the young men in our national sample from 2005, support for the withdrawal of federal troops is not notably higher in any of the three North Caucasus republics. We do find that Muslim respondents in all three regions are likely to advocate withdrawal, but only in North Ossetia (where the Muslim population is small) is that a majority view even among Muslims. Of course, individuals could advocate withdrawal of federal forces from Chechnya on many grounds other than a desire to see Chechnya become an Islamic republic. Thus, these measures represent a very high "upper limit" on any estimate of the extent of support for Islamic radicalism. Thus, it is worth applying additional criteria.

²⁰ For example, one human rights activist in Nalchik claims, according to RFE/RL that the young people have a lot of anger at the "Spiritual Directorate...siding with a government they describe as illegitimate, corrupt, and criminal, and not protecting the interests of Muslims." "Kabardino-Balkaria's Young Want to Migrate to Avoid Harassment," August 31, 2005, RFE/RL, <http://www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2005/08/322ab34b-c4c9-4797-97bb-5f1f8d17199a.html>

It also seems reasonable to assume that a supporter of Islamic radicalism would want Islam to play a very important role in the political life of his republic. Among those who desire such a role, support for withdrawal from Chechnya is indeed somewhat elevated in all three republics. It is also elevated among those in Kabardino-Balkaria and North Ossetia who want Islam to play a greater role than it currently does. But even among those who hold these views about Islam, support for withdrawal of federal forces from Chechnya remains a minority position.

Another indirect and soft measure of support for the cause of Islamic radicalism is how respondents understand the term “jihad.” We asked respondents whether they knew what the world jihad means, and if they answered yes, we asked whether they believe it refers to the struggle of Muslims against the devil within themselves, the struggle of Muslims against non-Muslims, or with both definitions.²¹ We assume that a supporter of Islamic radicalism would purport to know what jihad means and also define it as a struggle of Muslims against non-Muslims, so they would choose one of the latter two answers.²²

Among the Muslim respondents, 21% in Dagestan, 32% in Kabardino-Balkaria, and 36% in North Ossetia adhere to this definition of jihad. The numbers are fairly similar among those who want a very important or a more important political role for Islam in their republic, with (once again) especially high numbers in North Ossetia, where those who advocate these positions are small minorities. Of course, anyone might accept that definition without necessarily endorsing jihad.

Our measures of support for Islamic radicalism are all quite weak and soft. One can support withdrawal from Chechnya and a greater political role for Islam and also define jihad as a struggle against non-Muslims and at the same time reject Islamic radicalism. And yet it seems unlikely that one who embraces Islamic radicalism would *not* endorse withdrawal from Chechnya, an important political role for Islam, and a definition of jihad as a struggle against non-Muslims. Thus, by combining these three measures we obtain a more reliable upper limit – but an upper limit nonetheless – estimate of the extent of support for Islamic radicalism. If we treat *all* respondents who take *all three* positions consistent with Islamic radicalism as supporters of Islamic radicalism, we nonetheless find a mere 10 respondents out of 1238 fit the bill. Given that this measure is probably biased upward to a substantial degree, the conclusion is clear: *our data suggest that support for Islamic radicalism is, in fact, quite low among the young males in all three of these regions, even in Dagestan and Kabardino-Balkaria where Muslims predominate.*²³

²¹ We got the idea for this question from surveys conducted in Central Asia, where it was asked as a way of indirectly gauging support for radical Islam. We thank Johannes Linn for sharing the 2004 “Perceptions of Central Asia” survey instrument with us. In the North Caucasus, we might have liked to follow up with a question about whether the respondent would like to participate in a jihadist movement or organization, but such a question would have been far too direct and sensitive.

²² We also coded 22 of the 36 “other” responses to this question as reflecting a view that jihad refers to a struggle against non-Muslims (“war in the name of Allah,” “war against infidels,” etc.)

²³ Using alternative combinations of variables to measure Islamic radicalism yields even fewer supporters of Islamic radicalism. For example, only six respondents advocate a very important political role for Islam and withdrawal from Chechnya and also voice hostility toward Americans. Only one takes the first two positions and voices hostility toward Russians. None at all take the first two positions and also voice

Ethnic Relations

Numerous press and nongovernmental reports suggest a surge in xenophobic and hate crime activity throughout Russia.²⁴ Given the proximity of these regions to Chechnya, and given the intense ethnic mix, we asked with some trepidation about a variety of attitudes toward other ethnic groups. Such reports indicate that tensions between different ethnic groups have been rising. Yet these reports cannot be relied on to provide reliable information as to how widespread particular views are in a population or which demographic groups are especially likely to hold particular views.²⁵ Survey data are better suited to address these issues. Generally speaking, our data suggest that ethnic tensions and conflict are less pronounced in these three regions than incidence reports have suggested, although there are signs of some tensions in North Ossetia.

We start by examining questions pertaining to overall perceptions about the state of inter-ethnic relations and to experiences of discrimination based on ethnicity (*Table 14*). We asked respondents how they would describe relations between peoples of different ethnicities in their republic, with answers ranging from “very good” to “very bad.” Relatively small proportions in each region – 12% in Kabardino-Balkaria, 15% or 16% in the other two regions – characterized them as “somewhat bad” or “very bad.” Perhaps some respondents are reluctant to admit a great deal of concern over ethnic relations, since there are official laws against fomenting inter-ethnic hostility, and instead chose not to provide an answer. Even if we treat all the “hard to say” responses as equivalent to characterizing ethnic relations as bad, that position remains a minority view in all three republics: 25% in Dagestan, 16% in Kabardino-Balkaria, and 31% in North Ossetia.

Perhaps members of ethnic minorities take a less sanguine view of the state of ethnic relations than the majority ethnic groups. To see if this is so, we broke down the responses separately for the ethnic majorities, for ethnic Russians (minorities in all three relations), and for other minorities. We found that in Dagestan and Kabardino-Balkaria ethnic Russians hold especially negative views of the state of ethnic relations, but there are no differences between the ethnic majorities and other ethnic groups.²⁶ In North Ossetia, even ethnic Russians have similar views to the majority Ossetins. Perhaps one source of the conventional wisdom that ethnic tensions are high is the presumed reliance of journalists who cover these regions to interview disproportionately ethnic Russians, who it turns out appear to have unusually negative views. We also examined whether Muslims had distinctive views about the state of ethnic relations. In fact, Muslims have

hostility toward Danes, despite the recent surge of protests by radical Muslims against cartoons in Danish publications.

²⁴ RFE/RL, “Anti-Semitic, Racist Attacks a Growing Threat in Russia, Ukraine,” June 23, 2006, summarizes a recent presentation by Nikolai Butkevich in which he noted that “the month of April this year saw the largest number of racially motivated murders (7 murders), and that the number of attacks against minorities in Russia has increased over the last decade.”

²⁵ For an especially good source, see the webpage of the SOVA center, <http://sova-center.ru/>.

²⁶ There are only 16 ethnic Russians in our Dagestan sample, so these figures should not be given too much credence. There are 110 in Kabardino-Balkaria and 79 in North Ossetia.

considerably more positive views than non-Muslims in the two republics where they are the majority, but the reverse is the case in North Ossetia, where they are much in the minority.

