

NATO AND ALLIED CIVIL-MILITARY CO-OPERATION DOCTRINE, OPERATIONS, & ORGANIZATION OF FORCES

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Key Definitions:

CIMIC is defined as "The co-ordination and co-operation, in support of the mission, between the NATO Commander and civil actors, including national population and local authorities, as well as international, national and non-governmental organisations and agencies." MC 411/1 (Final), NATO Military Policy for CIMIC, 17 Jul 01 & AJP-9 NATO CIVIL-MILITARY CO-OPERATION (CIMIC) DOCTRINE Jul 03

***The Strategic Concept.** Civil-military co-operation is not a new phenomenon within NATO. Traditionally, however, it was seen as presenting little more than a logistic challenge. NATO's operations beyond its own domestic borders, on territory devoid of fully functioning civil institutions or effective infrastructure present different and more complex challenges. Changes to the environment in which NATO might potentially operate have led to the development of a new Strategic Concept (SC 99/ MC 327/2 (Final), NATO Military Policy for Non-Article 5 CRO, 29 Aug 01). This recognises a much wider range of threats to international security than existed hitherto. In addition to continuing to provide for collective defence, the Concept states that the Alliance must stand ready "to contribute to effective conflict prevention and to engage actively in crisis management, including crisis response operations". The Strategic Concept goes on to state: The interaction between Alliance forces and the civil environment (both governmental and non-governmental) in which they operate is crucial to the success of operations. AJP-9 NATO CIVIL-MILITARY CO-OPERATION (CIMIC) DOCTRINE Jul 03*

Background: The discussion within NATO and with its allies on CIMIC (Civil-Military Co-operation) doctrine and the supporting documents that flow from it began in the mid-1990s, primarily in response to lessons learned in the Balkans. This discussion culminated in the acceptance of *Allied Joint Publication – 9 (AJP – 9)* in July 2003. Prior to this document NATO signed the following as supporting documents to AJP – 9:

1. MC 400/2 (Final), MC Guidance for the Military Implementation of Alliance Strategy, 23 May 00
2. MC 133/3 (Final), NATO's Operational Planning Systems, 06 Sep 00
3. MC 327/2 (Final), NATO Military Policy for Non-Article 5 CRO, 29 Aug 01
4. MC 411/1 (Final), NATO Military Policy for CIMIC, 17 Jul 01
5. MC 334/1 (Final), NATO Principles and Policies for Host Nation Support (HNS), 04 Sep 00

6. NATO CIMIC Functional Planning Guide (DRAFT).

These documents along with *AJP – 9*, and the unique conditions of each mission are key planning factors in how NATO and its allies organize their forces. In essence, they organize based on the situation on the ground and the requirements of the mission.

Take-Aways:

- **No two nations in the NATO Alliance conduct, train for, or organize their CA or CIMIC equivalent forces in the same manner.**
- **With few exceptions, member nations of NATO or their allies task organize for the missions as required by the situation on the ground.**
- **CA or CIMIC training is a core competency interwoven in the training of the general-purpose forces.**
- **If the nations have dedicated CA or CIMIC forces, they employ them as advisors to the commander and they reside within the staff as J-9, G-9, or S-9 representatives.**
- **CIMIC is at national level discourse for NATO members.**
- **This discourse primarily focuses on the manner in which to integrate the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Defense, the private sector, and non-governmental organizations.**
- **CIMIC is both a function and a capability. As a result, there are soldiers in most NATO armies specifically trained and employed in CIMIC.**
- **At the same time, soldiers on most operations conduct some CIMIC business in their day-to-day operations.**

Discussion

United Nations (UN): The United Nations does not use the terms Civil Affairs (CA) or CIMIC. The term used is Civil-Military Co-ordination (CMCoord) and it is defined as “the essential dialogue and interaction between civilian and military actors....to protect and promote humanitarian principles, avoid competition, minimize conflict, and when appropriate pursue common goals.”¹

