The Importance of Building Local Capabilities: Lessons from the Counterinsurgency in Iraq

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Executive Summary

The US experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan have shown that building local allied forces and capabilities will be major mission requirements in future wars and US military interventions. Placing greater reliance on local forces provides a mechanism for reducing the demands placed on US forces; it helps the US compensate for the religious, ideological, and cultural differences that the US faces in fighting the war on terrorism; and it can help compensate for the lack of US civilian counterparts to the US military that can take up many of the potential burdens in stability operations and nation building.

History provides consistent warnings about the need for the US to build-up local forces and capabilities. This is also a key point in the new, draft US Army Field Manual (FM 3-24) on Counterinsurgency issued in June 2006, and it is touched upon in part in the new Department of Defense Directive on stability operations, DoD Directive 3000.05. Establishing security in post-conflict areas has always required a broad effort at the regional and local levels to create a mix of military forces to deal with the main threats. But it has also required developing police or paramilitary forces, establishing some kind of local government presence and services to provide credibility, and creating courts and legal institutions to establish a rule of law that kept corruption, arbitrary official violence, and the abuse of minorities and human rights within workable limits.

One of the most serious US strategic failures in Iraq was the lack of effective planning to ensure the continuity of government, police, and legal operations. The US realized late in the nation building game that the only strategy that could allow it to remove most or all of its forces from Iraq within a few years, produce some kind of victory, and solve America’s immediate problem of “overstretch” on a timely basis, was to create a mix of Iraqi forces and Iraqi governance that could relieve the burden on the US, and support this effort with added economic aid.

While it is too early to draw a full, detailed set of conclusions about the US intervention in Iraq, several lessons can be learned from the initial phases of the operation. Some of these include: fully assessing the risks in going to war as objectively as possible; looking carefully at containment, diplomacy, and alternative uses of resources; not committing US forces without corresponding levels of resources; emphasizing the role of local governments and forces; anticipating ethnic and sectarian fault lines; and not narrowly imposing US values on a foreign country. The US cannot afford to prepare for an era of asymmetric warfare, and a “long war” against Islamist extremism and terrorism, without acting on these lessons as quickly as possible.

Iraq and Afghanistan also show that stability operations and nation building activities not only should begin before hostilities or any other form of military intervention, they should be an integral part of even the most intense conventional warfare. Having civil-military teams to work immediately with local police and local governments, and military units to work with Iraqi military units to keep them in place and preserve potential cadres for future Iraqi forces would have been critical. Local aid teams might have done much to defuse hostility, particularly if they had worked through local authorities, mosques, and institutions. Integrating ideological and political warfare, and combining conventional warfighting with effective stability operations are crucial to success.

In most divided countries and failed states, military action will cause a significant part of the population to see US forces as a threat or an enemy from the start, and large portions of the populace will blame every failure or problem that follows on US forces. As Iraq and Afghanistan both demonstrate, there may be a narrow window of opportunity in which to create local
government and security capabilities out of existing elements of local forces, reduce the image of US forces as “invaders” or “occupiers,” and avoid local tensions and ethnic and sectarian rivalries from exploding into terrorism or insurgency.

US experience in Iraq also highlighted some ideological lessons. The US must not go to war assuming that its actions and values are popular or transcend local values. It must recognize that rhetoric about the universal support for democracy, secular views of law and human rights, and/or capitalism is simply not realistic, and that a thin veneer of exiles and Western educated citizens who may claim to share such views does not provide a picture of what the people of a country want or can accept.

On the political side of operations, the US should rely as much as possible on local government and expand its role and capability as soon as possible, to work within the limits imposed by local conditions, and to set a clear strategy for encouraging the kind of compromises and consensus that allows the political process to function and governance to operate.

Regarding foreign aid, Iraq is scarcely a unique example of the problems in using foreign aid to help a developing country. Aid efforts since World War II have shown that they can be of great value in helping a country get organized and become capable of helping itself. But this course of aid efforts has also shown that outside efforts to use aid to reshape the economies of failed states rarely produce meaningful results, and that the US has little competence in planning such efforts even under peacetime conditions.