Discrimination

We asked respondents whether they had personally experienced discrimination on the basis of their ethnicity in their dealings with the police, employers, or local government. Here we combine “hard to say” responses with those indicating occasional or frequent experiences of discrimination, on the grounds that “hard to say” probably indicates some suspicion of discriminatory behavior that the respondent is reluctant to forthrightly characterize as such. This decision means that, if anything, our results probably overstate the extent of discrimination. Even with this rather liberal measure, we find that 11% or fewer report these forms of discrimination in these three republics, with the lowest figures generally in Kabardino-Balkaria and the highest in North Ossetia. Here we do observe a divergence in the experiences of minority and majority groups, particularly in Dagestan and North Ossetia: both Russians and other minorities report significantly more frequent discrimination, especially by police and employers. Still, at most 25% of any particular group reports having been discriminated against. Muslims in North Ossetia also report particularly high levels of discrimination.

Ethnic animosities

To probe how respondents themselves view the various ethnic groups that predominate in their region, we asked how they relate to people from six of the largest ethnic groups (a different set of groups for each region). We posed the same question with regard to nine more global ethnic, national, and religious groups: Jews, Americans, Chechens, Gypsies, Swedes, Muslims, Danes, Catholics, and Russians. Respondents were asked to choose which of six response categories best describes how they view each specific group: 1. With admiration; 2. With kindness; 3. With no particular feelings – just like any other group; 4. With dislike; 5. With fear; 6. Hard to say.

When we disregard the small number of those who say hard to say, we find (as in earlier surveys) the majority in all localities regard all other groups neutrally (no particular feeling). There is one notable exception: 13% of respondents in Dagestan (which is mostly Muslim) view Muslims with admiration and 38% with kindness. But they also regard Russians with a significantly larger amount of kindness (36%). They are also the most anti-American by far (21%). In other words, they tend to be the least neutral respondents.

In *Table 15* we present the responses with respect to the local ethnic groups, along with Russians, Americans, and Chechens. Since negative responses are of more interest than positive responses, we focus on the percentages who voiced negative views toward each group. The data suggest that animosities directed toward particular ethnic groups are quite rare in Dagestan and Kabardino-Balkaria – among ethnic majorities, ethnic Russians, and other minorities alike. They are relatively low in North Ossetia too, with one important exception: more than half of the majority Ossetins hold negative views of Ingush, which translates into an overall percentage of 39% with negative views. This is

consistent with what we all learned in the aftermath of Beslan: there is a long-standing historical conflict between the Christian Ossetins and the Muslim Ingush, which the Beslan crisis only made worse. We would be surprised (and suspicious of the survey) had we not found a high level of animosity toward the Ingush among our Ossetin respondents.

The surprising finding is the virtual absence of any other pronounced ethnic animosity toward groups in these regions. Even ethnic Russians, who might well be perceived by non-Russians in these regions as representing colonial domination, are not the target of very much animosity. In contrast, in all three regions there is more animosity toward Americans and, to an even greater extent, toward Chechens than toward any locally predominant group. With the exception of the Ossetin-Ingush hostility, national, religious, and ethnic hostility is directed outside the borders of these republics, not within those borders.

As for globally-directed hostilities (*Table 16*), several results are of note. As we found in our national samples, “Gypies” (we do not use the term Roma on the survey) attract more animosity than any other group, followed by Chechens. Resentment of both groups is especially high in North Ossetia. Next come Americans, who are especially disliked in Dagestan. However, even in Dagestan only 21% say they dislike or fear Americans. Moreover, there is not much variation in views toward Americans (or other groups) by religion, suggesting that Islamic radicalism is not the primary basis for anti-American sentiment. Another sign of this is the relatively low levels of anti-Semitism in all three republics, though we do see a somewhat elevated level among Muslims in North Ossetia. There are minuscule levels of hostility towards Catholics, Swedes, Danes, and Russians. It is particularly striking – and perhaps telling – that so few young men in these regions harbor negative feelings toward Danes, given the recent wave of mass protests and violence in many European and Muslim countries against the Danish cartoons that depicted images of the prophet Mohamed. The fact that this issue apparently fails to have engaged the Muslim populations in these three republics casts further doubt on claims that they are hotbeds of Islamic radicalism.

Ethnicity and the authorities

Even if respondents do not personally harbor animosity toward individuals from other ethnic groups and do not see ethnic relations as generally tense, ethnicity could become an explosive political issue if some groups perceive that other groups receive better treatment by the authorities. Therefore, we also asked respondents whether they believe that six locally prominent ethnic groups (including the majorities and Russians) received better or worse treatment (*Table 17*).

In Dagestan, there is not much sentiment that groups are treated differentially by the authorities. Even among minorities, less than one quarter perceive advantageous treatment of either of the two largest groups (the 31% figures for ethnic Russians should be downplayed due to the small sample size). Equally important, few minorities see unfavorable treatment of Laks, Lezgins, or Russians.

In Kabardino-Balkaria, there is more widespread sentiment that the majority of Kabardins receive better treatment, and this view is especially pronounced (48%-49%) among ethnic Russians and other minorities. Some ethnic Russians also perceive favorable treatment for Balkars and unfavorable treatment for Russians, Turks, and Ukrainians. Among other ethnic minorities, very few perceive unfavorable treatment of minorities, and not many see better treatment for Russians and Balkars. Thus, while the perceptions of better treatment for Kabardins might be a source of growing resentment, the risk is mitigated by the tendency not to see unfavorable treatment of minorities. Also, it is worth noting that ethnic Russians are notably more likely to perceive differential treatment of one form or another than either the majority Kabardins or other minority groups.

In North Ossetia, the situation is again somewhat more troubled. Not only do one third of the sample – and one half of non-Russian minorities – perceive Ossetins as receiving better treatment; also, about one fifth say Russians are treated better and about one third say the Ingush are treated worse. Among non-Russian minorities, 16% also say that Kumyks receive worse treatment. This is more evidence that ethnic tensions and resentments are higher in North Ossetia than in the other two republics.

Still, given the degree of concern over the outbreak of ethnic-based conflict and violence in this region where many diverse ethnic groups co-exist, our results generally suggest that the situation is not so fraught, especially not in Dagestan and Kabardino-Balkaria.

Russia's Place in the World and the Role of Foreign Development Projects

We conclude our presentation of the findings by discussing responses to a series of questions designed to measure views toward the West and toward possible financing of development projects in the region by various foreign entities.

Anti-Western sentiment: like elsewhere in Russia

We asked six questions pertaining to different aspects of nationalism and Russia's place in the world, which we also included in our June 2005 national survey of young adults. The young males in our North Caucasus samples may not be especially nationalistic with respect to ethnic identity but, like a younger cohort of males sampled in 2005, they demonstrate somewhat nationalist tendencies when it comes to the topic of Russia.

Many young men in the three republics of interest appear to be suspicious of foreign influence. Most strikingly, 82 % in Dagestan, 78% in Kabardino-Balkaria, and 75% in North Ossetia agree Russia would be better off if foreigners “stopped imposing their ideas.” In a similar vein, 59% in Dagestan, 68% in Kabardino-Balkaria, and 50% in North Ossetia say foreigners who assist Russian organizations financially are trying to “meddle in Russia's affairs.” Though nowhere a majority, surprisingly large numbers (41% in Dagestan, 40% in Kabardino-Balkaria, 28% in North Ossetia) agree that “foreigners introduced AIDS into Russia in order to weaken the country.”

