

The U.S.-Japan Alliance

A New Framework for Enhanced Global Security


AUTHOR

Hideki Wakabayashi

FOREWORD

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Center for Strategic and International Studies

1800 K Street, NW, Washington, DC 20006

Tel: (202) 775-3119

Fax: (202) 775-3199

Web: www.csis.org




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FOREWORD

BY MICHAEL J. GREEN

In *The U.S.-Japan Alliance: A New Framework for Enhanced Global Security*, Hideki Wakabayashi offers a compelling vision and a concrete work plan for a new administration in the United States and—quite possibly—a new government in Japan as well. Wakabayashi prepared this report while at CSIS as a visiting fellow, but it builds on his decades of experience working on U.S.-Japan relations as a labor union official, a diplomat, and a politician in the opposition Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ). These unique perspectives are reflected in the pragmatism of the recommendations and the broad bipartisan appeal of his overall approach. These are recommendations that one can imagine John McCain or Barack Obama—and Taro Aso or Ichiro Ozawa—picking up as a concrete guide for bilateral relations.

The report begins by reiterating the centrality of the core competencies of the U.S.-Japan alliance: defending Japan and contributing to broader security in the Far East. Wakabayashi is clear that an alliance relationship broadened at the expense of these core objectives would be hollow and would ultimately undermine U.S., Japanese, and regional security. But he also presents an ambitious agenda of global issues where the United States and Japan can combine their hard and soft power to respond to new challenges in the era of globalization, building on closer bilateral cooperation on security and economic issues over the past decade. His focus is on three issue groups: development and Africa; nonproliferation; and energy and the environment. These are areas where Japan has demonstrated a commitment of resources and innovative policymaking and has credibility in the eyes of the international community. They are also areas where the combined efforts of the world's first- and second-largest economies will have a significant impact on the decisions of other nations.

The U.S.-Japan alliance has many strengths at present. Opinion polls about Japan in the United States have never been more positive. Given the rise of China, the North Korean nuclear challenge, the war on terror, the financial crisis, and the global issues highlighted by Wakabayashi, it is clear to the publics in both nations that the United States and Japan need each other more than ever before. But the reality is that the next U.S. administration will be heavily focused on Iraq, Iran, and Afghanistan and will likely face a period of diminished resources because of the current financial crisis. Meanwhile, Japanese politics are entering a period of fluidity and uncertainty. It is therefore essential that alliance managers on both sides of the Pacific put in place a framework for cooperation that will ensure continued high-level coordination and strategic dialogue. Wakabayashi has presented an important starting point.

Michael J. Green is a senior adviser and holds the Japan Chair at CSIS. He is also an associate professor of international relations at Georgetown University.



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This paper was based on interviews and meetings with more than 100 U.S. and Japanese professionals who have been involved in U.S.-Japan relations, including politicians, bureaucrats, academics, policy experts, and members of the media. I wish to thank all of these dedicated people for their advice, encouragement, and inspiration.

I owe a special debt of gratitude to Paul White, who was the director of the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) in Tokyo. I could not have finished this paper without his assistance and valuable advice. Finally, I would like to express my great appreciation to Michael Green, senior adviser, Japan Chair, CSIS, and Nicholas Szechenyi, deputy director, Japan Chair, CSIS, who have patiently advised me throughout this project.

Although I am pleased to acknowledge the assistance I have received in writing the report, I am fully responsible for its contents, and the views expressed are solely my own.



EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

- The U.S.-Japan relationship has been and will remain instrumental in realizing peace and prosperity in Asia and around the world. Although the relationship can easily be taken for granted, it is necessary to periodically reaffirm the importance of the bilateral relationship by identifying areas of common interest that can inform the policy agenda.
- The definition of security has changed over time. People are increasingly feeling threatened by new global challenges such as climate change, the energy and food crises, terrorism, nuclear proliferation, and many social and economic development problems. The United States and Japan are well positioned to meet these challenges, and they will strengthen the alliance by promoting a new agenda for bilateral cooperation.
- The year 2010 will mark the 50th anniversary of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between the United States of America and Japan. Now is a good time for both countries to redefine what the treaty means to their mutual security in the face of new global challenges and threats. For nearly 50 years there has been an overlooked aspect of the treaty, namely its reference to “mutual cooperation”—a call for the two nations to cooperate not just for their own security but also to realize international peace and prosperity in economic and other fields. Pursuing this overlooked aspect would lead to a “definitive” implementation of the treaty.
- Japan and the United States have had a long and diverse history of cooperation. Under the Global Partnership Agreement initiated after the Cold War, the United States and Japan began to build a substantial and carefully orchestrated portfolio of joint projects using official development assistance (ODA). In 1993, during a period of intense trade friction, the two governments pursued the Common Agenda for Cooperation in Global Perspective, the first comprehensive framework to jointly address global and other important development issues. The direction of bilateral cooperation changed dramatically during the second term of the George W. Bush administration, after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. Antiterrorism efforts and military cooperation in Afghanistan and Iraq became a new face and a new symbol of the alliance. This has been described by some as “boots on the ground.” The bilateral economic agenda under the current Economic Partnership for Growth framework has progressed somewhat, but the programs have not been as coherent as previous efforts in this field.
- Under the proposed new framework for enhanced global security, the two countries should establish a long-term vision and direction for the relationship. This would include an

economic architecture in the Asia and Pacific region, with an Asia-Pacific Union as a long-term objective. A U.S.-Japan free-trade agreement (FTA) would be the first step in this process.

- The new framework would include three main pillars:

Environment and energy: The environment, including energy, is an important issue for both countries in the twenty-first century. At the 2008 Hokkaido Toyako Summit, the G-8 countries agreed on a goal of achieving at least a 50 percent reduction in global emissions by 2050. The United States and Japan should work on: (a) initiating a ministerial-level environment forum to discuss key issues, including climate change; (b) leading international discussions to form an effective global post-2012 climate regime involving all nations; (c) developing environment-related technologies, including carbon capture and storage, clean and renewable energy, and nuclear energy; (d) providing environmentally friendly assistance to developing countries; and (e) launching a new cooperation initiative to encourage energy conservation.

Development and Africa: International security cannot be achieved without improving the lives of people in developing countries. Cooperation to achieve more significant development results in Africa should be one focus of Japan-U.S. cooperation. The two countries should: (a) enhance cooperation on global health issues, especially in Africa; (b) develop strategic projects to reduce poverty and strengthen governance and education; and (c) expand public-private partnerships (PPPs) with significant corporate and civil society involvement.

Nuclear nonproliferation: Nuclear weapons are the most dangerous threat to human security, yet there are serious challenges to achieving nuclear disarmament. The world faces thorny nuclear proliferation issues with countries such as North Korea and Iran. Japan and the United States should cooperate on: (a) enhancing dialogue and cooperation on nuclear proliferation issues and strengthening the nonproliferation regime; (b) strengthening the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) initiative and the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP) on nuclear nonproliferation; and (c) enhancing cooperation in developing nuclear and reprocessing technologies that are safe and reliable, including nuclear recycling.

- *Other possible areas for cooperation:* There are many other areas of concern that may be appropriate for joint cooperation, among them: (1) the global food crisis; (2) reconstruction and emergency humanitarian aid; (3) counterterrorism and cooperation to counter international organized crime; (4) aging and demographic change; and (5) a personnel exchange program.
- Maximizing security is a matter of finding the proper balance between and mix of hard and soft power. If the United States and Japan are successful in cooperating to address global issues and working on preventive diplomacy under the proposed new framework, that will lead to a more favorable environment for global security. As a consequence of that

cooperation, the bilateral relationship will become even stronger and will be viewed by the international community as a public good.

1

INTRODUCTION

As the two largest economies in the world, the United States and Japan are becoming increasingly dependent on one another both economically and politically. Together, both countries account for approximately 33.5 percent of the world economy¹ and about 28 percent of total official development assistance (ODA).² The bilateral relationship has been and continues to be extremely important for both countries—countries that share common values such as liberty, democracy, and an enormous responsibility for securing world peace and prosperity.

In the post–Cold War era, the world is facing new global challenges such as food and energy crises, terrorism, ethnic and religious conflicts, nuclear proliferation, a growing gap between the rich and poor, infectious diseases such as HIV/AIDS, and an increasing environmental crisis that includes concerns about global warming and clean water resources. Safeguarding international security has become more and more complex and can only be achieved by improving the lives of people and prevailing over the global challenges mentioned above. Therefore, strengthening cooperation between the world’s two largest economies is important for achieving human security in the twenty-first century.

The impact of emerging economies on the international system cannot be overstated. In the case of China, the fastest-growing economy of the last decade, and India to a lesser degree, one would expect over the next 10 years to see a strong impact on the global economy, environment, energy and food supply, and global security. The same could also apply to other developing nations such as Russia and Brazil.

In response to these phenomena, it is incumbent on Japan to recommit itself to carrying out an extensive and responsible foreign policy and to working with the United States on a new cooperative framework. This framework would serve as a strong foundation for the U.S.-Japan bilateral relationship and would also bolster American security interests in Asia. It would underpin and strengthen the U.S. relationship with the Asia-Pacific region and would also help solidify Japan’s role in the world. Furthermore, this important collaborative effort would help keep the U.S.-Japan relationship alive and foremost in the minds of policymakers and publics in both countries.

¹ World Development Indicators Database 2007, World Bank, <http://siteresources.worldbank.org/DATASTATISTICS/Resources/GDP.pdf>.

