Enhancing Stabilization and Reconstruction Operations

A Report of the Global Dialogue between the European Union and the United States

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Project Director
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January 2009
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The need for this report is both clear and urgent. A new U.S. administration has come to power just at the moment when the mission in Afghanistan is in danger of becoming bogged down. For that reason, while this report considers stabilization and reconstruction (S&R) operations in principle, so that the conduct of future such operations will improve, the focus must in major part be on Afghanistan, where Americans and Europeans are deployed together in force. Indeed, although the experience gained in the Balkans and Iraq was also considered in the course of this project, they were done so from the perspective of how lessons learned there can be applied in the first instance to Afghanistan.

The report is part of a series in a project, a Global Dialogue between the European Union and the United States, led by Simon Serfaty of the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, D.C., with support from the European Commission. With a determinedly practical approach, a Euro-Atlantic working group was established, composed of a mix of U.S. and European S&R professionals, policymakers, practitioners, and leading academics. The U.S. members of the working group met on May 9, 2008, in Washington, while the European members met in Breda, Netherlands, on June 23, 2008. After each meeting, a detailed report was prepared that formed the basis for the preparation of this report. The draft report was then discussed at a combined session in Brussels on October 20 before the preparation of the final report was completed to coincide with the U.S. election and transition.

I am thankful to Robert Hunter for his contributions to the executive summary and agenda for action at the front of this report, which was released by CSIS in December 2008 as a separate, parallel publication cosigned by the two of us, and whose “general thrust” was endorsed by the members of the working group in their own names. I am indebted to Edward P. Joseph for his contribution to the early work of the project. I am also indebted to Major General Siem van Groningen, commandant of the Netherlands Defence Academy, who welcomed the European working group members to Breda. The members of both working groups have given their time in a spirit of cooperation and support when other pressures have been intense, and I am deeply grateful for their support. However, there are two people to whom I am particularly indebted. My colleague Martijn Kitzen has made such an invaluable contribution in terms of research and drafting that he should be seen as a coauthor of this report. Above all, I want to thank my friend and colleague Simon Serfaty. Simon is one of the Western world’s leading analysts, for whom I have held a profound respect for many years. It has been an honor to prepare this report under the aegis of his overall leadership.

While the members of the working group were consulted extensively in preparation of this report, the content and any errors contained herein are solely my own responsibility.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

“Security incidents in Afghanistan have been on the rise every year since 2003, especially in the south and south-western provinces. The number of security incidents increased sharply in 2006, in parallel with the increase of opium poppy cultivation. The year 2008 shows a further sharp increase in security incidents.”—UN Office of Drugs and Crime, Afghanistan Opium Survey 2008

Americans and Europeans must consult much more closely if they are to develop the cohesion necessary for effective stabilization and reconstruction (S&R) operations, along with shared concepts and capabilities that are needed as the very minimum for success.1

Central to the analysis is the need for an agreed transatlantic definition of what has become known as the Comprehensive Approach (or whole-of-government approach), whereby civilian and military personnel work together from across different parts of a single government and from among different governments toward a stabilization and reconstruction end state. Unfortunately, such is the complexity of making such approaches work at the national level that a real danger exists that transnational coordination will be adversely affected.

To permit an effective EU-NATO (and also EU-U.S.) relationship, we recommend the early establishment of an EU-NATO Working Group on the Comprehensive Approach to harmonize better the European Union’s Crisis Management Concept (CMC) with NATO’s Concerted Planning and Action (CPA). The working group should consider how such a reciprocal arrangement for mutual support can be established during S&R operations. We also call on greater efforts to modernize the NATO Strategic Concept and similar efforts at the European Union to review the European Security Strategy (ESS) with respect to S&R. We propose a direct relationship between the U.S. State Department (and other U.S. government agencies) and the European Union to promote a dialogue with international organizations (IOs) and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) that are increasingly important to mission success. This

1 The executive summary and agenda for action, coauthored by Julian Lindley-French and Robert Hunter, was released by CSIS in December 2008 as a shorter, parallel report whose “general thrust, although not necessarily every word and finding” was endorsed in their own names by members of the S&R working group, including Charles Barry, Nora Bensahel, Hans Binnendijk, Yves Boyer, Daan Everts, Ray Salvatore Jennings, Roberto Menotti, Graham Messervy-Whiting, Roberto Perito, Andrew Rathmell, Simon Serfaty, and Emma Sky.
effort should be explicitly linked to the Early Recovery Initiative of the secretary-general of the United Nations. It is important that the transatlantic effort be seen to support the multilateral effort.

The legitimizing (and operational) role of the United Nations is important. For that reason, a stronger UN role in promoting political reconciliation at the outset of S&R operations should be welcomed. To that end, mainly within the context of Afghanistan, we focus on three elements: a) legitimization and authorization of missions; b) a possible UN role in achieving political reconciliation on the ground; and c) developing a common concept of operations, doctrines, and civil-military structures that could be established as standard operating practices with parties outside the transatlantic partnership, especially including UN partners. We stress that current concepts of S&R tend to comprise too many goals covering the broad sweep of security, development, and governance but place insufficient emphasis on seeking early reconciliation of the different parties to a conflict.

For the foreseeable future, with the exception of some British and French capabilities, Europeans will only have a limited advanced expeditionary stabilization capability and capacity. Indeed, S&R operations are particularly challenging for Europeans because they require both a mass of forces and forces that can maneuver. The military component is vital to credible presence in-theater and to provide protection for nonmilitary elements of S&R. Consequently, while the United States has at times tended to over-militarize S&R operations, Europeans have often tended to over-civilianize them. Leadership of S&R operations through the EU and its various mechanisms is still in its infancy. However, emerging concepts for S&R operations, while encouraging, are as yet not properly supported with adequate capabilities and capacities and tend to remain too focused on institutional shape, structure, decisionmaking, and reporting procedures. The reverse might be said for the United States, which has a high level of military capability (although profound weaknesses in government civilian capacity) but suffers from interagency disputes and stovepiping. It should be noted that Canada has a long tradition with its pioneering of the “3D” concept (defense, diplomacy, and development), including through its deployable civilian elements, CANADEM.

We stress that all parties to an S&R operation be as clear as possible from the outset about the objective. Self-delusion or denial of the need for change as an S&R operation evolves must be avoided, because almost inevitably the balance between stabilization “S” and reconstruction “R” will, and indeed should, shift in the course of operations, with the emphasis of efforts moving progressively from a military to a civilian focus. Indeed, although sound campaign planning is vital to the generation of a security continuum, only realistic, relevant, and effective metrics can measure true progress toward an agreed end state. Such an objective must itself involve reducing the military role in S&R as soon as is practically possible, bearing in mind, of course, that protecting civilian agencies and individuals can still require a significant military role.

With regard to Afghanistan more specifically and most urgently, the period 2009 to 2011 will be a critical time for both the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and the U.S.-
led Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF). NATO’s 2008 Bucharest summit laid out a clear mission end state covering security, reconstruction, development, and governance—the so-called security package. Unfortunately, S&R efforts remain inadequately coordinated and at times incoherent, making it difficult to tie stated strategy and actual progress together.

We call for a renewed common vision of the political (governance), social, and economic track, reinforced by a shared level of ambition and backed up by the requisite unity of effort and level of resources, civilian as well as military. Therefore, if the coalition is to make significant progress in S&R during the next two years (critical because of the European electoral cycle and declining popular support for the Afghanistan mission), some basic demonstrable objectives will have to be achieved. But without a common view of what is to be done and how to do it, across the S&R spectrum, it will be hard to generate sufficient progress or even to translate progress when it occurs into renewed political support back home. This requires significant commitment of people and resources, especially in the civilian sectors, to make possible serious progress toward reducing support for the insurgency and increasing support for government and governance at all levels of Afghan society. An Afghan-Afghan political dialogue will be essential. Particular effort should be invested to return disaffected elements of the Taliban to Afghan political and social life, as has reportedly already been initiated under Saudi auspices. An end to insurgency ultimately must rest on a political base.

Whether in Afghanistan or in any other environment, reconstruction efforts require years if not decades, major financial resources, and a lot of staying power. People are the critical ground, and life fundamentals are the critical focus: education, improved public and personal health, job creation, and effective policing and justice. Effective rule of law is and must be a top priority. Security is a means to an end, and in Afghanistan, the S&R role of regional partners through the United Nations in areas such as reconciliation and the training of police will be vitally important.

The campaign plan for Afghanistan must therefore be based on a realistic time frame that clearly identifies what needs to be done by 2011 and what will be required thereafter. Such a plan must be reinforced by a shared strategic narrative that is honest about the current position (positive and negative), a vision of success and of end states, and the nature and extent of challenges ahead.
AN AGENDA FOR ACTION

1. Establish a strategic framework for stabilization and reconstruction (S&R) operations: North Americans and Europeans, working through NATO and the European Union, as appropriate, need to create means for harmonizing views, reconciling differences of perspective and approach, and in the process, determining where and when to cooperate in undertaking S&R operations.

2. Design a basic methodology for S&R operations: Key to S&R success is helping local states enhance the performance of state functions, whether at a national, regional/provincial, or local level. Key actors will need to “buy in” to the goal of state building from the outset of an intervention. One possibility would be to foster agreement on a compact between a country’s leadership, its citizens, and outside states and institutions. As clear a conceptual understanding as possible is needed early on in S&R efforts of the relationship between different efforts and their sequencing throughout the security continuum—security, governance, reconstruction, and development.

3. Understand the constraints of S&R operations: The limits of S&R also need to be understood to the extent possible. If carried out without sufficient political support at home, international interventions can undermine the rationale and legitimacy of such operations. This can exacerbate rather than alleviate insurgencies. Furthermore, in some circumstances, potential tensions between counterinsurgency operations and S&R operations can actually undermine state-building capacities. Most important, S&R operations cannot substitute for what states, their leaders, and their peoples are prepared to do on their own behalf; nor can they be effective without both sensitivity by outsiders to local attitudes, beliefs, practices, and requirements and adequate “buy in” by in-country leaderships and populations.

4. Greater cohesion and synergy must be generated from the EU-NATO relationship: NATO and the European Union each have unique capabilities, and both have much to contribute to S&R operations. As of now, however, there is very little relationship between the two institutions, politically or functionally, in this important area. There needs to be a major effort to develop and build on the potential for EU-NATO synergies covering S&R operations. This includes restructuring investment so that the most effective balance can be achieved among military, diplomatic, intelligence, and development efforts. It includes concerted efforts to remove political impediments to EU-NATO cooperation. And it includes building practical cooperative mechanisms for the full range of S&R operations that can maximize the value of what the two institutions can achieve together.
As part of this transformation of relations, it would be useful for the EU and NATO jointly to assume responsibility for building a cadre of civil-military experts committed to promoting S&R interoperability. This could possibly be part of a new center of excellence, perhaps a new civil-military staff college that could also contribute to lessons learned and to harmonization of S&R and security force reform concepts and doctrines. The Berlin Plus agreement enables the European Union to have access to NATO military assets and capabilities for European-led operations. The European Union should likewise be prepared to offer its civilian crisis management capabilities in support of NATO operations. An EU-NATO working group should be created to consider how such a reciprocal arrangement for mutual support could be established during S&R operations. This should include a reservoir of law enforcement capacity, working closely with the United Nations and providing access to police trainers, prison service professionals, and judges, as well as public administrators and utilities and infrastructure engineers.

**5. Establish a stronger and more direct EU-U.S. security relationship built on S&R operations:** The European Union and United States should look jointly at a range of initiatives. These include: reviewing the roles of economic aid in conflicts to help donors better tailor their efforts; expanding rule of law aspects of S&R operations; creating “super-civilians” with a particular emphasis on how best to improve the role of the UN special representative of the secretary-general—a special representative able to speak on behalf of all outside states and institutions engaged in S&R operations; building the capacity of the United Nations and regional institutions in pursuit of effective stabilization and reconstruction, possibly in conjunction with the G-7; and understanding the potential roles and functions of IOs and NGOs during S&R operations—including dialogue with responsible organizations in both the IO and NGO communities about their planning and what tasks they regard as central to their mission in such environments.

**6. Reconcile S&R operations with counterinsurgency operations:** Hitherto the contrast between S&R and counterinsurgency has had more to do with contrasting political and military methods than dealing with different threats. There needs to be a search for common ground between the often overly militarized approach of U.S. forces and the overly political approach of many European forces.

**7. Reinvigorate relations with the United Nations:** Over time, S&R operations need to be de-Westernized by involving regional powers under the aegis of the United Nations. This can help remove the potential stigma of “neocolonialism.” European states will almost certainly require that all S&R operations henceforth be conducted under a UN Security Council mandate, with support from regional institutions. Capacity building of the United Nations, as well as a joint EU-U.S. approach to empowering regional institutions such as the African Union (AU), should be central to a generic U.S.-EU S&R concept.

**8. Launch a strategic narrative to relegate S&R efforts:** The choice of both the strategic narrative and the language therein needs to be better linked to progress, performance, and publics. Too often a government is given credit for progress for which it is not responsible or damned for being weak and irresolute, the benchmarks having been set at the level of Western governance and
government. North Americans and Europeans also need to explain to their own peoples and other nations the nature of S&R operations. A flourishing media is a central function of good governance.