Clearly, these results all point to relatively strong anti-Western sentiment, as does the tendency of the majority in each region to disagree with the statement that Russia should try to become a European country rather than pursue its own path. At the same time, we

should keep in mind that the distributions of opinions on these issues in the three North Caucasus regions do not diverge much from the national averages among the male respondents to our June 2005 national survey of Russians under 30. The most noteworthy exception pertains to the question about AIDS, which distinctively large numbers in Dagestan and Kabardino-Balkaria view as a Western plot to undermine Russia. Otherwise, while anti-Western sentiment appears to be prevalent in the North Caucasus, it seems no more prevalent there than in the rest of Russia.

By one measure, however, male youths in the three republics of interest see some commonality between themselves and young people elsewhere: they tend to agree (62% in Dagestan, 75% in Kabardino-Balkaria, and 65% in North Ossetia) that young people in Russia want the same things as young people in Western Europe. Again, in this they resemble the national average for young males – if anything, young males in the North Caucasus are more likely to agree.

They also resemble other young Russian males in their overwhelming rejection of the idea that Russia should apologize for the Soviet occupation of the Baltics (76% in Dagestan, 74% in Kabardino-Balkaria, and 58% in North Ossetia). No more than 8% agree that such an apology, which would bring Russia's understanding of that period in line with that of the West, would be appropriate. Given the history of deportations and collective punishment of specific ethnic groups in this region, it is a bit surprising to see so few take a critical position regarding another instance where the Soviet state crushed a smaller and weaker national group. This raises the possibility that nostalgia for the Soviet period may actually play a role in these republics, as it appears to among young people in other parts of Russia.²⁷

In fact, when we asked these young men whether things “would be better, worse, or the same if the Soviet Union had not collapsed,” 47% in both Dagestan and Kabardino-Balkaria and 37% in North Ossetia said it would be a lot or a little better. Only from 8% (in the first two regions) to 12% (in the latter) said it would be a little or lot worse. Indeed, it may be that longing for the security, order, and stability that the Soviet Union supposedly provided plays a bigger role in the thinking of young people in the North Caucasus than observers who have focused on the threat of Islamic radicalism have appreciated. One possibility suggested by a Russian sociologist from Dagestan is that individuals envision that the powerful central government they associate with Soviet times would protect them against the predations of local elites and local authorities.²⁸

Foreign assistance: neutral to positive

We also asked questions assessing the knowledge of and attitudes toward assistance from foreign entities in the form of development projects, in order to see if the public is open to such initiatives (*Table 19*). To gain a sense of whether many such projects are already on the ground, we asked if in the last three years, respondents had heard of construction

²⁷ See Sarah E. Mendelson and Theodore P. Gerber, “Soviet Nostalgia: An Impediment to Russian Democratization,” *The Washington Quarterly*, 29:1, pp. 83-96.

²⁸ V. Iu. Remmler, “Razmyshleniia posle issledovaniia...”

projects in their locality supported by religious or humanitarian organizations from the US and Europe (Western NGOs), religious or humanitarian organizations from Muslim countries (Muslim charities), the U.S. or Western European governments, Muslim governments, and international organization (IOs) such as the U.N.

Very few respondents have heard of any sort of foreign sponsored projects of any kind in Dagestan or Kabardino-Balkaria. More appear to be underway in North Ossetia: a third of respondents there said they know of some IO projects. About 17% in North Ossetia knew of Western NGOs, 12% knew of Muslim charities, 12% knew of Western government programs, and 10% knew of Muslim states' projects. Very few respondents in Dagestan or Kabardino-Balkaria report knowing of any projects by any foreign organizations.

We then asked how respondents would feel about the same categories of foreign sponsorship for building a school or a new hospital in their locality. Here it is useful to compare the responses of Muslim and non-Muslim respondents in each region, to see if views toward the desirability of Western-, Islamic-, and IO-sourced assistance vary on this basis. Our general finding is that most young men in these regions would support any form of foreign assistance for these ventures, and that they tend not to make fine distinctions based on the source of funding. One fifth or fewer in each region would actually oppose foreign funding from any particular source for either a school or a hospital. In Dagestan and Kabardino-Balkaria, there is a slight tendency for Muslims to be less opposed to foreign funding than non-Muslims, regardless of the source. In North Ossetia, we observe moderate divergences in the views of Muslims and non-Muslims that are consistent with the expectation that Muslims would be more supportive of funding from Islamic sources and vice versa. But even among Muslims in North Ossetia, at most 28% would oppose Western-sourced funding, and among non-Muslims at most 18% would oppose funding from Islamic sources. It appears that in these regions the desire for foreign investment and development projects trumps any concerns about meddling by *either* Western *or* Islamic countries in local affairs.

These findings are significant because the Kremlin has waged a fairly intense media campaign for several years maligning foreign assistance. Despite this campaign, most 16 to 39 year old males in these three regions of the North Caucasus are neutral or positive about assistance for building schools or hospitals. Given the significant gaps in the social safety net that the survey results demonstrate, especially concerning hospitals, we take this as largely positive news. But it also means that the ground is fertile for those who wish to use assistance as a cover to advance radical or extremist agendas as has been the case in parts of the Middle East.

Conclusions and Recommendations: Invest in Jobs and Health Care

It would be tempting to draw conclusions about what the data suggest about the likelihood that individuals will engage in violence or terrorism. Unfortunately, survey data are seldom useful for predicting this type of behavior. Instead, the data provide a sense of the economic and political environment in the region and, to some degree, what some refer to as the “enabling environment” for instability and terrorism.²⁹

²⁹ Von Hippel, “Counter Radicalization Development Assistance,” p.2.

In light of regularly occurring violence in these regions, the data provide surprisingly little evidence of social breakdown, ethnic conflagration, or imminent radicalization. Economic deprivation, corruption and the ineffectiveness of local institutions emerge as much more salient concerns and problems than ethnic tensions, police brutality, or surging Islamic radicalism. In many important ways, the attitudes of young males in Dagestan, Kabardino-Balkaria, and North Ossetia are quite similar to the attitudes of young men elsewhere in Russia, despite the distinctive ethnic and religious composition of these regions and their close proximity to Chechnya. Judging by the survey data alone, fears of an impending social explosion in the North Caucasus seem overstated.

We by no means wish to suggest that all is well in the North Caucasus. Our survey results may give an overly optimistic impression if hostile or radicalized respondents were reluctant to express their true feelings or were more likely to refuse to participate in the first place. We believe the Levada Center staff upheld their customary level of professional norms in carrying out the survey, but we cannot rule out the possibility that some type of undetectable interviewer misconduct may have helped produce the particular patterns we observe in the data. On the other hand, we find many consistencies between the survey samples and data on these regions from the Census or other sources, as well as certain patterns that we would expect, such as the animosity of Ossetins toward the Ingush. Moreover, our results for Dagestan are similar to those of a survey conducted there in 2000.³⁰ Conventional portraits of the region as a seething cauldron of terrorism and ethnic violence rely overwhelmingly on incidence reports and statements of government officials. We do not mean to negate the devastation that such events can have on the lives of victims and their families, but we also caution against generalizations based on such incidence. While future surveys will be needed to replicate our results, as those of any other survey, we think it is more likely that our survey captures an important reality that has been missed in other accounts than that it is so flawed as to be seriously misleading.