² Development Aggregate Aid Statistics: ODA by Donor, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), April 4, 2008, http://stats.oecd.org/wbos/Index.aspx?DatasetCode=ODA_DONOR.

The purpose of this report is to contribute to the strengthening of the U.S.-Japan bilateral relationship by reviewing and analyzing previous collaborative efforts between the two nations and to proffer a new cooperation framework for consideration by politicians, bureaucrats, academics, and civil society in both countries. This new framework would be timed to coincide with the beginning of a new administration in Washington in 2009 and of a government in Tokyo, possibly led by a new ruling party, following a general election expected in Japan no later than September 2009. The cooperation framework could provide timely and germane information for discussions between U.S. and Japanese policymakers as political transitions in both capitals unfold. The policy recommendations in this report should be applicable regardless of which parties or individuals come into office in the United States and Japan.

2

REAFFIRMING THE IMPORTANCE OF THE U.S.-JAPAN RELATIONSHIP

The purpose of this research paper is not to describe why the U.S.-Japan relationship is important. It starts with the assumption that the importance of the bilateral relationship is widely understood among policymakers and citizens of both countries. However, it is still necessary to reaffirm the salience of the bilateral relationship from time to time, especially during periods of political transition. To avoid drift, there is a need for the two governments to periodically take stock of the challenges that their countries face and develop a policy agenda in response. This process strengthens the bilateral relationship but also reflects a broader interest in maintaining world peace and global prosperity.

Contributing to World Peace and Global Prosperity

The purpose of diplomacy is to protect the lives of a nation's citizens, property, and territory. As the world responds to the challenges posed by globalization, it is increasingly more difficult for any one nation to solve complex transnational problems alone. Today, it is both desirable and efficient for countries to cooperate with other countries that share similar values and interests, and the U.S.-Japan relationship serves as a good example.

What are the current threats to global security? The definition of security has changed over time. Today, a traditional army crossing a national border to invade a neighboring country is a rare occurrence. On the other hand, people are increasingly feeling threatened by new global challenges such as food shortages, energy shortages, terrorism, local conflicts, and infectious diseases such as HIV/AIDS. Equally important is what some describe as a looming environmental crisis, which includes concerns about global warming. In recent years, there have been an increasing number of large hurricanes and severe storms (such as Hurricane Katrina in 2005) that have taken hundreds of lives and caused extensive damage to infrastructure.

Other issues such as environmental protection, product safety, and health pandemics also command our attention. For example, toxic chemicals in some toys from China have caused children to become ill and even comatose,¹ and acid rain and yellow sand carried by prevailing westerly winds across the Japan Sea have caused significant agricultural damage and resulted in serious threats to human health. Avian influenza has resulted in poultry mortality rates reaching

¹ "Toy Contaminated with 'Date Rape' Drug Pulled," CNN, November 8, 2007, <http://www.cnn.com/2007/US/11/08/toy.recall/>.

90 to 100 percent in some countries and also threatens human health. These threats can emerge at any time and are not contained within national borders.

Moreover, there have been an increasing number of failed or fragile states where overall governance and the provision of health, education, and security services have been weak or nonexistent. Governments in countries such as Somalia, Sudan, and Afghanistan, for example, can no longer protect human life and provide government services without significant outside assistance.

Although the international community has launched efforts to address some of these challenges, such as the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), we must find even more effective and efficient ways to combat these new threats. The United States and Japan share an enormous responsibility to lead the global response to these new challenges in addition to continuing to cooperate on conventional national security issues.

Definitive Implementation of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty

The year 2010 will mark the 50th anniversary of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between the United States of America and Japan. It is not an exaggeration to say that this treaty is the most important official agreement between the two countries, and now is a good time for both countries to redefine what the treaty means to their mutual security in the face of new global challenges and threats.

This treaty, better known as the “Security Treaty” in Japan, essentially authorizes the United States to have military bases in Japan to protect Japan when either Japan or the United States is attacked by a third country on Japanese territory. This understanding remains true, but another important aspect of the treaty, its focus on “mutual cooperation,” has been overlooked for nearly 50 years. This phrase suggests that the United States and Japan should cooperate not just for the security of the two countries but also for international peace and prosperity in economic and other fields. Mutual cooperation certainly applies to today’s global challenges and should therefore assume a more prominent role in the bilateral policy agenda.

The preamble of the treaty includes the following two phrases: (1) “Desiring further to encourage closer economic cooperation between them and to promote conditions of economic stability and well-being in their countries...”; and (2) “Considering that they have a common concern in the maintenance of international peace and security in the Far East...” Further, article II states, “The Parties (The United States and Japan) will contribute toward the further development of peaceful and friendly international relations by strengthening their free institutions. They will seek to eliminate conflict in their international economic policies and will encourage economic collaboration between them.” Because the treaty applies a broader concept of security, the two countries should continue to focus not only on defense cooperation (hard power) but also on cooperation in other fields (soft power), such as the environment, social and economic

development, international trade, nuclear nonproliferation, and other areas. Furthermore, the two countries could integrate military and nonmilitary cooperation into a larger framework, building on the smart power concept that the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) has proposed (see box). These “new” dimensions of the treaty would place bilateral cooperation under a new cooperation framework that would further strengthen the relationship and at the same time facilitate a more coordinated and concerted effort to address pressing global challenges.

Smart Power

In 2006, CSIS launched the bipartisan Commission on Smart Power, cochaired by Richard Armitage and Joseph Nye Jr. The purpose was to develop a U.S. strategy to address current global challenges. The CSIS Commission on Smart Power specifically identified five critical areas: (1) alliances, partnerships, and institutions; (2) global development; (3) public diplomacy; (4) economic integration; and (5) technology and innovation.

CSIS convened many meetings and seminars with experts in various fields including development, the military, the corporate sector, and the media. The Commission’s final report was issued on November 6, 2007. John Hamre, president of CSIS, emphasized the importance of smart power in the foreword of the final report saying, “We do not have to be loved, but we will never be able to accomplish our goals and keep Americans safe without mutual respect.”

Integrating Hard Power and Soft Power

Although the main focus of this paper is the importance of bilateral cooperation on soft power, this does not mean to suggest that such cooperation should come at the expense of hard power, such as military capability and U.S.-Japan security arrangements. Security is strengthened through the greater integration of soft power and hard power.

The U.S.-Japan security arrangement, based on the above-mentioned Security Treaty, is the most important pillar for Japan’s defense. Japan has been able to enjoy rapid economic growth since World War II with a relatively small defense capability because the U.S.-Japan security arrangement has achieved a balance of military power in the region.

The international security situation has remained unpredictable since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. As a result of various initiatives, including refueling missions in the Indian Ocean in support of Operation Enduring Freedom, reconstruction activities in Iraq, and disaster relief operations in Southeast Asia, Japan’s Self-Defense Forces (SDF) are now expected to play a more active role in regional and global security. Japan needs to maintain and modernize SDF capabilities to strengthen U.S.-Japan cooperation in many areas, especially those (such as humanitarian relief and UN peacekeeping operations) where hard power can be used to support soft power objectives.

The Political Necessity for Cooperation

U.S.-Japan cooperation has strengthened considerably over the decades since the Security Treaty was signed, and the relationship remains the foundation for peace and prosperity of the Asia-Pacific region. The two countries have always emerged from difficult times with new initiatives, such as in the 1990s when the tension stemming from trade friction was offset by the Common Agenda for Cooperation in Global Perspective, an effort to broaden the cooperative framework for the alliance. Today, there is another compelling reason to reinvigorate the bilateral agenda: to boost public support for the alliance in both countries.

According to a Japanese attitude survey carried out by the Cabinet Office of the government of Japan in October 2007, the favorable rating of the U.S.-Japan relationship decreased to 76.3 percent from 82.7 percent in 2006. At the same time, the unfavorable rating increased from 11.6 percent to 20.4 percent. This survey is important and should remind policymakers that diplomacy cannot be sustained without public support.

Meanwhile, a public opinion poll conducted by the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs in February 2008 revealed that the percentage of Americans who believe that “Japan is a dependable ally” decreased from 74 percent to 67 percent in 2007. That is still a very high rating overall, and the rate among opinion leaders only was 92 percent. Nonetheless, it is important to restate the value of the alliance to both publics.

In Japan, there is concern that the United States will dedicate more time to the relationship with China. The growing presence of China as a regional and world power makes the strengthening of the U.S.-China relationship inevitable. However, if the Japanese public sees broadening U.S.-China ties and perceives the U.S.-Japan relationship as focused narrowly on defense issues, fears of “Japan passing” could resurface and weaken support for the alliance.

In that scenario, the Japanese government would struggle to facilitate defense cooperation, including the agreement to realign U.S. forces in Japan. It also might be more difficult to continue the Host Nation Support program, which is already a controversial issue in Japan. The United States and Japan should therefore seek to cooperate on more nonmilitary and soft power activities to show the Japanese public that alliance cooperation has many dimensions and that they all contribute to mutual security and prosperity. Maintaining a strong and healthy relationship depends not only on the treaty and other official agreements but also on continuous engagement with the peoples of the two nations.

3

REVIEW OF BILATERAL COOPERATION ON GLOBAL ISSUES

The United States and Japan have had a long history of cooperation in many different areas. In this section, previous initiatives will be reviewed, starting from the post–Cold War period (around 1990), though some development cooperation projects were initiated even before then on an ad hoc basis. The review will shed light on trends and lessons learned that may serve as guideposts for the new cooperative framework that will emerge as a logical consequence of this study. A more detailed review of the Common Agenda can be found in Appendix B.

