Integrating 21st Century Development and Security Assistance

Final Report of the Task Force on Nontraditional Security Assistance
Center for Strategic and International Studies

Cochairs
Rep. Robert Andrews (D-NJ)
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Preface

In early 2007, CSIS launched an expert task force to examine the growing involvement of the U.S. Department of Defense as a direct provider of “nontraditional” security assistance, concentrated in counterterrorism, capacity building, stabilization and reconstruction, and humanitarian relief. The CSIS Task Force on Nontraditional Security Assistance set out to shed light on what drives this trend, including the new global threat environment; assess what was happening at the same time in the diplomatic and developmental realms; evaluate the Department of Defense performance in conducting its expanded missions; and consider the impact of the Pentagon's enlarged role on broader U.S. national security, foreign policy, and development interests. From the outset, the task force sought to generate concrete, practical recommendations to Congress and the White House on reforms and legislation that will create a better and more sustainable balance between military and civilian tools.

We have been very fortunate that Representative Robert Andrews (D-N.J.) of the House Armed Services Committee and Representative Mark Kirk (R-Ill.) of the House Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs agreed to serve as the task force cochairs. Both are intellectual leaders in Congress and eloquent spokesmen for a robust and balanced U.S. national security policy. We are grateful for their guidance and commitment.

In populating the task force, we consciously sought to bring to the table the divergent perspectives spanning the defense, diplomatic, and development communities. All needed to be present for the task force to succeed, and for it to be different. Seldom, it seems, do all three deliberate together on shared emerging challenges and pragmatic options for moving forward. We succeeded in achieving this essential goal. The task force's 13 members are all prominent individuals with extensive experience in the executive and legislative branches, the U.S. military, Department of Defense, Department of State, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), nongovernmental organizations, the private sector, and major think tanks. We thank the task force members for clearing their busy schedules to participate in several meetings and for their generous intellectual input and feedback on drafts. Both the analysis and recommendations of this report reflect a strong majority consensus among the task force members endorsing its policy thrust and judgments, though not necessarily every finding and recommendation.

The task force is grateful to the project’s gifted core contributors. Through their extensive personal contributions, Jim Schear of National Defense University, independent consultant Mark Wong, and Stewart Patrick of the Center for Global Development spearheaded analysis of disaster relief, counterterrorism, and post-conflict reconstruction, respectively. We wish to single out Stewart Patrick for special praise in light of the exceptional skill and care he invested in bringing the full report together.

The task force is indebted to Elizabeth Sullivan and Eric Ridge of CSIS, who ably managed its multiple activities and the final report's publication. Finally, we thank the William and Flora Hewlett Foundation for supporting this experiment, financially and intellectually. Linda Frey and Smita Singh were active partners, at all times flexible, engaged, and accessible. Their support made it possible to test whether diplomatic, development, and security experts could engage successfully in a focused, constructive dialogue on the balance of approaches needed in this new era.
Executive Summary

Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the U.S. concept and approach to global security have changed fundamentally. Weak and failing states, long neglected, have risen dramatically as a priority focus. We understand that threats to U.S. interests can emanate from within states with which the United States is not at war and that persistent poverty can be a significant contributor to those threats. There is now a strategic imperative to devise multi-decade, integrated approaches that are preventative in nature. Foundational to this preventative approach are sustainable overseas partnerships that build capacity for good governance and security, foster economic prosperity and social well-being, and more effectively promote community-level development. Accordingly, we now place a more explicit, and far higher, premium on the unity of effort of our foreign and national security policy instruments, especially defense, diplomacy, and development.

In just a few short years, the Pentagon's role as a direct provider of foreign assistance has surged. The Department of Defense (DOD) has assumed an expanding role in counterterrorism, capacity building, post-conflict operations, and humanitarian assistance. Beyond implementing traditional military-to-military programs supported by State Department funds, DOD has been granted temporary authorities by Congress to use directly appropriated funds both for prevention and post-conflict response, concentrated in conflict-ridden, nonpermissive environments where civilian actors have difficulty operating or where civilian capacities are weak or absent. DOD has also provided billions of “reimbursement” dollars to coalition members, such as Pakistan and Jordan, outside of the formal State Department–run Economic Support Funds process.\(^1\)

From 2002 to 2005, DOD's share of U.S. official development assistance increased from 5.6 percent to 21.7 percent. The Bush administration has recently submitted to Congress a proposal, in the form of the Building Global Partnerships Act, that would give the Pentagon additional and permanent authorities to provide such “nontraditional” security assistance. Some of these authorities are used in Afghanistan and Iraq, and DOD would now like to make them permanent and global. At the same time, the United States has consistently under-resourced the diplomatic and development instruments of its national power. The staffing, programs, and operational capacities of the U.S. Agency for International Development and the U.S. Department of State have continued to stagnate at the very moment in history when diplomatic and development agencies should be better, not less, well positioned to advance the United States' new, evolving global agenda.

The CSIS Task Force on Nontraditional Security Assistance was constituted to identify the main drivers behind these asymmetric trends; to assess Pentagon performance in several nontraditional areas; to examine what is happening at the same time in the diplomatic and development spheres; to evaluate the implications of DOD's enlarged role for U.S. national security, foreign policy, and development objectives; and to offer concrete recommendations to foster a better balanced and more sustainable division of responsi-

\(^1\) To date, insufficient tracking of these funds has hampered DOD's ability to justify them on the grounds of reimbursement for coalition expenses. It is also questionable whether DOD, rather than the State Department, should have authority over disbursement of coalition funds. As recent events in Pakistan have highlighted, this is a significant and potentially worrisome issue area that warrants further study.
bilities between the Pentagon and U.S. civilian agencies. This document summarizes the task force's findings and recommendations based on a series of meetings and expert consultations held between March 2007 and October 2007. It proposes policy, institutional, and legislative changes for consideration by the current and future executive branch and Congress.

Focus of Inquiry

The task force focused on three areas of DOD nontraditional security assistance:

- **Counterterrorism (CT) Capacity Building Assistance** to help partner countries police and control their territories, so that these territories do not become havens for terrorists, criminals, and insurgents. Relevant initiatives include the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP), East Africa Counterterrorism Initiative (EACTI), the Combined Joint Task Force–Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA), and Section 1206 authority to train and equip foreign security forces for CT and stability operations.

- **Post-Conflict Stabilization and Reconstruction** efforts to shore up weak states and prevent their deterioration and consolidate peace following “major combat operations,” including the establishment of Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) as a vehicle to promote military-civilian collaboration in the field and the creation of new funding mechanisms, notably the Commander’s Emergency Response Program (CERP).

- **Humanitarian Assistance** in response to major natural disasters (e.g., the Indian Ocean Tsunami and the Pakistan earthquake), failed states, and prolonged irregular warfare.

The task force also examined the newly launched U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) with a view to how the military might pursue its coordination with the diplomatic and development communities most effectively to achieve success in the above three areas.

The Main Drivers behind These Trends

The task force attributes DOD’s growing assistance role to three main factors:

- **Urgent operational requirements of the Global War on Terror**, including building up the capacities of partners and responding quickly and flexibly to emerging opportunities.

- **The relative incapacity of U.S. government civilian agencies**. In both diplomatic and development spheres, underinvestment in personnel and programs and institutional culture limit the ability of these civilian agencies to maintain, mobilize, and rapidly deploy sufficient resources and numbers of skilled personnel for state building, particularly in conflict zones.
A mismatch between authorities and resources within the executive branch, whereby State has legal authorities but very limited resources while the reverse is true for DOD. This disconnect skews incentives in favor of an ever-higher operational reliance upon DOD and the extension of DOD’s authorities to compensate for weak civilian performance.

Key Questions and Policy Dilemmas

These recent trends pose formidable policy dilemmas. In charting a way forward, the executive branch and Congress need answers to the following questions:

- **Are recent trends exceptional—or are they part of a long-term trajectory of ever greater reliance upon DOD to provide nontraditional assistance?** U.S. national interests will continue to require effective development assistance, including support for defense and diplomatic objectives as well as for traditional poverty reduction goals. Absent a concerted major effort to ensure significant improvements in diplomatic and developmental capacities, the task force believes DOD will inexorably shoulder an increasing share of the burden in building the capacities of weak and failing states and rebuilding war-torn countries.

- **Is the Department of Defense the right agency to be playing this role?** Other than in armed conflicts or similar discrete operations, it is inadvisable to yield leadership for humanitarian assistance, counterterrorism, and post-conflict reconstruction to the military. Nevertheless, there is an ongoing need for effective military contributions to overall U.S. security assistance, and the operational exigencies of semi- and non-permissive environments at times necessitate military leadership in these areas.

- **What impact do recent trends have on U.S. foreign policy?** DOD nontraditional security assistance can be indispensable in responding to urgent U.S. security challenges and strategic needs. At the same time, care must be taken to avoid undermining State Department leadership in international affairs, and indeed to strengthen it. Similarly, DOD programs must bolster broader U.S. foreign policy objectives to achieve enduring stability, economic prosperity, and community development. Smart, agile concurrence procedures can help better align DOD aid programs with the broader U.S. foreign policy agenda.

- **What impact do recent trends have on U.S. development objectives?** The short-term security imperatives of winning “hearts and minds” will sometimes trump longer-term development considerations in the design and delivery of DOD assistance, particularly in situations of active insurgency. As a rule, however, DOD aid programs should be nested within broader U.S. efforts to build effective, accountable, and sustainable local institutions. The Pentagon whenever possible should defer to—indeed be active advocates of—civilian agencies, international organizations, and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) in the design and implementation of development and humanitarian projects.
Executive Summary

What balance should the United States seek between DOD and civilian capabilities? The Bush administration and its successor should work with Congress to build more robust capacities within U.S. civilian agencies to help meet public security, good governance, and development challenges in unstable and post-conflict countries and to reduce reliance on DOD for these tasks. A high priority should be augmenting and building up the capacities of civilian agencies. Not only will this allow stand-alone civilian capacity, it will also create the necessary civilian capacity to liaise with and integrate into defense organizations. In the interim, the authorities granted DOD to build the capacities of partner countries should largely remain temporary and limited to named contingency operations, rather than be made global and permanent as the Bush administration has requested.

How realistic is it to expect that robust civilian capacities will actually emerge and be funded? A business-as-usual approach to these pressing issues is simply unacceptable and antithetical to U.S. long-term national interests. Meeting the security challenges of the twenty-first century requires the United States to marshal the full range of instruments of national power and influence. Creating a whole-of-government approach and requiring the executive branch to explain how its budgets support a unified national security and foreign aid strategy will substantially improve the nation’s ability to address the structural roots of poor governance, instability, and extremism in the developing world.

Key Findings and Recommendations

The Big Picture

The United States stands at a crossroads in defining the contours of its national security policy. Despite rhetorical emphasis on the challenges of weak, failing, and post-conflict states and the need to build up civilian capacities for “transformational diplomacy,” there is continued neglect of critical nonmilitary components of national power and influence. The Department of Defense’s growing provision of nontraditional security assistance—and the Pentagon’s request to expand and make some new assistance authorities permanent—reflect an understandable effort to work around this asymmetry to respond to urgent contingencies. The Pentagon’s entry into new forms of security assistance does bring distinct short-term benefits in insecure environments, particularly in countries deemed critical to winning the global war on terrorism, where DOD conducts diverse missions such as helping improve the effectiveness of security forces, restoring systems of governance, and providing essential services.

By defaulting to reliance on the military, however, the United States aggravates existing institutional imbalances. The authority, responsibilities, and resources of the U.S. military continue to grow as U.S. civilian diplomatic and developmental capacities further erode. Moreover, recent trends risk overextending the already stretched U.S. armed forces. Although there are compelling reasons to give DOD flexibility to provide foreign assistance in specific, circumscribed crisis situations, granting more permanent global authorities
Integrating 21st Century Development and Security Assistance does not address the larger structural problems and must be handled carefully to avoid undermining both sustainable capacity building and broader U.S. foreign policy interests.

To advance U.S. national interests into the future, it will be critical to rebalance the military and nonmilitary components of U.S. global engagement. This will entail systematically correcting the imbalance between civilian and military resources and authorities. Equally important, it requires building up relevant civilian expertise within State and USAID, so that they are in a position to deliver stability-creating assistance in difficult environments.²

The task force acknowledges the many shortcomings in the outdated Foreign Assistance Act (FAA) of 1961. Although many task force members believed the FAA and its implementation procedures require revision, the task force chose to focus its efforts on identifying smart, actionable steps that can attract broad bipartisan support and bring quick results. This more narrow focus also recognized that other recent reports have attended to the need for fundamental changes in the FAA, which many on the task force endorse.³

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To unify the U.S. government’s approach to national security, the task force recommends, first, that the executive branch provide increased budget transparency to Congress in the form of an integrated resource picture for U.S. foreign, national, and homeland security policy. Wholesale revision of the existing congressional authorization and appropriations structure would require bold leadership and near unanimous support in Congress—conditions that will not be obtained in the near term. Nevertheless, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and the National Security Council (NSC) should be required to document more systematically how the foreign assistance streams for USAID, State, DOD, and other relevant U.S. agencies fit together. Such transparency would help provide an accurate portrait to Congress of what the United States is actually spending across agencies to meet its most pressing national security challenges as well as facilitate the creation of benchmarks to assess progress in meeting these objectives through various instruments of national power.

Second, Congress should take steps to ensure more effective and comprehensive oversight over foreign and security assistance programs across existing committee jurisdictions. One potential solution would be the creation of a Select Committee on U.S. National Security, in both the Senate and the House, that comprises bipartisan leadership from all relevant communities. Simply improving coordination processes across committees could also bear fruit.

Third, both Congress and the executive branch need to elevate the priority attached to development, placing it on an equal footing with defense and diplomacy in U.S. foreign and national security policy. To this end, the task force calls for a significant increase in U.S. official development assistance (ODA) and for better integration of the multiple streams of development aid.

What are the critical next steps to create a new balance between the civilian and military domains? To improve the performance of civilian agencies in conflict prevention and

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2. Restoring USAID’s once-vaunted technical expertise would be a good place to start. Notwithstanding specialized units like the Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI), USAID has only modest standing, deployable technical expertise. There is only one person within USAID, for example, engaged full time in security sector reform (SSR).

post-conflict response, the task force recommends the next administration appoint an
NSC senior director for conflict prevention and response to serve as a locus of interagency
coordination on these issues in the White House, in close concert with OMB. The senior
director should also occupy the contingency planning role envisioned in Presidential De-
cision Directive 56 (PDD-56), “Managing Complex Contingency Operations.” At the same
time, the State Department Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization
(S/CRS) should be empowered with a larger multi-year funding stream, so that it may lead
contingency planning for the State Department and USAID. The State Department should
create and Congress provide budget support for the standing Civilian Reserve Corps pro-
posed by President Bush in his January 2007 State of the Union address. Congress and the
White House should also expand the expeditionary capabilities of civilian agencies, par-
ticularly within the U.S. Agency for International Development.