9. **Give the Comprehensive Approach substance and meaning:** The Comprehensive Approach (whole-of-government approach) is central to the success of S&R operations. These are complex undertakings. Civilian and defense ministries must be required to work together, and this effort should be designed to reinforce transnational organization and effect. This will require overcoming intragovernment rivalries and contrasting cultures and doctrines, fostering unity of effort. Host countries must be able to deal with a relatively limited number of points of contact. The Comprehensive Approach needs to include a new cadre of elite civilian and military planners and commanders able to plan, direct, and manage operations as a single team. To that end, an EU-NATO Working Group on the Comprehensive Approach should be established to harmonize civilian and military efforts during S&R operations built on a comprehensive capability planning process. NATO’s Allied Command Transformation should be tasked to lead this effort, on behalf of both NATO and the European Union.

10. **Create a compelling rationale for engagement in Afghanistan:** Most European countries sent troops to Afghanistan—all 26 NATO allies have troops there—in few cases because of concern about a direct impact on their national security as opposed to concerns about relations with the United States: the aftermath of 9/11; the fact that few Europeans were prepared to become engaged in Iraq; and the need to be reassured about continued U.S. commitment to European security. None of these arguments will be sufficient to sustain the commitment of several of the NATO allies. A politically sustainable rationale needs to be a compound of legitimate concerns about the potential for a renewed spread of terrorism; inherent problems of instability in Afghanistan and neighboring Pakistan; the potential for at least relative success of S&R efforts; and support for the continuing strategic role and leadership of the United States in the region, in the greater Middle East, and elsewhere in the world, including Europe. The rationale can also draw on the benefits of pursuing the Comprehensive Approach, where contributions from some European countries can be denominated more in nonmilitary instruments and activities, especially in the critical areas of governance, reconstruction, and development.

11. **Develop shared understandings over the level of ambition, unity of command, and unity of effort required for success in Afghanistan:** In Iraq, U.S. predominance in the coalition has enhanced unity of command and effort with obvious benefits as lessons learned are implemented. Afghanistan demonstrates the consequences of a relative lack of such unity. The Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs), for example, cannot be “one size fits all,” but they tend to be too diffuse in their organization and effort—and too inadequately staffed and funded—to provide sufficient overall effect. It is not always clear where they fit into the overall International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) campaign design, what they are supposed to achieve, and how such achievements are to be measured. The European Union should take on much greater responsibility in nonmilitary areas of Afghanistan S&R, including for many if not most of the PRTs. The European Union’s Crisis Management Concept (CMC) should be further developed with that specific goal in mind. The European Union should also appoint a senior representative in
Afghanistan to coordinate nonmilitary efforts, and European countries should provide much greater resources, including in critical areas of governance, reconstruction, and development. Within NATO, the practice of “costs lie where they fall” should be revised in order to permit more equitable burden sharing.

12. Create a regional framework for S&R: It has become clear that success in Afghanistan requires efforts that relate to neighboring countries as well. Most important is Pakistan. Helping it to stabilize its frontier areas must become a high priority, along with significant support for the central government. This will require substantial resources; it will also require much greater efforts to coordinate Afghan and Pakistani policies. ISAF leadership needs to foster such relations, and all regional countries need to be engaged to the extent possible. This includes Iran, which played a critical role in the defeat of the Taliban in 2001 but which has since been sidelined at U.S. insistence. Diplomatic initiatives in all these areas should be launched jointly by North Americans and Europeans.

13. Create government assistance teams (GATs): Beyond NATO and partner countries directly engaged in Afghanistan, the wider international community has shown little inclination to improve S&R performance. This is particularly the case where it has proved difficult to link the needs for aid and development to contributing countries’ national interest. One approach in Afghanistan might be to create a common model in place of the current PRTs. Such government assistance teams would be tailored to specific scenarios but would involve a function-led common understanding of how to approach key S&R tasks and thus permit a better audit trail to be established. To that end, each GAT could be organized around several task groups: a military-security group, a rule of law group, an economic assistance group, a police training group, a religious affairs group, an agricultural assistance group, a customs and border control group, an infrastructure group, etc. Such an approach could also help produce common funding aimed at better supporting the efforts of poorer countries engaged in S&R operations.

14. Review political alternatives: Where possible, political reconciliation of all significant parties to a conflict must begin at the outset of an S&R operation: in fact, the military effort must always be subordinate to the political objective (and track) for S&R operations, and the political track cannot be allowed to take second place to the military effort. Thus, the potential for political reconciliation in Afghanistan should be thoroughly canvassed, under the leadership of the Afghan government and consonant with the long-term interests of the Afghan people. There should also be continued efforts to reintegrate elements of the Taliban who have been either “economic warriors” or who are not tied to radical Islamist ideology. Beyond that, consideration should be given to the potential for dialogue between the Afghan government and Taliban leaders. Such an approach carries obvious risks; but it might in time produce benefits in terms of a potential halt to fighting while preserving critical elements of Afghanistan’s ability to chart its own course within the outside world.
### ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

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<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tr>
<td>ACT</td>
<td>Allied Command Transformation</td>
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<td>AU</td>
<td>African Union</td>
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<td>ANA</td>
<td>Afghan National Army</td>
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<td>ANCOP</td>
<td>Afghan Civil Order Police</td>
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<td>ANDS</td>
<td>Afghanistan National Development Strategy</td>
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<td>ANP</td>
<td>Afghan National Police</td>
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<td>CERP</td>
<td>U.S. Commander’s Emergency Response Program</td>
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<td>COIN</td>
<td>counterinsurgency</td>
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<td>CPA</td>
<td>Concerted Planning and Action of Civil and Military Activities</td>
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<td>CMC</td>
<td>EU Crisis Management Concept</td>
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<td>DDR</td>
<td>demobilization, disarmament, and reintegration</td>
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<td>DfID</td>
<td>UK Department for International Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>DPA</td>
<td>UN Department for Political Affairs</td>
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<td>DPKO</td>
<td>UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations</td>
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<td>EBAO</td>
<td>effects-based approach to operations</td>
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<td>EDT</td>
<td>embedded development teams</td>
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<td>EGF</td>
<td>European Gendarmerie Force</td>
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<td>ESDP</td>
<td>European Security and Development Policy</td>
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<td>ESS</td>
<td>European Security Strategy</td>
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<td>EUPM</td>
<td>European Union Police Mission</td>
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<td>FATA</td>
<td>Federally Administered Tribal Areas</td>
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<td>GAT</td>
<td>government assistance team</td>
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<td>IED</td>
<td>improvised explosive device</td>
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<tr>
<td>IRGC-QF</td>
<td>Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps–Qods Force</td>
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<td>Abbreviation</td>
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<tr>
<td>ISAF</td>
<td>International Security Assistance Force</td>
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<td>Inter-Services Intelligence (Pakistan)</td>
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<td>KFOR</td>
<td>Kosovo Force</td>
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<td>MNF-I</td>
<td>Multinational Force–Iraq</td>
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<td>OEF</td>
<td>Operation Enduring Freedom</td>
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<td>OMLT</td>
<td>Operational Mentor and Liaison Team</td>
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<td>POMLT</td>
<td>Police Operational Mentor and Liaison Team</td>
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<td>PRT</td>
<td>Provincial Reconstruction Team</td>
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<td>QIP</td>
<td>quick impact project</td>
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<td>QSIP</td>
<td>quick sustainable impact project</td>
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<td>RC-South</td>
<td>Regional Command–South</td>
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<td>R2P</td>
<td>responsibility to protect</td>
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<td>S&amp;R</td>
<td>stabilization and reconstruction</td>
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<td>SCR</td>
<td>senior civilian representative</td>
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<td>SSR</td>
<td>security sector reform</td>
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<td>UNAMI</td>
<td>UN Assistance Mission for Iraq</td>
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<td>UNDSS</td>
<td>UN Department of Safety and Security</td>
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<td>UNHCR</td>
<td>UN High Commission for Refugees</td>
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<td>UNIFIL</td>
<td>UN Interim Force in Lebanon</td>
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ENHANCING STABILIZATION AND RECONSTRUCTION OPERATIONS

A Sense of Urgency

Where Everything Is a Priority, Nothing Is a Priority

At the outset of the new Obama administration, one of the main issues in the transatlantic relationship over the next two years will be the effective conduct of stabilization and reconstruction operations. Today, there are 40 to 60 states that can be characterized as failed or fragile states in which the gap between de jure sovereignty and de facto capabilities is stretched to the point of fracture. While much greater effort must be made to prevent the collapse of such states, the need to intervene to restore sound governance is likely to remain. Properly organized and funded stabilization and reconstruction operations can lead effectively and efficiently to a desired end state consistent with U.S. and European values. Indeed, stabilization and reconstruction (S&R) operations primarily concern the funneling of western taxpayers’ money into ungoverned spaces through the medium of military and civilian efforts, and in partnership with the people therein, in pursuit of mutual security.

Therefore, the task of this report is not simply to produce priorities per se (i.e., a laundry list) but rather to order them in a pragmatic and practical manner so that the conduct of S&R operations becomes more efficient. That said, there are many contrasts between Americans and Europeans (and among Europeans) concerning the conduct of S&R operations. It is evident that both in terms of level of ambition and capability a gulf exists between Americans and Europeans that will need to be bridged if future operations are not again, like Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) in Afghanistan, to become a series of inefficient national fiefdoms, each and all with their own practice and levels of effectiveness.

The specific objective of the report is to better understand what balance and interrelationship will need to be found among peacekeeping, enforcement, humanitarian, and rule of law efforts as part of a minimum benchmark for institution building implicit in the United Nations’ “responsibility to protect” (R2P). Central to the concept of operations underpinning the report is thus the need for a far better and more sophisticated understanding of the people in-theater as part of efforts to improve the balance between the kinetic and nonkinetic. While much of the report is devoted to a generic concept of S&R operations, implicit in the findings is also a recognition that each operation will also need to be scenario specific.

The main priority that this report addresses concerns the consequences to mission success of the lack of a properly understood, agreed on, and feasible multilateral S&R strategy in-theater based
on a campaign plan owned by all parties. The focus is Afghanistan. The report also considers the lack of any proper command authority and the lack of a clear strategic narrative for friend and foe alike. Indeed, although no Afghanistan fatigue apparently as yet exists in the United States, such fatigue is clearly evident in Europe where there is little or no ownership of the mission at the popular level and little or no understanding of the link among terrorism, terrorists, and their exploitation of ungoverned spaces. However, while no fatigue per se exists in the United States, Afghanistan must become far more central to the policy of the new U.S. administration if European support is to be maintained. Indeed, most Europeans are only present in Afghanistan out of solidarity with the post-9/11 United States. Unfortunately, Europeans have been concerned that Iraq has dominated U.S. thinking and action because most Europeans have never believed a link existed between the Saddam Hussein regime and the perpetrators of the attacks on Washington and New York. Therefore, as 9/11 recedes in Europe, a far more sophisticated case for staying in Afghanistan beyond 2010 will have to be made. The period 2009 to 2011 on which the coalition is entering in Afghanistan will thus be the critical period. The method of Afghanistan therefore must become central to a new U.S. strategy designed to convince the Allies that a new approach to the transatlantic conduct of S&R operations will be vital. However, such a strategy must emphasize a renewed and specific emphasis on the Comprehensive Approach and its planning, design, and effectiveness.

**Flexibility and Inclusiveness**

The need for a shared vision, together with a shared understanding of the challenges posed and faced by an S&R operation is therefore vital from the outset. Such vision must be systematically reinforced by a common definition of success if planning and the associated benchmarking of relevant metrics is to be better harmonized across the effort. Put simply, in Afghanistan there is little agreement over what success could look like and where best to engage the most effort in pursuit of such an end. Increasingly, success in Afghanistan is being defined as the avoidance of failure, and that viewpoint will simply make failure inevitable. Indeed, several members of the coalition are in effect planning to leave Afghanistan as soon as possible, irrespective of the situation in country. Even in Iraq, where much has been made of the U.S. security surge, the U.S. commander, General David Petraeus, has suggested that the United States is merely holding the ground. Henry Kissinger pointed out the dangers of S&R attrition; the guerrilla wins if he does not lose, whereas the conventional army loses if it does not win. Only a strategy that is properly founded on relevant and sustained resources has any chance of success over the medium to long term, which is the true test. Unfortunately, in both Iraq and Afghanistan a culture of wishful thinking, particularly on the part of political leaders, led to wholly inadequate assessments being made of the commitments required, the time needed, and new partnerships necessary if success is to be achieved and sustained. The result is excessive pessimism in most European countries about S&R operations.

In Afghanistan, success is both very basic and very complex. Afghanistan must be preserved as a state, there must be some credible but basic rule of law institutions, and a balance achieved
between central governance and traditional tribal structures. Loftier notions such as democracy, while desirable, are not in themselves vital to the achievement of an acceptable end state. Indeed, the confusion of values with interests in the deployments in both Iraq and Afghanistan has greatly complicated the task of armed forces leading the S&R effort in both countries. Therefore, only a clear interest-led approach to S&R from the outset can provide the basis for effective planning and action with the end state of any such strategy being defined as whatever it takes for the Afghan people to sustain stable government and governance. If Iraq presents a challenge for representation, Afghanistan is much more a challenge of organization. The people are the vital ground.

It is evident that a political clock is now running. Many Europeans believe that in the aftermath of 9/11, the United States was permitted excessive influence over the strategy and conduct of S&R operations and that such influence has warped and undermined the traditional interest-led relationship among states, even close ones. Europeans are unlikely to ever permit that to happen again. Equally, the development of credible S&R is central to the emerging European strategic ethos. To that end, many European countries are trying to develop the capacity to undertake more, not less, S&R operations, even if the geopolitical context militates against many such operations, in the near future at least. This is because central to the European concept of operations is multilateral relations at the European level or through the United Nations. In many European countries, S&R is seen as the evolution of peacekeeping, which became central to the role of European armed forces in the 1990s.