In any case, our results hardly suggest that policymakers should be complacent about the three regions we surveyed. Economic woes are severe there, as are concerns about corruption and incompetence in local institutions. While not necessarily higher than in the rest of Russia, police brutality remains fairly common. And a number of signs suggest that ethnic conflict and radicalism may be a serious threat in North Ossetia. Social conditions are poor, needs are not being met, and people are essentially indifferent to which outsiders provide these services. If a radical Muslim group under the cover of a social service network were to begin providing needed services, there might be a ready

³⁰ Robert Bruce Ware, Enver Kisriev, Werner J. Patzelt and Ute Roericht, "Stability in the Caucasus: The Perspective from Dagestan," *Problems of Post-Communism* Vol. 50, no. 2 (March-April 2003), pp. 12-23. The authors report, based on a survey of 1000 adults in late March and early April 2000, that Dagestanis viewed their main threat stemming from Chechnya and not from Russia; they are more anti-Chechen than anti-Russian; and ethnic tensions are low despite the fact that Dagestan is ethnically highly diverse. The authors argue that precisely these ethnic cleavages essentially balance out so that despite Dagestan's proximity to Chechnya, and despite incidence of violence, the republic is more stable than outsiders think. To the extent sources of instability exist, however, they are more likely to arise from corruption and economic woes rather than ethnic and religious hatred.

audience for extremist messages. We also see evidence of fairly strong anti-Western sentiment in the region, even if it seems to be rooted in Soviet nostalgia more than jihadist sentiment.

In this situation, there is a clear need for as much investment in economic development, improved governance, and social service provision as local and federal authorities and private business will permit. No donors are widely known in these regions, but we do not detect high amounts of antipathy toward Western assistance, despite the best efforts by the Kremlin to generate such sentiments.³¹ Perhaps an effective strategy would be to build credibility, so that Western donors could develop partnerships with the local community by addressing the most salient needs as suggested by the survey. Donor assistance, perhaps in collaboration with private partnerships, such as U.S. or European businesses, should be targeted at job creation where possible. Regional authorities should be creating incentives for Russian and for foreign companies to relocate to the region. Government and business leaders might, for example, at least begin to engage on this topic with the idea of eventually setting up a joint U.S. or European and Russian Cooperative Program on Business Investment in the North Caucasus.

Certainly there are many risks. Corruption is an issue of serious concern, especially in Dagestan, but also in hospitals and clinics throughout the region. We also found signs of fairly widespread corruption in universities and institutes, as well as in encounters with law enforcement. Clearly, the region needs serious and sustained support in combating corruption, but in terms of recommendations, we suggest that programs not be cast as abstract. Instead, donors might benefit from needs assessments – specific and targeted surveys or a series of in-depth interviews of professionals, for example, in hospitals to understand what sorts of working conditions exist and what sort of support is needed in order to reduce incidence of corruption. We know from other research that many doctors report a lack of supplies, such as latex gloves and disposable needles.³² Presumably, there are shortages of equipment as well and needs in terms of training. We find a serious shortage of quality and affordable health care. While this is the case in many countries, including in our own, the severe health care crises before Russia make this a dramatic situation.

We are also struck by the lack of programs addressing youth in the regions. In previous research elsewhere in Russia on students' rights, we have observed few programs designed for young people.³³ Before setting up youth programs, donors should proceed again with a targeted needs assessment. What specific problems do young people experience and what sorts of programs might be most appealing? Student newspapers?

³¹ Senior Russian government officials have repeatedly called into question the motivations and integrity of Western assistance efforts, suggesting that such activity represents a “fifth column” in Russia. For just one example, see “Putin Opposes Foreign Financing of Political Activities in Russia,” Mosnews.com, July 20, 2005.

³² Theodore P. Gerber and Sarah E. Mendelson, “A Survey of Russian Doctors on HIV/AIDS,” January 2006 (unpublished manuscript).

³³ Authors' observations during research trip on impact of a series of regional public awareness campaigns, June 2004. On the campaigns see, http://www.csis.org/index.php?option=com_csis_progj&task=view&id=236

After school programs? Sports programs? Our survey did not address these specific issues, but our results suggest that the needs of young people are not being met. We find this to be the case against a backdrop of violence and poverty.

TABLE 1. Basic demographic characteristics

	Dagestan	Kabardino- Balkaria	North Ossetia	Total North Caucasus	National sample, males 16-39, July 2004
N	400	400	438	1238	
Age					
16 to 19	23%	21%	20%	21%	18%
20 to 24	20%	21%	27%	23%	29%
25 to 29	21%	21%	21%	21%	17%
30 to 34	17%	19%	16%	17%	20%
35 to 39	19%	19%	15%	18%	16%
Marital status					
Never married	49%	57%	62%	56%	52%
Married	47%	40%	35%	40%	34%
Cohabiting	1%	1%	0%	1%	9%
Separated	1%	1%	1%	1%	1%
Divorced	2%	2%	2%	2%	4%
Education					
Less than secondary	17%	16%	18%	17%	9%
Lower vocational	15%	20%	20%	18%	18%
Secondary	51%	43%	38%	44%	57%
University degree	17%	21%	24%	21%	16%
Locality type					
Oblast capital	21%	32%	44%	33%	
Other city/town	25%	25%	21%	24%	
Rural village	54%	44%	35%	44%	
Household composition					
Live with parents	62%	69%	74%	68%	49%
At least one female in household	97%	98%	97%	97%	87%
Live with grandparents	2%	3%	4%	3%	5%
Household size					
1	2.3%	1.5%	2.3%	2.0%	9.9%
2	5.0%	9.8%	10.5%	8.5%	19.9%
3	17.5%	23.8%	23.3%	21.6%	36.8%
4	30.8%	31.3%	26.5%	29.4%	24.2%
5	23.5%	18.5%	21.9%	21.3%	4.6%
6 or more	21.0%	15.3%	15.5%	17.2%	4.6%

TABLE 2. Ethnic Composition: Comparing 2002 Census Data and Survey Samples

Note: All ethnicities comprising at least 1.0% of the oblast population are considered.

	Overall percentage (2002 Census)	Survey Sample percentage	Lower 95% Confidence Limit	Upper 95% Confidence Limit
Dagestan (total population; 2,576,531)				
Avars	29.4%	24.5%	20.3%	28.7%
Dargins	16.5%	15.0%	11.5%	18.5%
Kumyks	14.2%	20.8%	16.8%	24.7%
Lesgins	13.1%	8.3%	5.6%	10.9%
Laks	5.4%	11.3%	8.2%	14.3%
Russians	4.7%	4.0%	2.1%	5.9%
Azeris	4.3%	6.3%	3.9%	8.6%
Tabasarans	4.3%	2.5%	1.0%	4.0%
Chechens	3.4%	0.5%	0.0%	1.2%
Kabardino-Balkaria (total population: 901,494)				
Kabardins	55.3%	59.8%	54.9%	64.6%
Russians	25.1%	27.5%	23.1%	31.9%
Balkars	11.6%	7.0%	4.5%	9.5%
Osetins	1.1%	1.3%	0.2%	2.3%
Turks	1.0%	0.5%	0.0%	1.2%
North Ossetia (total population: 710,275)				
Osetins	62.7%	65.3%	60.8%	69.8%
Russians	23.2%	18.0%	14.4%	21.6%
Ingush	3.0%	0.5%	0.0%	1.1%
Armenians	2.4%	4.1%	2.3%	6.0%
Kumyks	1.8%	5.7%	3.5%	7.9%
Georgians	1.5%	1.6%	0.4%	2.8%