The Global Partnership under the George H. W. Bush Administration (1989–1993)¹

In 1989, George H. W. Bush and Mikhail Gorbachev declared that the Cold War was over. The Berlin Wall fell. This monumental change opened the possibility of outside assistance to address the need for economic reform and restructuring in both Eastern Europe and the states of the former Soviet Union.

The United States and Japan had an opportunity to initiate major programs. The Bush administration proposed what it called the U.S.-Japan Global Partnership to help transitioning countries address massive environmental problems and assist them in restructuring and rebuilding their devastated economies. Thorny transnational problems and global issues such as HIV/AIDS, water and air pollution, and a growing demand for cleaner energy and production challenged the development community. These vexing problems offered yet another avenue of potential cooperation between the United States and Japan, and it was precisely at this time that Japan increased its ODA program.

Several ongoing U.S.-Japan projects were incorporated into the Global Partnership and had the potential to improve coordination between the two governments. Many of the projects were extremely successful, but the difficulty of linking two different funding cycles, two different program modalities, and two different administration systems burdened project managers in both governments and drove them to implement their components separately rather than jointly, thus losing an opportunity for greater synergy.

¹ This section was based on interviews with Paul Edward White, who was the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) director in Tokyo from 1991 to 1997.

From the beginning, Japan stated a strong preference to limit Global Partnership cooperation to Asia, while the United States wanted to develop at least one project in each major region. Japan also was under increasing pressure from the donor community through the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) to extend a greater percentage of its ODA to non-Asian countries. As Japan's ODA budget grew larger, developing countries also began to insist that Japan provide more funding for Africa, Latin America, the transition countries of Eastern Europe, and nations formerly in the Soviet Union.

Even though Japan's ODA was growing at an amazing rate, surpassing U.S. levels to become the largest program in the world, Japan lacked depth in certain priority areas, especially "softer" assistance modalities such as biodiversity conservation, HIV/AIDS, support for nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), human rights, basic education, and population projects. Japan's assistance was largely provided in what is called "hard" assistance (infrastructure and equipment provision). While necessary for development, most practitioners felt that Japan's almost exclusive focus on hard assistance made its ODA portfolio seem "out of balance." The Global Partnership relationship with the United States was seen by Japan as a way to acquire more experience in softer assistance and in geographic areas where Japan had less experience. It was the first major attempt to define a cooperation scheme for both countries, with the hope that by working together in partnership, the United States and Japan could set an example and develop a model that would be emulated by other major countries.

The Common Agenda under the Clinton Administration (1993–2001)²

In April 1993, President Bill Clinton met with Prime Minister Kiichi Miyazawa and agreed to establish the U.S.-Japan Framework for a New Economic Partnership. The Clinton administration faced a burgeoning trade deficit with Japan and wanted to address that issue and spur an economic recovery in the United States by increasing U.S. exports to Japan.

The Framework for a New Economic Partnership consisted of two parts: the sectoral and structural consultation and negotiations; and the Common Agenda for Cooperation in Global Perspective. The goals of this framework were to deal with structural and sectoral issues in order to substantially increase access and sales of competitive foreign goods. It is clear that the important priority for the United States was structural reform in Japan; Japan proposed the Common Agenda as an add-on to the dialogue on structural reforms, stating that it was important that the world see the United States and Japan as partners and not just as feuding competitors.

A remarkable aspect of the Common Agenda was that it proposed and implemented projects on a more comprehensive and systematic basis, building on the lessons of the Global Partnership. In

² The author was in charge of the Common Agenda as first secretary, embassy of Japan (1993–1996).

fact, all of the ongoing Global Partnership projects became an integral part of the Common Agenda. The United States and Japan initiated about 100 projects (not including many hundreds of small grassroots grant projects) and triggered various international cooperation initiatives involving other advanced donor countries and international organizations.³ Common Agenda initiatives included efforts at polio eradication, population and HIV/AIDS programming with special funding from Japan under the Global Issues Initiative on Population and AIDS (GII), and projects on other infectious diseases such as tuberculosis and malaria.

Another significant achievement was the involvement of civil society under what was called the public-private partnership (PPP). When the Common Agenda began, Japan's ODA program was almost entirely government to government, while the U.S. program worked almost entirely and directly with civil society groups, academic institutions, and the private sector. By the end of the Common Agenda initiative, Japan had established new partners in the nongovernmental and private sectors.

Overall, officials in both countries agree that the Common Agenda was successful. It may still be unclear to some how much Common Agenda cooperation helped strengthen the bilateral relationship, but both countries showed a very strong and persistent commitment to address the need for concerted action to achieve global peace and prosperity. Through the Common Agenda, many new NGOs, civil society organizations (CSOs), academic, and private sector players became involved in development assistance in Japan; "soft" assistance was initiated and has now become routine for Japan; and programming was expanded, especially to the previously underfunded regions of South Asia and Africa. The United States developed a better understanding of Japan's ODA program, and the general lesson was that the two countries can accomplish more when working in partnership than they can separately.

Would all of this have occurred without the Common Agenda? Perhaps, but it would have happened over a much longer timeline. In the humble opinion of the author, both countries are stronger because of the Common Agenda, and the bilateral relationship is deeper and more firmly rooted.

Alliance Cooperation under the George W. Bush Administration (2001-present)

Three significant factors have affected U.S.-Japan cooperation in the George W. Bush administration. The first is that there were no serious problems between the two countries that required urgent action, as did the very open trade frictions of the 1990s. Second, and most significant, was the change brought about by the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks. This more than any other single event changed the direction of U.S.-Japan cooperation. Bilateral initiatives have since tended toward antiterrorism cooperation. Military cooperation between the United

³ Internal paper, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, May 2002.

States and Japan in Afghanistan and Iraq has become a new face and symbol of the U.S.-Japan alliance—an alliance described by some as displaying Japanese “boots on the ground.” Third, continuous cuts in Japan’s ODA budget have had a negative impact on bilateral cooperation. In 2007, Japan dropped from the leading donor in the world to fifth position in terms of ODA net disbursement among the OECD countries. At the same time, the Bush administration has dramatically increased its development assistance budget, regaining the United States’ long-standing position as the world’s largest development aid provider. During the Common Agenda era, Japan achieved significant diplomatic leverage through its rapidly expanding ODA budget. Now, Japan must use other tools as well, which would necessarily expand Japan’s diplomatic agenda.

The first cooperation framework under the second term of the Bush administration was called the Japan-U.S. Economic Partnership for Growth (EPG). Launched in June 2001, its purpose was to promote the sustainable growth of the Japanese and U.S. economies. The EPG consisted of the following groups: 1) U.S.-Japan Subcabinet Economic Dialogue; 2) Regulatory Reform and Competition Policy Initiative; 3) Trade Forum; 4) Investment Initiative; 5) Financial Dialogue; and 6) Private Sector/Government Commission. The two governments made some progress but lost momentum when Japan suspended U.S. beef imports in 2003 amid concerns about bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE). Nonetheless, the Regulatory Reform and Competition Policy Initiative continues to address these key issue areas.

The September 11, 2001, attacks were a turning point for the two countries in terms of security cooperation. The SDF participated in operations outside of Japan for the first time in 2001 under the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law, which allowed maritime self-defense force (MSDF) vessels to support refueling activities in the Indian Ocean. That was followed by the Law of Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance for Iraq in 2003 that enabled the SDF to provide humanitarian and reconstruction assistance, mainly in the area of Samawah, Iraq. That initiative included the provision of medical support, water purification, and other reconstruction activities coordinated with Japan’s ODA assistance program.

The United States and Japan also expanded cooperation on development issues. The Strategic Development Alliance was launched in 2005 to promote “poverty reduction through economic growth”; “sustainability through country ownership, capacity building, and empowerment”; and “development and security.” Specific projects in these areas are under discussion following key strategies and targets of opportunity that will define specific areas for collaboration.

In 2007, at a U.S.-Japan summit meeting between President Bush and then-Prime Minister Yasuo Fukuda, both countries agreed to strengthen cooperation on critical global trade, energy, and environmental challenges. The joint statement included a “secure and efficient trade” component to discuss ways to make trade more secure without hindering efficient trade flows; an “intellectual property rights” component to strengthen international cooperation on the protection of intellectual property rights; and an “energy security” component to work on innovative

technological development and the peaceful use of nuclear energy with a view to achieving climate change mitigation, energy security, and economic growth.

U.S.-Japan cooperation has evolved to respond to new challenges such as terrorism, climate change, energy, and global health, an issue the two countries have worked on since the Common Agenda. In 2002, the two countries launched the Clean Water for People Initiative, a joint endeavor to provide safe water and sanitation to the world's poor, improve watershed management, and increase the productivity of water. On climate change, the United States and Japan are working to accelerate the development and deployment of clean energy technologies through a multilateral effort known as the Asia-Pacific Partnership on Clean Development and Climate (APP). In the case of the 2004 tsunami, the United States and Japan responded quickly and coordinated disaster relief with Australia, India, and the United Nations. Other cooperation includes the Six-Party Talks for the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula, nonproliferation projects such as the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), cooperation in science and technology, and activities to prevent health pandemics such as the avian flu.