From a European perspective, the need to develop practical proposals for mutually consistent and mutually reinforcing bilateral, multilateral, and institutional approaches to S&R is a priority. Thankfully, while the Europeans are slowly developing European approaches to S&R, it is by and large complementary to that of the United States, even if as yet they lack sufficient capability and capacity investment to be credible in all but the most permissive of environments. The European Union, which in many ways is a strategic Comprehensive Approach in waiting, enjoys a crisis management concept (CMC) based on the Comprehensive Approach that is supported by a whole raft of instruments. However, the European Union’s Civilian Capabilities Improvement Plan continues to highlight shortfalls in the number of available judges, prosecutors, prison personnel, police officers, and border police officers that would be needed to ensure that S&R operations cross the threshold to establish credible presence. Therefore, given both Afghanistan and Iraq, the focus must now be on taking practical steps to better enable Europeans to be effective in low- to medium-intensity operations, with the civilian crisis management capacity further enhanced.

The Stabilization Challenge

Getting the Mind Map Right

A key question concerns how best to link “S” with “R” as part of an all-important security continuum that establishes the need for security first, as the prerequisite for the rule of law that is at the heart of effective S&R. For Europeans, stabilization tends to be emphasized because it
is the method by which they can shape the international environment and thus is central to the European strategic method. Stabilization, for example, is not intrinsically linked to counterterrorism and yet has been thus far reasonably effective in preventing terrorism in places such as Africa. However, the difficulty of generating success from S&R operations has accelerated a sense of relative decline, certainly within Europe, but also beyond. This has encouraged others to miscalculate. For example, the Russian invasion of Georgia would have been unlikely to have happened if the Kremlin had a) not perceived weakness; and b) could not have justified the intervention using similar arguments employed by the West over “S,” if not “R.” One of the fundamental realities of successful S&R is that political top cover is vital. In an ideal world, it would be provided by the United Nations. Indeed, legality under international law and political legitimacy are as important to S&R as capability. This is particularly the case where multinational formations are concerned. Thus, the limits of S&R operations are also becoming apparent, at least for Europeans.

Reconstruction is far more problematic for Europeans because it implies the need to impose a certain world view on others. To many Europeans, reconstruction is dangerously close to becoming a form of postmodern neocolonialism. For that reason, “R” is politically sensitive both in Europe and the wider world community, something that does not seem so readily apparent in the United States, where such efforts are seen as part of the a wider U.S. mission. Such strategic dissonance over the nature of S&R also extends to governance. For most Europeans, successful reconstruction in Afghanistan will only be possible with the active support of states in the region. Indeed, the need to de-Westernize the identity of the coalition in Afghanistan is for most Europeans an essential step. That will include a much closer dialogue than hitherto with the likes of Iran, India, and China, as well as Russia.

To be successful, S&R operations must also deal decisively with the main threat or threats. In the opinion of both Americans and British, Afghanistan is part of south Asian security instability, with the focus as much on Pakistan as Afghanistan. Consequently, both countries have a strategic mindset to match a strategic commitment, of which S&R is an important part, but only a part of what is for them a strategic objective. For many Europeans, Afghanistan represents a Bosnia-plus operation in which the rules of engagement and area of operations are limited to peacekeeping in local environments. It is this dichotomy that explains the varying levels of ambition and the fractured unity of the S&R effort. Over time, such fissures could prove fatal for effective multilateral S&R operations.

The lack of a shared big picture makes it very hard for the coalition to speak with one voice to either Afghan or Pakistani leaderships. This has made reaching common cause hard, with Islamabad in particular, which has further undermined the ability of the coalition to deal with the safe havens in Pakistan. The Taliban leadership and foreign fighters in Quetta and Peshawar have thus gone virtually unmolested in spite of several offensives into Waziristan and Baluchistan by a Pakistani Army that has taken many casualties. This has enabled them to carry out an increasingly sophisticated insurgency and propaganda operation. If S&R operations are to be successful, counterinsurgency operations must have the credible presence and capability to deal with threats
to stability decisively. For that reason, the area vital to mission success in Afghanistan now extends beyond the Afghan-Pakistan border into Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). Consequently, there needs to be a regional-strategic approach to both S&R and counterinsurgency (COIN), as FATA is key to any political settlement in Afghanistan. Indeed, when the Taliban leadership has been targeted, the results have proved effective. Such an approach will require the positing of S&R operations within a proper political-military strategy for the region. The United States made progress in Iraq not simply because of the establishment of credible presence through the surge, but because key Sunni tribes switched sides in the fight against al Qaeda and their supporters. This was partly as a function of the surge but also because of improved S&R in tribal homelands, backed up by copious amounts of cash payments to key individuals. The need for a Pashtun awakening is pressing, similar to the Sunni awakening in Iraq, with the caveat that such an awakening should not undermine the Afghan or Pakistani states. It will prove no easy task.

**Simplifying S&R for Effect**

The current concept of S&R tends to comprise too many goals—security, development, governance, etc. Such complexity has tended to undermine strategic patience in most Western states (i.e., a popular acceptance of the risk and cost necessary to succeed over time and distance). Such a lack of strategic patience has led to an S&R paradox in that Western impatience tends to promote a revolutionary approach to S&R, given the rush to declare victory. As a result, the West fails to permit societies to evolve. Indeed, the perceived urgency of the West’s own security needs thus undermines the crafting of success. Therefore, achievable and relevant end states need to be established at the outset before requirements and timelines can be realistically assessed and expectations thereafter managed.

One basic dilemma of S&R operations is that there exists as yet no clearly identified and agreed method for the proper understanding of the inner workings of a complex society. This failure prevents the generation of an all-important net intelligence assessment or intelligence picture and thus no proper basis to establish workable links between the generation of macro and micro effect. This is a particularly acute problem for Europeans, for whom the leadership of S&R operations is still new in the modern age.

Moreover, the very real and profound capability and capacity constraints on Europeans are all too apparent on contemporary S&R operations, caused by a lack of sufficient numbers of forces and forces able to undertake effective maneuver without U.S. support. With the exception of the British and French, European leadership of S&R operations is in its infancy. EU operations thus far have been very small, with the partial exception of Operation Artemis in Bosnia. The UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL-2) could have been an EU-led operation, but the temptation of the Italians and French to fall back on proven national command chains proved too strong to resist. With no clear understanding apparent as to when the European Union should lead or when a nation should take the lead, this is a problem that will persist. In this case, this was partly to avoid a complicated chain of command with the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), and partly because the British were otherwise engaged in Iraq and Afghanistan.
However, it was also partly due to the unproven and complex nature of EU decisionmaking. EU
S&R is thus very much a work in progress.

Such concerns beg the question as to why transnational coalition efforts in the Balkan operations
have appeared reasonably effective, while those in Afghanistan have seen the progressive
renationalization and fragmentation of the effort. There are several factors: the nature of U.S.
strategy and leadership, the sheer complexity of getting whole-of-government approaches to work
even at the national level, the varying levels of political will in the contributing states, and the
length of the operation and the distance from the home base. All of these factors have been
complicated for Europeans in Iraq and Afghanistan by a lack of political and popular belief in the
missions and the lack of belief in a successful outcome. Success is, of course, relative. Both the air-
led operations in Bosnia in 1995 and Kosovo in 1999 demonstrated profound limitations in the
ability of Europeans to conduct large-scale operations, even close to home. One of the realities of
modern day European stabilization projection is that history matters as much as geography.
Consequently, Europeans are very sensitive to any accusation of latter day colonialism. Therefore,
for the foreseeable future most Europeans are likely to have only a limited advanced expeditionary
stabilization capacity.

Furthermore, the S&R effort in Bosnia suffered from the outset because a territorial approach was
adopted to resolve ethnic tensions, which should in the future be avoided. Indeed, there were
dilemmas and failings apparent across all aspects of S&R in the Balkans that are echoed in
Afghanistan. These include a confused political-military approach with little or no consensus over
the end state to be achieved or the political legitimacy of the operation; an inability to effectively
control belligerents; difficulties in generating and delivering effective humanitarian aid; slowness
in repairing infrastructure; poor preparation of elections, development of civil society, and
creation of employment; and inadequate anticorruption measures and judicial reform. Reinforced
by the so-called Sanger mentality, which increased the isolation of aid providers from society,
progress to date in the Balkans has been patchy at best. Therefore, both NATO and the European
Union will need to be present in the region in strength for some time. One of the problems in the
Balkans that is also all too apparent in Iraq and Afghanistan is the very heavy presence of foreign
contractors, which has tended to reinforce barriers between the political-military leadership and
the people.

The tendency to focus S&R on space rather than function can prevent the effective organization of
best practice—how best to use relative comparative advantages of the coalition members in key
areas. For example, the relationship between rule of law and security is and must be a central
theme for all S&R operations. The United States faced profound problems in Iraq, not least
because there was no national police force, the judiciary and the executive were variegated and
separated, and all prisons were run at a local level. There are today some 28,000 detainees in Iraq
that have yet to pass through a court. Police training is difficult and complex and it must be
sensitive and sensitized to local needs. At the same time, the political realities on the ground have
to be confronted if credible policing, the sine qua non of a functioning state, is to be established.
In Afghanistan, too many local warlords simply see the police as a means to “shake down” citizens
in order to extort money and thus to confirm their authority in defiance of central political authority.

**A Focus on the S&R Practical**

A pragmatic understanding of the relationship between “S” and “R” is also needed. Ideally, stabilization should be a short-term activity designed to return a fragile state to development. While it is important to consider the strategic implications of stabilization, the immediate need is to focus on effective and practical stabilization. Evidence from Iraq and Afghanistan would suggest that an S&R “hole” exists in the grey area between the role of armed forces in stabilization and the role of the development community. Establishing sufficient criteria for the understanding of handover is difficult in environments in which development will always involve risk to those civilians deployed. However, rapid and early civilianization of a mission is a vital component of S&R success. This conundrum has yet to be resolved and may only be so when a more robust civilian is deployed who is able to cover the tipping point between military-led stabilization and civilian-led reconstruction. The United States has attempted to resolve this dilemma through the extensive use of robust civilian contractors, such as DynCorp International and Bearing Point, the teams of which are often comprised of ex-military personnel. However, the cost of these services is such that some 90 percent of headline aid and development is repatriated through such contractors and consultants, exacerbating the perception of insufficient development impact among the people. In other words, such an approach can be self-defeating.

In Afghanistan, reconstruction is an essential component of stabilization, not subsequent to it. The old, neat assumption of reconstructing after stabilization simply does not work therein. Therefore, stabilization is to an extent dependent on effective reconstruction in conflict, not after it. Certainly, there is no military solution per se. Moreover, any political solution at both national and regional levels must be dependent on a demonstrable and critical level of stabilization and reconstruction, with the reinforcement of the state security sector and rule of law, both fundamental to S&R, necessarily running in parallel to security operations. Again, the center of gravity must be the local people, with planning necessarily established on several lines of S&R operations that run in parallel, not in sequence. Unfortunately, failure to grasp this basic planning reality (and therefore the flaws inherent in the planning) results in tension between the level and direction of effort and the actual effect on the ground, too often leading to a loss of confidence in the mission in key political constituencies. Certainly, such a lack of clarity over the balance of effort to be made is causing considerable confusion among coalition and Afghan forces on the ground in Afghanistan.

The lesson is clear: depth of local knowledge is vital. One way around this planning dilemma could be the creation of a generic checklist at the outset of an S&R operation based on a shared intelligence picture that includes an understanding of key questions, such as who to seek a relationship with, who needs to be neutralized, and which civilian leaders could and would act as intermediaries.
Effective S&R will never succeed in the absence of effective counterinsurgency operations, and the distinction between the two needs to be understood by all coalition members. It is certainly the case that the coalition is producing far less effect than it should in critical areas because of the imbalance of both effort and effect evident among the partners. Clearly, the United States is better at counterinsurgency than many of its European allies. That becomes particularly apparent in Afghanistan in the critical space of Regional Command–South (RC-South), where the Australians, British, Canadian, and Dutch forces (supported by others) are showing dangerous signs of stabilization attrition, caused by having an insufficient mass of troops to gain, clear, and hold key areas. Indeed, while the center of gravity of the U.S. S&R effort is to the marginally more manageable east of the country, the 2008 to 2009 reinforcement of U.S. forces in southern Afghanistan is demonstrative of how concerned Washington has become about the situation in RC-South, which in many ways is the hypercritical space, containing the critical people at the critical time. The need is pressing because indefinite stabilization without demonstrable reconstruction undermines the effect of armed forces over time and distance.

Equally, when small forces have to both carry out their traditional stabilizing role and undertake reconstruction tasks that are normally the preserve of civilians, their ability to maneuver, which is central to the establishment of credible presence, is rapidly undermined. For example, British commanders have been concerned for some time about the effect of stabilization attrition on British forces in both Iraq and Afghanistan, and RC-South is in danger of being the wrong peg in the wrong hole at a critical juncture in the overall effort. One approach would be to rotate European forces more systematically through less difficult areas and tasks. Unfortunately, national caveats prevent that.