CT Capacity Building
The task force welcomes DOD’s commitment to building the capacities of vulnerable de-
veloping countries to secure their borders and territories and to mitigate the underlying
sources of support for terrorism. A review of regional CT programs in Africa suggests
that unity of effort remains elusive at the strategic, organizational, and resource levels.
There is a lack of coherent strategic vision and authoritative plans to guide identification
of critical U.S. government CT capabilities, to rationalize resources across agency bound-
aries, and to integrate activities in target countries. At the organizational level, there is a
persistent structural misalignment between regionally based Combatant Commands and
State Department country-based approaches, complicating the use of either instrument as
an interagency platform. Finally, at the resource level, a failure to invest in the civilian CT
capabilities required to improve governance and the rule of law, promote economic and
social development, and advance public education, results in an overreliance on military
instruments in the Global War on Terror.

To promote a more integrated U.S. approach to counterterrorism, the task force en-
dorses stronger State/DOD joint strategic planning and coordination at the regional level
and recommends that DOD, State, and USAID present relevant congressional committees
with a joint CT security assistance budget, part of the more comprehensive effort requir-
ing increased executive branch budget rationalization and transparency. To overcome or-
ganizational obstacles to unity of effort, the task force calls for more robust cross-staffing
at Combatant Commands, the State Department, and USAID; the creation of interagency
CT task forces in U.S. embassies; and additional funding and professional incentives for
cross-agency counterterrorism training and exercises. To redress funding gaps, the task
force recommends interagency formulation of country-specific assistance strategies, the
establishment of flexible CT accounts for use by U.S. ambassadors, and increased funding
for USAID’s Office of Transition Initiatives.

The issue of 1206 funding authority was the most contentious facing the task force.
Some members questioned DOD’s competence in conducting nonmilitary security train-
ing (as proposed by the administration) and worried about the potential militarization of
U.S. foreign assistance. They argued that Section 1206 authority should be repealed and
more emphasis placed on reforming the FAA to provide more flexible tools to the State
Department for such training purposes. Other members disagreed, arguing that Section
1206 represents exactly the kind of innovative and agile mechanisms required to conduct
the Global War on Terrorism. They also noted the historical inability of other agencies to operate in nonpermissive environments. These members generally supported the Bush administration's request to make 1206 authorities permanent and global, to allow DOD training of nonmilitary counterterrorism elements under the provision, and to create a higher resource ceiling for the program.

The task force ultimately concluded that Section 1206 does provide a valuable, flexible instrument to meet unanticipated contingencies and opportunities in the struggle against terrorism. The use of such funds, however, has wider foreign policy implications. Accordingly, 1206 authority should be restricted to time-sensitive emerging threats, require robust State Department concurrence and joint formulation of projects, and be subject to close congressional oversight. To maximize the effectiveness of the 1206 authority, which currently requires annual reauthorization, Congress should extend 1206 authority over three to five years to foster program stability (rather than making it permanent and global) and allow DOD to carry over unspent funds across fiscal years. It should also permit DOD to use such monies in combat zones or other insecure environments to work with nonmilitary internal security forces that typically fall under the Ministry of the Interior (such as constabulary, border police, counterterrorism forces, and coast guards), subject to explicit agreement from the secretary of state and intense legislative oversight. Over time, Section 1206 authority should be phased out, replaced by a substantial, flexible cross-government contingency fund (notionally within Foreign Military Financing, or FMF) to support current 1206 activities.

Post-Conflict Operations

The task force welcomes DOD's adoption of security, stabilization, transition, and reconstruction (SSTR) operations as a core mission of the U.S. military and its acknowledgment of the need to devote resources and personnel to this undertaking. Anecdotal evidence suggests that Provincial Reconstruction Teams and the Commander's Emergency Response Program can be helpful in delivering assistance rapidly in war-torn settings. At the same time, both initiatives have serious shortcomings and almost no documentation. PRT effectiveness has sometimes been hampered by ambiguous mandates, the absence of interagency doctrine, the lack of metrics for success, inadequate baseline assessments and strategic planning, insufficient civilian agency personnel and resources, minimal predeployment training, and uneven coordination with other agencies—notably USAID. To correct these shortcomings, the National Security Council should initiate a government-wide process to clarify PRT mandate and doctrine, including agency roles; DOD and its civilian partners should commit to joint planning, assessments, and training and commence more robust monitoring and evaluation of PRT impacts; and USAID should streamline processes for delivering assistance in post-conflict settings.

The task force likewise recognizes that CERP has the potential to be an agile, short-term national security instrument to leverage support of local leaders and populations. There should be continued use of CERP in Iraq and Afghanistan. Further, CERP should be made global, but limited to named operations and, like Section 1206, be authorized over three to five years to foster program stability and to allow DOD to carry over unspent funds across fiscal years. CERP also has several potential weaknesses that should be corrected without undermining its fundamental flexibility. These include balancing the highly decentralized nature of the program, which is essential to success, with the need to make CERP less vulnerable to waste and abuse; developing CERP doctrine to make CERP less
dependent on the judgment of individual commanders; increasing coordination and inputs on CERP uses from governance and development professionals within State, USAID, and other agencies; and conducting a comprehensive assessment of the uses and impacts of CERP for security, political stability, and economic recovery. To promote more effective and accountable use of CERP funds without compromising their operational agility and flexibility, DOD should compile lessons learned and institutionalize training for field commanders in use of CERP; DOD should develop stronger financial controls and improved approval processes and promote standing arrangements (memoranda of understanding, or MOUs) between combatant commanders and chiefs of mission on the use of such funds; and State Department and USAID personnel should be deployed to brigade or battalion level, as the embedded PRT (ePRT) concept currently provides.

**Humanitarian Assistance**

The task force finds that U.S. civil-military procedures for coordinating humanitarian assistance work reasonably well during both “forced entry” international operations and major natural disasters (such as Hurricane Mitch or the Indian Ocean tsunami). Such coordination becomes more problematic and controversial in contingencies involving chronic rather than immediate human needs, as in protracted complex emergencies, stability operations, and situations of irregular warfare. Among other shortcomings, military-civilian collaboration is often complicated by conflicting or contradictory signals of what is expected of DOD in the provision of humanitarian relief; uneven synchronization of needs assessments and joint humanitarian assistance planning by USAID and DOD; the breakdown of information sharing in nonpermissive settings; lack of timely USAID input on quick-impact projects; and shrinking “humanitarian space” for NGO aid providers in nonpermissive environments.

The task force proposes several reforms to strengthen civilian and military performance in humanitarian operations. These include drafting a new National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD) on interagency support for humanitarian assistance; supporting full USAID staffing of senior development adviser positions (SDAs) at U.S. Combatant Commands, including individuals with expertise in emergency relief; ensuring timely USAID review of all DOD humanitarian assistance projects; increasing USAID Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) funds available for immediate disaster needs; keeping humanitarian-related information collected by the U.S. military in unclassified channels to the extent feasible; and continuing a regular dialogue with humanitarian NGOs on their needs in nonpermissive environments. With regard to DOD’s Overseas Humanitarian Disaster and Civic Aid (OHDACA) account, there should be expanded use of such funds for “stabilization” missions only where the chief of mission and combatant commander jointly determine that such efforts are in U.S. national security interests and that there is insufficient civilian capacity. Such a change would require action by Congress.

**AFRICOM**

An effective U.S. approach to Africa will marry the best elements of development, diplomacy, and defense. It will take full account of the United States’ complex, rising stakes in Africa, comprising humanitarian interests; poverty alleviation; good governance and human rights; energy security; resolution of chronic wars and internal conflicts, concentrated in weak or failing states; counterterrorism; and rising trade and investment competition.
with China and other Asian powers. The newly launched U.S. Africa Command, AFRICOM, is a DOD platform that for the first time seeks to unify U.S. military assistance programs for the region under a single roof. Its new leadership has also been eager, acting in parallel with the experimental approach of the U.S. Southern Command and elsewhere, to seek new means to integrate civilian agencies into its work in nontraditional ways. If successful, AFRICOM will bring greater unity and cost-effectiveness to U.S. security programs and begin soon to demonstrate concrete results. There is much more that the United States can contribute to building African peacekeeping capacities and strengthening control by African partner states of borders, ports, weakly governed remote territories, and rich maritime environs. Much more can be done through expanded military-to-military partnerships to strengthen democratic norms, respect for human rights, effective planning and civilian oversight within Africa’s security sector, and public health programs, especially with respect to HIV/AIDS. But to be successful, AFRICOM’s mandate and mission will need also to be conspicuously embedded in (and subordinate to) a broader, U.S. government-wide effort, led by the Department of State, to set and oversee U.S. foreign policy toward Africa. It will need to operate as a complement to USAID, and not as a rival or threat.

AFRICOM has been launched amid controversy. The United States has been actively engaged in support of Ethiopian military interventions inside Somalia, on counterterrorism grounds. The creation of a unified U.S. military approach, with the possibility of a significant headquarters’ presence on the continent, has stirred considerable opposition in Africa and elsewhere and made more conspicuous the chronic weakness of U.S. diplomatic capacities in Africa. Until the United States enhances the quality and strength of its diplomatic corps in Africa, its policy approach will not be balanced and effective, and a unified AFRICOM will continue to appear threatening.

AFRICOM’s success will also depend on the Pentagon’s ability to address several outstanding challenges in its delicate first year. Any decision for basing AFRICOM’s headquarters in Africa should follow from U.S. strategic objectives in the region. The Department of Defense will need to clarify the new command’s mandate and concept of operations, as well as its relationship to civilian U.S. departments, the National Security Council, and U.S. missions in host countries. Proposed Regional Integration Teams (RITs) need far better explanation and interagency consensus, if they are to become reality. For all of these reasons, basing decisions should either be postponed to a much later point or suspended altogether.

In a similar vein, AFRICOM’s leadership will need to explain more persuasively the value of the new command for African countries and populations, while better managing expectations about what it can accomplish in the near term. AFRICOM will need quickly to bolster the relevant regional expertise of its military staff and persuade civilian agencies to commit adequate numbers of personnel to the command’s headquarters. In its dialogue with Congress, the Pentagon will need to ensure an adequate funding base to meet AFRICOM’s requirements and convey to African partners that the United States is indeed serious about expanding its security partnerships in Africa. Finally, the command must find the right balance between long-term preventive action and short-term crisis response in U.S. engagement on the continent.
Since 9/11 the various components of the U.S. national security apparatus have struggled to adapt and integrate their respective missions, roles, capabilities, and assistance streams to the pressing needs of the global war on terrorism. The National Implementation Plan (NIP) for counterterrorism, created by the interagency as the definitive document apportioning counterterrorism (CT) responsibilities and resources, has assigned some 65 percent of all CT tasks to the State Department. This proportion of work, however, is clearly not mirrored in the current national security budgets of U.S. departments and agencies. The Pentagon, thanks to its extensive resources, global reach, and overseas platforms, plays a growing role in shaping U.S. government CT strategies and in delivering CT assistance to partner nations. Major U.S. efforts in which the military plays a prominent role include the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP), the Combined Joint Task Force–Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA), and the East Africa Counterterrorism Initiative (EACTI), as well as bilateral CT efforts in Southeast Asia, including in the southern Philippines.

The task force focused its inquiry on the U.S. experience in Africa, analyzing TSCTP, CJTF-HOA, and EACTI to identify the key challenges to the integration of defense, diplomacy, and development tools for counterterrorism. These initiatives have not yet fostered sufficient unity of effort between the military and civilian components of U.S. counterterrorism campaigns. Current shortcomings include: an absence of strategic vision to inform regional plans and resource allocations; a fragmented institutional architecture that hinders effective collaborative action; an underinvestment in the civilian components of the global war on terrorism; and a narrow approach to capacity building that runs counter to the long-run requirements of good governance and economic development.

Beyond these specific regional initiatives, Section 1206 of the FY2007 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) permits the Department of Defense (DOD) to dedicate up to $300 million of its appropriations to enhance capacities of partner countries by training and equipping foreign military forces involved in CT and stability operations around the globe. The authority is intended to provide a contingency fund to cover unbudgeted needs that will subsequently be terminated, transitioned to regular Foreign Military Financing (FMF), or shifted to host country funding. The Pentagon regards Section 1206 as an invaluable instrument, and the State Department supports the provision. Implementation of Section 1206 authority got off to a problematic start in FY2006, when some Combatant Commands (CoComs) designed projects without sufficient embassy country team input. Moreover, some projects did not sufficiently address time-sensitive
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emerging threats and opportunities, as required by law, which created tension with defense authorizers in Congress. Implementation improved during FY2007 through better coordination in the formulation of joint proposals by DOD and State. The Bush administration’s proposed Building Global Partnerships (BGP) Act would provide DOD with permanent expanded and flexible authority, with Secretary of State concurrence, to train, equip, and work with an array of security forces, using up to $750 million of DOD operations and maintenance (O&M) funds in any one fiscal year.

Below, the task force reviews DOD’s involvement in regional U.S. counterterrorism initiatives in Africa and in providing direct train and equip assistance to build up the CT and stability operations capacities of partner countries. A truly integrated U.S. approach will require greater DOD–State collaboration on CT strategy, more robust machinery for interagency coordination, and greater resources for civilian CT programs. The task force regards Section 1206 as a valuable stopgap measure to address critical CT needs and opportunities, but it does not consider these funds to be a viable permanent alternative to the weak capabilities of U.S. civilian agencies. The use of 1206 funds, moreover, poses risks for U.S. foreign policy coherence that must be carefully managed.

Regional Counterterrorism Programs

U.S. counterterrorism strategy seeks to deny terrorists with global reach a safe haven and base of operations. To complement this strategy of denial, the United States seeks to deter potential state sponsors of terrorism; bolster the political will and indigenous capacities of vulnerable states to prosecute the antiterrorist struggle; and use aid and other policy instruments to help alleviate some of the “underlying conditions” perceived to create a permissive environment for terrorists and their supporters, including political and economic stagnation. Each of these elements—denial, deterrence, capacity building, and attention to root causes—is included in the National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, released in 2003 and updated in 2006. Implementing this ambitious agenda requires an unprecedented level of cooperation among the Department of Defense, Department of State, and USAID, as well as a host of other departments and agencies, including Homeland Security, Justice, Treasury, and the CIA.

An examination of three of the most prominent regional U.S. CT strategies highlights both the promise and the challenges of developing an integrated approach to nontraditional security assistance.

The Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership

The TSCTP is a five-year interagency program established in 2006 to bolster the governance capacities of the four Sahel nations—Mali, Mauritania, Chad, and Niger—as well as Senegal and Nigeria. The partnership also aims to foster institutionalized cooperation among these countries and their Maghreb partners Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia. Beyond seeking to improve the capacities of partner nations to control their territories and borders, TSCTP takes a holistic approach. It seeks to eliminate underlying sources of extremism and political grievances by promoting democratic governance, economic development, and public education. TSCTP is a direct descendent of the Pan-Sahel Initiative
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(PSI), launched in 2002, and its successor, the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Initiative (TSCTI), launched in 2005.

The United States has designated several areas of the world as front-line states in the Global War on Terrorism. The Sahel emerged early on as a central region of concern, given the weak capacities of states there, their extensive ungoverned zones and long, porous borders, and the ongoing activities of transnational jihadi groups (including the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat, renamed in 2007 as Al Qaeda of the Islamist Mahgreb) within their borders. In response, Washington announced the Pan-Sahel Initiative (PSI), a modest train and equip program, funded by $6.85 million from the State Department’s Peacekeeping Operations (PKO) account, to help the Senegal, Nigeria, and the Sahel countries in “protecting their borders, combating terrorism, and enhancing regional stability.”¹ Progress toward these aspirations was limited, however, by meager funding and the initial lukewarm support of the NSC and State, the latter of which was concerned about the resource implications of supporting a multi-year initiative.²

Despite these reservations, the NSC Deputies Committee agreed in 2005 to extend PSI as the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Initiative, or TSCTI, although no funds were directed for its operation. DOD and State thus worked from the bottom up to assemble $16 million in 2005 from an array of CT funding accounts. DOD undertook a series of Joint Combined Exchange Training (JCET) missions within its Title 10 Authority, while the State Department drew from existing accounts, using PKO funds to buy equipment and Development Assistance (DA) and Economic Support Funds (ESF) for other activities.