Overall, the United States and Japan have not had a big umbrella initiative during the second Bush administration. Rather, the two countries have created ad hoc cooperation initiatives to respond to specific needs and situations. As compared with earlier periods, the current cooperation is less coherent, smaller in scale, and lacks the vitality and vibrancy of previous cooperation frameworks. The EPG, for example, has achieved some results but is not adequate to strengthen the economic relationship. A survey by Nippon Keidanren (Japan Business Federation) in 2006 showed a low level of recognition; 70 percent of corporate members either did not know of the EPG at all or said they had heard of it but were not familiar with the contents.⁴

Many of the current initiatives appear to be designed somewhat to meet the specific needs of a given moment or situation—lacking the coherence that an overarching philosophy or principle demands. This seemingly ad hoc approach should be consolidated and reorganized under a new and more coherent framework designed to address the new economic and political environment in the world today.

⁴ “Call for the Start of Joint Study for a Japan-U.S. Economic Partnership Agreement,” Nippon Keidanren, November 21, 2006, <http://www.keidanren.or.jp/english/policy/2006/082.html>.

4

A NEW FRAMEWORK FOR ENHANCED GLOBAL SECURITY

It is important to share a long-term vision and a common goal as the basis for U.S.-Japan cooperation. Under the new framework for enhanced global security, the United States and Japan, as the world's two largest economies, should assume a leadership role in shaping the economic architecture of the Asia-Pacific region. A U.S.-Japan free-trade agreement (FTA) should be the first step toward achieving regional economic integration in the form of an Asia-Pacific Union (APU). The new framework would also consist of three main pillars of cooperation: the environment and energy; development; and nonproliferation.

Promoting Regional Economic Integration: An Asia-Pacific Union


Japan is geographically positioned in the middle of a region that is both complex and rapidly advancing economically. Japan and the United States should lead the region toward peace and prosperity in the twenty-first century.

In 2005, the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) approved an interim policy report on economic diplomacy. The report was entitled *Envisioning the Asia-Pacific Union (APU)—Building an East Asia Community*, and the effort was led by Katsuya Okada, former president of the DPJ.¹ The author was the director of an economic diplomacy study team that contributed to the report, and the ideas presented are applicable to this proposed cooperation framework. The APU vision aimed to realize an open network for liberalization based on the movement of people, capital, goods, services, and information, supported by active diplomacy to secure regional peace and prosperity. The report lays out a roadmap for an APU beginning with efforts by Japan to expand economic partnership agreements (EPAs) from East Asia to the United States, other Pacific countries such as Australia and New Zealand, and North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) members.² Although this report was not finalized as an official policy, it shows the DPJ's preferred direction for Japanese economic diplomacy.

¹ The conceptual member countries of the APU are ASEAN members, China, India, South Korea, Japan, the United States and other NAFTA countries, Australia, and New Zealand.

² An economic partnership agreement (EPA) is more expansive than a free-trade agreement (FTA) and could include cooperation on noneconomic issues.

A New Framework for Enhanced Global Security



Both Japan and the United States should support an open network that encourages the principles of liberalization in accordance with World Trade Organization (WTO) rules and free-trade agreements. The size of the economy of the Asia-Pacific region is more than double that of the European Union, and the population is more than half that of the entire world. This region has exhibited spectacular economic growth over the last two decades, and the potential for continued growth is substantial. On the other hand, security challenges including nuclear proliferation, piracy, and territorial disputes pose potential threats. Environmental degradation and health crises such as HIV/AIDS are also prevalent in some countries in the region.

Both the United States and Japan should promote discussions to develop an economic architecture framework in conjunction with a free-trade agreement for the Asia Pacific (FTAAP) and promote an Asia-Pacific Union to foster regional peace and economic prosperity. This also should be seen as a way to strengthen the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum, including security cooperation, which has dominated the APEC agenda in recent years. Security architecture could be discussed in tandem with the economic architecture framework because the two are intimately related. The United States, Japan, Korea, and other interested countries should be invited to cooperate in collective security measures through military cooperation in the region.

U.S.-Japan Free-Trade Agreement

The two countries have entered a stable period in their economic relationship after the trade friction of the 1990s. The economic issues are now less about market access and more about the need for improvements in the business environment.³ There are still many areas where both countries have actually benefitted from vigorous bilateral consultation processes, as demonstrated by the Regulatory Reform and Competition Policy Initiative.

Despite the fact that both the United States and Japan are facing economic downturns and political momentum to introduce a new FTA is very weak at present, it is still strategically important to hold up the idea of a bilateral FTA because promoting free trade is the only way for the two countries to sustain economic growth in the long run.

The American Chambers of Commerce in Japan (ACCJ) suggests that a U.S.-Japan FTA—the ACCJ calls it the economic integration agreement (EIA or FTA-plus)—would promote institutional cooperation in areas such as (1) standards and certification; (2) information technology (IT) security; (3) intellectual property rights; and (4) security and trade. Nippon Keidanren expects improvements in areas such as (1) simplification and facilitation of consular procedures; (2) assurance of national security and facilitation; (3) enhancement of efficiency of trade and distribution; (4) removal of tariffs; and (5) harmonization of intellectual property rights

³ American Chamber of Commerce in Japan (ACCJ), *Working Together, Winning Together* (Tokyo: ACCJ, 2006), http://www.accj.or.jp/doclib/advocacy/BWPE_English.pdf.

systems. Japan would have to carefully address certain areas including the agricultural sector, the services sector, healthcare, civil aviation, and energy.

Japanese agricultural reform is extremely urgent despite political obstacles that complicate liberalization efforts. Japanese politicians should awaken from their obsession with protectionism. The agriculture sector needs competitiveness and security, not protectionism. The world is facing a serious food shortage. Japan's self-sufficiency rate was 40 percent in 2007, one of the lowest rates among advanced countries. The agricultural sector could possibly collapse in the near future because of a lack of workers and low productivity. The percentage of farmers who are 65 years old or older was about 60 percent in 2005.⁴ Japan's protectionist policies are causing agriculture to shrink. Japanese politicians should institute the comprehensive agricultural reforms needed to revitalize agriculture as an industry. A trade liberalization schedule with "phased-out terms" might be needed in the FTA negotiations for sensitive items, including rice and other agricultural products, along with implementing income compensation policies based on market prices.

As the world's two largest economies, the United States and Japan should demonstrate the importance of free trade and investment to the world through FTA negotiations at a time when worldwide negotiations seem to be at a standstill. High-level bilateral agreements could be a good model for expansion of economic integration in the entire Asia-Pacific region. After an intensive and joint research and study period, both countries should begin FTA negotiations with all items and services on the negotiating table. Industry, government, academia, and civil society should participate in the joint research and study process. The FTA could be expanded to include other areas such as nontariff barriers and also almost any other bilateral forms of cooperation, including EPAs or EIAs. Japan and the United States should realize that they have a historic opportunity that should not be missed.

⁴ Monthly Statistics of Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries, October 17, 2008, <http://www.maff.go.jp/toukei/sokuhou/data/kihon-kouzou2008>.

5

MAIN AREAS FOR COOPERATION

The areas for cooperation in the new framework should be realistic in their proposed deliverables and limited to certain carefully defined areas where visible accomplishments could be expected. Care in defining goals and objectives will serve the purpose of not overly inflating expectations. The following three pillars should be addressed, and they are all equally important.

1. Environment and Energy

Climate Change

At the Hokkaido Toyako Summit in July 2008, G-8 leaders agreed in a declaration to “share with all parties to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) negotiations, the goal of achieving at least 50 percent reduction of global emissions by 2050.” Climate change is therefore an important issue for U.S.-Japan cooperation.

In 2001, the Bush administration strongly opposed the Kyoto Protocol and withdrew from the framework because major emerging countries like China and India were not obligated to pursue the goal of emissions reductions. The United States recently agreed to pursue emissions reductions with a modest long-term target and supported the position of Japan at the Toyako Summit that an effective international framework for post-Kyoto negotiations must include China and India. The United States has long supported energy conservation and technological innovation.

Under the new framework, the United States and Japan could realize post-Kyoto objectives by:

- Initiating a bilateral ministerial environment forum for cabinet-level leaders to discuss key issues including climate change;
- Leading international discussions to form an effective global post-2012 climate regime involving all key nations;
- Developing environment-related technologies including carbon capture and storage; carbon emissions reduction; and clean and renewable energy such as solar, clean coal technology, and nuclear energy; and
- Providing assistance to developing countries in energy-saving technology.

Energy-Saving Societies

Energy supply spikes and shortages are not one-time phenomena—they are long-term issues that must be addressed if the world is to develop what some call an energy-efficient society and if renewable energy resources are to be developed.

Japan is highly dependent on foreign energy resources and has an energy self-sufficiency rate of only about 4 percent.¹ Because of this low rate, Japan has become the most energy-efficient country in the world. Japan's annual use of oil is 4.5 tons per capita,² while the U.S. annual use is 7.9 tons per capita. The energy efficiency rate (oil-conversion ton/1,000 US\$(2000) real GDP) for Japan is 0.11. For the United States it is 0.21, which is about two times higher than for Japan.

Under the new framework, the United States and Japan should work on:

- Jointly developing energy-related technology, including renewable energy such as solar, nuclear and bio, and electricity storage technology; and
- Launching a new cooperation initiative for energy to develop so-called energy-saving societies and lifestyles, including “zero net energy” houses and buildings.

2. Development and Africa

International security cannot be achieved without improving the lives of people living in developing countries. At the midpoint of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), there are still challenges to be met. At the Toyako Summit and the fourth Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD) in 2008, all countries reaffirmed commitments to address these goals as a way to enhance human security, promote good governance, induce private-sector-led growth, and achieve a participatory approach that involves various stakeholders.