The United States would certainly welcome a stronger European role, particularly in Afghanistan and Pakistan, but the degree to which the United States would cede control over direction as a result is still questionable. The greater the European effort, the greater the say Europeans will demand. Certainly, several Europeans have significant experience in areas of S&R, such as security sector reform (SSR). Moreover, many Europeans have both paramilitary gendarmeries and national police forces from which to generate trainers and mentors. To that end, the European Gendarmerie Force (EGF) has been singled out as a potential focal point for SSR efforts and early establishment of the rule of law. However, the difficulties that Europeans face in risking civilian casualties in-theater is a major constraint. Many European states find it hard enough to risk professional soldiers for domestic political reasons. The loss of civilians would risk the loss of any support for the mission back home. This is a fundamental dilemma that Europeans will need to confront if solidarity is not to repeatedly collapse on the point of contact with danger.

The European Union has a vital role to play in this regard. It must move quickly and effectively to further intensify its efforts to build capacity in the vital area of civil administration development. One among several European national programs, the United Kingdom’s Early Recovery Program could be developed at a European level. However, only by Europe acting as Europe will sufficient capabilities and capacities be aggregated and economies of scale generated that could overcome dangerously fragmented efforts. Indeed, it is the very fragmentation of the European S&R effort in
Afghanistan that is leading to the false impression of a West in rapid decline. If Europeans really committed to success both in terms of scale of investment, and thereafter its effective organization, a very different impression would be created.

**Getting the Comprehensive Approach Right**

An S&R “industry” is emerging around the Comprehensive Approach that is causing dilemmas for military and civilian planners alike, not least because of the many varying definitions and usages. COIN, complex operations, and hybrid warfare pretty much explain the same concept and method of operations. The United States has faced particular problems with the effects-based approach to operations (EBAO)—which is equivalent to the Comprehensive Approach. By 2003, much of the hitherto impressive U.S. civilian security capacity was no longer extant, not least because Senator Jesse Helms helped to emaciate the U.S. Foreign Service during the 1990s. Moreover, since 2003, the U.S. military has had to move deeply into areas where civilians used to lead, which is partly because senior civilian representatives (SCRs) have tended to move very cautiously to fulfill mandates. That is beginning to change, but SCRs continue to tend to be in the wrong place, with offices and staffs that are too big and remote to act as coordinating bodies, or too small to be action offices.

Balance will need to be restored if the Comprehensive Approach is ever to be more than a rhetorical flourish. The differences among PRTs in Afghanistan highlight the problems, as they affect the Comprehensive Approach. Put simply, the number and complexity of the actors and partners vital to S&R success makes effective campaign planning very hard to achieve, especially as so many of those actors are resistant or downright hostile to military leadership. One approach might be to create a common function-led model in place of the current PRT approach. Such government assistance teams (GAT) could be tailored to specific scenarios but would require a common understanding of how to approach key S&R tasks. To that end, each GAT could be organized around several task groups: a military-security group, a rule of law group, an economic assistance group, a police training group, a religious affairs group, an agricultural assistance group, a customs and border control group, an infrastructure group, etc. Such an approach could also help to lead toward some form of common funding.

Some attempts to turn theory into practice have been moderately successful. The model adopted by the British in the Mazar-e-Sharif PRT was an early and enlightened approach to a whole-of-government solution that sought to employ all relevant British government departments to create the desired S&R effect. However, as the British moved into Helmand Province and a less benign environment, many fissures among the various departments of state became steadily more apparent. Civilian ministries have a different culture and employ different doctrines (ways of going about business) than the military. This is often underpinned by what may be called an alternative political culture. An example is resistance to the idea that aid and development should be instrumentalized in pursuit of national strategic ends. Certainly, much resistance has been faced by the armed forces to their leadership of civilians, even though only the military is in a position to properly conduct campaign planning. The ever present dilemma of where and to what
extent to risk civilians (and what level of risk they are prepared to run) is a major constraint on turning security operations into reconstruction effect. Where the British have been effective is the speed by which they have turned the leadership of PRTs over to civilians. Indeed, in Afghanistan the pace at which the effort can be civilianized and Afghanized is a basic litmus test of the progress of an S&R operation.

The United States is improving fast in its conduct of S&R operations, even though problems still remain translating civil-military planning into S&R effect. Nor have the many and seemingly interminable interagency turf battles been solved. The resources available to the United States, and the robust relationship it enjoys with many in the U.S. aid community, has led to the generation of more effect through both a critical mass of investment and a willingness of civilians to accept military leadership. However, too often the use of U.S. contractors has exaggerated the real impact of the gross U.S. investment in S&R in both Iraq and Afghanistan. Moreover, for all its many failings, it is probably a source of some solace to Europeans that on occasions the European Union seems to find it easier to organize interagency effect in S&R than the United States (at least in theory).

Therefore, one logical conclusion of recent experience would suggest that the U.S.-EU relationship should emerge as a key relationship for future complex S&R missions, and effort to formalize such a relationship should be intensified. Not only would the scale of effort generated be similar, but the fact that the European Union took responsibility for European S&R operations and paid the civilians directly could remove from national European politicians the direct responsibility for the well-being of their fellow nationals that has so constrained the European effort. Indeed, a paradox may well emerge in which it becomes easier to deploy EU civilians (i.e., EU staff) than national armed forces. The bottom line is that the scale of any effort shapes its organization and structure, and it is the mismatch between U.S. and European levels of ambition and scale of effort that has so marred proper coordination in both Iraq and Afghanistan.

Clearly, there needs to be a far higher level of information sharing between the PRTs than currently exists. The need for national secrecy is exaggerated and prevents an effective dialogue among partners at all levels of the command chain. Indeed, intelligence classification reinforces stovepipes that prevent effective coordination, particularly when much of the information in question need not be treated as classified. One solution for this problem might be the creation of a civilian response corps directly under the control of the European Union, similar to that envisaged in the Biden-Lugar initiative in the United States. Indeed, such a corps might also help to overcome the many barriers that exist between nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and the armed forces. For example, in Afghanistan, the NGOs could provide a lot of local knowledge about who to engage (leader engagement) and ease increasing isolation of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) from the Afghan people, both in Kabul and other regional commands, which is daily more problematic. Equally, it would also be useful to reduce the sheer number of NGOs on the ground. Too many of them too often seem more interested in competing for resources with each other than acting as part of a logical and coordinated approach to S&R. One lesson is that donors have to become far tougher over the use of their financial investments,
particularly as it pertains to NGOs. Simply servicing opportunistic groups in pursuit of money so that governments can proudly present the headline sum invested hardly generates the effect that properly targeted investment should generate.

To that end, one way ahead might be the establishment of an ongoing series of dialogues led by the nonmilitary element of national governments committed to the Comprehensive Approach and international organizations (IOs) and NGOs. Such a dialogue would help to a) overcome suspicion of the Comprehensive Approach; and b) establish all-important relationships with key figures in IOs and NGOs that could help rapidly overcome barriers during crises. Certainly this is an area that the European Union and the U.S. State Department could jointly explore.

**Getting the Mindset Right**

At the very least, the mindset needs to be right from day one in all elements of an S&R coalition. In Afghanistan, so-called stage-four operations effectively began on day one, but few members of the coalition were prepared to recognize the challenge as it was rather than as they would like it to have been. Indeed, all members of the coalition in Afghanistan were in one way or another guilty either of naivety bordering on incompetence or disingenuousness bordering on deceit when considering the scale and nature of the challenge. Indeed, there was no real strategy for Afghanistan until stage-four operations expanded the ISAF mission to cover the whole of Afghanistan in 2006 and no formal alliance-wide strategy until the 2008 Bucharest summit, some four years after the initial deployment to protect the seat of government. Consequently, the failure to recognize the importance of planning to the proper end from the beginning has drastically undermined the establishment of credible presence. While Europeans wanted only to stabilize the seat of government, the American unwillingness to keep open a channel to elements of the Taliban undermined early reconciliation, a key element of successful S&R. Planning fundamentals matters in S&R operations and should include basic elements such as (inter alia) proper consideration the location of office space, the amount and nature of rent paid, the hiring of personnel, the choice of interlocutors, the choice of vehicles, the nature of external behavior, cultural knowledge, and even the use of terminology.

Too often the planning mindset in Afghanistan has been based on a “let’s hope for the best” approach that has ignored much COIN experience hitherto, which traditionally emphasizes the need to plan for the worst. This has been reinforced by the inability of military commanders and planners to exploit civilian knowledge, which has also caused profound fissures in the effort. Indeed, many civilians in-theater tend to be there longer than most military personnel, some of whom are present for as little as four months. Not only does this result in a lack of continuity in the leadership effort, especially when the military are in the lead, but it reinforces a tendency for regional commands to constantly reinvent themselves and/or become policy shops rather than nodes of effective command, control, and communication. For these reasons, S&R efforts too often focus more on quantity rather than quality and on impact rather than sustained effect.
The Reconstruction Challenge

Reconstruction and Reconciliation

The European historical experience is useful in considering the reconstruction challenge, not least because those lessons emphasize two basic truisms for effective S&R: there can be no military solution per se, only a political solution; and success is dependent on the relationship among resources, reconciliation, and leadership. An agreed political track from the outset is therefore a vital part of both COIN and S&R operations. Reconciliation between Germany and France and within South Africa are cases that have bearing. Reconciliation in the north of Ireland was only achieved with the active external involvement of key outside actors who enjoyed legitimacy and influence in the province—the European Union and United States. However, central to all these examples was the establishment of mechanisms that created the generational circumstances for reconciliation. These included soft issues not normally associated with planning, such as the promotion of professional and educational exchanges and tourism. Conceptually, such initiatives were necessarily placed within an all-important strategic concept of operations aimed at establishing the minimum security requirement as part of the security continuum.

Other lines of operation in the effective reconciliation of peoples include vitally the promotion of economic growth, effective institution building (the European Union has proved relatively successful in the Balkans), and the effective fighting of corruption. The European Union’s June 2008 statement on the Balkans put the reconstruction challenge in perspective, as it concerns every field of human activity. This is in marked contrast to the European Union’s stability concept that sees the role of the European Security and Development Policy (ESDP) as merely holding the ring. Central is the generation and application of sufficient resources. For example, Afghanistan receives only 1/20th per capita of the aid and development that has been devoted to the Balkans. Equally vital is the way that money is spent. Much of the focus is on generating basic human security, which itself places the provision of basic and effective policing and justice at the heart of the challenge. Indeed, the minimum of justice is the sine qua non of effective reconstruction.

A significant part of the reconstruction challenge concerns the effective disbursement of resources linked to sufficient absorption capacity in-country to render such investment effective. The linking of strategic control by the sponsoring states to on-the-ground effect through a proper metric and audit of the effort is essential, but far more could be achieved if common standards are put in place. A functional approach requires the progressive expansion of effect across a given area through the effective disbursement of resources through complex partnerships over time and distance. One promising approach would see the development of pockets of competence as part of a so-called ink spot–plus strategy. Such an approach would need to be reinforced by pockets of confidence where the strategy is demonstrably seen to be working (both in-theater and at home).

Iraq is very different from Afghanistan. This is not least because Iraq is an oil-rich state that will not in time need international funds. However, there are lessons learned in Iraq that could prove
useful for Afghanistan. The Sunni awakening in Iraq came about precisely because the United States cut deals with tribal leaders hitherto seen as enemies, which helped to reduce the violence. The political strategy now in Iraq is to build institutions within the framework of the awakening, while encouraging Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki to act in the national good above and beyond traditional sectarian divides. Given the relationship between the Pashtun and the Taliban in Afghanistan, the lesson is clear. It will not be easy because the very nature and complexity of S&R operations in complex environments means that political, military, and aid instruments rarely work as well or as quickly as sponsoring states would like. Moreover, neither those representing the Sunni awakening nor Sadrist elements are in a government still dominated by former exiles. Equally, since 2003 many lessons have been learned in Iraq, which has enabled the U.S. military to adapt effectively at the tactical level. That said, the objective is sound. It is to progressively embed rule of law institutions as a prelude to the gradual phasing out of U.S. forces by 2011 (under an August 2008 agreement with the Maliki government). This should be a model for all S&R operations.

Unfortunately, adaptation at the strategic, diplomatic, and development levels is less impressive, with nothing like the required levels of understanding and commitment needed to generate both the flexibility and focus necessary for a genuinely comprehensive approach across government. Much the same can be said for the security force assistance and rule of law efforts at the strategic level. Any improvements tend to come from the bottom up. While a constitutional framework is very important for building effective rule of law, ownership of such a concept inevitably starts at street level. Therefore, marrying the bottom up with the top down must be an essential element if effective governance is to be central to sound S&R.

It is rarely clear which ministry is in charge, and where it is clear, that leadership is often contested. Civilian ministries too often are incapable of developing sufficient numbers of deployable experts. The British have attempted to develop a register of such experts through the Stabilisation Unit, but it too has faced considerable difficulties. Equally, simply trying to rewire the bureaucracy has not worked, for while the Stabilisation Unit is responsible to three ministries, it is in effect responsible to none.

Indeed, under-resourcing, on the one hand, and the rushing of the effort in Afghanistan, on the other, raised expectations that were bound to be dashed. S&R operations are difficult, and if that is not understood from the outset, a mission will always tend to be dogged by wishful thinking. Therefore, to create a Comprehensive Approach in-theater it is first and foremost necessary to create a Comprehensive Approach culture and institutions at home. The way forward is to develop a common understanding of whole-of-government approaches based on early assessment of the local need.