Many of the lessons from Afghanistan and Iraq apply more broadly to the “global war on terrorism.” Once again, the US needs local allies and forces that are able and willing to act to combat the terrorist threat posed by Islamic extremism, and specifically by neo-Salafi Sunni Islamist extremism. Military and counterterrorist battles need to be won by local and Islamic forces, not by “occupiers,” “crusaders,” and “neo-imperialists.”

The West needs to accept the fact that a more evolutionary approach to change means working with many local leaders that are not democratic, fall short of Western ideals, or are traditional in character. Calls for “regime change” and other efforts that introduce political instability, and produce more resistance to reform, will do far more harm than good. The West must recognize that people in the Islamic world do not make politics or Western approaches to human rights their main priority. They look for personal security, for jobs, for education for their children, for health services, and for other government services. The key to defeating Islamic extremism, and the broad popular base that sympathizes with such extremism, comes first from providing popular security without oppression and then from providing economic opportunity for both today’s workers and their children.

At the same time, this critique of the US and Western approach to winning the long war in no way absolves the political, religious, and intellectual leaders in Islamic nations from making even more striking changes in their behavior—local forces and efforts are the ultimate keys to success. The real “war on terrorism” can only be won if the religious, political, and intellectual leaders of Islamic countries and communities actively confront and fight neo-Salafi Sunni Islamist extremism at the religious and ideological levels. The “long war” will be lost if such leaders stand aside, take half measures, or compromise with enemies that seek to destroy them and what they believe in. It will be lost if they deny that the real issue is the future of Islam, if they tolerate Islamist violence and terrorism when it strikes at unpopular targets like Israel, or if they continue to try to export the blame for their own failures to other nations, religions, and cultures.
Implementing a “winning” strategy in this struggle does require mutual cooperation, but the key lies in the ability of those who are part of the Islamic world to exploit the real-world limitations and capabilities of the enemy and defeat them at the heart of their ideological arguments in the mosques, in the classrooms, on the television screens, and at all levels of civil society. This is not the job of Western nations or intellectuals but of Muslim religious, government, business, and intellectual leaders.

This leaves the US with some hard choices. It must realize that no matter what it does to improve its counterterrorism capabilities, counterinsurgency capabilities, and area expertise, it will fight an uphill battle if it fights alone or without substantial support. Winning local and regional support, however, means accepting allies that often will have different values. The US cannot simultaneously seek to impose its own vision of “democracy” or reform, and cannot count on quick and rapid progress. It cannot assume that its Western values will always be right or triumphant, and it will have to be far more realistic about the possible pace of reform in much of the world, the need to work with individual countries and groups at their own pace, and defer to local leaders and reformers.
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**Introduction**

The problem of creating effective Iraqi forces is only one example of the challenges the US faces in restructuring its alliances to reduce the strains on its forces and to make American military action more effective. At the same time, the US experience in both Iraq and Afghanistan has shown that building local allied forces and capabilities is almost certain to be a major mission requirement in other wars and US military interventions.

Placing greater reliance on local forces provides a mechanism for reducing the demands placed on US forces. It helps the US compensate for the religious, ideological, and cultural differences that the US faces in fighting the war on terrorism. And it can help compensate for the lack of US civilian counterparts to the US military that can take up many of the potential burdens in stability operations and nation building.

Far more is involved, however, than making the maximum possible use of allied forces and reducing the burden on the US and the risk of “overstretch.” There are many things the US can do to improve the counterinsurgency capabilities of its forces, their area and language skills, and expertise in civil-military and nation building operations. There is much the US can do to improve its Interagency capabilities to provide civilian support to military operations, and much it can do to improve its overall structure of alliances and ability to obtain allied support. This is a key point in the new, draft US Army Field Manual (FM 3-24) on Counterinsurgency issued in June 2006, and it is touched upon in part in the recent Department of Defense Directive on stability operations, DoD Directive 3000.05.²

The fact remains, however, that the US needs to go much further if it is to deal with a world filled with non-state actors who fight on asymmetric terms, and use new methods of terrorism and insurgency. Many future wars will involve nations that at least partially qualify as “failed states” as well as states that have very different cultures and values from those of the US. This is particularly true of the areas where the US faces its most severe challenges in the “long war.” As long as the US struggles against Islamist extremists, it will have to deal with different religious and ideological values and the perception that the US is a “neoimperialist,” “crusader,” or “occupier.”