At the opening remarks of TICAD, then-Prime Minister Fukuda promised that Japan will double its ODA over five years (by 2012), including up to \$4 billion of “soft” loans for Africa, and said that Japan had already decided to contribute \$560 million to the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria starting in 2009. The United States has drastically increased its ODA budget, including in July 2008 a reauthorization of \$48 billion for the President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) for 2009 to 2013. Most of the U.S. funding will be channeled to sub-Saharan Africa.

In development, corporations and civil society organizations are major players that provide assistance to developing countries. The U.S. Agency of International Development (USAID)

¹Agency for Natural Resources and Energy, *2007 Energy White Paper* (Tokyo: Japan Agency for Natural Resources and Energy, 2007), <http://www.enecho.meti.go.jp/topics/hakusho/2007energyhtml/index2007.htm>.

²International Energy Agency (IEA), “Selected 2005 Indicators for Japan,” http://www.iea.org/textbase/stats/indicators.asp?COUNTRY_CODE=JP&Submit=Submit.

changed its development assistance programming in the 1970s to an all-grant approach utilizing nonprofit nongovernmental agencies and in the 1980s began to form partnerships with the private sector as a way to assure sustainable development. These pioneering efforts among donor nations showed the way to implement development assistance by mobilizing the ideas, efforts, and resources of civil society and business. Public-private alliances were forged to stimulate economic growth and to address health and environmental issues, as well as to expand access to education and technology. In Japan, this kind of PPP approach is also considered to be very effective as it maximizes the benefit of the aid provided to developing countries.

Under the new framework, the United States and Japan should cooperate on:

- Promoting joint projects, especially in the global health sector and in Africa, to achieve MDG goals;
- Developing strategic projects in poverty reduction, governance, and education in priority regions; and
- Expanding PPPs with corporations and civil society organizations.

3. Nuclear Nonproliferation

Nuclear weapons are the most dangerous threat to human security. Japan is the only country to have suffered from the devastation of the atomic bombs, and the United States is the only country to have actually used them. Both countries know the impact of nuclear weapons, and both countries now cooperate to use their power to avoid war; to try to eliminate the capability of nations to produce nuclear weapons; and to prevent proliferation under the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), and many other international agreements, practices, and institutions.

The world is currently encountering serious challenges in the areas of nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation centered on states such as North Korea and Iran. The United States and Japan have played active roles in the Six-Party Talks on the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula. Iran must comply with UN Security Council resolutions to suspend enrichment-related and reprocessing activities. All countries should comply with the rules and the guidelines of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and other international agreements, regardless of their NPT membership status.

Complicating this challenge is the fact that more than 40 countries are interested in having their own nuclear power plants under the so-called nuclear renaissance.³ The risk of nuclear proliferation will be greater because of the transfer of nuclear technology and nuclear-related materials and because of the production of nuclear fuel and reprocessing of used fuel. Therefore,

³ “World Nuclear Power Plants: 2007/2008,” April 15, 2008, Japan Atomic Industrial Forum, Inc., <http://www.jaif.or.jp/ja/news/2008/0804doukou.html>.

this nuclear renaissance must be managed under a responsible and efficient international framework.

Japan has been making proactive efforts in maintaining and strengthening the nonproliferation regime. The nuclear disarmament resolution that Japan submitted along with other nations has been passed with the overwhelming support of member states. At the same time, Japan is one of few countries that have been active in manufacturing nuclear fuel and reprocessing used fuel for peaceful purposes.

Under the new framework, the United States and Japan should work on:

- Enhancing cooperation to strengthen the nonproliferation regime, looking toward the 2010 NPT review conference in New York;
- Strengthening the IAEA initiative and Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP) for nuclear nonproliferation; and
- Enhancing cooperation in developing nuclear and reprocessing technology for safe and reliable nuclear cycling.

6

OTHER POSSIBLE AREAS FOR COOPERATION

There are many other areas that could be included in the new framework for enhanced global security. For example, the Toyako Summit declaration expressed concerns about global growth, trade and investment, protection of intellectual property rights, corruption, abuses of the financial process, biodiversity, education, transnational organized crime, and peacekeeping and peace building. The following five areas appear particularly promising for bilateral cooperation.

1. Global Food Crisis

The world is facing a global food shortage. The combined problems of high food prices, the diversion of food crops to produce biofuels, and growing demand because of drought (attributed by some to climate change) are all areas of concern. Under the new framework, the United States and Japan should cooperate on:

- Enhancing policy dialogues to respond to global food shortage and price spikes;
- Providing food aid, high-yield seeds, and fertilizer to countries in need through bilateral assistance and the UN World Food Programme; and
- Increasing agricultural productivity by providing technical assistance to developing countries.

2. Emergency Humanitarian Aid and Reconstruction

There will be a continued and growing future need for reconstruction and humanitarian aid for post-conflict and natural disaster situations. The United States and Japan have a long history in this area. Under the new framework, the United States and Japan should cooperate on:

- Strengthening reconstruction and emergency humanitarian aid in post-conflict areas and natural disaster-afflicted areas by involving NGOs, CSOs, SDF and other military units, and other civilian organizations including police, firefighters, and coast guard.

3. Counterterrorism and International Organized Crime

In a globalized world with massive flows of people, goods, money, and information, it is important for the international community to join together to combat all forms of terrorism and organized crime. Under the new framework, the United States and Japan should cooperate on:

- Strengthening dialogues with the international community to enforce international legal frameworks for immigration control, money laundering, and similar matters; and
- Promoting cooperation to prevent human trafficking, drug-related crimes, cyber crime, and other activities of international crime organizations.

4. Aging and Demographic Change

Many developed countries suffer from rapidly aging populations, while others find themselves with burgeoning young populations and are in the midst of a rapid transition. These demographic changes can impact the global security environment. Under the framework, the United States and Japan should cooperate on:

- Enhancing policy dialogues on how global demographic change can affect the global economy and security environment; and
- Exchanging information on best practices in dealing with aging populations.

5. Personnel Exchange Program

Despite rapid advances in information technology, face-to-face contacts and exchanges are still the basic foundation for the long-term strength of the bilateral relationship. Under the new framework, the United States and Japan should cooperate on:

- Implementing policy-oriented parliamentary exchange programs to address important bilateral issues; and
- Implementing Peace Corps and Junior Overseas Cooperation Volunteers (JOCV) exchange programs with other countries, such as Korea, in response to the needs of developing countries.

7

CONCLUSION

The United States and Japan are the two largest economies in the world. As such, they have an enormous responsibility for securing world peace and prosperity and for responding to global challenges, threats, and concerns around the globe. Cooperation under the proposed new framework will significantly impact the lives of vulnerable people in developing countries and will serve to lead the international community to achieve enhanced development and security.

Ryozo Kato, a former Japanese ambassador to the United States, often compared the management of U.S.-Japan relations to gardening. In November 2007, he stated the following: “Gardens must be tended and watered. The Japan-U.S. relationship is like a green and lush garden, but I see evidence of a few plants curling up and browning around the edges. I ask myself, ‘Will this spread? Can it be contained? What must be done to make the individual plant robust again?’” In this spirit, every four or eight years, when a new U.S. administration takes office or when Japan enters a period of political transition, the old soil should be replaced by new soil. In this case, the newly fertilized soil is the new cooperation framework, which serves to reaffirm the importance of the bilateral relationship by identifying a broad set of common interests.

This paper is mainly focused on soft power, the various forms of nonmilitary and economic cooperation required to address global issues and threats. However, the importance of hard power for global security should not be overlooked. Given all of the resources available to both countries, soft power and hard power should be integrated to reduce the possibility of war and maximize regional and global prosperity. Soft power projects—from climate change to development—are related to human security. Success in these areas could reduce the possibility of domestic conflicts or even terrorism. Therefore, the break-even point for maximizing security is a balancing act to find the best mix of soft and hard power. The resulting balance, or smart power, will result in more peace and prosperity.

If the United States and Japan successfully rebuild their cooperative efforts to address global issues, and if they work on preventive diplomacy under the proposed new framework, they will create a more favorable global security environment, reduce the chances of war, and thereby reduce the need to use hard power. As a consequence of such cooperation, the U.S.-Japan relationship will remain strong and will be viewed by the international community as a public good. This vision should be endorsed by the next administrations of both countries.

A

SUGGESTIONS FOR GOVERNMENT-TO-GOVERNMENT COOPERATION

- The new framework should have high political visibility and momentum. This could be achieved if the initiative were to emerge from a U.S.-Japan summit meeting, ideally in early 2009. A blue ribbon committee and a strong interministerial secretariat might assure that the framework would start with a high profile and that the cooperation initiative would continue to move forward in a timely and visible manner.
- Because the new framework combines the hard power and soft power aspects of security, it is important to strengthen and expand interagency cooperation both within and between the two governments.
- The new framework should have a demonstrative effect on other countries and should inspire them to participate in collaborative efforts.
- The new framework for development issues should be built around a trilateral public and private partnership concept. Activities would involve the United States, Japan, and recipient nations or areas. Partnership programs and projects would extend beyond the three governments to include and highlight participation by the three partner nations' private sectors, nonprofit sectors, and academic institutions/think tanks.
- There have been many public and private sector bilateral cooperation initiatives and exchange programs over the years. The new framework initiative should include a comprehensive evaluation of all former and current initiatives to produce a set of best practices and new criteria for funding.