**Balancing COIN with S&R**

The kinetic and nonkinetic sides of COIN and S&R have to be better harmonized than they are in Afghanistan. In Afghanistan, that requires the progressive promotion of Afghans into key
positions, with the Afghan National Army (ANA) encouraged to play a pivotal role as soon as is practically possible. Indeed, the early involvement of local people in any S&R operation is vital. However, such steps can only be taken with any real hope of success if the mission as a whole is relegitimized in the eyes of the Afghans, the people in the wider region, and publics at home. To that end, an Afghan version of the Iraqi Security Pact could be useful. At the very least, a proper status of forces agreement (SOFA) would help strengthen the legitimacy of the effort.

A critical path in Afghanistan would necessarily require a basic but functioning police force, the continued building up of the ANA, the steady promotion of acceptance by all groups of national political and security institutions, and the exploitation of Afghanistan’s huge natural resources for Afghans. Moreover, police training should be an area where countries from the region could be invited to play a much stronger role. Such a task would also give the United Nations a more high-profile role. The United Nations has been reluctant to play such a greater role partly due to its own political constellation and partly because of a very conservative secretary-general in Ban-ki Moon, but also because of the Brahimi report on UN peacekeeping, which proposed that the United Nations itself always seek to have a light footprint in conflict regions.

Ironically, while Iraq enjoys oil wealth, Afghanistan could benefit from major mineral reserves of natural resources that, given high commodity prices, could be far better exploited to generate the finances on which self-sustaining economies must be built. In Iraq, the situation remains very fragile. Much of the debate over S&R concerns the management of complex civil-military efforts in pursuit of an end state. However, there are very genuine military challenges, particularly as they concern the relationship among the function of a deployed force, force sizing, and the role of combat forces. Often, the mission for an S&R force is unclear. Consequently, it is very hard to know to what purpose a force should be sized and structured: one major S&R/COIN operation, two medium-sized ops, or three to four small such operations? Equally, there are some basic ratios that military planners should consider, caused by the need to rotate forces through deployment, recovery, and preparation. Although it is estimated that a minimum force requirement of 300,000 to 400,000 troops is needed to maintain a force in-theater of between 180,000 and 200,000 troops, only between 15,000 to 18,000 civilians would be needed for most S&R operations.

However, these figures contrast very unfavorably with NATO’s current performance, where fulfilling two medium-sized S&R operations—Kosovo (KFOR, with 14,759 troops) and Afghanistan (ISAF, with 50,700 troops in November 2008, including national support elements)—is leading to profound operational stress for the forces involved. The relative lack of both military capability and capacity all around is a major impediment to success in Afghanistan. Put simply, in the absence of a sufficient number of deployable soldiers and civilians, the military task list generated by S&R operations is beyond the capacity and thus drains capability, leading inexorably to a capability-capacity crunch where the task list expands exponentially even as resources and number of boots remain at best static. It is the crunch that leads to stabilization attrition over time.
Nor is this a problem confined to Europe. Key agencies in the U.S. government simply lack resources and/or influence to play a leading S&R role. The interagency battles that afflict Washington are in part responsible, with some 28 U.S. government agencies responsible for S&R in some form. One reason why European officers during the imperial age became adept at S&R operations was that they had access to a large number of native auxiliary troops and indigenous civil servants. Today, neither Americans nor Europeans would or could create something akin to an imperial office. In a sense, this demonstrates the limited utility of history for effective future S&R operations. The professional core of the Indian Army in 1914 was 150,000 strong, in addition to the British troops stationed in the region at the time.

Other steps needed concern counternarcotics and the use of nonlethal weapons. The rigorous commitment to counternarcotics in Afghanistan at almost any cost has become a source of major concern for many Europeans, given the lack of alternatives to compensate farmers. At the very least, it is important to highlight the basic contradictions between S&R operations and counternarcotics before moving to de-conflict the two approaches. A sound strategy would include a focus on the destruction of laboratories rather than on the livelihoods of farmers who should have the “loans” that tie them to the narco-khans and the warlords bought out by the coalition. One problem is that insufficient efforts are made to target laboratories in Taliban areas, which helps to sustain the trafficking at the heart of the narcotics industry, which is funding Taliban operations. Such an approach would need to be balanced by law enforcement that entails the apprehension of those in the drug chain, however close they may be to government. In the longer term, it would be useful to establish a regional economic plan so that poppy production could be replaced with another high-value crop locking Afghanistan into regional trading patterns. Moreover, commanders on the ground should have more creative solutions available, including nonlethal weapons that can afford them more levels of control between the lethal and nonlethal.

**S&R and the Deteriorating Strategic Environment**

All partners are going to have to confront the reality of S&R in a deteriorating strategic environment. Other issues are beginning to emerge on the U.S. and European strategic radar, such as the new balance of power, energy security, the food crisis, and the financial crisis. Moreover, national armed forces may well have to consider force reconstitution and to begin preparing again for potential strategic or regional peer challengers. Although the latter should not actively impact the ability of the West to undertake S&R operations, it will make it politically more complicated to gain popular support at home. Moreover, assets and capabilities specific to S&R operations are unlikely to benefit from major future investment. The only way forward, therefore, is a cost-effective functional approach (as opposed to a geographical approach or a parceling out bits of real estate approach) that is more efficient and realizes economies of scale and effort through intense coordination (at the very least). The emerging shift in U.S. strategic priorities is already evident in the Department of Defense (DOD), where a battle is underway
between those who favor a direct approach (the so-called punishers) and those that advocate a more indirect approach to dealing with those that challenge U.S. security.

Therefore, while the Euro-Atlantic community has accepted the challenge of rescuing failing states, much of the future commitment will depend on a) the U.S. strategic net assessment concerning its role in the world; b) to what extent Europeans are really prepared to make S&R the centerpiece of their strategic method; and c) to what extent the new geopolitics will permit S&R operations. Key questions will include how best to get a transatlantic stabilization and reconstruction coalition to effectively implement a common understanding of the Comprehensive Approach. Indeed, the conversation between civilians and military is at present very strained, as there is no consensus over the Comprehensive Approach. Moreover, the lack of any realistic and shared strategic horizon prevents the requisite sustained commitment and also tends to undermine effective investment in police forces that are at least as important as developing effective armed forces. If a common shared picture is to be developed, the effective sharing of intelligence will be vital. Indeed, such a picture will always be central to S&R mission success.

To that end, politicians on both sides of the Atlantic will need to show strong leadership if all-important security sector reform is to take place at home and if the cultural barriers that prevent effective interagency coordination are to be overcome in order for such reform to take place as part of effective S&R. To that end, there is an urgent need to develop prior planning at all levels of the command chain. In particular, those who control the money for S&R operations at the highest levels need to meet at least once a month to build up key relationships.

Given the contending realities of a deteriorating strategic environment and the need for an effective Comprehensive Approach, the U.S.-EU-NATO impasse needs to be sorted out as a matter of urgency. Unfortunately, narrow-minded thinking is all too apparent within NATO. For example, the Multiple Futures Project at Allied Command Transformation (ACT) does not permit the military to look beyond narrow political guidance that will do little or nothing to promote effective S&R operations. A joint EU-NATO civil-military command that could lead an S&R effort would be a major step forward. At the same time, the need for an effective nonmilitary partnership between the United States and the European Union is also pressing. One option would be to seek to harmonize the respective reviews of the European Security Strategy (ESS) and a new NATO strategic concept on those areas that pertain to S&R. To that end, a debate is needed in Europe about what civilian S&R assets and capabilities Europeans will be able to offer a new U.S. administration that will certainly come to Europe in 2009 seeking support.

Indeed, problems establishing NATO’s Concerted Planning and Action of Civil and Military Activities (CPA) are partly due to the difficulty of getting the European Union and NATO to work together. Ultimately, the problem is political. Too many Europeans consider the United States as too kinetic in its approach, which results in a failure to understand how stability operations and COIN interact, while many Americans wait longingly for Europeans to turn rhetoric into civilian and military S&R capabilities. The role of diplomacy in prevention is a case in point, with a profound imbalance apparent between the U.S. and European diplomatic efforts. While the
United States spends $1 on diplomacy for every $20 it spends on defense investment, Europeans spend €2 on diplomacy for every €1 spent on defense.

Certainly, U.S. security policy is in need of urgent reform to reinvest and reinvigorate U.S. diplomacy. While boots on the ground in places like Afghanistan are vital, so is a strong diplomatic presence in those parts of the world causing concern, for only then will an active prevention policy be developed. Indeed, if faced with a balance of investment choice, it would be better to invest in conflict prevention in those states in which collapse would be of profound concern to the West. Equally, Europeans need to look closely at how the United States has developed the PRT concept. In Afghanistan, U.S. PRTs are the most effective primarily because of the intense links between U.S. military and civilian efforts, the resources disbursed, the lessons learned and their application, and the longer deployments of U.S. personnel.

Equally, the vital role of the United Nations needs to be better acknowledged. Given the capability-capacity crunch from which most Western forces suffer, the only place where properly funded “boots” in any quantity will be found is in Asia, and this basic reality will reinforce the role of the United Nations in S&R operations. However, the ability of forces under UN command to deal with anything other than gangs is questionable. Indeed, given the current weaknesses of the UN Department of Political Affairs (DPA) and the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), the United Nations has now reached its limits militarily.

2009–2011: The Critical Path in Afghanistan

NATO’s 2008 Bucharest summit laid out a clear mission end state covering security, reconstruction and development, and governance—the so-called security continuum. However, a renewed common vision is needed of the political track, reinforced by a shared level of ambition, and backed up by the requisite unity of effort. Therefore, if the coalition is to make an S&R breakthrough in the next two years (vital given the European electoral cycle), some basic demonstrable objectives will have to be achieved; without such a common perception it will be hard to generate such progress. To that end, the core of the strategy must be the promotion of an Afghan-Afghan political dialogue that includes elements of the Taliban with the coalition mediating but increasingly in the background. The political track must be central to an Afghan solution.

The coalition must play its full part in creating a belief in success both at home and in-theater. NATO defines the Comprehensive Approach as requiring the cooperation and coordination of all major actors, including nongovernmental organizations and relevant local bodies. Afghanistan is winnable, but the coalition is making insufficient headway partly because of the lack of an agreed definition of success, but also because stabilization attrition is denuding forces, the development effort, and thus the support of public opinion.

However, the main reason why progress is insufficient given the political timetable that is implicit in the minds of many coalition members is the lack of any systematic and/or direct interaction
operationally between civilian and military actors. The lack of unity among the partners is further reinforced by a fragmentation of the effort, while the military effort is similarly fractured with two forces (ISAF and OEF) under separate command. The non-U.S. military efforts are too compartmentalized, while not enough influential Afghans have taken ownership of what strategy exists. Those that have been included have insufficient influence or tools to be effective. Steps taken by Regional Command–South to create new S&R working groups involving Afghans at a senior level are useful, but such best practices need to be applied consistently across the whole country. Indeed, the civilian effort reflects 15 Afghanistans, which by definition contradicts a comprehensive, Afghan-wide approach.

Self-generated problems also include the inequality in investment by the varying and various coalition members who invest in those parts of the country under their charge at very different levels. The U.S. military has spent some $30 billion since 2001 to overcome some 10,000 Taliban. Even though a functional approach to S&R, rather than a geographical approach, is to be recommended, the manner by which thematic approaches were pursued have thus far not worked as envisaged. For example, giving the task of improving the police to the Germans, counternarcotics to the British, and justice to the Italians only served to reinforce fragmentation in the all-vital rule of law effort. As a consequence, the credibility of the Western intervention with the Afghan people in both Afghanistan and the wider region has been dealt a series of severe blows that threaten to stall the entire effort. This has led to a loss of momentum that has weakened support the world over, reinforced by an often confused strategic narrative over the ends and means of the operation. Indeed, neither the mission nor the method has been properly and consistently communicated to key constituencies.

A major concern to Europeans continues to be the nature of U.S. leadership. Any suggestion that the United States cede leadership is fanciful. Indeed, in terms of the investment being made, the number of PRTs under U.S. control, and the fact that U.S. personnel stay in-theater on average six to eight months longer than their European partners, renders U.S. superiority unquestionable. However, U.S. leadership must be questionable as S&R operations more often than not involve partners in a pluralistic democratic community. Indeed, such operations draw much of their legitimacy from their membership and structure. Too often, the U.S. leadership culture appears insensitive to external allied, partner, or host nation input.

Equally, too many Europeans suffer from a failure mindset in Afghanistan, made more complicated by the linking of successful S&R to the preservation of NATO. These two objectives are by nature very different. Unfortunately, by linking the fate of NATO to S&R operations, the coalition has become victim to the tyranny of its own rhetoric. Again, most Europeans went to Afghanistan to preserve the transatlantic relationship, not to secure Afghanistan. It is a price that they felt they had to pay to keep the United States engaged in European security. However, the price they themselves are willing to pay in Afghanistan is very small. This is not the correct mindset to adopt at the outset of complex S&R operations with strategic implications requiring a strategic commitment. When a coalition engages on S&R, it must mean to be successful and be prepared to invest to that end as a group from the very beginning.
The Fundamentals of Effective S&R in Afghanistan

The U.S. Afghan Study Group has stressed the fundamentals for successful S&R: better coordination between partners, a focus on effective governance, the building of rule of law, effective counternarcotics, sound security and development planning and implementation, and improved relationships with neighbors. Thus, the priority now is to make existing mechanisms work more effectively in-theater. Therefore, the need for effective and relevant in-theater civilian leadership of the conduct of complex S&R operations is urgent, as is the need for effective civil-military campaign planning. Consequently, there not only needs to be a far greater common understanding of the doctrine and practice of S&R among partners, but also a much more synergistic approach to metrics and benchmarking as part of a commonly agreed roadmap to success. Where practicable, the level of multinational predeployment training therefore has to be increased.