TABLE 3. Employment, earnings, and job satisfaction

	Dagestan	Kabardino- Balkaria	North Ossetia	Total North Caucasus	National sample, males 16-39, July 2004
Main Activity					
Working for hire	31%	40%	36%	36%	64%
Self-employed	13%	4%	7%	8%	6%
In school	27%	21%	25%	24%	16%
Pension/disabled	2%	4%	1%	2%	1%
Unemployed	23%	25%	21%	23%	9%
Not in labor force	3%	3%	3%	3%	2%
Military service	2%	4%	6%	4%	1%
Other	0%	0%	1%	0%	1%
Unemployment rate	33%	35%	29%	32%	11%
Supplemental or irregular work the prior month:					
Overall	14%	16%	18%		
Among working	11%	10%	12%		
Among non- working	17%	22%	23%		
Average monthly wage in rubles, March 2006, Goskomstat Data (RF average=9914)					
	4563	5242	5450		
Income from Primary Job (rubles):					
Arithmetic Mean	6149	4402	6744		
Standard Deviation	4579	3375	4415		
Median	5000	3793	6000		
Geometric Mean	3238	1793	4362		
Measures of poverty					
<i>All respondents:</i>					
Earnings below subsistence, self	59%	64%	60%		
Total family income below subsistence	65%	77%	78%		
<i>Respondents 21 and older:</i>					
Earnings below subsistence, self	42%	52%	45%		

Total family
income below
subsistence

62%

74%

74%

TABLE 4. Percent identifying particular problems as those which worry them the most

A. Which of the following problems in our country worries you the most? (Choose up to six.)

(Arranged in rank order of average across three N.Caucasus regions)

	Dagestan	Kabardino- Balkaria	North Ossetia	<i>National sample, males 16-29, June 2005</i>
Growth of unemployment	66%	73%	59%	39%
Corruption and bribery	61%	49%	46%	37%
Rising prices	47%	46%	40%	37%
Poverty, impoverisation	47%	48%	33%	40%
Threat of a terrorist act in locality	28%	28%	37%	23%
Growth of drug abuse	22%	19%	41%	46%
Growth of crime	20%	17%	30%	31%
High cost, lack of access to education	20%	29%	16%	27%
Economic crisis, collapse of production	19%	28%	16%	21%
More inequality, unfair pay distribution	17%	22%	13%	17%
Ecological problems	15%	16%	18%	26%
Lack of access to health care	16%	19%	15%	14%
Growth of nationalism	10%	20%	12%	10%
Crisis in morals, culture, norms	11%	14%	16%	16%
Lack of a future for children	14%	16%	10%	16%
Police brutality	10%	20%	9%	21%
Spread of AIDS	11%	9%	13%	32%
Weakness, ineffectiveness of government	11%	9%	8%	11%
Lack of care for the elderly	6%	9%	7%	8%
Military conflict in Chechnya	5%	4%	7%	13%
Delays in wage payments	5%	8%	3%	9%
Hard to say	1%	1%	3%	1%
Conflict among leaders	2%	1%	2%	2%
Limits on civil rights, democratic freedoms	1%	1%	1%	2%
Other	0%	1%	0%	1%

B. Which of the complicates your own life the most?

Low income, lack of money	74%	78%	61%
Everyday troubles	21%	34%	30%
Unemployment, fear of losing work	18%	18%	10%
Poor health, problems getting treatment	14%	16%	15%

Lack of future	17%	21%	7%
Lack of free time	11%	17%	14%
Poor housing	12%	11%	7%
Fatigue, exhaustion	8%	9%	11%
Trouble getting good education for kids	12%	11%	5%
No answer	7%	5%	9%
Other	2%	1%	2%
Difficult family relations	1%	1%	2%
Alcoholism or drug use of family member	1%	1%	2%

FIGURE 1. Most pressing problems in the country (% who chose each problem)




TABLE 5. Subjective Measures of Economic Well-Being

	Dagestan	Kabardino- Balkaria	North Ossetia	Total North Caucasus	National sample, males 16-39, July 2004
How would you describe your household's economic situation?					
Very good	2%	0%	1%	1%	0%
Good	15%	15%	14%	15%	15%
Average	64%	65%	68%	66%	62%
Bad	15%	16%	13%	15%	16%
Very bad	4%	2%	3%	3%	4%
Hard to say.	2%	1%	1%	1%	2%
How is your household's material situation compared to one year ago?					
Significantly better	2%	4%	5%	3%	
A bit better	17%	20%	25%	21%	
No change	70%	60%	56%	61%	
A bit worse	9%	14%	10%	11%	
Significantly worse	1%	2%	1%	1%	
Hard to say	2%	2%	3%	3%	
How will your household's material situation change in the next year?					
Significantly better	4%	4%	14%	7%	
A bit better	26%	32%	25%	28%	
No change	37%	25%	30%	30%	
A bit worse	3%	5%	1%	3%	
Significantly worse	1%	1%	0%	0%	
Hard to say	30%	35%	29%	31%	
Which statement best describes the current situation?					
Life is not bad, one can get by	27%	31%	31%	30%	35%
Life is hard, but bearable	57%	52%	52%	53%	48%
Our difficult situation is unbearable	12%	15%	12%	13%	10%
Hard to say	5%	2%	5%	4%	7%
How would you describe the economic situation in your town/village?					

Very good	1%	0%	0%	0%	1%
Good	6%	4%	6%	5%	10%
Average	46%	30%	55%	44%	44%
Bad	33%	45%	27%	35%	31%
Very bad	7%	16%	7%	10%	6%
Hard to say.	7%	4%	4%	5%	8%

TABLE 6. Firm type and occupation

	Dagestan	Kabardino-Balkaria	North Ossetia	Total North Caucasus	National sample, males 16-39, July 2004
A. Industry					
Manufacturing, energy	9%	8%	12%	10%	20%
Military production	0%	1%	0%	0%	3%
Oil, gas, coal extraction	3%	1%	1%	2%	1%
Construction	15%	15%	9%	13%	18%
Transportation	13%	15%	16%	15%	10%
Communication	1%	1%	2%	2%	1%
Agriculture, forestry	5%	5%	2%	4%	6%
Trade, marketing	14%	9%	14%	12%	12%
Utilities	4%	4%	2%	3%	5%
Consumer services	5%	6%	7%	6%	6%
Education and science	3%	5%	5%	4%	1%
Health and social services	5%	5%	0%	3%	1%
Culture, arts, sports	2%	2%	1%	2%	2%
Social orgs.(parties, unions)	1%	1%	0%	1%	1%
Credit, finance, insurance	2%	2%	1%	1%	2%
Military, police, FSB	13%	18%	23%	18%	8%
Federal government	0%	1%	2%	1%	1%
Regional government	3%	1%	1%	2%	0%
Other	2%	1%	1%	1%	1%
B. Type of firm					
State or municipal	46%	49%	44%	47%	
Privately held company (OOO)	14%	12%	23%	17%	
Private joint stock, no foreign ownership	12%	16%	17%	16%	
Private joint stock, with foreign ownership	0%	1%	2%	1%	
Private farm	1%	1%	2%	1%	
Cooperative or individually owned firm	26%	21%	11%	19%	
Non profit organization	1%	0%	1%	1%	
C. Occupation					
Professional/managerial	27%	25%	23%	25%	
Routine non-manual	27%	24%	33%	28%	

Skilled manual	19%	19%	23%	20%
Unskilled manual	25%	29%	20%	24%
Agricultural laborer	2%	3%	2%	2%