Moreover, major stability and nation building operations will always present serious problems in terms of US force quantity and force quality. Unless the US can rely on local forces, it will face the potential need to make long term deployments of large numbers of US troops and civilians. It will simultaneously need large numbers of personnel with highly specialized area, language, cultural, and administrative skills. In most cases, the US simply will not be able to have the numbers and kinds of personnel it needs, whether military or civilian, unless it can develop strong local forces and civil capabilities to supplement its resources.

Political and ideological dimensions will likely dominate many future asymmetric wars. Only using or creating local forces and local governance can minimize the inevitable frictions between US efforts and the local populace, and the ability of terrorists, insurgents, and other hostile forces to exploit the alien status of a US presence. In most cases, this will mean that the US must expend significant resources to create the local capabilities the US needs to win. Almost by definition, the kind of local forces and governance required will be missing. If they were there in the first place, there would be no need for US intervention short of a major invasion or series of operations from a neighboring state.

In most such cases, the US will still have to send in combat forces, but the ultimate focus of its operations will not be the direct defeat of an enemy by US forces, but rather the creation of local
capabilities that can defeat the enemy, and the establishment of political and economic stability, even in sustained asymmetric struggles and wars of attrition.

Furthermore, even when local allies already have substantial capabilities, extensive US training and financial and equipment aid will still be needed. So will the ability to rapidly deploy and sustain a balanced US assistance effort that mixes the development of military and police forces with political and economic aid, and efforts to create an effective criminal justice system and rule of law.

**Balanced “Construction,” Not “Reconstruction”**

History provides consistent warnings about the need for the US to build-up local forces and capabilities. It also warns, however, that each case must be treated differently. This is not the place for case study comparisons, but even a casual acquaintance with history makes it clear that Vietnam was not Lebanon, which was not Haiti, which was not Somalia, which was not Afghanistan, which was not Iraq. If one looks at UN and other peacemaking operations, the case specific nature of efforts to create local forces and capabilities is even clearer.

At the same time, in most cases, the use of the word “reconstruction” was a fundamental misnomer. Existing local capabilities provided some foundation, but the primary task was actually to improve or construct new local capabilities and not to reconstruct old ones. In each case, it was also clear that the end goal had to be developing a balanced mix of local capabilities, and not simply creating local military forces. Action was also required at the ideological, political, security, and economic level or local forces could not win and often became part of the problem.

Establishing security also always required a broad effort at the regional and local levels to create a mix of military forces to deal with the main threat. It also, however, required the development of police or paramilitary forces to deal with local or lesser threats. It required some kind of local government presence and services to give governance and the political process credibility. Finally, it required the development of courts and legal institutions to establish a rule of law that kept corruption, arbitrary official violence, and the abuse of minorities and human rights within workable limits.

This why the new, draft US Army Field Manual (FM 3-24) on Counterinsurgency issued in June 2006 and the new Department of Defense Directive 3000.05 on stability operations are only initial guidance in dealing with far more serious problems in working with local forces.\(^5\) The US does not simply need to transform its military forces to fight terrorists or insurgents. It needs to transform its national security structure to be able to fight civil-military warfare in ways that rely far more heavily on the development of local forces and capabilities. One of the most serious US strategic failures in Iraq was the lack of effective planning to ensure the continuity of government, police, and legal operations. Another was the failure to see the transformation of the Iraqi military and the various militias into an effective force as the key both to providing local stability with a local face, and to keeping such elements from becoming part of the security threat.

The US was slow to see the need to create new military forces, restructure and reform the police, match military and police efforts with the deployment of a local Iraqi government presence, and provide courts and a functional rule of law. It was not until 2005 that the development of Iraqi military forces gathered full momentum. And it was not until late in 2005 that officials recognized the potential importance of the Ministry of Interior and its security forces, as a source of Shi’ite sectarian violence.
Preserving or creating effective police forces was treated as a tertiary or passing priority until it became brutally clear that local civil, sectarian, and ethnic violence were becoming as much of a threat as the insurgency, and that many of the police and other security forces were part of this problem. This led to 2006 being called the “year of the police,” but it was not until mid-2006 that the US and its allies recognized just how important such efforts really were, and how dangerous private militias and security forces were. Even then, there was limited recognition of the need for a matching government presence at the local level, and functional courts and legal institutions. The same was true of the need to fight crime and soft ethnic cleansing, not just the insurgents and militias, and the importance of providing the kind of economic aid that could actually deal with the worst problems of unemployment.