At the very least, PRTs must better serve the agreed S&R strategy of the United States and its European (and other) partners and play a logical and assigned role to that end, as well as being better tailored to local circumstances. That is the planning challenge. Indeed, the very disparate approaches to on-the-ground S&R operations precludes effective strategic control by the political leaders of a coalition, as any such effort tends to become atomistic as it breaks down into a series of mutually disaggregating national stovepipes. Given that successful S&R ultimately concerns the effective generation, transit, application, and auditing of resources, a logical first step in Afghanistan would be to create a common source of quick disbursing funds for PRTs, to better enable them to support short- and long-term development projects that are structurally relevant at the local, provincial, regional, and national levels. Finally, the accomplishments of PRTs must be better communicated to the population in-theater, as well as to the sponsoring publics of coalition states and the wider international community as part of an effective and consistent strategic narrative. Indeed, one key function must be to strengthen the media in Afghanistan.

In the absence of sufficient investment in alternative sources of income for those affected, such as farmers in southern Afghanistan, the result is often multiple strategies at cross purposes. Such contradictions reinforce the need for a graduated substitution plan. Indeed, sustainable stability based on a viable economy is the end state, and all investments and efforts should be directed toward that end. Therefore, NATO’s new approach of supporting the Afghan government in a joint effort to dismantle laboratories that process heroin and disrupt the trafficking system is to be welcomed, but the consequence must be managed along the production line.

Finally, generating and maintaining effective security is the sine qua non of effective S&R. In the early stages of S&R, the deployment of overwhelming mass and maneuver forces, backed up by relevant firepower and rules of engagement, is vital. Therefore, whatever sensibilities some Europeans may have, S&R in Afghanistan must go together with a sustained offensive effort and the maintenance of kinetic operations against the insurgents. Indeed, the insurgency in Afghanistan can best be described as multidimensional, which places a particular emphasis on the coalition having sufficient forces to achieve a credible military presence over time and space, the
ability to employ maneuver forces in an effective manner across the country, and sufficient mass of forces to conduct S&R in conjunction with key civilian partners.

The Afghanistan S&R Agenda

Launch a new regional diplomatic initiative: States in the region need to be given a much stronger role in the political track, specifically as it concerns broader security and economic factors. India will be a key partner in this regard. Unfortunately, New Delhi’s long-running dispute with Islamabad over Kashmir complicates the coalition’s mission, particularly in southern Afghanistan. Pakistan sees southern Afghanistan as strategic depth in the event of a conflict with India, and the appearance of Indian “consulates” near the Afghanistan-Pakistan border has complicated relations in the region. India is a world power and vital to a regional diplomatic solution. Therefore, Indian cooperation must be sought both in terms of the broad security strategy and the longer-term embedding of Afghanistan in a region-wide economic structure. There are grounds for optimism, such as the recent agreement between India and Pakistan to open a trade route across the Kashmir line of control.

Focus on regional factors: Insufficient attention has been given to regional factors in the Afghan conflict, with particular emphasis on Pakistan. At the very least, a much greater effort will be needed to address the many grievances and the grinding poverty in Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal Areas. In return, the coalition should push the Pakistanis to do more to deal with the Taliban leadership in Quetta and Peshawar. In Afghanistan, the Afghans need to be given a much stronger role in dealing with the Taliban, but channels need to be opened to promote reconciliation. The majority of the Taliban wanted two things: a) not to be arrested; and b) re-access to property, houses, and land. The latter will require funding.

Relegitimize, de-Westernize, and “UN-ize” the S&R operation: The S&R operation in Afghanistan urgently needs to be relegitimized in the eyes of the Afghan population, as well as citizens in regional and home countries. To that end, it is important to find as many partners as possible from the region and the wider Islamic community to join the effort. Central to such an effort will be an enhanced role for the United Nations. Through the offices of the special representative of the secretary-general (SRSG), help should be sought from regional states, with a specific focus on enhancing and accelerating the training of police trainers and senior civil servants.

Reconnect government to the governed at the local level: If central and local governance are to be better harmonized, local government needs to be taken more seriously, with Kabul pressed to remove corrupt governors. Indeed, governors must face checks and balances from above (and the side) if sound governance is to be established. They must be held to standards that by definition will be a mix of Afghan and Western standards. Moreover, while the subregional strategy is well understood, too many governors refuse to deploy into the countryside and sell both themselves and the regime, which they must be required to do.
Develop a new campaign concept: Part of the lack of political credibility from which the S&R mission suffers results from an overly optimistic assessment of the effort required at the outset of the campaign back in 2004. A new and more realistic campaign concept and plan is needed to reenergize the S&R effort over the 2009 to 2011 period that specifies publicly what success will entail. To that end, such a plan will need to be predicated on far tighter harmonization of national efforts across Afghanistan, which in turn will require integration into nationwide military campaign and operational cycles. Equally, such a plan will also need to establish a realistic timeframe for the stabilization objective and properly lay out publicly the relationship between the S&R campaign plan and the Afghanistan National Development Strategy (ANDS). Indeed, remarrying the two is a vital need. In the short term, the emphasis will need to be the identification of S&R projects that can be tailored to effect across all PRTs in Afghanistan as a first step toward common standards for metrics. The objective is the generation of sustainable sustainability. The focus therein must be the effective reestablishment of clear linkages among the security effort, rule of law, functioning and reasonably stable state institutions, and development projects on the ground.

Balance S&R, COIN, counterterrorism, and counternarcotics: Over the 2009 to 2011 period, the linkage between stability in Afghanistan and the counternarcotics effort will need to be reconsidered. Indeed, a stringent counternarcotics drive will have to be far more closely coordinated with S&R efforts because what political stability might exist in Afghanistan must be linked to the perceived well-being of farmers and their families, particularly in southern and eastern Afghanistan. Moreover, given the relatively low level of aid currently being disbursed it is hard to see how to effectively fight the Taliban while at the same time dealing with the narco-khans. Conceptually and analytically, the 2009 to 2011 surge will need to focus on improving the quality of life of the Pashtun. Counternarcotics efforts, while not abandoned, will have to be tailored to reflect that basic reality.

Take a realistic view of forthcoming elections: The coalition must be clear that promoting democracy through elections might not promote stability. Evidence suggests that narco-khans are well placed to overly influence the elections planned for 2009. In such an event, the elections would only bring undesirable elements closer to the heart of government, further undermining good governance efforts. If it is clear that free and fair elections are not possible (even by Afghan standards), it would be better to postpone them while efforts are made to bring those seeking to influence them to justice.

Accelerate Afghanization and civilianization: The weekly meetings of the working groups on governance and stabilization must be embedded as a mechanism for coordinating and implementing high-level decisions across the PRTs. This will also help to accelerate all-important Afghanization and civilianization. Moreover, the monthly meetings between task force commanders and senior civilian representatives (SCR) must better promote cohesion within the security continuum through enhanced campaign planning, SSR, rule of law, and development cycles.
Stop reinventing regional commands: The rotations of command across various national forces reinforce a tendency of regional commands to be continually reinvented, which too often leads to a loss of momentum in the S&R effort. Indeed, regional commands should become more a coordinating mechanism for S&R effect and less policy shops. In the south, NATO should support an interim command of 24 months starting in early 2009, as part of a new and fully elaborated and reenergized civil-military campaign plan.

Ease stabilization attrition: Many of the armed forces in Afghanistan are suffering stabilization attrition for two reasons. The first reason is the relatively slow rate of development of the ANA, which prevents the effective backfilling for coalition forces in anything like the numbers required, as well as the slow and uneven development of the Afghan National Police (ANP). Canadian estimates are that the ANA in fact has only some 22,000 troops that could backfill to any effect and that the hoped for 70,000 will not be realized until 2012 at the earliest. The early establishment of more regional police academies where new cadres of trainers can begin their important work is required. To put such a challenge in perspective, in Afghanistan there are 385 police districts needing in total some 82,000 police. Second, the reluctance of the civilian development agencies to risk a greater presence in the south and a closer relationship with the armed forces is exacerbating the stabilization attrition of the armed forces and thus further undermining military effect. To that end, training and deployment of the ANA must be further accelerated.

Create new civil-military groupings: Seventy percent of all Afghan military and civilian development has no Afghan input. The net transfer of resources is far less than the gross figure. That must change. Therefore, a new group of civil-military, functional Operational Mentor and Liaison Teams (OMLTs) or Embedded Development Teams (EDTs) would promote rapid SSR progress through involving Afghans. Such an effort should be reinforced by robust and rapid development. The concept of quick impact projects (QIPs) must be adjusted to become quick sustainable impact projects (QSIP) that are run through Kabul and given the necessary funding to be effective rapidly. Moreover, the Afghan role and input must be both highlighted and intensified.

Find more civilians: Contemporary S&R operations demand that development takes place in conflict. That in turn requires a new kind of robust civilian, probably ex-military, who should be sought to turn decisionmaking in Kandahar into effect across the region. To that end, the databases of civilian consultants held by various states should be expanded and adapted. At the very least, civilians supporting PRTs need more and better training before deployment. In this regard, the approach and experience of the United States in Iraq should be examined.

Forge a real Comprehensive Approach: Afghanistan has become the laboratory in which the experimental Comprehensive Approach is being tested. However, if the Comprehensive Approach is to mean anything, more investment will be needed over the 2009 to 2011 period. However, economies of scale and effect will only be achieved if a far greater unity of effort is established. At
present, the application of resources does not generate the S&R traction that it should because of the very fractured nature of the current whole-of-government effort.

**Promoting best S&R practice:** An urgent examination is needed of best practice in each PRT to see which projects are a) relevant to success; and b) effective. Thereafter, a list of such projects should be identified that can be applied across Afghanistan, with the performance of each measured using the same criteria. Such a benchmarking effort will need to be linked to a determined effort to increase absorption capacity and a hard-nosed approach to auditing. Such requirements again demand far closer links between the RC-South staff and the development effort.

**Craft a single strategic narrative:** A single strategic narrative must be communicated to audiences in-theater, the wider region, and at home in parallel with the strengthening of the Afghan media. The coalition presence is seen by Afghans as being one purely of narrow self-interest. There certainly needs to be a much better public information strategy and campaign to counter the Taliban depiction of the coalition as an “army of occupation.” Moreover, the very fact of endeavoring to create a more synergistic approach will send a powerful message of intent that will counter the sense of impending failure that is all too apparent in key constituencies and capitals.

**Launch a stabilization and reconstruction surge in RC-South:** The need for a stabilization and reconstruction surge in RC-South over the period June 2008 to December 2010 is compelling. Such a surge will see increases in stabilization and reconstruction run in parallel, together with efforts to both give greater credit to the Afghan government and ensure absorption capacities for aid and development in region, and matched with improved accounting and anticorruption reforms by the Afghan government. Only such a compact can form the basis of a new “contract” between the Afghan government and the states engaged in RC-South over the critical 2009 to 2011 period and reinforce the re legitimization of the effort.

**Hold an effects-based conference:** The new U.S. administration will not have the luxury of a relatively calm lead-in period. An effects generation conference is therefore needed early in 2009, based on the benchmarks established for 2011 by the Canadian cabinet’s Emerson committee on Afghanistan, which are designed to track development work, education levels, and the Afghan government’s capacity to run its own affairs and maintain law and order.

**Improving Transatlantic Cooperation on Stabilization and Reconstruction Operations**

**S&R Lessons Learned: A Glass Half Full?** While the need for a far greater level of ambition for S&R operations remains, and with it appropriate levels of political support, important lessons have been learned. Quite simply, if S&R operations are to develop, much more effect must be squeezed out of what by definition
will always be limited resources given the scale of the challenge such operations will confront. That will depend on a far clearer understanding from the outset of S&R operations of what needs to be achieved and whether or not it is achievable. Thankfully, an audit trail for S&R performance has been established since the deployments to the Balkans in the 1990s, which has led to important conceptual developments, such as the Comprehensive Approach, contemporary COIN operations, and SSR. Moreover, institutions and structures have improved, as have those charged with planning, commanding, and implementing S&R operations. Indeed, since the 2002 Brahimi report, S&R has become the strategic method of both the United Nations and the European Union.

On the demand side of S&R, the lessons learned in Iraq and Afghanistan include the need to intervene early and substantively, the need to organize the Comprehensive Approach effectively at the strategic level, and the need to strike a better balance between agencies and resources, as well as a requirement to improve doctrine across the effort. On the supply side, the application of resources in both Iraq and Afghanistan are daily more effective. Problems, however, continue to constrain and hamper S&R operations. S&R operations will always need a legitimizing concept that can build support both at home and in-theater. The United Nations’ “responsibility to protect” (R2P) could be vital in this regard, for it balances the sanctity of state sovereignty with humanitarian rights and needs and thus confers legitimacy. Clearly, each and every government engaged must work harder to improve the whole-of-government and intergovernment balance if effective S&R strategy is to lead to sustained on-the-ground effect. Truly fit-for-purpose deployable civilian and military capabilities are needed at the transnational level.

The success of future S&R operations will thus be built on five key elements. First, a much more profound analysis of the context and environment of an S&R operation by all coalition partners prior to any deployment. Second, integrated strategies (campaign planning) from the outset, based on two or three agreed and essential elements critical to success. Third, an operational rationale that is clear from the outset (possibly led by an elite cadre of civil and military leaders). Fourth, the ability to measure progress both in terms of the overarching campaign strategy and the people whom such an operation serves. Finally, a single and effective strategic narrative must be established to explain the operation and to communicate its positive story both in-theater and at home. S&R operations are dynamic human security.