In 2006, the TSCTP replaced TSCI as an actual line item in the budget. DOD has allocated approximately $100 million for five years to the program. Estimating the contributions of State (and USAID) is more challenging, since TSCTP allocations will be spread across State’s traditional funding accounts and will always be susceptible to reprogramming to respond to other emergencies and crises. Nevertheless, the program rests on a firmer resource foundation than its predecessors.

TSCTP holds promise as a relatively coherent policy response to the transnational terrorist challenge in a vulnerable region of Africa. Realizing its potential, however, will require overcoming current strategic, institutional, and resource shortfalls. Rather than a truly strategic effort directed from Washington, TSCTP has emerged from improvised interagency collaborations in the field on CT issues. In the words of one USAID officer, “TSCTP can be considered a pilot project—an experiment in interagency cooperation as a work in progress.”³ Similarly, to date the programs funded under its rubric have been a collection of initiatives cobbled together from various accounts, with little consideration of their strategic integration, sustainability, and long-term developmental impacts.

At the organizational level, DOD, State and USAID have taken some steps to improve interagency cooperation on TSCTP. These include the deployment of USAID liaison officers in relevant Combatant Commands; the creation of an Office of Military Affairs (OMA) at USAID; and the holding of an annual Regional Strategic Initiative (RSI) conference of ambassadors, USAID mission directors, DOD officials, and CoCom representatives. Day-to-day interagency coordination by the NSC and State has also improved. Prac-

². Components of the program included provision by EUCOM of equipment and training to Sahel military units, as well as CT training for police at the International Law Enforcement Academy in Botswana.
³. Interview of USAID official by CSIS consultant Mark Wong.
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tical coordination tends to be strongest in the field, particularly between embassy country
teams and CoComs, but is strongly dependent on individual personalities.

Even so, counterterrorism officials interviewed for this report repeatedly mentioned
several institutional barriers to strategic coordination and execution of CT programs.
These include the following:

- Frequent “stovepiping” of policy development and implementation in Washington,
at the commands, and at U.S. embassies and USAID missions;

- Stark differences in institutional culture that hinder communication and coopera-
tion among DOD, State, and USAID;

- Misalignment between the regional focus of DOD’s CoComs and the bilateral
focus of the State Department and U.S. country teams;

- A lack of understanding by planners and action officers about what capabilities in
their respective departments might be relevant to the core mission of counterpart
agencies.

Although securing dedicated financing for TSCTP is an important achievement, en-
suring the strategic impact of such funding in African partner countries will require that
the three agencies involved integrate and harmonize their efforts. At a 2006 conference
involving TSCTP partner countries, participants noted that whereas the CT effort should
be 80 percent “development” and only 20 percent “defense,” in practice the reverse was still
the case.4

The Horn of Africa

Like the Sahel, the Horn of Africa—an area that includes Sudan, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Dji-
bouti, Somalia, Kenya, Uganda, and Tanzania—has been seen as ripe for terrorist activity,
given the region’s weak and often corrupt governments, ongoing violent conflicts, porous
borders, ungoverned spaces, and grinding poverty. Osama bin Laden based his operations
in Khartoum from 1991 through early 1996. The U.S. government has taken a variety of
steps to respond to this threat, with the Department of Defense often in the lead. This has
included the establishment of the Combined Joint Task Force–Horn of Africa in Djibouti.5

The 1,800 troops that comprise CJTF-HOA work to “prevent conflict, promote regional
stability, and protect Coalition interests in order to prevail against extremism.”6 They do
so using a mixture of short- and long-term assistance such as providing counterterrorist
training for militaries of partner nations and conducting small-scale civic action proj-
ests—including digging wells, building clinics, and repairing schools—intended to win
support and cooperation from marginalized communities. These latter, quasi-develop-

4. Mark Wong, “Counterterrorism Issues and Approaches,” background paper for CSIS Task Force on

5. Although Yemen is not traditionally considered part of the Horn of Africa, it falls within the AOR of
Combined Joint Task Force–Horn of Africa. For more information, see: http://www.hoa.centcom.mil/fact-
sheet.asp.

centcom.mil/factsheet.asp>.
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ment projects have raised some concerns about whether the U.S. military is best suited to perform such tasks, particularly in permissive environments where civilian actors who possess the requisite skills might be able to operate and are more focused on sustainable outcomes.

As a complement to military-led efforts under CJTF-HOA, President Bush in 2003 announced a multi-year East African Counterterrorism Initiative, an interagency program totaling $100 million intended to improve the broad counterterrorism capabilities of Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania, Djibouti, Eritrea, and Ethiopia. This regional CT initiative thus started out in a much stronger funding position than its Sahel counterpart. Activities conducted under EACTI have covered a broad spectrum, including coastal and border security programs, training to combat terrorism finance, the formation of joint terrorist task forces, educational and other assistance for marginalized communities, and public diplomacy campaigns. A rough estimate of State Department expenditures to sustain EACTI programs in FY2006 was $28 million, drawn from a combination of FMF, PKO, INCLE, NADR, ESF, and DA accounts. The major thrust of the EACTI involves building up the capacities of African security forces, rather than longer-term governance and development programs.

Challenges Identified

Unity of effort has often proved elusive, hobbled by the failure of DOD and its civilian partners to agree on common strategies and create effective mechanisms for collaboration and by the failure of the administration and Congress to invest in civilian CT capabilities. The following sections outline these strategic, organizational, and resource shortcomings in greater detail.

Lack of strategic approach and overall planning: The task force identifies a lack of coherent strategic vision and authoritative planning on CT matters across DOD, State, and other relevant U.S. government departments. Despite the release of the National Implementation Plan, there is no common structure to guide the identification of critical CT capabilities, rationalize resources across agency boundaries, and integrate activities in target countries. Instead of developing integrated strategies and doctrine, DOD, State, and USAID tend to go their own way, referring to separate CT planning and guidance documents, adopting agency-specific approaches, and submitting to Congress CT budgets reflecting their unique missions, priorities, institutional cultures, and timelines.

To address these gaps in strategic planning and coordination, particularly between U.S. embassies and CoComs, the task force calls on the executive branch to make more effective use of the Regional Strategic Initiative (RSI), under the leadership of the State Department’s Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism (S/CT). The RSI is envisioned as a “flexible network of coordinated country teams” that will allow the United States to “bring all instruments of statecraft to bear, in a calibrated fashion, through coordinated interagency strategy.” This field-driven initiative seeks to forge consensus on counterterrorist priorities in each region, encourage a common strategic approach, promote the pooling of agency resources and tasks, provide a basis for closer cooperation with target nations, and leverage the resources of the G8 and other international partners.

7. See http://www.state.gov/s/ct/enemy/.
Inadequate institutional architecture and misalignment between State and DOD:
At the organizational level, unity of effort within the U.S. government is hobbled by the absence of effective coordination mechanisms to design and implement coherent regional and country-based approaches to CT challenges. The persistent structural misalignment between Combatant Commands, which take a regional approach to CT (and other security) challenges, and the State Department, which takes a bilateral approach based on U.S. country teams, complicates policy coherence. In fact, neither CoComs nor U.S. embassies have emerged as effective interagency platforms for integrated, government-wide CT efforts: few civilians are detailed to military commands, and interagency CT task forces do not exist in many U.S. embassies. There are few institutional and professional incentives and opportunities to promote truly “joined up” CT approaches within the U.S. government, including through joint education and training on CT issues or the secondment of staff to other U.S. government agencies. Breaking down these barriers will require, among other steps, placing more special operations officers in civilian agencies and deploying more civilians to relevant military organizations, including Joint Strategic and Operational Planning Mechanisms, Joint Interagency Coordination Groups (JIACGs) or J-9s at Combatant Commands, and the newly established Africa Command.

Failure to create funded and flexible civilian CT capacities: Despite the widely shared recognition that U.S. counterterrorism efforts should be “80% civilian and 20% military,” with significant U.S. aid being directed to activities like improving governance and the rule of law, promoting economic and social development, and advancing public education, the actual proportion has often been the reverse. In addition, some of the authorities governing the involvement of civilian agencies and resources in CT efforts have been overly rigid, hindering the ability of civilian agencies to respond to emerging opportunities and rapidly changing conditions. To address these gaps, the United States should consider providing U.S. ambassadors with flexible funds to permit targeted CT efforts in host countries, as well as increased staffing and funding for USAID’s Office of Transition Initiatives, which has a proven track record in providing targeted civilian assistance.

Section 1206 of the National Defense Authorization Act

Beyond these regional initiatives, DOD has for the past two years enjoyed new authority to enhance the capacities of foreign military forces in connection with the Global War on Terrorism. Introduced as a three-year pilot project in FY2006 at the level of $200 million, Section 1206 of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) is designed to help nations vulnerable to terrorist infiltration or at risk of collapse to insurgents gain control over their borders and territories, to prevent them from serving as breeding grounds for groups antithetical to U.S. interests. DOD regards Section 1206 as an invaluable contingency fund to allow commanders to respond to emerging threats and opportunities more flexibly than through FMF, without having to shift already allocated funds. Section 1206 is intended to cover a brief transition period (one to two years) to meet unbudgeted needs that will subsequently be terminated, transition to regular FMF, or shift to host country
funding. Like FMF, Section 1206 funds are implemented through the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA). 8

As part of a Building Global Partnerships Act submitted to Congress in spring 2007, the Bush administration has requested significant changes to the 1206 authority. 9 The relevant provision would amend current legislation to provide DOD with permanent expanded and flexible authority, with the concurrence of the secretary of state, to train, equip, and work with military and other security forces of partner countries for operations to combat terrorism and enhance stability, using up to $750 million in DOD O&M funds in any one fiscal year. It would also allow DOD to carry unexpended O&M funds across fiscal years.

The decision to provide DOD with its own assistance pipeline to fund counterterrorist and stability operations of partner governments remains controversial. It has the potential to impinge on State Department leadership in U.S. foreign policy and the authorities given the secretary of state under the Foreign Assistance Act (FAA). A number of legislators on Capitol Hill have expressed fear that Section 1206 could undermine the coherence of U.S. foreign policy, by allowing combatant commanders to assist foreign security forces without taking account of broader U.S. considerations at stake in bilateral and regional relationships. Although these misgivings have been tempered by gradual improvements in interagency coordination over use of 1206 funds, both the executive branch and Congress must remain vigilant to ensure that the United States can exploit the flexibility of this new instrument while managing and mitigating its inherent risks. Below, we trace the origins of 1206 authority, review DOD performance in implementing it, and identify limitations to its effectiveness that should be addressed.

Origins and Experience to Date

After September 11, Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld and Deputy Secretary of Defense Wolfowitz made a push within the executive branch and on Capitol Hill to secure more flexible, permanent global authorities to train and equip military and nonmilitary security forces around the world as part of the Global War on Terrorism, arguing that this would permit DOD to respond quickly to unforeseen contingencies. Such authorities would in principle have allowed DOD to fund a wide range of security (including paramilitary) forces without Department of State concurrence. This initiative met resistance from Secretary of State Powell and Deputy Secretary Armitage, who rejected it as an incursion on State Department leadership of foreign policy and authorities delegated by the Foreign Assistance Act (FAA). The Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC) and Senate Foreign Relations Committee (SFRC) were also skeptical of providing DOD with such blanket flexibility. Accordingly, when this issue arose during the Iraq supplemental request for 2004, the SASC limited such authority to training and equipping of military and police in Iraq and Afghanistan, and on a temporary basis. The conference report explicitly excluded training of paramilitary forces.

By FY2006, the climate both in the administration and on Capitol Hill had changed. The new secretary of state, Condoleezza Rice, supported DOD’s request in principle, and

8. Although this task force focused on Section 1206 authority, it is notable that Section 1207 of the NDAA of 2006 permits DOD to draw down up to $100 million in O&M funds and transfer these to the State Department to support critical civilian reconstruction efforts under the leadership of the Office of the Coordinator of Reconstruction and Stabilization.

General Jones of EUCOM testified on potential capacity-building projects in Africa.\textsuperscript{10} Although the Senate Armed Services Committee did not authorize provision 1206 in the NDAA legislation reported out of committee, it was inserted as an amendment by Senator Inhofe, approved by Congress, and signed into law, permitting DOD to train foreign military forces in CT and stability operations for urgent contingencies. Use of 1206 funds was subject to a presidential determination (changed in FY2007 to a determination by the secretary of defense with secretary of state concurrence). Section 1206 did not meet all of DOD's original desires, however. Specifically, it permitted DOD to work only with foreign military forces; was limited to two years; was restricted to $200 million in O&M funds; and excluded 1206 funds from being used for any purpose not permitted the secretary of state under the FAA. Congress also insisted that the administration provide it by January 2007 with a comprehensive report on the use of 1206 funds. (As of December 2007 this report had yet to materialize.) For FY2007, Congress approved an increase in 1206 authority to $300 million. For FY2008, DOD has again requested 1206 authority, at the level of $750 million (including an appropriation for $500 million and authorization for another $250 million in case combatant commanders and ambassadors have other requirements).

Implementation of 1206 got off to a rocky start during FY2006, but improved noticeably in FY2007. Section 1206 explicitly calls for the secretaries of defense and state to jointly decide on projects that will receive funding, with details to be worked out in close coordination between regional Combatant Commands and U.S. embassy staffs. In practice, such coordination was uneven during FY2006, with some breakdowns in concurrence procedures.\textsuperscript{11} According to a GAO report, only 4 of 14 Section 1206 projects involved significant State Department input in the field, and only 9 of these 14 subsequently benefited from high-level DOD-State coordination in Washington before Congress was notified of them.\textsuperscript{12} In several cases, GAO argues, CoComs approved the inclusion of countries in 1206 programs without informing the embassy, and in at least two cases (Algeria and Equatorial Guinea) that inclusion was later rescinded because of diplomatic or government concerns. (Pentagon officials dispute some of these GAO claims and cite internal State miscommunications as another source of disarray.)\textsuperscript{13}

Although 1206 funding was to be restricted to time-sensitive emerging threats and opportunities, CoComs sometimes employed it to fund unbudgeted projects that did not meet these criteria.\textsuperscript{14} One example cited by SFRC was a request for a radar system for the


\textsuperscript{13} OSD officials note that all projects received approval of the secretary of state before they went to the Hill, attributing some shortcomings in State-DOD collaboration to failure of embassy personnel to keep ambassadors informed.