TABLE 7. Job Satisfaction

	Dagestan	Kabardino- Balkaria	North Ossetia	Total North Caucasus
Job satisfaction: wages				
Completely satisfied	5%	6%	12%	8%
Somewhat satisfied	28%	24%	38%	31%
Somewhat dissatisfied	39%	36%	32%	35%
Completely unsatisfied	23%	33%	15%	23%
Hard to say	5%	1%	3%	3%
Job satisfaction: job security				
Completely satisfied	10%	13%	16%	13%
Somewhat satisfied	28%	44%	49%	41%
Somewhat dissatisfied	30%	21%	22%	24%
Completely unsatisfied	17%	16%	7%	13%
Hard to say	15%	7%	6%	9%
Job satisfaction: opportunities to use skills				
Completely satisfied	13%	27%	20%	20%
Somewhat satisfied	35%	33%	44%	38%
Somewhat dissatisfied	23%	18%	19%	20%
Completely unsatisfied	13%	13%	7%	11%
Hard to say	16%	9%	10%	11%

TABLE 8. Views on performance of government institutions

	Dagestan	Kabardino- Balkaria	North Ossetia	Total North Caucasus	National sample, males 16-39, July 2004
How often would you say local government addresses the needs of your town/village?					
Always	2%	1%	1%	1%	
Often	4%	5%	6%	5%	
Sometimes	24%	24%	41%	30%	
Rarely	33%	33%	32%	33%	
Never	30%	30%	12%	24%	
Hard to say	8%	7%	8%	8%	
How often would you say regional government addresses the needs of your town/village?					
Always	1%	1%	0%	1%	
Often	3%	5%	6%	5%	
Sometimes	26%	29%	39%	31%	
Rarely	31%	26%	32%	30%	
Never	31%	24%	13%	23%	
Hard to say	9%	15%	10%	11%	
How much confidence do you have in President Putin?					
Complete confidence	34%	30%	30%	31%	24%
Some confidence	43%	53%	45%	47%	53%
Not much confidence	8%	5%	9%	8%	10%
No confidence	5%	5%	6%	5%	4%
Hard to say	10%	7%	10%	9%	9%
How much confidence do you have in the president of your republic?					
Complete confidence	20%	28%	10%	19%	
Some confidence	44%	43%	43%	43%	
Not much confidence	11%	4%	17%	10%	
No confidence	5%	2%	11%	6%	
Hard to say	21%	24%	20%	21%	
How much confidence do you have in the Army?					
Complete confidence	11%	15%	11%	12%	8%
Some confidence	37%	48%	43%	43%	40%
Not much confidence	26%	18%	24%	23%	27%
No confidence	14%	10%	12%	12%	15%
Hard to say	12%	9%	10%	10%	10%
How much confidence do you have in the courts?					
Complete confidence	7%	6%	8%	7%	5%
Some confidence	18%	33%	32%	28%	35%
Not much confidence	40%	27%	32%	33%	30%
No confidence	23%	17%	15%	18%	15%
Hard to say	12%	18%	13%	14%	15%

TABLE 9. Views on performance of local institutions

	Dagestan	Kabardino- Balkaria	North Ossetia	Total North Caucasus
<i>How would you assess the quality of the following institutions in your town/village?</i>				
Medical services				
Very good or good	12%	19%	20%	17%
Satisfactory	53%	59%	54%	55%
Bad	22%	15%	21%	19%
Very bad	10%	4%	5%	6%
Hard to say	4%	3%	1%	2%
Secondary schools				
Very good or good	24%	42%	32%	33%
Satisfactory	61%	43%	52%	52%
Bad	9%	10%	11%	10%
Very bad	2%	1%	1%	1%
Hard to say	4%	5%	5%	5%
Universities (provincial capitals only)				
Very good or good	14%	28%	20%	21%
Satisfactory	44%	41%	50%	46%
Bad	27%	15%	19%	20%
Very bad	8%	2%	2%	3%
Hard to say	6%	13%	9%	10%
Services for youth				
Very good or good	7%	5%	15%	9%
Satisfactory	23%	16%	33%	24%
Bad	22%	38%	32%	31%
Very bad	18%	25%	6%	16%
Hard to say	30%	16%	14%	20%
Local social services				
Very good or good	6%	7%	8%	7%
Satisfactory	25%	21%	27%	24%
Bad	25%	24%	35%	28%
Very bad	18%	23%	9%	16%
Hard to say	27%	26%	20%	24%
Minority rights				
Very good or good	6%	13%	13%	11%
Satisfactory	19%	31%	26%	25%
Bad	9%	8%	16%	11%
Very bad	10%	7%	3%	6%
Hard to say	57%	42%	42%	47%

TABLE 10. Experienced corruption when dealing with local institutions, last 2-3 years*

	Dagestan	Kabardino-Balkaria	North Ossetia	Total North Caucasus
Medical services				
Many times	16%	17%	11%	15%
Occasionally	18%	12%	24%	18%
Once or Twice	10%	11%	9%	10%
Never	53%	58%	52%	54%
Hard to say	4%	2%	3%	3%
Secondary schools				
Many times	2%	7%	2%	4%
Occasionally	5%	7%	9%	7%
Once or Twice	4%	5%	5%	5%
Never	80%	76%	79%	78%
Hard to say	8%	5%	5%	6%
Universities				
Many times	14%	24%	18%	18%
Occasionally	11%	12%	19%	14%
Once or Twice	10%	10%	7%	9%
Never	53%	47%	52%	51%
Hard to say	11%	7%	4%	7%
Local government				
Many times	4%	12%	8%	8%
Occasionally	6%	3%	18%	10%
Once or Twice	6%	9%	7%	7%
Never	69%	69%	60%	65%
Hard to say	15%	6%	7%	9%
Federal government				
Many times	2%	11%	7%	6%
Occasionally	1%	3%	9%	5%
Once or Twice	2%	4%	4%	3%
Never	74%	72%	71%	72%
Hard to say	21%	10%	10%	13%
Police				
Many times	12%	21%	10%	14%
Occasionally	13%	12%	17%	14%
Once or Twice	7%	12%	7%	8%
Never	59%	52%	59%	57%
Hard to say	9%	3%	7%	7%

*Note: Only respondents who have had dealings with the institutions are included.

TABLE 11. Concerns about the police and courts

	Dagestan	Kabardino- Balkaria	North Ossetia	<i>National sample, males 16-39, July 2004</i>
A. How much do you fear personally being subject to violent abuse by the police?				
A great deal	7%	10%	9%	12%
Somewhat	34%	32%	27%	48%
Not much	24%	19%	25%	17%
Not at all	26%	37%	35%	16%
Hard to say	10%	3%	4%	7%
B. How much do fear being arrested for no reason?				
A great deal	8%	10%	8%	7%
Somewhat	34%	31%	27%	40%
Not much	24%	20%	26%	29%
Not at all	26%	36%	34%	15%
Hard to say	9%	3%	4%	9%
C. If you were accused of a crime you did not commit, how likely is it that you would be convicted?				
Absolutely impossible	11%	10%	16%	6%
Almost impossible	4%	4%	13%	8%
Not very likely	9%	9%	13%	16%
Neither likely nor unlikely	29%	32%	26%	18%
Somewhat likely	21%	16%	13%	24%
Very likely	15%	13%	8%	10%
Extremely likely	4%	9%	4%	2%
Hard to say	8%	9%	8%	15%
D. Experienced violent physical abuse by the police in last 2-3 years				
Respondent...	4%	8%	9%	12%
Respondent's family member(s)...	2%	2%	3%	4%
Respondent, family member(s), or both...	6%	9%	11%	14%
E. How much confidence do you have in the police?				
Complete confidence	6%	6%	6%	2%
Some confidence	18%	22%	23%	23%
Not much confidence	31%	31%	29%	38%