**Enhancing Stabilization and Reconstruction Operations**

Whatever the geopolitics of the age, the need for Americans and Europeans to be able to undertake combined and joint stabilization and reconstruction operations will persist. The success of the Comprehensive Approach will be dependent on the effect generated by complex multinational, multi-institutional, and multidiscipline civil-military coalitions operating over time and distance at great cost in uncertain, often dangerous, and always complex environments. The basic challenge of S&R is thus how to translate grand strategy into human security—no more, no less. While the labels may change, that basic reality has been with politicians, planners, and
policymakers since time immemorial and will remain so. It is the culture of the age to believe that every insight is new.

Equally, while history has many lessons to offer about the conduct of such operations, those lessons are also of limited utility. The irony is not that the people Europeans and Americans seek to help have changed in places like Iraq and Afghanistan. Part of the enduring reality is that they have not. Rather, the problem in many respects is the extent to which Europeans and Americans have themselves changed. S&R operations thus only make sense as part of a new value-laden approach to international relations, examples of which are not bountiful.

Therefore, understanding what can be achieved by such operations requires Americans and Europeans to have a clear understanding at the outset of any such intervention of the balance between interests and values that they wish together to promote, just what change they seek to generate, and how and if such change can be realized. S&R operations are fundamentally political, and any retreat into a purely military-technical realm effectively decapitates the political concept that must drive the effort. Successful stabilization and reconstruction is therefore dependent on a complex mix of planning, commitment, and investment over time and distance. However, the dynamic ingredients are vision and leadership mixed with a liberal dose of self-belief. Only then will enhanced stabilization and reconstruction operations deliver what they have always promised. Some ages forgive mediocrity. This is no such age.
Afghanistan

(Unless otherwise stated, all the data herein was collected by Julian Lindley-French during a visit to Afghanistan in November 2007 and on a mission for the Dutch chief of defence staff in April 2008.)

Basic Facts

Afghanistan has a population of 31 million, some 2 million more than Iraq (Lt. Gen. D.W. Barno and Brig. R. Anderson, deputy commander, Regional Command–East, pers. comm.). Some 75 percent of the population is below the age of 25 (D. Sultanzoy, member of the Committee on Economy, Agriculture, Rural Development, and Non-Governmental Organizations, pers. comm.).

By 2009, 60 percent of the working population will be unemployed. (D. Hillal, member of the Afghan Parliament for Baghram, the National Communication Coordination Centre, pers. comm.).

In opinion polls, more than 50 percent of the Afghan population wants the coalition to remain. (TV Tolo, Kabul).

Regional Strategy

The border with Pakistan is 2,560 kilometers in length, on which there are 1,042 border posts (Pakistan Army Joint Staff, pers. comm.).

There are 4 million Afghan refugees in Iran (TV Tolo). There are 2 million registered refugees in Pakistan. In 2007, there were 152,000 registered returns (United Nations High Commission for Refugees [UNHCR]). About 95 percent of the cross-border movements take place at two crossings (UNHCR).

Some 80 percent of suicide bombers come from Waziristan (Pakistan) (Lt. Gen. D.W. Barno, pers. comm.). About 95 percent of the fighting takes place in the border region between Afghanistan and Pakistan (U.S. State Department).

The Taliban contain 10 to 20 percent foreign fighters. There are between 1,500 and 2,000 Taliban that form tier one (i.e., the high command, operating mainly out of Quetta, Pakistan). This group forms the national council and the provincial leadership. Tier two, who are to be found mainly in
Afghanistan, represent some 6,000 to 8,000 fighters who are either paid or coerced (RC-South staff and D. Hillal, pers. comm.).

Over the past year, the coalition has killed between 25 and 30 senior Taliban commanders along with leaders of other Afghan Islamic groups (RC-South staff, pers. comm.). The Taliban are overwhelmingly Pashtun and consequently only effective in the southern and eastern 50 percent of Afghanistan (C. Alexander, deputy special representative of the UN secretary-general, pers. comm.).

The United States is spending $1 billion per annum on military aid to Pakistan to help deal with the Taliban and their supporters in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) on the Afghan border. There are some 100,000 Pakistani troops in FATA. This increases to 250,000 through the use of local levies. As of November 2007, 759 Pakistani troops had been killed thus far in the year. The Pakistan Army has embarked on 103 major operations against the Taliban and al Qaeda since 2002 (Pakistan Army Joint Staff, pers. comm.).

About 20 percent more terrorist incidents occurred in 2007. Attacks using improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and suicide bombers increased by between 30 and 50 percent, and some 1,500 civilians were killed in 2007. However, while violence quadrupled in 2006, in 2007 the rate of increase in violence slowed (C. Alexander, pers. comm.).

Afghan Governance

The Afghan economy has grown by 10 percent per annum over the past five to six years, and thus the economy is now 50 percent bigger than in 2002. Afghanistan has copper reserves that would make the country one of the top 10 producers (C. Alexander, pers. comm.).

By 2010, it is planned that all civil and criminal law codes will be in place. Some $60 million to $90 million has been devoted by the World Bank to rule of law development. However, the World Bank will not release the money until the draft Justice Sector Consolidated Strategy is adopted. The pay of the average judge is only $80 per month (RC-South staff, pers. comm.).

Subnational consultations, which began in summer 2007, are part of an effort by the Afghan government to create five-year development plans within the Afghan National Development Strategy (ANDS). This is a top-down approach to development that passes funds from the national level through provincial development plans and projects (R. Anderson, pers. comm.). The National Solidarity Program is contributing $50,000 of aid to each village in the rural areas. More than 20,000 villages have now benefited (C. Alexander, pers. comm.).

Narcotics contribute some $3.5 billion to the national economy. There was a 17 percent increase in poppy production in 2007. Helmand Province now has 102,000 hectares under cultivation, making it the leading poppy cultivator per area in the world. North and east Afghanistan now have 13 provinces that are poppy free. Six other provinces were declared poppy free in 2007. This represents an 80 percent reduction. A total of 396 drugs traffickers had been arrested in 2007 as of
November, and some 6,000 kilograms of heroin and 60 tons of other drugs seized. In September 2007, one seizure confiscated 4,030 kilograms of heroin (Afghan Interior Ministry).

Some 60 percent of Mullahs are neutral. Of the remaining 40 percent, 30 percent are pro-Taliban, with some 10 percent pro-government (National Communication Coordination Centre).

About 85 percent of the population now has access to basic “healthware,” compared with five percent under the Taliban. There are now more than 350 health clinics in the country. Female and child mortality has declined by 25 percent across the country since 2002 (C. Alexander, pers. comm.). However, 300 schools closed in 2007 due to pressure from the Taliban, leading to problems with literacy (Afghan Interior Ministry).

Iran controls 50 percent of the print media and 3 out of 11 TV channels (Afghan Ministry of Information and Culture).

The Role of the International Community

Some $12 billion to $13 billion has thus far been spent on development, but up to 90 percent is repatriated to donor countries (NATO civilian staff, pers. comm.). The United States spent $2 billion on police training thus far, but mainly through DynCorp. Each private sector U.S. police trainer costs approximately $400,000 per annum, whereas EU trainers will costs approximately $40,000 per annum. The objective is approximately 800 U.S. police trainers and 200 from the European Union. The EU police mission currently stands at 80 and is due to reach 180 in March 2008, but recruiting trainers is proving hard due to the low salaries (European Union, Kabul).

The UN Strengthening Peace Program (PTS) led to the surrender of 4,000 Taliban by October 2007 (NATO civilian staff, pers. comm.).

ISAF/OEF

The International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) has 40,000 troops under its command, including some 16,000 U.S. personnel. In addition, there are 10,000 U.S. personnel under Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) command (NATO civilian staff, pers. comm.). There are 18,000 European forces in ISAF (European Union, Kabul). The United Kingdom is the second-biggest troop contributor, with 7,700 personnel, almost all of which have a combat role. Germany is the third-largest contributor with 3,000 personnel in-country, of which approximately 600 are combat forces (RC-South staff, pers. comm.).

There are 25 Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs), of which the United States leads 12. Most U.S. personnel stay 15 months, whereas many of the personnel from coalition partners stay only 6 months on average, and some stay for as little as 4 months. ISAF is short of three to four maneuver battalions. ISAF is also profoundly short of helicopters (ISAF staff, pers. comm.).
Regional Command-South

RC-South has a population of between 2 million and 3 million, with 1 million living in Kandahar Province. The life expectancy is in the mid-40s, with 85 percent of the population living on farms and homesteads. Some 70 percent of the population is neutral (RC-South staff, pers. comm.).

RC-South has 12,000 ISAF troops alongside some 10,000 OEF troops, covering six provinces with an area of 480,000 sq kilometers. There are no ISAF forces in the provinces of Nimroz and Day Kundi. ISAF needs 12,000 more forces in RC-South. However, over the past year, improvements in the security situation have been seen due to an increase in the force of some 6,000 (RC-South staff, pers. comm.).

Improving the Afghan Police and Army

The Afghan National Army (ANA) will be 70,000 strong by the end of 2009. Currently, the ANA possesses “almost” 10 infantry brigades, with an objective of 14, plus 5 maneuver corps by the end of 2009. Each brigade has three infantry battalions or KANDAKs of 600 personnel (Combined Security Transition Command–Afghanistan [CSTC-A]).

The ANA enjoys a 50 percent retention rate, with a desertion rate of 10 percent (NATO headquarters, pers. comm.). About 10 percent are absent without leave (AWOL) at any one time, mainly due to the need to deliver pay personally to home villages. An automated payment system is currently being established (CSTC-A).

The ANA lacks 3,500 personnel given current planning. Basic pay of a private soldier is around $100 per month, which rises to $160 per month when engaged on operations (CSTC-A). Members of the Afghan National Police (ANP) are paid $70 per month. The Taliban are paid approximately $200 per month (D. Sultanzoy, pers. comm.).

Some 50 percent of the 18 to 30 age group are willing to join either the ANA or the ANP (CSTC-A). However, it will be two to three years before the pay of ANA and ANP is comparable (U.S. Armed Forces, Qalat, pers. comm.).

The ANA will deploy 11,000 to 12,000 troops to RC-South, of which 80 percent are already there. However, KANDAK 21 in Kandahar had only 50 percent of its personnel in October 2007—300 out of 600 were missing, which could have been explained by a major religious holiday (RC-South staff, pers. comm.).

It is proposed that the ANA commando force will be some 4,552 strong. This will be an important element in the credible fighting power of the ANA and must receive priority treatment (RC-South staff, pers. comm.).

The ANP will total 82,000 personnel. The ANP can only cover 50 percent of police districts at present due to lack of available personnel. There are 365 police districts with the need for at least 10 officers per district (CSTC-A). The Afghan government claims that there are now 40,000 police officers on the ANP payroll. The United States checked these figures and confirmed that some
32,000 (80 percent) can be accounted for (ISAF headquarters, pers. comm.). ANP casualties are 20 times higher than ANA. Some 3,000 ANP are planned for RC-South, but only 1,500 were present in October 2007 (RC-South staff, pers. comm.).

The Afghan Civil Order Police (ANCOP), a paramilitary force that is designed to support the ANP, is being deployed. A strengthened border police with 4,500 stationed in RC-South will also be deployed (RC-South staff, pers. comm.).

About 685 border police had been killed in 2007 as of November. In June 2007, more than 200 police were killed. Army and police hospital services are still lacking. More than 1,000 police had been killed in 2007 as of November. A total of 40 senior police officers had been removed in 2007 either due to incompetence or corrupt behavior (CSTC-A, C. Alexander, and the Afghan Interior Ministry, pers. comm.).

In all, 103 Operational Mentor and Liaison Teams (OMLTs) are required by the end of 2008. There are currently 23, and there are only likely to be 41 or 42. According to General Dan McNeil, commander of ISAF, there are only 18 active OMLTs.

**UNODC Afghanistan Opium Survey 2008**

The seven southern and western provinces that contributed to 98 percent of Afghan opium cultivation and production are Helmand, Kandahar, Uruzgan, Daykundi, Zabul, Farah, and Nimroz. This clearly highlights the strong link between opium cultivation and the lack of security. The regional divide of opium cultivation between the south and rest of the country continued to sharpen in 2008.

Most of the opium cultivation is confined to the south and the west, which are dominated by insurgency and organized criminal networks. This corresponds to the sharper polarization of the security situation between the lawless south and relatively stable north. Helmand still remains the dominant opium-cultivating province (103,500 hectares), followed by Kandahar, Uruzgan, Farah, and Nimroz.

In 2008, 98 percent of the opium poppy cultivation was concentrated in Helmand, Kandahar, Uruzgan, Day Kundi, Zabul, Farah, and Nimroz, where security conditions are classified as high or extremely risky by the UN Department of Safety and Security (UNDSS). Most of the districts in this region are not accessible to the United Nations and NGOs. Antigovernment elements as well as drug traders are very active in this region. Provinces in the south are the stronghold of antigovernment elements, while provinces in the west (Farah and Nimroz) are known to have organized criminal networks.
Iraq

Basic Facts

Iraq has a total population of 29 million (OSB 2007). The median age is 20.2 years, and 39.2 percent of the population is under age 15 (Central Intelligence Agency). The main ethnic groups are Arabs and Kurds. Within the country, there is also a persistent religious cleavage between Sunni and Shi’a Muslims.