B

DETAILED REVIEW OF THE COMMON AGENDA

In April 1993, President Bill Clinton met with Prime Minister Kiichi Miyazawa and agreed to establish the U.S.-Japan Framework for a New Economic Partnership. The Clinton administration faced a burgeoning trade deficit with Japan and wanted to address that issue and spur an economic recovery in the United States by increasing U.S. exports to Japan.

The Framework for a New Economic Partnership consisted of two parts: the sectoral and structural consultation and negotiations and the Common Agenda for Cooperation in Global Perspective. The goals of this framework agreement were to deal with structural and sectoral issues in order to substantially increase access and sales of competitive foreign goods. It is clear that the important priority for the United States was structural reform in Japan; Japan proposed the Common Agenda as an add-on to the dialogue on structural reforms, stating that it was important that the world see the United States and Japan as partners and not just as feuding competitors.

A remarkable aspect of the Common Agenda was that it proposed and implemented projects on a more comprehensive and systematic basis, building on the lessons of the Global Partnership. In fact, all of the ongoing Global Partnership projects became an integral part of the Common Agenda. Bilateral trade disputes were contentious during this period, but the two governments began to simultaneously build a strong portfolio of successful cooperation projects. Under Secretary of State Timothy Wirth and Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs Kazuo Ogura orchestrated close cooperation among a vast array of agencies and individuals. The Common Agenda quickly expanded to 26 initiatives under categories including: (1) promoting health and human development; (2) responding to challenges to global stability; (3) protecting the global environment; (4) advancing science and technology; and (5) fostering exchanges for mutual understanding. After a period of rapid expansion, the leaders of the Common Agenda sought to consolidate and focus the initiative by reducing the 26 initiatives to 18.

Under the Common Agenda, the United States and Japan initiated about 100 projects (not including many hundreds of small grassroots grant projects).¹ The Common Agenda achieved what the Global Partnership could not: it triggered various international cooperation initiatives involving other advanced donor countries and international organizations. Common Agenda initiatives included efforts at polio eradication, population and HIV/AIDS programming, and projects on other infectious diseases such as tuberculosis and malaria. Cooperation in the health

¹ Internal paper, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, May 2002.

sector eventually led to the Okinawa Infectious Disease Initiative (IDI), which was initiated at the G-8 Okinawa Summit in 2000. Other success stories included girls' education programs and work on biodiversity and conservation.

There was a reason why the health sector, including HIV/AIDS, population, tuberculosis and polio eradication, and other areas, formed the largest and most successful area of cooperation under the Common Agenda. At the very beginning of the initiative, Japan made a special amount of ODA funding available for bilateral health sector cooperation under what it called the Global Issues Initiative (GII). This multiyear pledge was to match what was a massive ongoing U.S. health sector portfolio, and because the health sector funding was agreed on "up front," the two governments were able to work on joint projects with assurance that funding would be available, usually as a match to significant U.S. funding in ongoing or planned initiatives. Such up-front funding was never secured for other Common Agenda development assistance areas, and the governments therefore struggled to identify funding sources in areas other than health.

When this author visited Guatemala in 1994 to pay a field visit to USAID projects in remote areas of the country, there was almost no dialogue between the U.S embassy (including USAID) and the Japanese embassy. Bilateral discussions were then initiated and resulted in an outstanding project on girls' education that became a model for U.S.-Japan–host country collaboration. One example was a seminar held in Guatemala in 1997, the results of which were incorporated into the government of Guatemala's Girls' Education Five-Year Program. The Common Agenda also facilitated many joint environmental projects in Latin America that fed into national-level biodiversity conservation programs. For instance, activities initiated in Mexico in the area of national park management served to establish operational programs adopted by the Mexican government's National Park Management Agency under the Ministry of Environment.

Like the Global Partnership before it, many of the jointly identified and planned Common Agenda projects were implemented separately because the government agencies had to deal with differing rules and regulations, timetables, work styles, etc., but that did not detract from success on the ground. The fact is that the United States and Japan made progress through a joint project identification and planning process and implemented activities that would not have occurred had the two donors worked separately.

Another significant achievement was the involvement of civil society under what was called the public-private partnership. When the Common Agenda began, Japan's ODA program was almost entirely government to government, while the U.S. program worked almost entirely and directly with civil society groups, academic institutions, and the private sector. This led to much movement in NGO/CSO circles in Japan. Following the examples set by USAID, which had instituted outreach programs over several decades, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan started quiet dialogues with Japanese NGOs and the private sector. Seeking to formalize this new and increasingly open dialogue, the Japanese government created the Common Agenda Round Table (CART) in 1996 to solicit the advice of the private sector on development issues. The U.S.-

Japan Common Agenda CSO network was created soon after that to advocate the importance role of CSOs in bilateral cooperation programs. The results were considered highly successful.

Most Common Agenda projects were NGO based with many different partners. This framework, applied to areas other than health, was based on a grassroots grant program of Japan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs. (Health projects could count on GII funding from Japan, mentioned earlier, and those Japanese projects were often implemented through government-to-government mechanisms.) USAID projects were often ongoing rather than new initiatives, some with governments and others with NGOs or the private sector. Japanese funding in the environment sector and other nonhealth areas often came from the grassroots grants program, which meant that those projects were by nature NGO based and small in size. The unintended result was that in comparison to Global Partnership projects, which often cost \$60 million or more, Common Agenda projects were less visible despite various achievements with significant impact.

The Common Agenda was quite successful overall and expanded over time to the point where officials had to focus on containing it; many agencies in the U.S. and Japanese governments wanted to participate in what was seen as a highly effective partnership. However, both sides were frustrated by certain aspects of this framework. In general, U.S. development assistance officers lamented the fact that Japanese counterparts in the field had little authority to negotiate. (Japan's programming was centralized in Tokyo.) Some officials in Japan felt that Common Agenda cooperation was time consuming and believed that the synergy realized was small compared to the effort invested. Common Agenda administrative meetings took time to plan and implement, and the follow-up work was always significant, and cooperation in the field also required considerable effort. Another concern in Japan was that the Japanese GII funds, which were for new Japanese initiatives where Japan previously had not implemented bilateral programs, were matched with large USAID projects that had already been identified and were in planning or in implementation. Japan felt it was always asked to match USAID's portfolio with new money while USAID was not contributing new funding.

What factors made a difference between cooperation success and failure? Success was most often achieved when the U.S. officials in the field and their Japanese counterparts had mutual respect for one another and where both sides "bought into" the project concept and the idea that cooperation would yield better results than separate planning and implementation. Less-than-successful implementation was more common when such camaraderie did not exist.

Project directors in the field often equated success with ease of implementation, which resulted when each nation played to its strengths and implemented program components separately. Cooperation was smooth when Japan had the responsibility of building infrastructure and providing equipment to a center and USAID was responsible for training staff and developing curriculum. This mode of parallel cooperation did not encourage joint meetings and communication. Cooperation based on differentiated capacity and specialization was not ideal for achieving synergy, but it was certainly the easiest option and was greatly appreciated by field officers responsible for implementation. Last but not least, effective leadership from the top in the

form of encouragement to field staff—reminders of the importance of cooperation—played a big role. That kind of leadership was rare but necessary to ignite the imagination and passion of the workers in the field.

The issue of project visibility was vexing. Japan proposed the Common Agenda as a way of showing the world that the two countries could have a positive relationship even while involved in fierce trade battles. With little or no progress on trade, the United States was reluctant to publicize the positive results of the Common Agenda.

Improvements in several areas would strengthen future bilateral initiatives. First, administrative and bureaucratic matters that complicated project implementation can be corrected if both sides would agree to harmonize the rules and regulations for joint projects. This would eliminate many of the Japanese complaints about workload, most of which were caused by differing approaches to development. Second, requiring both sides to delegate decisionmaking for joint projects to the field would eliminate one of the major complaints of the U.S. side. Third, making up-front funding commitments such as the GII would eliminate the need to scramble for funds or match funding levels. Finally, putting in place senior leaders focused on synergy between the two bureaucracies, not just the technical aspects of project implementation, and the broad impact of U.S.-Japan cooperation would go a long way in realizing future initiatives.

It may still be unclear to some how much Common Agenda cooperation helped strengthen the bilateral relationship between the United States and Japan, but both countries showed a very strong and persistent commitment to addressing the need for concerted action to achieve global peace and prosperity. Through the Common Agenda, many new NGOs, CSOs, academic, and private sector players became involved in development assistance in Japan; “soft” assistance was initiated and has now become routine for Japan; and programming was expanded, especially to the previously underfunded regions of South Asia and Africa. The United States developed a better understanding of Japan’s ODA program, and the general lesson was that the two countries can accomplish more when working in partnership than they can separately.

Would all of this have occurred without the Common Agenda? Perhaps, but it would have happened over a much longer timeline. In the humble opinion of this author, both countries are stronger because of the Common Agenda, and the bilateral relationship is more firmly rooted.