\textsuperscript{14} In FY2006, Congress approved 9 projects involving 15 countries, under Section 1206: (a) Pakistan: Improving Counterterrorism Strike Capabilities; (b) Yemen: Countering Cross-Border Terrorist Activity; (c) Lebanon: Reducing Hezbollah’s Operational Space; (d) Gulf of Guinea: Countering Threats to U.S. Energy Security (Nigeria, Sao Tome, and Principe); (e) Trans-Sahara Africa Countries: Securing the Region
countries of the Gulf of Guinea, despite doubts that this qualified as an urgent need and questions about whether the target countries had the capacity to sustain it. DOD and State officials attribute some of the sloppiness in FY2006 to the rushed timeline to approve and budget projects in the program’s first year. DOD did not receive funding until January, leaving it with less than nine months to implement a complex interagency train and equip program.

Implementation of Section 1206 went much better in FY2007. New guidance from the Pentagon and State Department underlines that CoComs must develop proposed projects jointly with country teams from their inception. Under this procedure, CoComs and embassies are to submit joint proposals for use of 1206 funds to DOD and State in October, for review both within departments and in interagency settings. Within the State Department, the proposals are evaluated by the Political-Military Affairs bureau in the context of other security assistance programs; by the director of foreign assistance for compatibility with other U.S. aid streams; by regional bureaus for consistency with foreign policy priorities in the country and region; and by ambassadors for compatibility with the embassies’ strategic goals. In February, the final list of projects is submitted concurrently to the secretaries of defense and state for approval. Funding sources are then identified, Congress is notified, and contracting begins. DSCA and DOD’s security assistance officers (SAOs) at each embassy then implement projects similarly to traditional State-funded security assistance programs.

Notwithstanding recent improvements in interagency coordination and overall performance, the decision to provide the Department of Defense with its own security assistance pipeline carries policy risks. A principal concern, expressed in Congress and State Department corridors, is that 1206 authorities will undermine the secretary of state’s leadership in—and the overall coherence of—U.S. foreign policy. The worry is that relatively resource-rich CoComs may wind up driving U.S. engagement with target countries at the expense of U.S. ambassadors. Such misgivings are not unreasonable, particularly if 1206 is funded at the $750 million level requested by the Bush administration for FY2008. Depending on country allocations, ramping up 1206 to this aggregate level might have significant consequences for U.S. relations with particular countries (for example, Chad or the Central African Republic), dwarfing anything else that the U.S. government is spending there.

The Department of Defense regards Section 1206 authority as a critical contribution to the Global War on Terrorism, providing a flexible basket of resources for responding to unforeseen emergencies and building the capacity of partner nations. Nevertheless, Section 1206 and the BGP Act continue to lack a strong constituency on Capitol Hill. Congressional committees responsible for the 050 function (notably in the House) perceive it as taking money from war fighters, while committees responsible for function 150 object that it takes authorities from State. Although legislators support the continuation of temporary DOD train and equip authorities in Iraq and Afghanistan, where significant conflict is ongoing, they are less persuaded that an alteration to FAA authorities is warranted.

against Terrorism (Morocco, Algeria, Senegal, Nigeria, Chad, Tunisia); Indonesia: Securing Strategic Sea Lanes; Sri Lanka: Reducing Ungoverned Maritime Spaces; Thailand: Securing Strategic Sea Lanes; and Caribbean Basin: Forward Defense of the U.S. Homeland (Dominican Republic, Panama, Operation Enduring Friendship).

By December 2007, both versions of the FY2008 NDAA passed by the House and the Senate declined to make 1206 global or permanent, instead extending it into the third year of its current three-year pilot phase. The only significant change was in the House version, which would explicitly permit use of 1206 to train and equip the Pakistan Frontier Corps, as requested by the Bush administration. The ultimate fate of this provision will be determined in conference.

Challenges Identified
Among some members of the task force, the issue of 1206 authority proved contentious. Some members stressed that 1206 funding authority should be made neither global nor permanent, as well as questioning DOD competence in conducting nonmilitary training and advocating instead for those resources to be allocated toward building State Department capacity. Other members with defense backgrounds argued that 1206 should be made permanent and global, with higher resource ceilings to maximize US government freedom of action. With these differences in mind, the task force reached three principal Section 1206 findings and associated recommendations.

Restrictions on funding nonmilitary internal security forces are a substantial barrier to effective use of 1206: By law, Section 1206 funds are limited to the training and equipping of foreign military forces. The Pentagon argues persuasively that current restrictions undercut its practical ability to build local capacity for counterterrorist and stability operations, since the foreign forces engaged in such operations often include coast guards, gendarmes, paramilitary, border police, civil defense, and other forces that typically fall under the control of the local Ministry of the Interior (MOI). The Bush administration’s proposed BGP Act, which has the support of Secretary of State Rice, would give DOD permission to work with a wider range of security forces.16 To date, Congress has remained cool to such requests. The main fear on Capitol Hill is that DOD efforts to improve the operational capabilities of internal security forces could entail supporting regimes that crush internal dissent and violate human rights, to the detriment of broad U.S. foreign policy. In an effort to allay such concerns, DOD officials cite ample safeguards contained in the Leahy Amendment and other established U.S. laws, which restrict U.S. assistance to countries that commit such abuses, and contend that the Pentagon will use 1206 authority only to fund entities that pass legal, feasibility, and political-military assessments. Given the operational necessity of working with foreign security forces to advance key counterterrorism objectives and the State Department’s support of such temporary efforts, the task force supports the expansion of 1206 authority beyond military-only security elements.

The inability to carry funding across fiscal years reduces the impact of 1206: A significant obstacle to the effective use of 1206 in emerging contingencies is that it relies on O&M funding, which (unlike FMF) cannot be carried over into the next fiscal year(s). This implies, for example, that any program to train security forces must be completed by September 30 of a given year. This short time horizon makes 1206 programs difficult to implement, given the brief window to plan, budget, and run projects. The task force thus supports the BGP legislation’s request for authority to carry 1206 funds across fiscal years.

16. The BGP Act would permit DOD “to build the capacity of a foreign country’s national military forces and other security forces, including gendarmerie, constabulary, internal defense, infrastructure protection, civil defense, homeland defense, coast guard, border protection and counter-terrorism forces.”
Section 1206 is a temporary stop gap, not a long-term solution: As with a number of other proposals in the BGP legislative package, the DOD request for permanent and global 1206 authority is an effort to work around a clear mismatch between resources and authorities. An alternative approach would simply be to build a larger State Department budget with increased and more flexible counterterrorism funding. In principle, there is no reason that the administration could not propose—and Congress fund—a contingency fund within the FMF account to respond rapidly to unforeseen contingencies by training security forces in counterterrorism and stability operations. In practice, however, congressional resistance to funding such State Department “slush funds,” and the comparative ease of getting resources for DOD, creates a temptation to rejigger authorities rather than budgets. The White House must attack this dynamic head-on, working to persuade relevant committees of the value of a more balanced approach to funding the country’s national security needs.
A striking change in the mandate of DOD has been the Pentagon’s recent embrace of Security, Stabilization, Transition and Reconstruction (SSTR) operations as a core mission of the U.S. military, on a par with combat operations. Directive 3000.05 of November 2005 establishes that U.S. forces must be prepared to perform a vast array of functions in the aftermath of major combat operations, from helping meet basic human needs to reforming the security sector, establishing institutions of government, reviving market activity, and rebuilding infrastructure, if indigenous foreign or U.S. civilian organizations are not able to do so. Two critical vehicles to fulfill this mission have been Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) and the Commander’s Emergency Response Program (CERP).

Both of these instruments are significant additions to the U.S. national security toolkit and have been developed to enhance the U.S. response in nonpermissive environments posing daunting challenges to civilian reconstruction activities. At the same time, the task force recognizes several shortcomings in both instruments and the need to bolster civilian input into their use.

Provincial Reconstruction Teams

Among the most distinctive innovations in U.S.-led stability operations are Provincial Reconstruction Teams. First created in Afghanistan and subsequently extended to Iraq, these joint civilian-military teams have enjoyed a measure of success in enhancing local security, conducting small-scale reconstruction efforts, and facilitating the expanding presence of the central government to localities. PRTs hold potential as a platform to integrate civilian and military instruments and provide sufficient flexibility to field commanders in unique operational environments. At the same time, PRTs suffer from important limitations, outlined below.

PRTs emerged in Afghanistan in late 2002, replacing Coalition Humanitarian Liaison Cells (CHLCs) and U.S. Army Civil Affairs Teams (CAT-As) that had been undertaking small-scale relief and reconstruction operations. From the outset, PRTs were envisioned as a way to produce an “ISAF-like” effect in Afghanistan outside of Kabul itself, by creating nodes of stability while maintaining the “light footprint” approach adopted by the U.S.-led coalition. PRTs gradually evolved a three-fold mandate: providing local security; conducting small-scale reconstruction; and facilitating the expanding presence of the central government. PRTs were sufficiently flexible to be tailored to unique operational environments, permitting commanders to exercise initiative and creativity. Although often characterized as civil-military teams, U.S. PRTs in Afghanistan remain overwhelmingly mili-
tary in composition, with 80 to 100 soldiers under the command of a field grade military officer, most dedicated to force protection. The sole civilian components are individual representatives from State, USAID, and the Department of Agriculture. Each PRT possesses two U.S. Army civil affairs teams (four soldiers apiece), one charged with running a civil-military operations center (CMOC) and the other with implementing small-scale, quick impact development projects employing local labor.

In November 2005 the U.S. government created the first of ten PRTs in Iraq to provide a platform for “capacity building” outside Baghdad, as part of the Coalition Provisional Authority’s effort to decentralize reconstruction and governance. Unlike in Afghanistan, PRTs in Iraq were to be led by a senior State Department official and composed primarily of civilian personnel from State, USAID, Justice, and Agriculture, complemented by army civil affairs teams, with security provided by U.S. military or commercial contractors. Their mission was to “assist Iraq’s provincial governments with developing a transparent and sustained capacity to govern, promoting security and the rule of law, promoting political and economic development, and providing provincial administration necessary to meet the basic needs of the population.” Whereas Afghan PRTs attempt to expand the central government’s reach at the provisional level, Iraqi PRTs seek to strengthen provincial governments’ abilities absent a center.

In January 2007, President Bush announced the creation of additional Iraqi PRTs, designed to raise the total to 21 by June 1, 2007. Several would be “embedded” PRTs—consisting of a senior State Department official, a senior USAID official, a senior DOD civil affairs officer, and an Arabic speaker—co-located within brigade combat teams. The PRT would receive guidance from both the U.S. ambassador and from the MNF-I commander, with the civilian PRT leader taking the lead on political and economic issues and the brigade commander on issues of security and movement. The PRTs’ mandate was broadened to include five goals: bolstering moderates, promoting reconciliation, supporting counter-insurgency operations, fostering economic growth and developing capacity.

Challenges Identified

PRTs are intriguing institutional experiments. At the same time, a range of official and nongovernmental observers have identified areas in need of improvement. The follow-

1. The model PRT would consist of a PRT team leader (State FSO); deputy team leader (Army LTC); MNF-I liaison (military); rule of law coordinator (DOJ); provincial action officer (State); public diplomacy officer (State); agriculture adviser (USDA); development officer (USAID); engineer (Army Corps of Engineers); governance team; bilingual adviser; U.S. Army reconstruction team (U.S. Army civil affairs); and a military movement team or protective detail (U.S. military or contract security). Robert M. Perito, “Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Iraq,” U.S. Institute of Peace Special Report 185 (March 2007).

2. This goal of “building sustainable capacity” was envisioned as the “transfer of skill and knowledge from Coalition Forces to the Iraqi people.” U.S. Department of the Army, Center for Army Lessons Learned, Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Iraq Handbook, version 2.1, Fort Leavenworth, Kan., November 2006, cited in ibid.

ing list summarizes these shortcomings, which should be addressed as the U.S. government considers the potential applicability of the PRT model to future theaters of stability operations.

**Ambiguous mandate and absence of interagency doctrine:** Returning members complain about a lack of clear guidance on core PRT objectives, including the relative priority of security, governance, and development goals. There is no interagency doctrine to provide a common frame of reference about the PRTs’ mission and how to achieve it, and the heavy focus on force protection and military considerations has often limited scope for reconstruction efforts. In Afghanistan, placement of U.S. PRTs under a military commander has often led allies and local populations to consider them overly militarized.

**Little strategic planning or baseline assessments:** PRT activities remain opportunistic and idiosyncratic, with individual PRT approaches evolving independently and shaped by the personality and interests of the PRT commander, rather than being embedded in a larger military or developmental effort. Although it is important that commanders retain operational flexibility, PRT activities have rarely benefited from an integrated, civilian-military planning framework linking their activities to broader U.S. government strategies. Nor have most PRTs conducted interagency needs assessments to inform projects in their areas of responsibility (AORs).

**Shortfalls in the governance and rule of law components of PRT action:** Inherent in the idea of PRTs is a continuum of activities ranging from quick impact projects and provision of immediate physical security to more challenging institution-building efforts in areas like security sector reform, governance, and the rule of law. Progress in addressing these higher levels of capacity building remains modest. Despite the stated aim of expanding the reach of the Afghan central government, for example, PRTs have often empowered warlords as provincial governors and police chiefs, cementing their positions.

**Little enduring developmental impact:** The PRT emphasis on speed has sometimes contributed to unsustainable projects. In the words of a major interagency assessment of PRTs in Afghanistan, “Schools were built without teachers and clinics without doctors.”

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4. These difficulties are compounded by the very different approaches adopted by other nations with PRTs, including in some cases the insertion of crippling “national caveats.”

5. Another contested issue has been the provision of security and logistical support for PRTs. In early 2007 State and DOD hammered out agreement to resolve this long-running dispute.

6. There exists a distinction between U.S.-run PRTs and those operated by other governments. This report is chiefly concerned with U.S. managed PRTs.

In response to these criticisms, Afghan PRTs have begun to adopt a “systems” approach to their intervention, reportedly including greater “synching up with USAID.” The impact of this change remains to be seen.

Inadequate civilian resources, personnel, and training to match ambitions: State and USAID have failed to deploy qualified personnel to PRTs in anything like the numbers required, and projects funded via USAID’s Quick Impact Project (QIP) resources remain significantly slower than those funded by CERP. These problems have been compounded by rapid staff turnover—even at the highest levels—and inadequate predeployment training. Similarly, DOD has endured criticism for failing to match the skill sets of those deployed to PRTs with the job descriptions they are asked to fill. Most PRTs have been formed in-country. State is seeking to add 57 new billets at S/CRS, but this modest step falls far short of current or expected future requirements.

Fraught PRT/NGO relations: The use of soldiers to perform humanitarian and reconstruction tasks continues to draw opposition from other aid providers. This is particularly true of international NGOs, who believe PRTs blur the distinction between military and civilian spheres, erode “humanitarian space,” and encourage the targeting of relief and development workers. NGOs would prefer that the U.S. military provide ambient security and leave humanitarian and reconstruction efforts to them.

Lack of metrics to gauge PRT performance: In the absence of any clear criteria and indicators to gauge impact (as opposed to simply inputs and outputs), it is difficult to assess PRT performance. Nor have PRTs developed a clear “exit strategy,” with benchmarks, outlining the transition of U.S./NATO operations to local control.