No confidence	34%	34%	31%	29%
Hard to say	12%	7%	11%	8%

TABLE 12. Religion and Politics

	Dagestan	Kabardino- Balkaria	North Ossetia	<i>Total North Caucasus</i>
Do you consider yourself a religious believer? If so, then what religion?				
Not a believer	12%	17%	25%	18%
Orthodox Christianity	3%	18%	53%	25%
Islam	85%	62%	8%	50%
Other	0%	1%	8%	3%
Hard to Say	1%	3%	6%	3%
What role <i>does</i> Islam play in the politics of your region?				
Very important role	14%	13%	5%	10%
Important, but not a primary role	36%	28%	20%	28%
An insignificant role	24%	34%	32%	30%
No role	13%	9%	21%	14%
Hard to say	14%	17%	22%	18%
What role <i>should</i> Islam play in the politics of your region?				
Very important role	20%	16%	3%	13%
Important, but not a primary role	44%	38%	22%	34%
An insignificant role	13%	21%	24%	19%
No role	9%	8%	26%	15%
Hard to say	15%	17%	26%	19%
Desired role of Islam in politics vs. perception of actual role:				
<i>All respondents</i>				
Wants a greater political role	23%	23%	9%	18%
Wants status quo or hard to say	73%	65%	77%	72%
Wants a lesser political role	5%	12%	14%	10%
<i>Muslim respondents</i>				
Wants a greater political role	23%	30%	42%	27%
Wants status quo or hard to say	74%	62%	50%	68%
Wants a lesser political role	3%	7%	8%	5%
<i>Non-Muslim respondents</i>				
Wants a greater political role	21%	11%	6%	9%
Wants status quo or hard to say	66%	69%	80%	76%
Wants a lesser political role	13%	20%	14%	15%

How much confidence do you have in religious leaders of your faith?***Muslim respondents***

Complete confidence	14%	20%	50%	<i>18%</i>
Some confidence	38%	24%	31%	<i>32%</i>
Not much confidence	12%	9%	11%	<i>11%</i>
No confidence	10%	4%	6%	<i>8%</i>
Hard to say	26%	43%	3%	<i>32%</i>

TABLE 13. Chechnya and understanding of *jihad*
What policy do you think the government should pursue in Chechnya?

	Dagestan	Kabardino- Balkaria	North Osetia	Total North Caucasus	National sample, males 16- 29, June 2005
Intensify military action to annihilate Chechen fighters	28%	15%	26%	23%	41%
Continue present level of military action	8%	8%	7%	8%	11%
Begin peace talks, but no ceasefire	5%	3%	6%	5%	5%
Declare a ceasefire, negotiate, but don't withdraw	15%	16%	13%	15%	15%
Immediately begin withdrawal and negotiate	6%	13%	10%	10%	9%
Withdraw troops, give Chechnya independence	4%	11%	8%	7%	8%
Hard to Say	34%	35%	29%	32%	12%
<i>Percentage advocating withdrawal from Chechnya among:</i>					
Non-Muslims	10%	16%	15%	14%	17%
Muslims	10%	28%	53%	20%	18%
Wants important political role for Islam in republic	19%	30%	15%	23%	
Want greater political role for Islam than current	9%	35%	20%	22%	
<i>Agrees that "jihad" refers to struggle of Muslims with non-Muslims</i>					
Overall	20%	29%	34%	28%	
Non-Muslims	15%	24%	34%	29%	
Muslims	21%	32%	36%	26%	
Wants important political role for Islam in republic	27%	27%	46%	28%	

Want greater political role for Islam than current	23%	38%	30%	30%
--	-----	-----	-----	-----

Wants withdrawal from Chechnya, very important role for Islam, and says jihad refers to struggle of Muslims with non-Muslims

N	3	5	2	10
	0.8%	1.3%	0.5%	0.8%

TABLE 14. Measures of ethnic relations and experiences of discrimination

	Dagestan	Kabardino- Balkaria	North Ossetia	Dagestan	Kabardino- Balkaria	North Ossetia
<i>Relations between nationalities very or somewhat bad:</i>			<i>Relations between nationalities very/somewhat bad or hard to say:</i>			
Overall	16%	12%	15%	25%	16%	31%
Ethnic majority	13%	6%	15%	23%	10%	31%
Ethnic Russians	38%	27%	14%	69%	34%	27%
Other minorities	17%	6%	15%	24%	10%	37%
Non-Muslims	31%	22%	14%	47%	28%	29%
Muslims	13%	5%	28%	21%	9%	50%
<i>Reports ethnic discrimination or "hard to say" in dealings with police:</i>						
	<i>Total percentages</i>			<i>Among those with dealings</i>		
Overall	8%	7%	11%	11%	9%	15%
Ethnic majority	4%	7%	8%	6%	9%	10%
Ethnic Russians	13%	7%	13%	15%	9%	16%
Other minorities	14%	6%	23%	20%	9%	36%
Non-Muslims	8%	6%	9%	12%	7%	12%
Muslims	8%	8%	33%	11%	10%	52%
<i>Reports ethnic discrimination or "hard to say" in dealings with employers:</i>						
	<i>Total percentages</i>			<i>Among those with dealings</i>		
Overall	9%	6%	11%	12%	7%	14%
Ethnic majority	4%	5%	8%	6%	7%	9%
Ethnic Russians	25%	4%	13%	31%	5%	15%
Other minorities	15%	10%	22%	21%	13%	33%
Non-Muslims	15%	4%	10%	20%	5%	12%
Muslims	8%	6%	22%	11%	8%	42%
<i>Reports ethnic discrimination or "hard to say" in dealings with local government:</i>						
	<i>Total percentages</i>			<i>Among those with dealings</i>		
Overall	7%	4%	6%	10%	6%	9%
Ethnic majority	4%	4%	4%	6%	5%	6%
Ethnic Russians	6%	5%	5%	9%	7%	7%

Other minorities	12%	6%	16%	19%	9%	26%
Non-Muslims	6%	5%	5%	11%	7%	7%
Muslims	7%	4%	22%	10%	5%	36%

TABLE 15. Feels dislike or fear toward...

	Overall	Majority	Russian	Other Minority
<i>Dagestan</i>				
Avars	1%	2%	0%	1%
Dargins	1%	1%	0%	1%
Kumyks	1%	0%	0%	2%
Lezgins	3%	2%	0%	3%
Laks	0%	0%	0%	0%
Azeris	4%	5%	0%	3%
Russians	1%	1%	6%	1%
Americans	21%	22%	13%	22%
Chechens	15%	12%	25%	19%
<i>Kabardino-Balkaria</i>				
Kabardins	1%	0%	4%	0%
Balkars	1%	1%	3%	0%
Osetins	1%	0%	2%	0%
Turks	5%	2%	13%	6%
Ukrainians	2%	2%	3%	2%
Koreans	2%	2%	2%	4%
Russians	1%	1%	0%	0%
Americans	11%	12%	9%	8%
Chechens	16%	18%	15%	12%
<i>North Osetia</i>				
Ossetins	1%	1%	0%	1%
Ingush	39%	52%	14%	14%
Kumyks	5%	7%	3%	3%
Georgians	11%	14%	1%	7%
Kabardins	3%	3%	0%	1%
Turks	6%	7%	3%	5%
Russians	2%	2%	0%	1%
Americans	11%	11%	14%	10%
Chechens	23%	26%	22%	14%

TABLE 16. Feels dislike or fear toward...