United States (U.S.): U.S. doctrine does not use the terms CIMIC or CMCoord. U.S. doctrine employs the term CA and defines it as “those that enhance the relationship between military forces and civil authorities in areas where military forces are present, to enhance the conduct of civil military operations. Civil-Military Operations (CMO) are those activities that establish, maintain, influence or exploit relations between military forces and civilian agencies in order to facilitate military operations to consolidate and achieve operational U.S. objectives. CMO may include performance by military forces of activities and functions normally the responsibility of local, regional or national government, and may occur in the absence of other military operations.”² In keeping with standing precepts for conducting operations (U.S. Commanders will lead U.S. Forces) the United States will deploy a separate CA command that retains its own structure, and command and control across the force. This functional capability will

¹ ‘Guidelines on the Use of Military and Civil Defence Assets to Support UN Humanitarian Activities in Complex Emergencies’ dated March 2003.

² US Joint Pub 1-02 amended August 2002.

reside at the staff level of the headquarters in the J-9, G-9, or S-9 depending on the size and composition of the force.

United Kingdom (UK): The manner in which NATO forces address the dilemma that is presented in attempting to integrate the capabilities of national power is captured well by the United Kingdom. “Although the UK accepts the NATO definition, the UK approach, (as articulated in UK CIMIC Policy³ and agreed by UK Chiefs of Staff in February 2003), is to ‘view CIMIC in the context of enabling military operations to make a more coherent contribution to the achievement of UK and international political objectives’. The UK does this by fully integrating CIMIC staff, and the CIMIC process, into the chain of command. This is fundamentally different to the approach of some other nations, notably the US.”⁴

Australia: The Australian Defense Forces definitions for CIMIC and CMO are close to those used by the UK, the Netherlands, Norway, and Denmark. The ADF defines CIMIC as “the coordination and cooperation, in support of the mission, between the commander and the civil dimension, including the national population and local authorities, as well as international, national and non-governmental organisations and agencies.” CMO is “any measures, activities, or planning undertaken by the military which both facilitates the conduct of military operations, and builds support, legitimacy and consent, within the civil population in furtherance of the mission.”⁵

In face-to-face meetings with Defense Attachés from the Norwegian Embassy, Netherlands Embassy, and Danish Embassy, as well as interviews conducted via email with Defense Attaché representatives from the German and Australian Embassies, it became clear that the discourse on CIMIC is at the national level for the member nations and their allies. Only the UK, the Netherlands, and the United States have dedicated CA or CIMIC forces in standing organizations. All others have subject matter experts or leverage expertise outside of the Ministry of Defense in order to accomplish the mission (refer to Figure 1 for assets/capabilities that these nations employ).

Denmark: Denmark developed the “**comprehensive approach**” concept because of its experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan. In the past two years, Denmark has redeployed its forces from Iraq and now focuses solely on Afghanistan with an infantry battalion in the province of Helmand. This was a national decision by the Danish Parliament, and the national discourse was focused on developing a coherent strategy. The intent was to develop a framework for making progress in a crisis, which they view as a long-term developmental effort. In order to make progress in this crisis, the nation focuses on the integration of efforts by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Defense, non-governmental organizations, and the Danish Embassy in Kabul, Afghanistan. A critical

³ D/JDCC/20/8/1 dated 6 February 2003 (UK document referenced in Civil-Military Co-operation (CIMIC) INTERIM JOINT WARFARE PUBLICATION 3-90).