Commanders’ Emergency Response Program

The Commanders’ Emergency Response Program, or CERP, permits U.S. military commanders to use appropriated O&M funds to meet urgent humanitarian and reconstruction needs of local populations in areas where U.S. military forces are operating. CERP currently applies only to Iraq and Afghanistan, with temporary authorities granted to DOD in successive supplemental appropriations covering those wars. The Pentagon regards CERP as a critical force protection and engagement tool, fostering a permissive environment for U.S. forces in SSTR and counterinsurgency operations. Overall CERP has been a reasonably successful instrument at the disposal of U.S. commanders to deliver goods and services rapidly and elicit local cooperation. The Building Global Partnership legislation submitted to Congress would permit commanders to use CERP funds for urgent humanitarian relief and reconstruction assistance to local populations anywhere that U.S. forces are operating.


Background and Experience to Date

CERP was created to provide U.S. commanders in Iraq with an instrument to help bring stability to Iraq after the U.S.-led invasion by providing tangible benefits to the Iraqi people. The initial funding for the program came from the hundreds of millions of dollars in cash discovered by the 3rd Infantry Division and other U.S. forces in the vaults of Saddam Hussein's Ba'athist Party. U.S. commanders had been frustrated by their inability, in the vacuum that resulted following the collapse of Iraqi public institutions, to meet massive emergency needs—from removing trash to restoring basic sanitation and public health, distributing rations, and repairing schools. On May 7, 2003, the coalition commander issued an order to establish a “Brigade Commander's Discretionary Recovery Program to Directly Benefit the Iraqi People.” In June 2003, Ambassador Paul Bremer, the newly arrived administrator of the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), gave the program its current name and delegated authority over its use to the coalition commander. The establishing memo declared: “This Program will enable commanders to respond to urgent humanitarian relief and reconstruction requirements within their areas of responsibility, by carrying out programs that will immediately assist the Iraqi people and support the reconstruction of Iraq.”

Under initial guidance, permissible uses of CERP funds included the building, repair, reconstitution, and reestablishment of the social and material infrastructure in Iraq. This included, but was not limited to, the following: water and sanitation infrastructure, food production and distribution, health care, education, electricity, telecommunications, transportation, economic and financial management, the rule of law, effective governance, irrigation systems, civic improvement, and repairs to cultural facilities. Prohibited expenditures fell into several categories: expenses of direct or indirect benefit of CJTF-7 (including coalition) forces; entertainment of the local Iraqi population; weapons buyback or rewards program; purchase of firearms, ammunition, or removal of UXO; duplication of services available through municipal governments; support to individuals or private businesses (with some exceptions—e.g., repair of damage caused by the coalition); and salaries, pensions, or emergency payments to civil service. Each division commander was provided with $500,000 and each brigade commander $200,000 in CERP funds and

11. FRAGO 89, June 19, 2003. On February 18, 2005, the under secretary of defense (comptroller) issued new guidance for use of CERP in Iraq and Afghanistan, as provided in the NDAA for FY05, adding to this list agriculture and other urgent humanitarian and reconstruction projects. In September 2005 this guidance was revised to include “repair of damage that results from U.S. coalition, or supporting military operations and is not compensated under the Foreign Claim Act; condolence payments to individual civilians for the death, injury, or property damage resulting from U.S. coalition, or supporting military operations; payments to individuals upon release from detention; and protective measures, such as fencing, lights, barrier materials, berming over pipelines, guard towers, temporary civilian guards, etc., to enhance the durability and survivability of a critical infrastructure site (oil pipelines, electric lines, etc.).
12. In September 2005, this list of prohibited activities was extended to include “providing goods, services, or funds to national armies, national guard forces, border security forces, civil defense forces, infrastructure protection forces, highway patrol units, police, special police, or intelligence or other security forces”; “training, equipping, or operating costs of Iraqi or Afghan security forces”; and “conducting psychological operations, information operations, or other U.S. coalition, or Iraqi/Afghanistan Security Force operations.”
instructed to coordinate all projects with regional CPA offices, governorate support teams, and civil affairs teams and to submit weekly expense reports.

Based on early successes, Congress in late October 2003 included as Section 1110 of the $87 billion emergency supplemental for Iraq a provision extending CERP to O&M funds appropriated to DOD. This legislation permitted U.S. commanders in Iraq and also Afghanistan to devote up to $180 million in O&M funding to CERP activities, “notwithstanding any other provision of law.” The secretary of defense was instructed to provide Congress with quarterly reports on the use of CERP. DOD issued further guidance instructing CENTCOM and the Department of the Army to develop procedures for the use of such funds.

By most accounts, including oral histories of returning officers from Afghanistan and Iraq, CERP has been an effective instrument at the disposal of U.S. military commanders to deliver goods and services rapidly and elicit cooperation with U.S. military forces in their area of operations. In normal circumstances, brigade commanders have virtually no discretionary funds to devote to this portion of their mission. Under CERP, commanders can take individual initiative to finance a range of emergency relief and rehabilitation activities in volatile settings where winning the political support (or at least acquiescence) of local inhabitants is critical. This has proved invaluable in settings where alternative funding streams have either been unavailable or, in the case of USAID funding, proven overly bureaucratic and slow. Within the first three months of the program in Iraq, for example, some 11,000 projects were completed. In Baghdad, this included payment to thousands of unemployed Iraqis to clean streets, alleys, and public spaces of debris; the repair of hundreds of generators; and the construction or repair of dozens of jails and police stations. Around the country, commanders spent millions repairing sewage and water systems, reconstructing bridges and roads, refurbishing schools, upgrading utilities, distributing essential humanitarian relief, jump-starting local markets, and even harvesting crops.

Challenges Identified

CERP has experienced several shortcomings.

**Lack of strategy, doctrine and training:** There is little overall strategy or doctrine about how CERP should be used to advance broader U.S. goals and little training about how to use it appropriately. The effective use of CERP thus depends heavily on the judgment, initiative, and situational awareness of the individual commander. Anecdotal evidence and oral histories suggest that commanders have often treated CERP as “walking around money” to win rapid favor with local power holders or publics, with little strategic planning or integration into a wider stabilization and reconstruction plan. Some returning U.S. military officers have indicated that the use of CERP in the field was undercut by the lack of predeployment training in its use, an absence of contracting expertise among implementing officers, and minimal knowledge of local political dynamics or the local economy.

**Inadequate input from civilian agencies:** CERP projects have rarely been designed with input from U.S. diplomats and development professionals who might place these efforts in a broader political strategy and institution-building requirements. This lack of input does not reflect a lack of interest on the military’s side in having such expertise. Several returning military officers have emphasized that it would have been useful to have
State Department, USAID, and other interagency presence down to brigade or even battalion level to help inform uses of CERP. Filling this gap will require enlarging the capacity of State, USAID, and other U.S. government agencies to deploy personnel to the field through Embedded Provincial Reconstruction Teams (ePRTs) or other mechanisms.

**Vulnerability to waste and abuse:** The highly decentralized and streamlined nature of the CERP program—which is essential for operational agility in the field—makes it vulnerable to waste and abuse. There have been periodic reports of weak financial controls, inadequate approval processes, inappropriate uses, substandard quality assurance, and an inability to track projects as units rotate in and out of theater. The very flexibility of CERP allows commanders to purchase goods and services with minimal competitive bidding, raising the possibility of corruption and price gouging.

**Failure to stick to urgent activities:** A common, related critique is that CERP has sometimes been used not for intended “emergency” purposes but to fund longer-term infrastructure or security—such as refurbishing an oil refinery or hiring civil defense forces—that are only indirectly “humanitarian” and could presumably be covered by other, appropriated funds (such as the Iraqi Relief and Reconstruction Fund) or be designed and implemented by other U.S. government agencies. Although such shortcomings were most apparent in the program’s first years, a recent DOD inspector general’s report for Afghanistan documents persistently weak financial controls over some CERP funds; inadequate approval processes, resulting in funding activities prohibited by CERP guidance (such as operational costs of security forces); substandard quality assurance of some CERP projects; and faulty documentation of expenditures.

**Uncertain long-term political and development impact:** CERP has a proven track record as a short-term instrument for demonstrating U.S. commitment to local populations and their needs and, in effect, enabling local cooperation. It is less effective in supporting legitimate and accountable local structures of governance over the medium to long term. Because aid is invariably political, CERP funds have the potential to empower particular factions at the expense of others or to reinforce inequitable or illicit power structures that may run counter to U.S. goals of participatory, evenhanded governance. Similarly, CERP’s effectiveness in building long-term capacity is questionable. The stopgap nature of CERP expenditures has at times contradicted the requirements of sustainable development (a problem that bedevils humanitarian assistance, too). In general, the U.S. military is less interested in building lasting local capacity than in winning hearts and minds in the here and now. Troublingly, there has been no comprehensive, publicly available official assessment of CERP.

**Establishing Limits for CERP**

Congress is currently considering a proposal by the Bush administration, contained within the Building Global Partnerships Act, to expand the scope and flexibility of CERP. Section 1541 of the proposed BGP legislation includes a provision that would permit the sec-

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Secretary of defense to authorize U.S. commanders to use DOD funds appropriated to CERP or other O&M funds to meet urgent humanitarian relief and reconstruction assistance to local populations anywhere that U.S. forces are operating, including during humanitarian, civic assistance, disaster relief, and peace operations. The proposed language widens the use of funds to cover a range of contingencies, not limited to named operations such as Operation Enduring Freedom. Indeed, it remains ambiguous as to whether the phrase “where U.S. forces are operating” extends to noncombat situations.15

The central questions regarding the proposed legislation are whether existing authorities for Iraq and Afghanistan should be made global and permanent and whether the expenditure of these funds should fall under chief of mission authority. The Pentagon contends that CERP “has proven to be a high-impact, relatively low-cost program, indispensable to security and stabilization efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan”—and that it could be similarly invaluable in other theaters of the Global War on Terrorism by allowing commanders to build trust and support among the local populace and facilitate a permissive operational environment for U.S. soldiers. As one DOD official interviewed by the task force stated, “We do not want the only thing in our soldiers’ rucksack to be a grenade.” Time and again, U.S. soldiers in such environments have found themselves with the need to deliver assistance quickly to make a payoff to a civilian population. In such circumstances, speed is of the essence, and waiting months for the interagency to respond to these needs would risk lost opportunities.

DOD insists that flaws in earlier CERP experience have largely been corrected. CERP guidance is now more detailed, and management is more rigorous. DOD prepares comprehensive quarterly and annual reports describing the uses of funds. DOD argues that if CERP is made global and permanent, it is more likely that the U.S. military will take a more strategic approach and institute a more rigorous program to train officers in its effective and accountable use. Rather than a wish list undertaken at the commander’s discretion, CERP will be more closely linked up with what the rest of the U.S. government is trying to do, imbued with considerations of sustainability and accompanied with metrics to assess impact.

As with the administration’s proposals for Section 1206 expansion, the proposal to make CERP permanent and global stimulated intense negotiations between the Pentagon and the State Department, which worried that it intruded upon the secretary of state’s prerogatives. The most critical disagreement concerned the issue of State Department “concurrence” with any uses of CERP funds—and the level at which that approval should come. The initial language of Section 1541 ignored the issue altogether, noting simply that the secretary of defense would provide guidance to “ensure coordination with Department of State country teams.” When State objected, DOD insisted that any concurrence process should remain at the country team level, since a more cumbersome process reaching all the way back to Washington (with the secretary of state in effect approving individual CERP projects) would be unworkable. In late May 2007, the two sides compromised on a less onerous concurrence procedure.16

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15. Depending on the interpretation, CERP might be used at the commander’s discretion in a peacetime situation to influence hearts and minds.

Despite State’s agreement on this legislative package, prospects for making CERP global and permanent remain slim on Capitol Hill, where relevant committees seem intent on keeping it exceptional and temporary. Although there is strong support for the continued use of CERP in Afghanistan and Iraq, legislators are wary of expanding the geographic scope of the program, particularly in the absence of more clarity about precisely where DOD is interested in exercising such authorities. Members are aware that such funds can have wide foreign policy implications, depending on the setting and context. Finally, legislators have noted that some of the activities under CERP are hardly urgent but closer to long-term development. As such, they should be undertaken by USAID and other civilian actors.

On the basis of the above considerations, the task force recommends that CERP be extended over three to five years and expanded to named operations only. In addition, to promote effective use of such funds, DOD should undertake the following:

- Compile lessons learned and institutionalize training for field commanders in use of CERP;
- Develop stronger financial controls and improved approval processes; and
- Institutionalize a standing arrangement (MOU) between combatant commanders and chiefs of mission on the use of such funds.
Humanitarian Assistance

The role of the U.S. military in providing humanitarian relief and civic action is long-standing, but it is today unfolding in a more complex international context, one shaped by the perceived strategic imperatives of the global war on terrorism and the demands of prolonged irregular warfare. The United States increasingly delivers such assistance as part of broader counterinsurgency, nation-building, and counterterrorist efforts. This new context poses important challenges for coordination between civilian and military actors. Neither DOD nor its civilian partners want to revisit basic humanitarian assistance roles and missions; nor in our opinion should they. At the same time, the task force believes that several reforms could improve civilian-military coordination in the provision of such aid.

Overall, U.S. civil-military procedures for coordinating humanitarian assistance (HA) work reasonably well for “forced entry” operations where relief assistance may be required or for major natural disasters on the scale of Hurricane Mitch in 1998 and the Indian Ocean tsunami in late 2004. Such coordination becomes more problematic and controversial in contingencies involving chronic rather than immediate human needs—protracted complex emergencies, stability operations, and situations of irregular warfare.

There are problematic areas between DOD and civilian agencies on humanitarian issues. The first set can be characterized as occasional irritants and are fairly easily addressed. These include a unified message from civilian agencies about what type of support they want from DOD; fully harmonized assessments by DOD and civilian agencies about priority needs in affected countries; operational-level coordination among U.S. agencies; and adequate USAID input into DOD quick impact projects. Of greater concern are several structural impediments to more effective unity of effort between the Pentagon and U.S. civilian departments and actors. These include the absence of resources to balance attention devoted to unanticipated crises and chronic emergencies; the breakdown of information sharing with other humanitarian actors in nonpermissive environments; inadequate doctrine to inform civilian-military planning for humanitarian action; and the perceived erosion of “humanitarian space” as a result of U.S. military involvement in HA activities.

These hurdles are described below. The recommendations section contains suggestions for surmounting them. A concluding section examines a recent DOD legislative proposal to expand the statute governing the Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster, and Civic Aid (OHDACA) account to permit the use of such funds for stabilization missions.
The Soft Side of DOD’s Hard Power

The Department of Defense has enormous latent capacity for providing life-saving, life-enhancing assistance, and a well-established record of doing so overseas. This involvement has spanned the Berlin Airlifts of 1948 and 1961, as well as Operations Sea Angel (Bangladesh, 1991), Provide Comfort (Iraqui Kurdistan, 1991), Strong Support (Hurricane Mitch, 1998), Unified Assistance (Indian Ocean tsunami, 2004–2005) and other missions. The Pentagon’s statutory authorities for humanitarian assistance activities are contained in Title 10 of the U.S. Code.¹ By law, DOD’s involvement in such activities must be in concert with civilian agencies and should complement rather than duplicate other forms of U.S. assistance. The statutes governing HA provide extensive flexibility to commanders, who have the authority to provide assistance in urgent circumstances, in some cases without getting prior approval from Washington or U.S. ambassadors.