C

JAPANESE SUMMARY

日米同盟：地球的安全保障強化のための日米協力（要約）

I. はじめに

日本とアメリカは世界のトップを占める経済大国であり、様々な面で依存関係にある日米は世界の平和と繁栄に対して大きな責任を負っている。冷戦終了後、世界は、食糧エネルギー危機、テロ、民族や宗教に起因する紛争、核不拡散、HIV/AIDSなどの感染症、地球温暖化等の環境問題など新たな地球的課題に直面している。また中国やインドなど急速に発展する新興国が今後の食糧、エネルギー、環境問題等に与える影響も測り知れない。従って世界の安全保障を担保するにはこれらの地球的課題等に的確に対応し、人々の暮らしと安心を担保することが非常に重要になってきている。

そして、これらの課題に対応するためには、日本が積極的で包括的な外交・安全保障政策を展開することが肝要であるが、日本独自で対応するには限界があり、米国との協力によってより効果の高い対応が可能となる。新たな日米協力は世界における日本の役割を明確にすると共に、日米関係を安定・強化させるための礎となり、米国に対してアジア・太平洋地域の安全保障に関心をもたせ続けることになるであろう。さらにはこの協力の枠組みが日米関係を活性化させ、日米の国民と政策担当者に日米関係の重要性を印象付けることに役立つであろう。

この論文の目的は、過去に実施した日米協力を検証し、新たな日米協力の枠組みを提案するものである。米国では2009年1月に新たな政権が誕生し、日本も同年9月までに実施される総選挙を通じて新たな政治体制が確立されることが想定されるが、日米がどのような政治体制になろうとも、この日米協力の枠組みは必要なものである。

II. 日米関係の重要性の再確認

日米関係の重要性は論をまたないが、その重要性を再確認するためにも、定期的に両国が直面している課題や政策について棚卸しを行うことが重要である。このプロセスを通じて日米関係は強化され、両国民が世界の平和と安全に対する関心を高めることになろう。

(1) 世界の平和と繁栄に貢献

国の役割は、領土と、人々の生命と安全を守ることである。今日、安全保障の定義も大きく変わりつつある。正規軍が国境を越えて攻めてくることは稀なケースとなりつつあり、人々は食料やエネルギーの不足、テロ活動、核の拡散、HIV/AIDSなどの感染症、地球温暖化に起因すると思われる異常気象、鳥インフルエンザ、中国等からの食糧等に含まれる有害物資などにより大きな脅威を感じている。また途上国に住む人々の暮らしは依然として大きな改善は見られず、スーダンやアフガニスタンのように、国としての統治機構が機能せず、人々の最低限の生活すら保障できない破綻国家も依然として存在する。また世界で取り組んでいる貧困削減を中心とするミレニアム開発目標（MDG's）の達成も道なかばであり、責任ある日米がこれらの課題解決に向け世界をリードすることが求められている。

（２）日米安全保障条約の完成

2010年は新日米安全保障条約を締結して50周年を迎えるが、これを機に新たな地球的課題や脅威への対応を含めた日米安保の再定義が必要である。一般にこの条約は「日米安全保障条約」として知られているが、正式名称は「日本国とアメリカ合衆国との間の相互協力及び安全保障条約」であり、これまで「相互協力」の部分が重視されずその内容すら知れ渡っていない。具体的には、前文と第二条に日米の経済協力等を通じて二国間のみならず、世界の平和と繁栄を希求する主旨が謳われている。

前文：「・・・両国の間の一層緊密な経済的協力を促進し、並びにそれぞれの国における経済的安定及び福祉の条件を助長することを希望し・・・」

第二条：「締約国は、その自由な諸制度を強化することにより、これらの制度の基礎をなす原則の理解を促進することにより、並びに安定及び福祉の条件を助長することによって、平和的かつ友好的な国際関係の一層の発展に貢献する。締約国は、その国際経済政策における食い違いを除くことに努め、また、両国間の経済的協力を促進する」

つまりこの条約は、軍事力（ハードパワー）を中心とした狭義の安全保障だけでなく、経済協力等、非軍事（ソフトパワー）における協力、広義の安全保障を担保するための日米協力の概念が含まれている。まさにこれらの地球的な課題に対応するためにも非軍事面での協力も必要であり、この条約の「相互協力」を重視し、包括的な安全保障という観点からこの条約を再定義し、日米の新しい協力の枠組みが提起されるべきものと捉えることができる。

（３）ハードパワーとソフトパワーの統合

この論文は主に非軍事、ソフトパワーでの日米協力を提起するものであるが、ハードパワーや日米安保体制を軽視するものではない。これまでのハードパワーに加えてソフトパワー面での協力も必要であり、戦略国際問題研究所（CSIS）が提起する双方の統合、組み合わせによるスマートパワー、包括的な安全保障の概念をも含むものである。

特に9.11以降、国際的な安全保障の状況は依然として不透明である。自衛隊はインド洋沖での給油活動、イラクでの復興支援活動、南東アジアでの自然災害への対応な

ど、その活動領域は広がっており、自衛隊への期待は益々高まっている。今後ともソフトパワーの目的をサポートするためにも日米のハードパワーでの協力は強化する必要がある。

(4) 日米協力の政治的必要性

国民の支持のない外交は持続性がない。日米協力はこれまでも日米関係を維持する上で大いに貢献してきた経緯があり、90年前後の貿易摩擦の時代においても、日米は協力関係を通じて困難な状況を乗り越えてきた。最近の世論調査では、日本の日米関係を支持する率が若干ではあるが下がってきており、全体として日米関係を好意的に見ている率は依然として高くとも、両国は常に良好な関係を維持するための努力が必要である

中国の台頭と共に、米国における中国のプレゼンスは拡大してきており、次期政権下においても米国と中国との関係は一層進展することが予想される。しかしその米中関係の進展と共に、米国の日本への関心が薄れ、軍事面だけの日米防衛協力が突出すると、日本国民に対して「ジャパン・パッシング」のイメージを印象付け、国民の日米同盟、日米防衛体制への支持が下がる可能性がある。したがって、良好な日米関係を維持するためにも、軍事面のみならず非軍事面も含むバランスの取れた日米協力が必要であり、日米が非軍事分野においても、日米のみならず世界の平和と繁栄のために貢献している姿をアピールすることが重要である。

III. これまでの地球的課題等に関する日米協力の評価（省略）

IV. 新しい地球的安全保障強化のための日米協力

(1) 地域経済統合の促進：アジア・太平洋連合（APU）

同盟関係、協力関係にある日米は、民主主義などの共有する価値観に加え、両国が共に進むべき方向性として共通の長期的なビジョン、目標を共有することが重要である。その一つがアジア・太平洋地区の経済統合であり、将来の集団的な安全保障構造も含むアジア・太平洋連合（APU）である。

筆者は2005年、民主党経済外交プロジェクトの事務局長として、「東アジア共同体を軸としてアジア・太平洋連合構想と展望する」という報告書作成に中心的に携わり報告書は民主党「次の内閣」にて中間報告ではあるが承認された。その内容は国民の英知を最大限活用して「開かれた外交」を促進し、アジア・太平洋地区経済統合、最終的にアジア・太平洋連合（APU）を目指すものである。その報告書の内容にも一部合致するが、日米はWTO（世界貿易機関）のルールを尊重しつつ、すべてのモノ・サービス貿易の原則自由化を奨励するオープン・ネットワークを推進し、この地域の経済発展と地球的課題を含む包括的な安全保障でリーダーシップを発揮すべきである。

(2) 日米自由貿易協定（FTA）

アジア・太平洋地域の経済統合の第一ステップとして、日米は他国の見本となる自由貿易協定を締結すべきであり、まずは産学官民の共同研究を開始すべきである。日米はかつての貿易摩擦を乗り越え様々な通商課題を解決してきたが、依然としてビジネス環境の向上に向け改善すべき点がある。

日米FTA締結には、日本の農産物自由化が大きな課題の一つである。政治的に難しい課題であることは理解できるが、今、農業に必要なことは、保護政策ではなく、競争政策であり、食糧安全保障政策である。すでに日本の自給率は約40%であり、先進国の中で一番低い。また日本の農家の65歳以上の年齢層は全体の約6割を占める。農業はFTA締結に関わらず早急で大胆な改革が必要である。FTA締結に際して、農産物などの個別物品は、過渡的な措置が必要であることは言うまでもない。

日米の質の高い自由貿易協定の締結は、他国の見本となり、その地域の経済統合を拡大させる上で不可欠である。また日米自由貿易協定は、単に貿易の自由化に留まらず、「経済連携協定（EPA）」として、非関税の課題、人の交流、移動、日米協力など様々な分野を含めることが可能である。

V. 主な協力分野

新しい協力の枠組みは、実現可能な分野に絞るべきであり、過度に期待を膨らませるだけの高い目標や目的は掲げるべきではない。以下は、日米協力で優先順位のない、すべて同等に重要な3分野である。

1. 環境とエネルギー

(1) 気候変動

2008年7月に開かれた洞爺湖サミットで、G8首脳は、「2050年までに世界全体の排出量の少なくとも50%の削減を達成する目標というビジョンを、国連気候変動枠組条約（UNFCCC）のすべての締約国と共有する（中略）」を含む首脳宣言に合意した。言うまでもなく地球温暖化への対応は、世界、そして日米にとって最重要課題である。

2001年、ブッシュ政権は、中国やインド等の新興国が義務を負わない京都議定書から離脱したが、その後、自ら中長期の削減目標を設定し、サミットでも中国やインド等を含む新たな温暖化防止の枠組みを策定しようとする日本の立場を支持した。

- ・ 気候変動などの環境問題を協議する二国間での「環境閣僚フォーラム」を設置する。
- ・ ポスト京都の枠組み策定に向け、日米が国際的な議論をリードする。
- ・ 炭素捕獲及び貯蔵技術、温暖化ガスの排出削減、太陽光などクリーンで再生可能なエネルギー、クリーン・コール・テクノロジー、原子力などの環境に関連した技術協力をを行う。