	Dagestan	Kabardino- Balkaria	North Ossetia
<i>Overall</i>			
Americans	21%	11%	11%
Jews	8%	5%	9%
Catholics	2%	1%	2%
Swedes	2%	2%	3%
Danes	3%	1%	2%
Russians	1%	1%	2%
Chechens	15%	16%	23%
Gypsies	28%	20%	32%
Muslims	1%	2%	8%
<i>Non-Muslim respondents</i>			
Americans	23%	10%	11%
Jews	10%	5%	8%
Catholics	3%	1%	2%
Swedes	3%	1%	2%
Danes	2%	2%	2%
Russians	2%	0%	2%
Chechens	19%	15%	24%
Gypsies	31%	20%	31%
Muslims	3%	3%	8%
<i>Muslim respondents</i>			
Americans	21%	11%	14%
Jews	7%	4%	19%
Catholics	2%	1%	0%
Swedes	3%	2%	0%
Danes	2%	2%	6%
Russians	1%	1%	3%
Chechens	14%	17%	6%
Gypsies	28%	19%	39%
Muslims	1%	0%	0%

TABLE 17. Treated better or worse by the government

		Overall	Majority	Russian	Other Minority
DAGESTAN					
Better	Avars	15%	13%	31%	17%
	Dargins	19%	14%	31%	24%
	Kумыks	2%	2%	0%	1%
	Lezgins	2%	2%	0%	0%
	Laks	1%	1%	0%	1%
	Russians	5%	5%	6%	3%
Worse	Avars	2%	2%	6%	1%
	Dargins	2%	2%	6%	1%
	Kумыks	5%	5%	6%	3%
	Lezgins	5%	5%	6%	4%
	Laks	5%	5%	6%	6%
	Russians	5%	5%	13%	4%
KABARDINO-BALKARIA					
Better	Kabardins	30%	18%	48%	49%
	Russians	9%	9%	6%	16%
	Balkars	12%	9%	13%	24%
	Ossetins	3%	3%	3%	4%
	Turks	1%	0%	2%	2%
	Ukrainians	1%	1%	1%	2%
Worse	Kabardins	2%	3%	2%	0%
	Russians	9%	2%	26%	0%
	Balkars	5%	2%	9%	6%
	Ossetins	3%	3%	5%	2%
	Turks	9%	4%	22%	6%
	Ukrainians	6%	3%	15%	4%
NORTH OSETIA					
Better	Osetins	34%	31%	30%	51%
	Russians	19%	19%	15%	23%
	Ingush	6%	8%	1%	1%
	Armenians	6%	6%	9%	4%
	Kумыks	2%	3%	1%	1%
	Georgians	3%	3%	5%	1%
Worse	Osetins	3%	4%	1%	0%
	Russians	5%	5%	10%	1%
	Ingush	34%	36%	28%	30%
	Armenians	5%	5%	6%	7%
	Kумыks	6%	4%	5%	16%
	Georgians	7%	7%	5%	8%

TABLE 18 Views on the West: Agree/disagree

	Dagestan	Kabardino- Balkaria	North Osetia	Total North Caucasus	National sample, males 16- 29, June 2005
<i>It would be better for Russia if foreign governments stopped imposing their ideas on us</i>					
Strongly agree	47%	49%	36%	44%	42%
Agree	35%	29%	39%	34%	32%
Disagree	6%	10%	10%	8%	17%
Strongly disagree	3%	4%	2%	3%	5%
Hard to say	10%	9%	13%	11%	4%
<i>Russia's youth basically wants the same things as youths in Western Europe</i>					
Strongly agree	24%	33%	20%	25%	23%
Agree	39%	42%	45%	42%	37%
Disagree	15%	12%	18%	15%	21%
Strongly disagree	7%	3%	5%	5%	12%
Hard to say	16%	10%	11%	12%	6%
<i>Russia should apologize for the Soviet occupation of the Baltics during WWII</i>					
Strongly agree	1%	4%	3%	2%	3%
Agree	2%	4%	4%	3%	8%
Disagree	12%	18%	18%	16%	21%
Strongly disagree	64%	56%	40%	53%	56%
Hard to say	21%	19%	35%	25%	12%
<i>AIDS was brought to Russia by foreigners in order to weaken Russia</i>					
Strongly agree	15%	23%	13%	17%	11%
Agree	26%	17%	15%	19%	14%
Disagree	15%	21%	23%	20%	32%
Strongly disagree	21%	21%	20%	20%	30%
Hard to say	24%	18%	29%	24%	13%
<i>Foreign organizations who help Russian organizations financially are trying to meddle in our affairs</i>					
Strongly agree	26%	33%	25%	28%	26%
Agree	33%	36%	25%	31%	38%
Disagree	7%	8%	17%	11%	20%
Strongly disagree	13%	5%	7%	8%	6%
Hard to say	22%	19%	26%	22%	10%
<i>Russia should try to become a European country rather than pursue its own path</i>					
Strongly agree	10%	14%	16%	14%	12%
Agree	14%	14%	19%	16%	22%
Disagree	19%	27%	18%	21%	26%
Strongly disagree	40%	29%	26%	32%	29%
Hard to say	17%	16%	20%	18%	11%

TABLE 19. Development projects

	Dagestan	Kabardino- Balkaria	North Osetia
<i>Has heard of development projects sponsored by following in region, last 3 years</i>			
US or European religious/charitable orgs.	2%	1%	17%
Islamic country religious/charitable orgs.	2%	2%	12%
US or European government orgs.	0%	1%	12%
Islamic country government orgs.	1%	1%	10%
International orgs. (like UN)	1%	1%	31%
<i>Opposes financing of new school in town/village by following organizations:</i>			
Overall			
US or European religious/charitable orgs.	20%	21%	11%
Islamic country religious/charitable orgs.	18%	20%	16%
US or European government orgs.	19%	20%	14%
Islamic country government orgs.	16%	20%	17%
International orgs. (like UN)	17%	17%	7%
Non-Muslims			
US or European religious/charitable orgs.	29%	24%	10%
Islamic country religious/charitable orgs.	29%	25%	17%
US or European government orgs.	31%	22%	13%
Islamic country government orgs.	29%	26%	18%
International orgs. (like UN)	24%	18%	6%
Muslims			
US or European religious/charitable orgs.	18%	19%	28%
Islamic country religious/charitable orgs.	15%	16%	8%
US or European government orgs.	17%	18%	25%
Islamic country government orgs.	14%	16%	6%
International orgs. (like UN)	15%	16%	19%
<i>Opposes financing of new hospital in town/village by following organizations:</i>			
Overall			
US or European religious/charitable orgs.	17%	17%	10%
Islamic country religious/charitable orgs.	15%	14%	13%
US or European government orgs.	18%	17%	12%
Islamic country government orgs.	13%	16%	14%
International orgs. (like UN)	14%	14%	6%
Non-Muslims			
US or European religious/charitable orgs.	24%	18%	9%
Islamic country religious/charitable orgs.	23%	17%	13%
US or European government orgs.	26%	18%	10%
Islamic country government orgs.	21%	17%	15%
International orgs. (like UN)	18%	14%	5%
Muslims			

US or European religious/charitable orgs.	16%	16%	28%
Islamic country religious/charitable orgs.	13%	13%	8%
US or European government orgs.	16%	17%	28%
Islamic country government orgs.	12%	15%	6%
International orgs. (like UN)	14%	14%	19%