⁴ UK Civil-Military Co-operation (CIMIC) INTERIM JOINT WARFARE PUBLICATION 3-90 Par 108

⁵ E-mail attachment for Australian Defense Forces (ADF) POCs: Lieutenant Commander Mark Koost, Lieutenant Colonel Craig Delaney and Major David Moon.

function of this process is to find “the round peg for the hole” and to ensure that those civilians (governmental, non-governmental, and private sector) are qualified to deploy in support of the mission and understand the challenges ahead.⁶

Norway: The government of Norway has engaged in discussion on the issue of how to conduct CIMIC and what the next logical step is in the development of a process with which to maximize one’s bid for success. As stated by MG Knutsen, “Before you have the discussion on how to train you have to have a decision by the policy makers on how to approach CIMIC from a national perspective.”⁷

This discussion at the national level led to a policy decision that is captured in the term ‘**Norwegian Model.**’ The ‘Norwegian Model’ for conducting stabilization and conflict resolution encompasses the following principles:

1. Close cooperation and coordination exists between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and non-governmental organizations.
2. There is a close network of key personnel from non-governmental organizations, the academic community, and the Foreign Service.
3. Norway has no colonial past.....As a small country; one does not normally suspect Norway of having economic or political self-interest in far away regions.⁸

The interviews demonstrated that the UK, Denmark, Norway, and Canada are committed to developing a “comprehensive approach” at the level of NATO and the European Union. They are doing this as a natural extension or growth from CIMIC discussions at the national level based on their national experiences in the Balkans during the 1990s. “Experience from NATO operations has demonstrated to Allies that co-ordination between a wide spectrum of actors from the international community, both military and civilian, is essential to achieving key objectives of lasting stability and security. At the Riga Summit, NATO Allies agreed that a comprehensive approach engaging all these actors was required to meet the challenges of operational environments such as those in Afghanistan and Kosovo. At the Bucharest Summit in April 2008, Allies agreed on an Action plan to take this forward.”⁹

All Defense Attachés interviewed stated that their nations participated in CIMIC operations in accordance with NATO doctrine, *AJP -9*. The significant difference is the manner in which they approach the mission. This is driven by the national discourse on the mission and the manner in which the forces are able to conduct missions. For example, in the Dutch Army, functional specialists are collocated. Another example is

⁶ Peter Lehmann Nielsen, interviewed by Captain Jeffrey Maclay, Lieutenant Colonel Robert Scott, and David Sokolow, notes, Royal Danish Embassy, Washington, DC, 31 October 2008.

⁷ Major General Tom Henry Knutsen, interviewed by Captain Jeffrey Maclay, Lieutenant Colonel Robert Scott, and David Sokolow, notes, Royal Norwegian Embassy, Washington, DC, 4 November 2008.

⁸ Arild Strommen, “Rebuilding Afghanistan,” *News of Norway* 66, no. 3 (2008): 5.

⁹ UK Delegation to NATO, “Comprehensive Approach,” <http://uknato.fco.gov.uk/en/uk-in-nato/comprehensive-approach>.

that the Netherlands does not have a specific CA mission per say, but in any mission in which they participate, they are able to insert a CIMIC element to deal with CA issues.¹⁰

The tools provided by the Ministries of Defense of each NATO nation and potential allies are captured below:¹¹

Table 11: Potential Niche Capability Contributors to Multinational S&R Operations

	Military Police/ Constabulary	Civilian Police	Engineer	Civil Affairs/ CIMIC	Medical	EO	Transport	Strategic Lift	ISR	Logistics
Argentina		X	X							X
Armenia					X	X			X	
Australia								X		
Austria						X				
Azerbaijan									X	
Belgium			X	X		X				
Bulgaria			X							
Canada			X				X		X	
Czech Republic	X		X		X					X
Denmark	X		X	X		X			X	
Estonia						X				
Finland										X
France	X		X		X	X		X		X
Georgia									X	
Germany			X	X	X	X	X		X	
Ghana		X								
Hungary					X					X
India		X								
Italy	X		X	X	X	X	X		X	X
Jordan		X								
Lithuania						X				

¹⁰ Colonel Hans van der Louw, interviewed by Captain Jeffrey Maclay, Lieutenant Colonel Robert Scott, and David Sokolow, notes, Royal Netherland Embassy, Washington, DC, 13 November 2008.

¹¹ Daniel Burghart, "International Capabilities," in *Transforming for Stabilization and Reconstruction Missions*, eds. Hans Binnendijk and Stuart Johnson, (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 2004), 124.