The scope of DOD’s HA-relevant activities is extensive. It includes the provision of air and sea lift; humanitarian daily rations; nonlethal excess property (such as trucks, bedding, medical equipment); search and rescue operations; noncombatant evacuations; water purification and treatment; expeditionary engineering (e.g., portable bridges); rudimentary construction (roads, wells, clinics, warehouses); medical services; tactical imagery and reconnaissance; training for humanitarian de-mining and unexploded ordnance removal; and (within limits) protection for refugees, internally displaced persons, and humanitarian actors.

DOD-provided HA is used to address two situations: life-saving relief following disasters and during humanitarian emergencies and “steady-state” quality-of-life assistance, such as civic action projects in areas of U.S. military presence. In meeting these needs, commanders can draw on a range of resource streams of varying flexibility. Relevant accounts include the OHDACA account, CERP, the Commander’s Initiative Fund (CIF), Military Department (MILDEP) accounts, and FAA “drawdowns.” The decision to draw on one or more of these mechanisms depends heavily on operational imperatives, perceived military necessity, and the prospects of supplemental appropriations from Congress. In the case of natural disasters, the trigger for any U.S. government assistance is a disaster declaration issued by the locally based American ambassador or chief of mission indicating the affected country’s request or willingness to accept U.S. aid. Once issued and validated by USAID’s Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance, the Political-Military Affairs Bureau at the State Department will forward the request to DOD.

Given its unrivaled logistical capabilities, DOD is often called upon to serve when speed is of the essence or the size of a disaster so necessitates. To avoid diluting its primary mandate of fighting and winning the nation’s wars, DOD has never aspired to be the U.S. government’s lead provider of humanitarian assistance. Pentagon officials and military commanders alike seek to avoid overexposure to purely humanitarian operations, insisting where possible that civilian relief agencies act as first responders, except where U.S. military forces are already involved or when DOD can provide a unique capability.

At the same time, the Pentagon’s reticence is balanced by a belief that the involvement of the U.S. military in humanitarian action has important instrumental value. At the tactical level, DOD involvement in humanitarian response efforts provides valuable training

¹. Sections 401–2, 404, 2561.
opportunities and operational experience to U.S. troops. Where U.S. forces are involved in irregular warfare, humanitarian assistance and civic action projects can help enhance operational effectiveness, minimize unintended harm to civilians, assist information and intelligence gathering, and win the trust and confidence of local populations. At the strategic level, HA can shape regional attitudes toward the United States in a positive direction and improve relations with host nations, including in places where DOD lacks a constant or regular presence.

DOD supplies much of its routine HA through the OHDACA account. First authorized in FY1996, this appropriation allows combatant commanders to deploy rapid noncombat assistance to respond to specific emergency and civic needs within their areas of responsibility, including provision of humanitarian assistance (including paying for nonlethal excess property; medical visits; minor construction; repair of roads, schools and clinics; well digging, and disaster preparedness); foreign disaster relief and emergency response (including logistics, airlift, search and rescue, humanitarian daily rations, plastic sheeting, tents, water, and capacity building); and humanitarian mine action.

DOD regards OHDACA as “a key shaping tool,” permitting commanders “to interact with governments, indigenous organizations, and ordinary citizens to establish long-term, positive relationships, mitigating terrorist influence and preventing conflict.” Following the Indian Ocean tsunami of late 2004 and the Pakistan earthquake the next year, the Pentagon reprogrammed tens of millions of dollars in OHDACA funds to respond to emergencies in strategically important, Muslim-majority nations. As former Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld declared, “Every effort we take to demonstrate the depth of America’s compassion and generosity is an important step in the global war on terror.”

OHDACA is today funded at $63 million, with an administration request for $103 million for FY2008. Unlike CERP, OHDACA funds can be used for planned, programmed activities.

Among the uniformed military services, support for the HA mission is strongest within the Marine Corps, light infantry of the U.S. Army and National Guard, and the indirect action portion of the Special Operations Forces, which focuses on civil affairs and psychological operations. Among the geographic Combatant Commands, the humanitarian assistance mission has found a receptive audience both in CENTCOM, which is deeply involved in stability and counterinsurgency operations, as well as in the so-called economy of force commands, including PACOM, SOUTHCOM, and now AFRICOM, a large share of whose mandate includes responding to humanitarian crises.

Challenges Identified

The expansion of the Department of Defense into the field of humanitarian relief has not been entirely smooth. It has generated occasional frictions and posed practical structural challenges for coordination with other U.S. government agencies as well as with nongovernmental actors in the field.

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Occasional Irritants

Lack of clarity over what DOD should provide: U.S. civilian agencies sometimes send conflicting or contradictory signals of what is expected or desired of DOD in the aftermath of a major disaster. The State Department, USAID, and other agencies often have very different expectations about what the role of the Combatant Commands should be, and their requests to DOD are often fragmented through multiple channels rather than being assembled into a single coherent request to the Pentagon. The lack of a senior civilian point of contact within each Combatant Command to rationalize these requests compounds the problem.

Field assessments are not seamless: There are continuing impediments to effective coordination between DOD and USAID in conducting early needs assessments in affected countries. In the absence of such coordination, USAID’s Disaster Assistance Response (DART) teams and DOD’s Humanitarian Assistance (HAST) teams may provide very different perspectives on priority actions. The lack of both communication and standard “rules of the road” can cause interventions to be driven by considerations of supply (assets the responding agency has available) rather than by demand (what the affected population actually needs). It can also create waste and duplication of effort.

Operational coordination on the ground can be problematic and overly dependent on personalities: In the absence of standardized processes for interagency coordination, efforts to blend resources and capabilities from different agencies can be messy and time-consuming. Success in breaking these inevitable logjams—for instance, in requesting DOD drawdown authority to fund USAID activities—depends heavily on leadership in the field and the collaborative instincts of DOD and civilian agency officials.

Lack of timely USAID input in selection of DOD quick impact projects: DOD commanders in the field too often lack the benefit of input from USAID humanitarian and development professionals in the targeting of so-called quick impact projects (QIPs) in volatile expeditionary settings. This has certainly been the case when it comes to the use of CERP funds and the activities of PRTs (both described earlier in this report). As a result, projects that may be well intentioned sometimes fail to meet the most basic human needs or prove to be unsustainable, thus failing either to win “hearts and minds” or to advance long-term recovery. Addressing these shortcomings will require greater investment in deployable USAID and other civilian capabilities.

Structural Impediments

HA funding does not balance immediate and long-term priorities: The Pentagon must work with civilian agencies to ensure a funding base for humanitarian assistance that permits the United States to respond to both sudden and chronic emergencies. Today, when faced with an unanticipated crisis, DOD often must “rob Peter to pay Paul” by drawing from the same account used to fund longer-term humanitarian situations (e.g., OHDACA). In USAID, meanwhile, assistance for “stable” chronic emergencies tends to draw down funds that would otherwise go to sudden-onset emergencies. Addressing this dilemma will require insulating HA from reprogramming, while requesting increased appropriations to create a buffering effect.
Information sharing breaks down in nonpermissive environments: In situations of irregular warfare, including stability and counterinsurgency operations, information related to humanitarian assistance tends to get treated as intelligence and thus handled in classified channels. This can pose insuperable obstacles to collaboration with USAID, which generally operates in an unclassified environment, to say nothing of UN agencies and NGOs also involved in the provision of humanitarian assistance. Unless affirmative steps are taken to reduce these restrictions, in the form of new, more liberal guidance on the treatment of HA-related data, information sharing efforts will continue to suffer.

Joint humanitarian assistance planning remains spotty, both within country teams and in expeditionary contexts: The effectiveness of DOD and broader U.S. response to humanitarian emergencies continues to suffer from a lack of integrated civilian–military planning for foreseeable contingencies. In the absence of agreed doctrine and sophisticated planning templates as well as efforts to synchronize preparedness and mitigation efforts and budget cycles, the Pentagon and civilian U.S. agencies are forced to develop each new response operation in an ad hoc manner. These shortcomings suggest the need for a new National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD) for HA as well as a standing interagency committee to oversee its implementation. To the degree possible, the center of gravity for planning humanitarian action in actual crises should be at the country team level.

Shrinking humanitarian space creates frictions between DOD and NGO aid providers: Undoubtedly the most controversial and intractable dilemma posed by the Pentagon’s growing involvement in humanitarian assistance and civic action is its potential to further blur the line between military and humanitarian action. Many NGO service providers—as well as UN agencies—contend that the provision of “humanitarian” relief and rehabilitation aid by soldiers erodes traditional humanitarian principles of neutrality and impartiality and encourages the targeting of humanitarian workers by combatants. Rather than conducting activities that NGOs can do more effectively and less expensively themselves, they argue, the U.S. military should focus on providing ambient security for humanitarians to do their jobs.

The merit of these arguments—particularly the claim that DOD HA activities make NGOs greater targets—remains the subject of vigorous debate. In fact, there are a number of other factors encroaching on NGO impartiality. In Afghanistan, for instance, these include their “guilt by association” in the eyes of the Taliban with human rights advocacy organizations; with the Afghan central government; and with aid initiatives (such as the rebuilding of girls schools) that smack of alien, Western concepts. Increasingly, NGOs in Afghanistan and other nonpermissive environments recognize that they have a choice of options, none particularly palatable: to stand out, like UN peacekeepers; to armor up; or to blend in, by being as unobtrusive as possible. Each has its drawbacks, with the first often deemed too dangerous, the second as impeding access, and the third not always being possible. It is critical that DOD continue regular dialogue with the NGO community to facilitate common HA principles and a code of conduct, while managing unrealistic expectations about bridging the divide.
Should OHDACA be Extended to Stabilization Activities?

Section 1542 of DOD’s proposed BGP legislation\(^4\) would amend Section 2561(a) of Title 10 of the U.S. Code by inserting the words “and stabilization” after “other humanitarian,” permitting commanders to employ OHDACA funds in a wider range of contexts. The impetus for this change comes in part out of the frustrating Afghan PRT experience, in which DOD was asked by the Afghan government, but was not permitted under law, to engage in activities like building police stations and court buildings, etc., when USAID and State did not have money for such activities. DOD maintains that this expanded authority is critical, given the stakes in the Global War on Terrorism:

> From Afghanistan to Lebanon, we continue to witness the profound influence that humanitarian assistance provided by terrorist organizations has had on the local populace. Including stabilization activities within this authority would enable DOD to expand its interaction with local populations that are vulnerable to violence or other factors. With this proposed change, DOD personnel helping to build clinics or dig wells could also assist by supporting basic economic and infrastructure projects.\(^5\)

In principle, DOD has no problems with State Department concurrence procedures on this matter, but it believes that such concurrence need not require that the secretary of state herself actually approve each project. Currently, most OHDACA projects originate with the country team and are subject to human rights vetting. However, State has objected to this change, regarding it as an incursion on its FAA authorities and the mandate of USAID.

Although only entailing a change in two words, the administration’s proposed modification of OHDACA authorities is potentially profound, allowing DOD to fund a broader range of activities, in a wider array of contexts, than current statute provides. Although OHDACA funds are fairly modest, some State Department officials remain wary of such a sweeping expansion of authorities. From a public diplomacy perspective, some Foreign Service officers, USAID officials, and congressional staff are cautious of granting the U.S. military too prominent a role in activities that in principle are more appropriately undertaken by civilian agencies, except in contexts of extreme violence.

State Department officials and congressional staff also express concern that such DOD “shaping” activities in target countries may be insufficiently cognizant of internal societal and political dynamics and run at cross purposes with broader U.S. foreign policy goals and initiatives. DOD has attempted to address such concerns by pointing out that its activities under the proposed OHDACA expansion will be conducted only in coordination with the country team and are thus collaborative in nature. Reservations about DOD involvement in this arena are even stronger among the humanitarian and development communities, particularly among NGO actors, who complain of soldiers intruding on their mandate, lacking appropriate skills sets, and blurring the line between military operations in pursuit of Global War on Terrorism goals and the ostensibly neutral activities of emergency relief and development activities in poor countries.

To strike the right balance, Congress should increase the cap for OHDACA funds, permit their use for stabilization missions only where the chief of mission and CoCom

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4. “Amendment of authority for humanitarian assistance to include stabilization activities” (from Department of Defense internal discussion document).

5. From Department of Defense internal discussion document.
commander jointly determine such efforts are in U.S. national security interests and that there is insufficient civilian capacity and engage USAID in monitoring and evaluating the uses of such funds.
AFRICOM

The recent creation of AFRICOM, the Pentagon’s new Regional Combatant Command for Africa, is seen by many as a dramatic expression of DOD’s expanded role in nontraditional security assistance. AFRICOM illustrates both the promise of DOD’s growing involvement in counterterrorism, capacity building, and humanitarian action, as well as the challenges the U.S. military will confront in integrating its mandate and activities with those of U.S. civilian agencies. The Combatant Command can only be effective if it is part of a unified, civilian-led U.S. government approach to Africa that incorporates perspectives from the development, diplomacy, and defense fields. It cannot substitute for effective civilian oversight of U.S. foreign policy toward the region. As such, Congress and the executive branch must act now to overcome the chronic weakness of U.S. diplomatic capacities in Africa, a vulnerability that has only become more starkly visible with the launch of AFRICOM.

AFRICOM was formally established on October 1, 2007, as a subunified command of the European Command (EUCOM), assuming management of EUCOM’s area of responsibility on the continent. It was originally scheduled to become a fully independent operational command overseeing the entire continent (minus Egypt) by October 1, 2008, but DOD has recently hedged on this aggressive timeline. Heretofore U.S. military assistance programs were divided among EUCOM, which had responsibility for most of the continent (as well as more than 40 countries in Europe and Central Asia); Central Command (CENTCOM), which leads in the Horn; and Pacific Command (PACOM), which is responsible for Madagascar and smaller islands off the eastern coast. Practically speaking, AFRICOM can help overcome fragmented U.S. military engagement on the continent and, if effective, achieve new efficiencies.

The creation of a unified Combatant Command for Africa is consistent with the growing strategic importance of the continent. No longer viewed predominantly in humanitarian terms, Africa matters increasingly to U.S. national interests due to rising transnational infectious diseases, counterterrorism, U.S. energy security, intensifying trade and investment competition with China and other rising Asian powers, and as a potential partner in the global economy. The United States must address these rising stakes through strong civilian oversight of U.S. regional foreign policy, an enduring development agenda focused on poverty alleviation, community development, good governance and respect of human rights and effective humanitarian response, and a preventative security approach.

The most innovative aspect of AFRICOM is its charter, which is geared precisely toward such a preventative security approach, which depends less on kinetic operations

than on reducing the underlying sources of instability, extremism, and conflict in Africa. Officials within AFRICOM and DOD recognize that the U.S. military lacks both the mandate and skill sets to accomplish many of these goals by itself. Accordingly, they are keen to ensure that the command includes heavy representation from other U.S. government agencies, particularly the State Department and USAID. This approach is reflected in AFRICOM’s unusual senior leadership structure. One of the two deputy commanders to the four-star commander, General William E. “Kip” Ward, is a senior U.S. diplomat of ambassadorial rank.

Challenges Identified

AFRICOM holds the potential for channeling more attention and resources—as well as fostering from the bottom up an integrated “whole-of-government” approach—to the problems of state fragility, internal conflict, and extremism in Africa. It raises the possibility that the United States can graduate to a much more serious level of engagement in enlarging Africa’s peacekeeping capacities; strengthening democratic, civilian oversight of the security sector and professionalizing militaries; strengthening controls by African partner states of borders and sea and air ports; and creating in the Gulf of Guinea and elsewhere integrated coast guard capacities that can reduce plundering of fisheries and piracy. Realizing this potential, however, will require the Bush administration to overcome at least seven important challenges.