After coming to an almost complete halt after the 2003 invasion, the oil-driven economy is gaining momentum once again, and steady progress is expected. This was demonstrated by 4 percent growth in 2007 and the prospect of 7 percent growth in 2008 (DOD 2008).

A nationwide poll in 2008 revealed that only 25 percent of the population believes that the multinational forces can provide security, while confidence in Iraqi security forces is rated much higher (army, 78 percent; police, 73 percent) (DOD 2008).

Regional Strategy

Given its strategic position in the Middle East, Iraq’s neighbors have a strong interest in the ongoing conflict. All neighboring countries favor a unified Iraq. However, there is a prevailing belief that the country should not be too strong, as it might become a threat to the region (Rand 2007). Therefore, part of any regional solution will require engagement with the surrounding countries (Iraq Study Group). Iran, Syria, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey are to be mentioned here, as they are the most actively involved neighbors.

As the leading Shi’a power in the region, Iran has strong ties with Iraqi Shi’a groups. Iran thus seeks to influence the Iraqi conflict by supporting various Shi’a militias. The two countries share a 1,458-kilometer border (CIA).

Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps–Qods Force (IRGC-QF) is engaged in large-scale trafficking of arms and ammunition and is also responsible for funding and training of some insurgency networks. Recent violence in Baghdad and Basra revealed an increased use of Iranian-supplied ammunitions (DOD 2008).

Although the Syrian government continues to step up its effort to reduce trafficking of fighters and material, the effect of these measures is still disappointing. Insurgents in Iraq still cross the 605-kilometer border with relative impunity to seek shelter from Iraqi and coalition forces. A considerable numbers of foreign extremists are also entering Iraq via Syria (DOD 2008).

Turkey (as well as Iran and Syria) strongly opposes an independent or even autonomous Kurdistan. The Kurdish aspiration for a greater Kurdistan is the main issue on Turkey’s agenda, with Turkey determined to prevent the Kurdistan Labor Party (PKK) from using northern Iraq as a safe haven. During February and March 2008, the seriousness of the situation was demonstrated by a Turkish incursion into Iraqi territory.
Iraqi Governance

Iraq’s elected government comprises some of the major parties to the conflict, but efforts are still under way to incorporate the Sunni minority. In order to keep the country together, the government in Baghdad faces three challenges: a) the prevention of a major conflict over Kurdish ambitions to control Kirkuk; b) the prevention of a large-scale civil war and ethnic cleansing, as occurred in 2006; and c) agreed control over oil revenues (RAND 2007).

The government of Iraq is encountering difficulties in managing its budget, especially at the provincial level. Corruption and nepotism, as well endemic bureaucratic inefficiency, are the major problems. Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) are leading the international attempt to strengthen provincial governance with three to five year provincial development strategies in 17 of the 18 provinces (DOD 2008).

The level of essential services provided to civilians has risen considerably. Healthcare, water, electricity, and sanitation are available now to the major part of the population. The Iraqis, however, still perceive the quality of these services as too low (DOD 2008).

An improved security situation has led to a more stable environment, which has enabled improved economic performance. Consequently, headline inflation has dropped to 12 percent, in comparison with some 32 percent in 2006. Thus, Iraqi purchasing power has also increased during the last year (DOD 2008).

The Role of the International Community

Any approach aimed at solving the Iraqi conflict should incorporate an international support structure (Iraq Study Group). On a regional level, this will require a new diplomatic effort aimed at stimulating cooperation with countries opposed to the coalition presence. Iran and Syria are vital to a secure and stable Iraq and should remain the object of continuing diplomatic commitment.

The UN Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI) is responsible for promoting a regional dialogue through the so-called neighbors process. The main role of the mission, however, remains improvements in Iraq itself. The UN mission is assisting the government of Iraq in improving infrastructure and essential services, and seeks to facilitate the return of displaced persons (DOD 2008).

Coalition Presence

The strategic goal of the coalition presence in Iraq is to create a unified, democratic, and federal Iraq, which will be able to sustain itself as a national entity in the region. Multinational Force–Iraq (MNF-I) is a U.S.-dominated venture of 24 countries and provides the executive military organization on the ground. MNF-I command and control is spread over six major areas: multinational divisions north, south, center, southeast, and northeast and multinational force west.
In addition to the military presence, the U.S. State Department also runs PRTs in all 18 Iraqi provinces. In addition, there are 13 embedded PRTs that are incorporated in the military structure at the brigade level. The total amount of staff committed to this work is approximately 800, compared with 144,000 U.S. troops plus a further 22,000 non-U.S. forces (U.S. State Department).

The draft U.S.-Iraq security agreement is the source of some controversy, as the Maliki government now wants all foreign forces out of the country by the end of 2011 at the latest. It is agreed that all U.S. forces will withdraw from urban areas by June 2009 and that some limited immunity from prosecution will be offered to U.S. forces.

**Improving the Iraqi Security Forces**

Central to the S&R strategy is the role of the Iraqi security forces, with the government of Iraq progressively expanding its security tasks and programs. Both the Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Interior are expanding their training programs in order to rapidly increase the number of fielded forces. The Provincial Iraqi Control Process is also being implemented to expand Iraqi security responsibilities. Institutional weaknesses, however, are still hampering the execution of these plans (RAND 2007).

Measures are being taken to overcome a recruitment gap from which the army is currently suffering. Hiring former officers and noncommissioned officers has proven to be one of the most effective solutions. The volunteer Sons of Iraq are contributing to enhanced security for local communities. Some 103,000 Sons of Iraq are offering protection of living areas, key infrastructure, and identifying extremist elements within the local population (DOD 2008). However, challenges remain in incorporating these elements into the state security forces.

Although suffering from many organizational problems, the Iraqi security forces are steadily becoming more efficient and effective. Throughout Iraq, their footprint is expanding as army battalions, special forces, national police, and local police are beginning to operate independently or in combination with coalition forces. In some cities, the police now take the lead and are performing reasonably well.
APPENDIX B: LIST OF SEMINAR PARTICIPANTS

Salman Ahmed, Visiting Professor, Woodrow Wilson School, Princeton University

Charles Barry, Senior Research Fellow, Center for Technology and National Security Policy, National Defense University

Frederick Barton, Codirector, Post-Conflict Reconstruction Project, and Senior Adviser, International Security Program, CSIS

Nora Bensahel, Senior Political Scientist, RAND Corporation

Hans Binnendijk, Director, Center for Technology and National Security Policy, National Defense University

Yves Boyer, Deputy Director, Fondation de la Recherche Strategique, Paris

Marc Cheek, Director, Policy and Integration, Office of the Secretary of Defense

Raymond Dubois, Senior Adviser, CSIS

Daan Everts, Former Senior Civilian Representative, NATO, Kabul, Afghanistan

Nathan Freier, Senior Fellow, International Security Program, CSIS

Robert Hunter, Senior Adviser, RAND Corporation

Ray Salvatore Jennings, Visiting Scholar, Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies, Stanford University

Edward Joseph, Visiting Scholar and Professorial Lecturer, School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University

Martijn Kitzen, Research Fellow, Netherlands Defence Academy and University of Amsterdam

Julian Lindley-French, Professor of Military Operational Science, Netherlands Defence Academy and Defence Academy of the United Kingdom

Colonel Thomas Lynch, Federal Executive Fellow, Brookings Institution

Michael McNerney, Foreign Relations and Defense Policy Manager, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Policy)

Roberto Menotti, Senior Research Fellow, Aspen Institute Italia, Rome, Italy

Graham Messervy-Whiting, Deputy Director, Centre for Studies in Security and Diplomacy, University of Birmingham
APPENDIX C: AGENDA OF THE U.S. WORKING GROUP, WASHINGTON, D.C., MAY 9, 2008

Welcome and Introduction
Speaker: Simon Serfaty, CSIS

A Sense of Urgency
Speakers: Edward Joseph, School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University
Julian Lindley-French, Netherlands Defence Academy

Identifying the Security Challenge
(“War Amongst the People?”) What have been the main security challenges in S&R operations? How to define the security challenge: ethno-sectarian conflict; insurgency; terrorism; state collapse; “war amongst the people”? How to define the reconstruction challenge—is there anyway to develop accountable institutions? What is the role of the interagency planning tool in identifying challenges? What are key differences in U.S. and European approaches to on-the-ground operations? What are the areas of overlap?
Speakers: Colonel Thomas Lynch, Brookings Institution
Michael McNerney, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Policy)

Identifying the Reconstruction Challenge—Institution Building, Reconciliation, and Rule of Law
(“There is no military solution, only a political solution.”) What have we learned about the process of reconciliation among foes? What has worked to foster it—and what factors have made it more difficult? Is economic growth the panacea for internal conflict? How have successes and failures of institution building affected the outcome of S&R operations? What elements have proven to be key in fighting corruption and establishing strong judiciaries and accountability from public officials and government? Have elections been part of the problem or part of the solution?
Speakers: Ray Salvatore Jennings, Stanford University
Robert Perito, U.S. Institute of Peace
Developing New Strategies and Transatlantic Opportunities

Lunch Speaker: Rick Barton, CSIS

Matching Capabilities to Missions

What are the human, material and financial costs to achieve effective S&R strategies? Are the institutions equipped to handle an S&R initiative in a self-sufficient manner? If not, how could they achieve self-sufficiency? Do they have the resources? If not, how could they build them? What are the priority areas, or niches, that can be most effectively developed and provided by the European Union, the United States, and NATO? By NGOs?

Speakers: Nora Bensahel, RAND
          Hans Binnendijk, National Defense University
          Nathan Freier, CSIS

Transatlantic and Multilateral Cooperation on S&R

What should be the terms of engagement between the European Union and the United States, and between ESDP and NATO for effective S&R missions? How can the European Union and the United States be associated, or partner, with other multilateral organizations, including NGOs, for global legitimacy? Is there a foundation for understanding on the Afghanistan mission? Is there possibility for cooperation on Iraq?

Speakers: Salman Ahmed, Princeton University
          Robert Hunter, RAND

Conclusions: Toward a Euro-Atlantic Vision for S&R

Speakers: Edward Joseph, School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University
          Julian Lindley-French, Netherlands Defence Academy
Welcome and Introduction
Speaker: Julian Lindley-French, Netherlands Defence Academy

A Sense of Urgency
Speakers: Edward Joseph, School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University
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Speakers: Yves Boyer, Fondation de la Recherche Strategique, Paris
Roberto Menotti, Aspen Italia

Identifying the Reconstruction Challenge—Institution Building, Reconciliation, and Rule of Law
(“There is no military solution, only a political solution.”) What have we learned about the process of reconciliation between foes? What has worked to foster it—and what factors have made it more difficult? Is economic growth the panacea for internal conflict? How have successes and failures of institution building affected the outcome of S&R operations? What elements have proven to be key in fighting corruption and establishing strong judiciaries and accountability from public officials and government? Have elections been part of the problem or part of the solution?
Speaker: Graham Messervy-Whiting, Centre for Studies in Security and Diplomacy, University of Birmingham

Lessons from Afghanistan
Speaker: Daan Everts, former Senior Civilian Representative, NATO, Kabul
Matching Capabilities to Missions

What are the human, material, and financial costs to achieve effective S&R strategies? Are the institutions equipped to handle an S&R initiative in a self-sufficient manner? If not, how could they achieve self-sufficiency? Do they have the resources? If not, how could they build them? What are the priority areas, or niches, that can be most effectively developed and provided by the European Union, the United States, and NATO? By NGOs?

Speakers: Andrew Rathmell, Libra

Transatlantic and Multilateral Cooperation on S&R

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Speaker: Martijn Kitzen, NLDA and University of Amsterdam

Conclusions: Toward a Euro-Atlantic Vision for S&R

Speakers: Edward Joseph, School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University
Julian Lindley-French, Netherlands Defence Academy
ABOUT THE AUTHOR AND THE PROJECT

The Author

Julian Lindley-French is a professor of military art and science at the Netherlands Defence Academy. He is also a senior associate fellow of the Defence Academy of the United Kingdom. Formerly director of the International Security Policy Training Course at the Geneva Centre for Security Policy, he was born in Sheffield, Yorkshire, in 1958. A historian by training, he is an Oxford Blue who graduated from Oxford University in 1980. He received a master’s degree in international relations from the University of East Anglia in 1992 and a doctorate in political science from the European University Institute in Florence in 1996. He has lectured in European security at the Department of War Studies, Kings College, London, and therein was deputy director of the International Centre for Security Analysis. He was also senior research fellow at the EU Institute for Security Studies in Paris and has acted as a consultant to NATO in Brussels, where in 1999 he was recognized for outstanding service. His most recent books are A Chronology of European Security and Defence, 1945–2006 (Oxford University Press, 2008) and The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (Routledge, 2006).

The Project

The Brzezinski Chair at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) is conducting a two-year Global Dialogue between the European Union and the United States based on five small Euro-Atlantic working groups on broad questions of stabilization and reconstruction (S&R), energy security, climate change, challenges in the world economy, and concepts for converging security strategies. For each of these groups, the goal is to develop a shared European-American approach and identify the institutional and practical dimensions of a set of transatlantic best practices that will both support mutual interests and elaborate a governance structure that better reflects the diffusion of interests in the international system. The project is directed by Simon Serfaty, holder of the CSIS Brzezinski Chair, and is being carried out with the support and cooperation of the CSIS Europe Program, whose director, Julianne Smith, also cochairs the working group on climate change. CSIS thanks the European Commission for its support of this project.