Table 11: Potential Niche Capability Contributors to Multinational S&R Operations

	Military Police/ Constabulary	Civilian Police	Engineer	Civil Affairs/ CIMIC	Medical	EOD	Transport	Strategic Lift	ISR	Logistics
Kazakhstan							X		X	
Kenya		X								
Kyrgyzstan									X	
Morocco					X					
Nepal		X								
Netherlands	X					X				
Nigeria		X								
Norway				X		X	X	X	X	
Pakistan		X								
Philippines		X								
Poland		X								X
Portugal			X		X		X			
Romania		X			X	X				
Slovakia			X		X	X			X	
Slovenia				X						
Spain	X									
Sweden		X							X	X
Switzerland	X		X				X			
Tajikistan									X	
Turkey		X		X	X					
Ukraine	X	X	X		X		X		X	X
United Kingdom	X		X	X					X	
Uzbekistan									X	

Source: Compiled from the KFOR website and interviews with senior defense analysts.

Figure 1 Compiled from the KFOR website and interviews with senior defense analysts, INTERNATIONAL CAPABILITIES, P 124-125.

¹² Daniel Burghart, "International Capabilities," in *Transforming for Stabilization and Reconstruction Missions*, 124.

Netherlands: An example of how NATO allies currently organize their CIMIC (CA equivalent forces) can be found in the methodology currently being employed by the Netherlands. At this time, they have one (1) CIMIC battalion that is being staffed and will be operational capable (FOC) by the end of CY2010. When it is FOC, it will be staffed with 585 personnel. A battalion staff, 6 x Civil Support Elements, 1 x Cultural Affairs section, 1 x Civil Administration section, 1 x Humanitarian Affairs section, 1 x Economy and Employment section, 1 x Integrated Development of Entrepreneurial Activities (IDEA) section, and 1 x Civil Infrastructure section.¹³

The soldiers that are being assigned to the battalion must be officers or Staff Non-Commissioned Officers (SNCO) because of the maturity and experience that is required to conduct the mission. Depending on the rank of the soldier, courses that must be attended are (1) the CIMIC BASIC Course and (2) the CIMIC STAFF Course. As part of their regular training methodology CIMIC personnel participate in regular training and staff planning exercises at least six times a year during which the CIMIC (G-9 or S-9) staff representatives are integrated. For general purpose forces, the training is interwoven in their standard pre-deployment training sequence and primarily focuses on cultural awareness and which organizations are practicing CIMIC or CA functions in their area of operations.¹⁴




Figure 2 Netherlands CIMIC Battalion (FOC CY 2010)

¹³ Colonel Hans van der Louw, interviewed by Captain Jeffrey Maclay, Lieutenant Colonel Robert Scott, and David Sokolow, notes, Royal Netherland Embassy, Washington, DC, 13 November 2008.

¹⁴ Colonel Hans van der Louw, interviewed by Captain Jeffrey Maclay, Lieutenant Colonel Robert Scott, and David Sokolow, notes, Royal Netherland Embassy, Washington, DC, 13 November 2008.

¹⁵ Colonel Hans van der Louw, interviewed by Captain Jeffrey Maclay, Lieutenant Colonel Robert Scott, and David Sokolow, notes, Royal Netherland Embassy, Washington, DC, 13 November 2008.

Germany: The German Army employs its forces to support CIMIC operations and, as with the other nations that contributed to this project, do not view it as a requirement that the Ministry of Defense be in the lead. It is in fact preferable to have the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the lead role for coordination with the private sector, the civilian governmental employees, and non-governmental organizations in order to placate their fears that they will be co-opted by the military arm. A graphic depiction of the manner in which the German model is used is below:



Fü S IV 3

CIMIC-Kernfunktionen gem. AJP 9




Figure 3 Schmitt - Raisem, Captain Ralf, German Defense Attaché. "CIMIC" PowerPoint Slides, 12 November 2008