The Lessons of Modern War
Volume IV

The Gulf War

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October 15, 1994
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Dedication

To Bridget Gail, Andrea Lynn, Justin Galen, and Alexander Scott
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Acknowledgments

The author is indebted Abraham Wagner for his help in Chapters IV and V, and throughout the writing and editing of this series, and to Dr. Amatzia Baram for his constant help in the material relating to Iraq in both this book and the author's *Iran and Iraq: The Threat from the Northern Gulf*. He is deeply indebted to many others for interviews, background material and supporting research material, and to Debbie Bernstein and Rebecca Joubin Aghazadeh for their help in research and editing.

He would like to thank Samuel Wells, Robert Litwak, Charles Blitzer, and his other colleagues at the Wilson Center for their help and support in preparing this book while the author was a Wilson Fellow, and John Duke Anthony and the National Council on US-Arab Relations for their support while the author was an International Affairs Fellow.

He is indebted to Peter Jennings and Christopher Isham for their support in analyzing the war during and after the conflict, and to many military officers and civilian experts in Coalition countries and the Middle East for reviewing this manuscript and interviews.

These officers and experts include General Walter E. Boomer, Lt. General Buster Glosson, Jeffery Cooper, Eliot Cohen, James Blackwell, St. John Armitage, David Boulton, Harlan Ullman, Lt. Colonel Steve E. Dietrich, Jeffery J. Clarke, Colonel William J. Davis, Lt. Colonel Charles H. Cureton, but only a small fraction of those who directly assisted the author can be publicly identified by name or country. Most of the insights in this book come from the interviews and the work of experts who worked on official analyses histories of the Gulf War, and it would have been impossible to complete this work without their help.