Clarifying AFRICOM’s mandate, including its role in U.S. policy integration and relationship to U.S. civilian agencies: Pentagon officials have repeatedly stressed the value of AFRICOM in providing a useful regional platform for integrating the various strands of U.S. security, diplomatic, and development engagement on the continent. How the command intends to formulate and pursue such integrated shaping activities has not been adequately explained, however. From the perspective of many in the diplomatic corps, it remains unclear how the command’s proposed role will relate to existing mechanisms of interagency decisionmaking in Washington led by the National Security Council as well as whether the command’s activities will complement and support (rather than complicate or undercut) the leadership of U.S. ambassadors in integrating activities of U.S. government agencies through country teams. In particular, concern remains that AFRICOM will erode “chief of mission authority” and State’s foreign policy leadership within the U.S. government. The Regional Integration Teams (RITs) are particularly worrisome to those concerned about the ambassador’s chief of mission status in a given country. To ease these legitimate concerns, the Department of Defense must clarify the mandate of AFRICOM and how the new command will seek to accomplish its objectives. DOD should also negotiate a Memorandum of Understanding, or MOU, with the State Department that places AFRICOM’s role squarely in the context of established, civilian-led mechanisms for policy integration.

Explaining AFRICOM’s value for Africans—while tempering unrealistic expectations: To date, U.S. officials have done a poor job of marketing AFRICOM to its most important constituencies outside the United States: the governments and publics of the

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2. The other deputy commander will be a DOD three-star operational commander.
continent itself. Initial efforts by DOD to sell AFRICOM to these audiences were widely regarded as clumsy and ineffective. In the eyes of many African governments and observers, the United States presented the creation and mission of the command as a fait accompli rather than engaging in discrete consultations to lay the groundwork for its creation or providing opportunities for Africans to provide input into its role. This has allowed critics to paint AFRICOM as something imposed on them to advance U.S. security concerns and (more nefariously) to meddle on the continent. Going forward, the United States must adopt a more sophisticated approach to public diplomacy and strategic communications—one that persuades Africans of the command’s potential value-added for Africans themselves. At the same time, U.S. officials will need to manage expectations. This means avoiding the temptation to depict AFRICOM as a bellwether for quick substantial increases of U.S. government aid to the continent.

**Forward locating the AFRICOM headquarters and five subregional hubs:** The administration’s intention to shift AFRICOM headquarters from Stuttgart, Germany, to the continent, as well as to stand up the five subregional RIT hubs, each consisting of approximately 20 to 40 U.S. personnel, is fraught with diplomatic, financial, and security complications. The command headquarters, with approximately 600 military and civilian personnel, will represent a sizeable U.S. presence on the continent. It will be difficult to justify the high costs associated with building a new headquarters when U.S. security programs in Africa currently amount only to approximately $250 million. Making the headquarters basing decision an early priority objective has proven to be a significant tactical mistake and attracted considerable—and avoidable—controversy. The question of site selection is a source of tension between State and DOD in Washington and between the United States and African leaders, with Liberia openly vying to be host and South Africa, Libya, Nigeria, and Algeria (as well as defense chiefs of the Southern African Development Community) decrying the proposed continental basing. The strategic rationale for forward locating the headquarters remains elusive.

Selecting a site will pose painful diplomatic trade-offs, carry symbolic weight, and absorb energies better spent on strengthening core assistance programs with partners states. Given the substantial resistance they have created to the command, and absent a compelling strategic rationale, the task force believes that forward basing decisions should either be postponed to a much later point or suspended altogether. If the administration persists in locating AFRICOM’s headquarters on the continent in the next year, it will need to be prepared for continued, significant domestic and foreign resistance.

**Laying the foundations for a true interagency approach:** Beyond clarifying the mandate, the Bush administration needs to ensure that AFRICOM represents a supporting facet of a multilayered whole-of-government approach to Africa. This will require the State Department, under the guidance of the NSC, to work aggressively to formulate an integrated U.S. government–wide policy for engaging the continent. The White House and Congress will also need to strengthen and expand civilian expertise and resources focused on African security. For its part, AFRICOM must ensure that it receives adequate

3. In addition to these facilities and personnel, the command will be supported by a 600 to 700 person Joint Intelligence and Operations Center (JIOC), likely in Stuttgart.

4. This figure does not include the approximately 700 personnel expected to staff AFRICOM’s Joint Intelligence Operations Center, which is unlikely to be forward-positioned on the continent.
personnel from the State Department, USAID, and other civilian agencies to achieve its ambitions.

The command has only just begun to integrate other U.S. departments as well as to reach out to critical nongovernmental organizations operating on the continent—so far with only limited success. To date, the State Department has remained at a distance, has been largely absent from the planning process and has yet to commit many personnel to the staffing structure that became operational on October 1 of this year. State, in fact, has few staff to spare and under the most optimistic current scenario will only begin to fill several critical billets in the next annual assignment cycle beginning in summer 2008. In contrast to State’s diffidence, USAID has shown more willingness to engage the command. This difference in outlook reflects a variety of factors, including USAID’s operational culture (which it shares with the Pentagon); its practical experience in collaborating with the U.S. military in Afghanistan and Iraq; its desire to leverage DOD’s extensive resources to compensate for its own personnel and resource limitations; and its relative lack of concern about preserving its interagency prerogatives.

USAID and AFRICOM have begun to insert personnel into each others’ structures and to compare priorities and plans, thus laying the groundwork for more collaboration in the future.

Improving regional expertise among AFRICOM personnel: The command will also need to enlarge the regional expertise of its current staff, which includes few Africa specialists. Currently, Ambassador Mary Yates, the new deputy to the commander for civil-military activities, is the lone senior figure with Africa experience. This situation has improved somewhat on the DOD side as of October 1, with the transfer of approximately 20 Africa area experts from EUCOM. When CENTCOM’s Africa component is transferred to AFRICOM at full operational capacity, its Africa experts will also be added to the mix. Despite these additions, creating a new, enlarged cadre of skilled interagency talent will take several years.

Providing AFRICOM with an adequate and sustainable funding base: As of September 2007, unofficial EUCOM estimates put the cost of standing up AFRICOM’s headquarters on the continent at approximately $5 billion dollars, with expected start-up costs totaling $300 million for FY2008 and $1.2 billion for FY2008/2009. This would represent a significant increase from the current annual U.S. expenditures on security programs in Africa, which run slightly more than $250 million, and there is a major question as to where these resources will come from—or whether Congress will approve them. Pentagon officials complain that the State Department–led foreign aid reform process, under the director of foreign assistance, has actually cut IMET (International Military Education and Training), FMF, and CT fellowship programs for a number of African countries, suggesting a disconnect between the growing security relevance of Africa and State Department willingness and ability to budget accordingly. The budget processes of DOD and

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5. Among other partnerships, the command has shown special interest in establishing collaborative relationships with the Department of the Interior’s Forestry Service, the Center for Disease Control, and the Transportation Security Administration (to help improve security of African airports).

6. In addition, General Ward’s positive previous experience working with USAID in the Palestinian Territories has smoothed USAID-AFRICOM cooperation.

7. The $250 million funding includes FMF, IMET, ACOTA (African Contingency Operations Training and Assistance program), and CT activities in West Africa and the Horn, maritime security programs, and the reform of the Liberian security sector.
State remain wholly out of sync, sending contradictory and confusing signals to African governments and Congress about U.S. intentions regarding AFRICOM. General Ward has signaled that his strategy as commander will be to focus on a pragmatic dialogue with African partners on how to strengthen existing programs through incremental improvements. But legislators on Capitol Hill may well object that the high costs of the command are unwarranted, given the modest programmatic investments the administration is willing to make to improve African security.

Finding the right balance between long-term “shaping” efforts and responding to breaking crises: Africans have experienced tremendous conflict over the past 15 years, and several times over the course of that time frame the U.S. military has deployed to the continent. Although the command’s primary stated objective is to help mitigate the underlying causes of conflict, extremism, and instability through enlarged partnerships in Africa, the command will inevitably face operational crises. Somalia is the most immediate, conspicuous prospect. AFRICOM will likely find it challenging to strike the right balance between crisis response and long-term “shaping” activities, including institution building, that it aspires to pursue with its interagency partners. Moreover, crises will put great strains on the command, particularly in the delicate start-up phase. A mitigating factor is that many of these crises are likely to emerge in the Horn of Africa, which will not be transferred from CENTCOM’s area of responsibility to AFRICOM’s until the latter reaches full operational capability.
Main Findings and Recommendations

The United States stands at a crossroads in defining its national security policy. Despite rhetorical commitments to address the challenges of weak, failing, and post-conflict states and to build up civilian capacities for “transformational diplomacy,” there is continued, significant underinvestment in the nation’s preventative civilian foreign and development policy instruments. The Department of Defense’s expansion into nontraditional security assistance—and the Pentagon’s request to enlarge and make some authorities permanent—reflects an understandable effort to work around deficient civilian capacities. Evidence to date suggests the Pentagon’s new forms of security assistance have generated short-term benefits in insecure environments, particularly in countries critical to the Global War on Terrorism. DOD has in various countries helped improve the effectiveness of security forces, restore systems of governance, and provide essential services.

At the same time, DOD’s growing role poses risks to the coherence of U.S. foreign policy, the U.S. image abroad, and the sustainability of U.S. efforts to build stable, democratic and economically prosperous states in the developing world. To be more effective in the future, U.S. political leaders will need to better address the mismatch between the authorities provided to the State Department and Defense Department under Title 22 (Foreign Assistance Act) and Title 10 (DOD) of the U.S. Code, respectively, and the resources actually budgeted by the president and appropriated by Congress. A key priority must be the rebalancing the military and nonmilitary components of U.S. global engagement. To these ends, the task force calls upon the administration, Congress, and presidential candidates to become far more serious about creating a more balanced, transparent, and intelligible federal budget to adequately fund the civilian as well as the military side of U.S. national security.

DOD’s growing involvement in nontraditional security assistance also has implications for development outcomes in recipient countries. By 2005, the Pentagon was supplying more than one-fifth of all U.S. official development assistance—rivaling USAID in terms of the volume of aid it provides.¹ These trends have not gone unnoticed. In its recent peer review of the United States, the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the OECD highlighted the “rapidly growing ODA role of the Department of Defense” and encouraged the United States “to maintain policies based on development experience and good

¹. This surge in Pentagon-provided ODA is largely, though not exclusively, a reflection of the heavy U.S. involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan.

This advice grows from a sound development perspective. Realistically, in insecure environments, as in the ongoing insurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan, some normal development practices will take a near-term back seat to operational realities. Certain best practices may still be applicable, such as relying as much as possible on local labor and contractors, but winning “hearts and minds”—which may require targeting aid to particular beneficiaries or holding off on downsizing bloated civil service—will likely trump a focus on sustainability in nonpermissive environments.

These realities notwithstanding, the Pentagon must lean on and learn from the development community, particularly with respect to sustainable and accountable security institutions. Since the release of the 2006 QDR Report, DOD has devoted increased attention to the challenge of “capacity building” in partner countries, creating a new position—deputy assistant secretary of defense for partnership strategy—to oversee these efforts. To date, however, the Pentagon’s approach has focused overwhelmingly on building the operational capabilities of foreign security forces, so that states in the developing world can control their territory and borders against transnational terrorists, insurgents, and criminals. These critical tasks need to be complemented by security sector reforms designed to ensure that military, police, and intelligence services and ministries in partner countries are accountable to democratically elected civilian governments.

Within the development community, “capacity building” denotes not only the transfer of skills but the building of effective local institutions that permit countries to realize long-term, broadly shared economic growth and social welfare. From this perspective, an effective approach to “capacity building” in the world’s most fragile states requires an integrated effort, spanning U.S. agencies beyond DOD, to help ensure that any short-term measures to increase the operational capability of foreign forces advance rather than detract from long-term state building.

Pentagon officials clearly recognize the need to do more to foster professionalism and accountability among their military counterparts. To this end they have integrated institution building and rule of law considerations into the training courses offered at DOD’s Regional Centers,\footnote{These include the Africa Center for Strategic Studies, the Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies, the Near East–South Asia Center for Strategic Studies, the George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies, the Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies.} through the Warsaw Initiative Fund among Partnership for Peace (PfP) countries, and through DOD’s Combating Terrorism Fellowship Program. In spring 2007, the Pentagon proposed as Section 15\footnote{Section 15 of the Building Global Partnerships Act} of the Building Global Partnerships Act a Stability Operations Fellowship Program, which would have placed even greater emphasis on security sector reform and building long-term institutional capacity. That provision, however, was blocked by the State Department, which believed that it duplicated the (State-led) International Military Education and Training, or IMET, program.

Overall, the task force welcomes the Pentagon’s recent adoption of the SSTR mission and DOD’s acknowledgment of the need to allocate its own resources to carry out this task. In accepting this role, the Defense Department has filled crucial gaps and met urgent
stabilization and reconstruction demands in Iraq and Afghanistan. At the same time, the United States cannot afford to rely predominantly on the U.S. soldiers to perform tasks that in many cases might be performed more effectively by civilians, or risk overextending an already stretched military. Although there may be compelling reasons to give DOD flexibility to provide foreign assistance in specific, circumscribed crisis situations, granting more permanent global authorities and vesting DOD with a largely unaccountable coalition reimbursement capability will not address the larger structural problem of weak U.S. civilian capacities and will need to be handled carefully to avoid undermining both sustainable capacity building and broader U.S. foreign policy interests.

The task force calls on the administration and Congress to bolster the nation’s civilian government agencies by building robust response capabilities and improving handoff options in the wake of conflicts. This will entail not just correcting the imbalance between resources and authorities but also building up relevant civilian expertise and changing cultures within State and USAID so that they are in a better position to deliver stability-creating assistance in difficult environments.4

The task force offers recommendations that address the long-term structural imbalance between the Departments of State and Defense, while recognizing that this transformation will not happen overnight. In the near term, the United States will continue to depend on the military to carry out some critical capacity-building tasks.

The task force’s recommendations, delineated throughout this report, address both long-term structural transformation and immediate short-term challenges. A summary of these recommendations follows.

### Addressing the Structural Imbalance

To begin bolstering the civilian components of U.S. national Security, the task force:

- Recommends that Congress require the executive branch to provide an integrated resource picture for U.S. foreign and national security policy and adequate funding for the State Department and the U.S. Agency for International Development (Function 150), particularly for capabilities related to stabilization and state building. This step will be critical to enhance transparency and intelligibility of the budget process. The task force chose not to propose a wholesale overhaul of budgetary statutes and authorities and instead has emphasized that the Office of Budget and Management (OMB) and the National Security Council (NSC) should be required to document clearly how the foreign assistance streams for USAID, State, and DOD fit together. Such transparency within the executive branch will significantly advance U.S. national security, allowing for easier funding comparisons across agencies and sectors and for the creation of new metrics.