- ・ 途上国へのエネルギー節減につながる技術協力を行う。

(2) 省エネ社会の推進

エネルギー不足は長期的な現象であり、省エネ社会の推進と再生可能なエネルギーの開発は重要な課題である。日本はエネルギー自給率が約4%であり、それ故に省エネ社会が進んだ。原油換算で日本は一人当たり4.5トン、アメリカは7.9トンで、日本はアメリカのおよそ倍のエネルギー効率の高い国である。

- ・ 太陽光、バイオ、電池技術などの再生可能なエネルギー、エネルギー関連の技術協力、共同での開発を行う（上記(1)気候変動における技術協力と重なる）。
- ・ ビルや家でのゼロ・ネット・エネルギー（消費と同量のエネルギーを生産）を含む省エネ社会、省エネのライフスタイル推進に関する協力を行う。

2. 開発とアフリカ

世界の安全は途上国の人々の生活条件の向上無くして保障されることはない。その上でミレニアム開発目標（MDGs）の達成にはさらに努力する必要がある。2008年日本で開催された洞爺湖サミットやアフリカ開発会議（TICAD）では、全参加国が人間の安全保障、良い統治、民間主導の成長等を確保するためにMDGs達成に向けて努力することを再確認した。

福田首相は、TICADでアフリカへの援助に関し、4千億の円借款を含め2012年までに倍増することを発表した。また日本はエイズ等を解決するために世界エイズ・結核・マラリア対策基金（グローバル・ファンド）へ5億6千万ドルを供出することを決定した。アメリカでは、近年、援助予算を増大させており、最近では主にアフリカを中心にエイズ対策の緊急援助（PEPFAR）として、5年間（2009年-2013年）で480億ドルを投入することを決めた。

開発の分野において、民間企業と市民団体はすでに主要な担い手となっている。米国国際開発庁（USAID）では、1970年代から非政府組織（NGOs）を通じて援助を行っており、1980年代から民間企業と協力して援助を行っている。日本でも官民が協力する手法（PPP）は援助に効果的であるとしている。

- ・ 日米による援助協力、特にグローバルヘルス分野と、地域ではアフリカを中心に行う。
- ・ 地域を決め、貧困削減、統治、教育等の分野で戦略的な援助を行う。
- ・ 日米の企業や市民団体による官民協力の援助を拡大する。

3. 核不拡散

人間の安全保障において、核は最大の脅威である。日本は唯一の被爆国である。また米国は唯一核爆弾を使用した国である。その核の破壊力をどの国よりも知っている両国

は、核戦争を回避すると共に核兵器を生産する能力を除去し、核拡散防止条約（NPT）包括的核実験禁止条約（CTBT）など国際的な枠組み等を通じて核不拡散に最大限の努力を行うべきである。当面は北朝鮮とイランへの対応が重要だ。朝鮮半島の非核化を進め、イランには安保理決議を遵守させなければならない。

さらに今後予想される脅威は、地球温暖化のリスクを軽減しながら世界のエネルギー需要にこたえる「核ルネサンス」の下で、40カ国以上の途上国が原子力発電を建設、もしくは計画中であるということである。そうなれば、核拡散の可能性は一段と高くなる。日本は核の平和利用である原子力発電所の建設・運営、核燃料の製造、使用済み核燃料の管理と処理等、原子力に関する一連の技術を有しており、その観点からも核不拡散に貢献できるものと思われる。

- ・ 2010年NPT再検討会議に向け、核不拡散の管理体制強化に向けた協力を行う。
- ・ 国際原子力機関（IAEA）や国際原子力エネルギー・パートナーシップ（GNEP）における核不拡散の取り組みを強化する。
- ・ 安全で信頼できる原子力発電や核燃料サイクルに関する技術協力を強化する。

VI. 可能性ある他の協力分野

世界食糧危機への対応

世界は食料不足と高価格の問題に直面している。この問題は食料需要の増大、穀物を使ったバイオ燃料の増大、地球温暖化が関係していると思われる干ばつ等の要因が複合的に影響し、取り組むべき課題は多い。

- ・ 食糧不足や高価格問題に関する政策対話を強化する。
- ・ 食糧、収穫の多い品種改良種、肥料などの供与、技術協力など、途上国への援助協力や世界食糧機関（WFO）を通じた援助協調を行う。

緊急人道援助及び復興援助

紛争国や自然災害による援助の需要はこれからも想定され、引き続き積極的で幅広い援助協力を行う。

- ・ 紛争や自然災害等の被害による人道援助や復興援助において、通常の政府開発援助や自衛隊による援助に加え、警察、消防隊、沿岸警備隊、NGO等の文民・民間組織による幅広い協力を行う。

カウンターテロリズム及び国際組織犯罪

人、物、金、情報が自由に行き交うグローバル化された世界において、国際社会と共に、日米は密接にテロや組織犯罪を防ぐ様々な協力を行う必要がある。

- ・ 国際社会と共に出入国管理、資金洗浄、情報交換等により、テロ対策を積極的に協力する。
- ・ 国際犯罪組織による人身売買、麻薬関連犯罪、サイバー犯罪などを防止するための協力を行う。

高齢化及び人口動態の変化

多くの先進国は高齢化現象に苦しみ、一方で途上国等では人口の増加が問題となり、高齢化への途上にある国も多い。このような人口の動態の変化は地球的安全保障に大きな影響を与える可能性が高く、日米はこれらの問題に日頃から備えておく必要がある。

- ・ 人口動態の変化が今後の経済や安全保障にどのような影響を与えるのか、日米の政策対話を強化する
- ・ 高齢化がもたらす問題への対応について、様々な意見交換を行う

人の交流プログラム

どんなにITによる情報化が進んでも、人と人との交流、人間同士の信頼関係は、良好で長期的な日米関係を維持する上で基本的な礎である。

- ・ 二国間の重要な政策を議論するために、定期的な日米議員の交流プログラムを実施する。
- ・ 途上国で平和部隊（ピース・コー）と青年海外協力隊（JOCV）が協力して援助、交流を行う。地域によっては援助国のニーズに応えるために韓国等、他国の協力隊との協力も検討する。

VII. おわりに

日米は二大経済大国として、地球的課題やテロなどの様々な脅威に対応し、世界の平和と繁栄に向けた大きな責任を負っている。日米の新しい協力は途上国の弱い立場にいる人々の生活に良い影響を与えることができるであろう。そして日米協力により、日米は、世界の開発と安全保障を強化する上で国際社会をリードすることになるだろう。

加藤良三元駐米大使は、「私はしばしば日米関係とガーデニングを比較する。庭を管理するには、水遣りと手入れが必要だ。日米関係は青々と茂った庭のようなものであるが、端には植物が巻きついたり、茶色になっているところがある。“この部分は広がるのかどうか”と自問自答し、また植物が青々と元気になるためには何をなすべきか考えるのである」と言っていた。その精神を日米協力を当てはめれば、日米の政権が代わる時は、古い土は新しい土に替える必要があり、まさに新しい日米協力は入れ替える新しい肥沃な土に等しい。新しい日米協力の導入は、両国が抱える共通の課題を改めて識別し、日米関係の重要性を再確認する上で重要な役割を果たすことができるであろう。

この論文は主に非軍事面でのソフトパワー、地球的課題や脅威に対応する経済面を中心とした協力について記述したものである。しかし、地球的安全保障においてはハードパワーの重要性を軽視するものではない。要は与えられた資源の中で、ハードパワーとソフトパワーをバランスよく組み合わせ、これらの諸課題に的確に対応して戦争のリスクを軽減し、世界の平和と繁栄を最大化できるかが問われているのである。ソフトパワーは、地球温暖化から開発まで人間の安全保障に関連している。もしこの分野でソフトパワーを効果的に発揮できれば、紛争やテロの可能性を軽減できるであろう。つまり安全保障を担保するためには、ハードパワーとソフトパワーのベストミックスが必要であり、そのバランスが良く、またソフトパワーが効果的に力を発揮できれば、結果して世界の平和と繁栄をもたらすのである。

もし日米が新しい協力の枠組みの下で、地球的課題に的確に対応し、予防外交を強化できれば、より良い地球的安全保障の環境が生まれ、戦争勃発のリスクを軽減し、ハードパワー、すなわち軍事力を使用する確率を減らすことになろう。そしてこの日米協力の結果、日米関係は強化され、国際社会の財産として認知されることであろう。今回の日米協力の提案が日米の次期政権に採用されることを願ってやまない。



ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Hideki Wakabayashi is a visiting fellow with the Japan Chair at CSIS. His research focuses on U.S.-Japan relations and global security. Mr. Wakabayashi was a member of the House of Councillors (upper house) representing the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) from 2001 to 2007 and served as shadow minister of economy and industry, shadow vice minister of finance, and deputy director-general of the International Department of the DPJ. He was a member of the Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee and the Humanitarian Reconstruction Support for Iraq Committee and was involved in bipartisan activities such as the Parliamentary Network of the World Bank (PNoWB) and the Global Legislators Organization for a Balanced Environment–Japan (GLOBE). Mr. Wakabayashi served in the Foreign Ministry as first secretary (economic section) at the Japanese embassy in Washington, D.C., from 1993 to 1996. He started his professional career at Yamaha Corporation in 1980. He received a B.A. in business from Waseda University and an M.S. in agriculture from Michigan State University. His publications include *15 Breakthroughs for Japan's Revival* (Nihonhyoronsha, 2006).