- Calls for improved congressional oversight mechanisms for national security to overcome structural obstacles in Congress to viewing unified national security authorities and budgets through a comprehensive lens. One option could be the

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4. Restoring USAID’s once-vaunted technical expertise would be a good place to start. Notwithstanding specialized units like the Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI), USAID has only modest standing, deployable technical expertise. There is only one person within USAID, for example, engaged full time in security sector reform (SSR).
creation of a select committee on U.S. national security, in both the Senate and House, with oversight responsibility for national security activities that cross agency boundaries and require interagency coordination of programs and budgets. Members would be drawn from the Intelligence, Senate Foreign Relations, Senate Armed Services, House Foreign Affairs, and House Armed Services committees, as well as from key homeland security committees. At a minimum, Congress should improve its coordination mechanisms across these committees.

- Underscores the critical importance of foreign aid, advocating placing development on a more equal footing with defense and diplomacy, by approving a significant increase in official development assistance (ODA) and integrating the multiple aid streams currently scattered throughout the U.S. government. Elevating development in U.S. national security policy will send a strong signal that promoting effective, accountable institutions in the developing world is a U.S. strategic imperative that requires significant investments and long time horizons.

- Proposes that the president appoint a new NSC senior director for conflict prevention and response to provide a locus of interagency coordination on these issues in the White House. Ideally, the senior director would occupy the contingency planning role envisioned in Presidential Decision Directive 56 (PDD-56). The Counterterrorism Security Group (CSG) could serve as a helpful model in creating this coordinating function. The senior director should be supported in large part by S/CRS, which would lead contingency planning for the State Department and USAID.

- Calls on Congress to pass Senate Resolution 613 and House Resolution 1084 officially establishing the State Department’s Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS). The mandate of this office should also be broadened to include greater emphasis on conflict prevention and capacity building, fostering a healthier interagency balance. It should be authorized and provided contingency funds to support rapid deployment to the field and the conduct of actual operations.

- Appeals to Congress to fully fund S/CRS’s three-tiered civilian response approach to support a credible civilian stabilization and reconstruction capability. The envisioned corps would include trained and ready federal civilian employees and arrangements to hire individual citizens and state and municipal employees as temporary federal workers, including for critical policing and rule of law functions.

- Requests the White House and Congress to eliminate or streamline presidential initiatives and legislative earmarks that sharply constrain the flexibility of U.S. foreign assistance for conflict-prone and post-conflict states.

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Implementing Near-term Solutions

The task force also offers more specific recommendations for the Bush administration and Congress regarding DOD provision of nontraditional security assistance, in the areas of counterterrorism capacity building; post-conflict operations; humanitarian assistance; and the newly established AFRICOM. In each case, these recommendations flow directly from the task force findings described earlier in chapters 1 through 4.

Counterterrorism Capacity Building

Findings
The task force concludes that unity of effort in U.S. government-wide CT initiatives has often proven elusive, with DOD and other U.S. agencies failing to agree on common strategies, to create effective architecture for collaboration, or to invest in civilian CT capabilities.

- At the strategic level:
  - There has been a lack of coherent vision and authoritative plans to guide identification of critical capabilities, rationalize resources across agency boundaries, and integrate target country activities. Instead there has been a proliferation of CT planning and guidance documents.

- At the organizational level:
  - There has been no coherent and effective institutional architecture to promote a unity of effort.
  - There has been a persistent structural misalignment between regionally based DOD Combatant Commands and State country-based approaches, complicating the use of either instrument as an interagency platform. This has been compounded by conflicting missions and institutional cultures among DOD, State, and USAID.

- At the resource level:
  - There has been a failure to invest in civilian CT capabilities. Despite a common belief that CT efforts should be “80% civilian and 20% military”—with aid directed toward activities like improving governance and the rule of law, promoting economic and social development, and advancing public education—the actual ratio has been the reverse.
  - Authorities for the use of resources have been overly rigid for many CT programs.

- With specific respect to Section 1206 authority:
  - The inability to carry 1206 funding across fiscal years is a significant obstacle to its effective use for emerging contingencies.
Limitations on DOD’s ability to work with nonmilitary internal security forces under Ministries of the Interior (e.g., gendarmerie, constabulary, border police, counterterrorism, coast guard) are a substantial barrier to the authority’s effective use.

**Recommended Solutions**

- **To foster a unified CT strategy, the task force:**
  - Recommends that DOD, State, and USAID present relevant congressional committees with a joint CT security assistance budget as part of a broader effort to require executive branch transparency on how State, USAID, and DOD budgets fit together.
  - Urges the administration and Congress to evaluate the National Implementation Plan (NIP) for Counterterrorism.
  - Endorses stronger State/DOD joint strategic planning and coordination at the regional level, using the Regional Strategic Initiative to improve embassy-CoCom coordination.

- **To break down institutional barriers, the task force:**
  - Advocates creating new incentives for “joint” CT approaches by providing additional funding for training, education, and recruitment and by mainstreaming the secondment of officials across agencies.
  - Supports robust civilian staffing of Joint Strategic and Operational Planning Mechanisms, including AFRICOM and CoCom Joint Interagency Coordination Groups (JIACGs).
  - Calls for the continuation and expansion of the practice of placing special operations officers in civilian agencies to improve unity of effort.
  - Endorses the creation of interagency CT task force structures in U.S. embassies.

- **To address gaps and weaknesses in funding for CT assistance, the task force:**
  - Recommends requiring budget-level displays of all CT Regional Strategic Initiatives and consideration of establishing flexible emergency CT funds for use by ambassadors.
  - Supports increased funding and staffing for USAID’s Office of Transition Initiatives, which has a proven track record for providing targeted civilian assistance.

- **With specific respect to Section 1206 authority, the task force:**
  - Supports extension of this authority over 3 to 5 years to foster program stability and allow funds to be carried over fiscal years.
  - Believes that the use of such funds should not be permanent and global but should be restricted to time-sensitive, emerging threats; should require State
Main Findings and Recommendations

Endorses improving the flexibility of 1206 by expanding its use to nonmilitary security forces (e.g., coast guards and Ministry of Interior forces) subject to explicit secretary of state agreement and intense congressional oversight.

- Recommends the gradual phasing out of Section 1206 authority with the creation of a substantial, flexible contingency fund (notionally within FMF) to support current 1206 programs.

Post-Conflict Operations

The task force welcomes DOD's adoption of SSTR operations as a core mission of the U.S. military and its acknowledgment of the need to devote resources and personnel to this undertaking. At the same time, its calls on DOD and the wider U.S. government to refine their approach to SSTR operations.

Findings

- Regarding Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs), the task force finds that
  - Effectiveness has been hampered by ambiguous mandates and the absence of interagency doctrine for stabilization missions, including any definition of the relative priority of security, governance, and development goals. The lack of agreed “metrics” makes it difficult to gauge the success or failure of PRTs.
  - PRT activities have rarely been informed by rigorous strategic planning or baseline assessments.
  - Rule of law efforts have performed weakly.
  - Civilian resources, personnel, and training have been insufficient relative to goals and ambitions. Many bureaucrats from civilian agencies lack the right skill sets for post-conflict operations, and there are too few professional incentives to get U.S. officials with the right talents to the field, particularly in dangerous places.
  - NGO/PRT relations have been often antagonistic, notably regarding NGOs’ desire for “humanitarian space” in which no military personnel are present to create the perception of compromised neutrality.

- Regarding CERP, the task force finds that
  - The highly decentralized and streamlined nature of the program—which is essential for operational agility in the field—makes CERP vulnerable to waste and abuse. There have been periodic reports of weak financial controls, inadequate approval processes, inappropriate uses, and substandard quality assurance.
  - The effective use of CERP depends heavily on the judgment, initiative, and situational awareness of the individual commander. There is little overall doctrine or training on how to employ it effectively.
The program has a proven track record as a short-term instrument for leveraging local support, which is of course its primary purpose. It is less effective in supporting legitimate and accountable local structures of governance over the medium to long term.

The program’s reliance on input from governance and development professionals from State, USAID, and other U.S. agencies has been uneven. There has been no comprehensive, publicly available official assessment of the uses and impacts of CERP.

**Recommended Solutions**

- To maximize the potential of PRTs, the task force:
  - Advises the NSC to initiate a government-wide process to clarify PRT mandate and doctrine, including agency roles.
  - Recommends that DOD and its civilian partners conduct more comprehensive strategic planning and baseline assessments.
  - Recommends expanded predeployment training of interagency teams.
  - Endorses a streamlining of USAID funds in post-conflict settings.
  - Calls for greater monitoring and evaluation of impact, including for security, governance, and development.
  - Advocates the development of robust civilian response and reserve corps to support future civilian-military teams, with attendant training and incentives.
  - Welcomes the recent DOD agreement with NGOs on “rules of the road” in insecure environments.

- To promote the effective and accountable use of CERP funds without compromising their agility and flexibility, the task force:
  - Welcomes the continued use of CERP in Iraq and Afghanistan.
  - Recommends that CERP be extended over 3 to 5 years and be expanded to all named operations.
  - Believes that CERP should be limited to funding emergency relief and rehabilitation activities, consistent with established guidance from the DOD comptroller.
  - Advises DOD to compile lessons learned and institutionalize training for field commanders using CERP.
  - Encourages DOD to develop stronger financial controls and improved approval processes and to institutionalize a standing arrangement (MOU) between Combatant Commands and chiefs of mission on the use of such funds.
  - Recommends the deployment of State and USAID personnel to brigade or battalion level, such as through the embedded PRT concept, to improve inter-agency input on the uses of CERP.
Humanitarian Assistance

Challenges Identified

- **Occasional irritants:**
  - U.S. civilian agencies at times generate conflicting or contradictory signals of what is expected or desired of DOD in the provision of humanitarian relief.
  - At times there is uneven synchronization of assessments by DART (USAID) and HAST (DOD) teams.
  - Operational coordination on the ground can be problematic and overly dependent on personalities.
  - Lack of timely USAID input on quick impact projects (QIPs) can impede these programs.

- **Structural impediments:**
  - HA funding does not balance immediate and long-term priorities.
  - Information sharing often breaks down in nonpermissive settings.
  - Joint HA planning is spotty at expeditionary/country team levels.
  - Shrinking humanitarian space creates frictions between DOD and NGO aid providers.

Proposed Solutions

- **To smooth over current irritants:**
  - Support full USAID staffing of senior development adviser positions (SDAs) at U.S. Combatant Commands, with skills in foreign disaster assistance.
  - Military commanders in theater should direct subordinate elements to ensure local USAID review of all HA projects under consideration; USAID for its part, must ensure that it has the requisite personnel and expertise available to assist commanders in the field.

- **To overcome impediments:**
  - On funding, ensure that HA contracts under negotiation are made off limits to reprogramming for immediate disaster needs and that USAID OFDA disaster funds are increased.
  - On planning problems:
    - Support issuance of a new National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD) to direct interagency cooperation on humanitarian assistance.
    - Make country teams the center of gravity for humanitarian planning, with guidance from Washington.
• On information collection/classification, adopt a new tactical-level requirement that HA-related data collected by military personnel on routine civil affairs and stabilization missions be treated as unclassified unless they are affirmatively deemed as CT or counterinsurgency related.

• On humanitarian space, provide training to the military on humanitarian practice and law and the role of NGOs. Continue a dialogue with NGO actors on ways to improve the role of the military in humanitarian operations.

With respect to OHDACA funds:

• Endorse an increase in OHDACA funds.

• Permit use of the funds for “stabilization” missions only where the chief of mission and combatant commander jointly determine that such efforts are in U.S. national security interests and that there is insufficient civilian capacity.

• Engage USAID in the monitoring and evaluation of uses of such funds.

AFRICOM

Challenges Identified

The task force believes the creation of DOD’s new Africa Command represents an encouraging but insufficient step in building a whole-of-government approach to Africa and creating the possibility for higher efficiencies in building partner capacities in Africa. Several obstacles to its effectiveness remain.

• A lack of clarity about the command’s mandate and concept of operations.

• Uncertainty about the command’s role in U.S. policy integration, including its relationship to the National Security Council in Washington and U.S. Missions in host countries.

• A lack of clarity about the command’s value-added for African partner states and unrealistic expectations in some countries.

• Uncertainty about the command’s permanent headquarters and subregional hubs.

• The lack of a significant interagency presence, particularly from State.

• An absence of sufficient regional expertise early in the command’s establishment.

• An uncertain funding base.

• The inherent difficulty of balancing AFRICOM’s long-term “shaping” agenda with its responsibility to manage breaking crises.

An additional important reality is that until the United States enhances the quality and strength of its diplomatic corps charged with managing Africa policy, its policy approach will not be balanced and effective and the creation of a unified, robust AFRICOM may be mistaken for the chief avenue for U.S. engagement with Africa.
Proposed Solutions

To help resolve these challenges, the task force proposes that the Pentagon work with the State Department and the National Security Council to

- Affirm clearly the primacy of civilian policy oversight for U.S. Africa policy. Develop a State Department–led interagency approach to promoting African regional security, stability, and development.

- Refine the command’s mandate and concept of operations. Clarify the command’s supporting relationship to existing U.S. government mechanisms for policy integration, notably the National Security Council and U.S. embassies, to ensure consistency with Washington policymaking and chief of mission authority.

- Intensify public diplomacy outreach to African audiences, both official and nongovernmental.

- Absent a compelling and overriding strategic rationale for locating AFRICOM’s headquarters in the region, either postpone any decision for basing AFRICOM’s headquarters in Africa to a much later point or suspended action altogether. Priority focus should instead be directed toward demonstrating AFRICOM’s ability to bring concrete gains in its critical emerging partnerships with African governments.

- Ensure a robust civilian agency presence in AFRICOM, particularly from State and USAID, and bolster regional expertise among both military and civilian staff.

- Secure, reliable long-term funding from Congress for core programs, such as building peacekeeping capacity; strengthening control by African partner states of borders, ports, and weakly governed remote territories and maritime environments; enhancing strategic planning and civilian, democratic oversight of the security sector; and strengthening public health, especially control of HIV/AIDS.
Appendix

The Building Global Partnerships Act

The Bush administration submitted the proposed Building Global Partnerships Act in an effort to close perceived gaps in the Department of Defense’s foreign and security assistance authorities. The act’s components are broken down below by capability, capacity, commonality, and conditions:

Capability (training, equipping, exercising, advising):
- Permanent, flexible authority to train, equip, and work with partners for operations to combat terrorism and enhance stability (Sections 1511 and 1512).

Capacity (logistic and material support, technical support):
- Loans of Significant Military Equipment to partners for personnel protection and survivability (Section 1521)
- Limited grants of nonlethal Excess Defense Articles directly by the CoCom (Section 1522)
- Authority to share maritime domain awareness information with partners (Section 1523)
- Authority to maintain inventories of critical items for sale, loan, or grant to coalition partners (Section 1524)
- Authorities to improve support of commercial defense sales overseas (Sections 1525 and 1526).

Commonality (interoperability, shared perspectives):
- Interoperability training for more partners (Section 1531)
- Greater DOD participation in multinational centers of excellence (Section 1533)
- DOD fellowships for stability operations (Section 1534)
- Increased authority for effective liaison and exchange programs with partners (Sections 1532 and 1535).

Conditions (support for local populations):
- Permanent and global Commanders Emergency Response Program authority to meet urgent humanitarian and reconstruction needs in the field (Section 1541)
■ Expansion of authority for programmed humanitarian activities and disaster response to include stabilization (Section 1542).

Authority to let third parties make payments under the DOD rewards program, enabling partners supporting U.S. operations to combat terrorism (Section 1543).