It is worth noting that in Afghanistan’s case, the problems were different. Heavy reliance was placed on local capabilities and forces from the start, but few resources were provided to create them. A single-minded military concentration on defeating the Taliban and a political concentration on creating a national democracy and government, were combined with minimal local security efforts, an attempt to create Afghani military forces that were a small fraction of what was needed, no serious effort to create effective police or rule of law, grossly insufficient economic aid, and denial of Afghanistan’s real-world dependence upon a drug economy. The importance of Afghanistan’s ethnic and sectarian problems, and particularly its religious and cultural conservatism and traditions, was sharply underestimated. This was particularly true of the Pashtun problem and its overlap into Pakistan, which helped create the Taliban in the first place.

The US has generally done a better job of helping countries develop local capabilities to fight the war on terrorism. In most cases, this was the only real option since occupation or a major US presence was not practical. The task was also easier because the US was not dealing with failed states. In general, developing local capabilities in these other countries required limited training, technology, and other assistance and expertise in counterterrorism, and could build on existing ideological, political, security, and economic structures.

Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia are all cases in point where the US effectively gained “force multipliers” in terms of local counterterrorism capabilities that it could aid and encourage and which acted not only as substitutes for US action and forces but as more capable forces than the US could generate because they were native, were perceived as legitimate, and had the necessary religious, cultural, and linguistic identities.

**The US Strategy for Iraq and Its Prognosis**

At this point, there is no way to be sure whether the US can succeed in building such balanced local capabilities in Iraq. The historical record in other countries has not been good, almost regardless of the effort involved. The internal divisions and forces that cause failed states are extremely difficult to change, and Secretary General Kofi Annan has noted that over 50% of all the countries where the UN sends in peacekeeping missions revert to violence within five years.

The US has, however, come to focus on such a balanced approach, and this has been the declared US strategy since President Bush formally announced it on November 30 2005. In fact, the US clearly laid out the need to address the political, security, and economic dimensions of its activity in Iraq as part of an integrated effort in the strategy it issued following the President’s speech:

*Our Strategy for Victory is Clear*

We will help the Iraqi people build a new Iraq with a constitutional, representative government that respects civil rights and has security forces sufficient to maintain
domestic order and keep Iraq from becoming a safe haven for terrorists. To achieve this end, we are pursuing an integrated strategy along three broad tracks, which together incorporate the efforts of the Iraqi government, the Coalition, cooperative countries in the region, the international community, and the United Nations.

The Political Track involves working to forge a broadly supported national compact for democratic governance by helping the Iraqi government:

- Isolate enemy elements from those who can be won over to the political process by countering false propaganda and demonstrating to all Iraqis that they have a stake in a democratic Iraq;
- Engage those outside the political process and invite those willing to turn away from violence through ever-expanding avenues of participation; and
- Build stable, pluralistic, and effective national institutions that can protect the interests of all Iraqis, and facilitate Iraq's full integration into the international community.

The Security Track involves carrying out a campaign to defeat the terrorists and neutralize the insurgency, developing Iraqi security forces, and helping the Iraqi government:

- Clear areas of enemy control by remaining on the offensive, killing and capturing enemy fighters and denying them safe-haven;
- Hold areas freed from enemy influence by ensuring that they remain under the control of the Iraqi government with an adequate Iraqi security force presence; and
- Build Iraqi Security Forces and the capacity of local institutions to deliver services, advance the rule of law, and nurture civil society.

The Economic Track involves setting the foundation for a sound and self-sustaining economy by helping the Iraqi government:

- Restore Iraq's infrastructure to meet increasing demand and the needs of a growing economy;
- Reform Iraq's economy, which in the past has been shaped by war, dictatorship, and sanctions, so that it can be self-sustaining in the future; and
- Build the capacity of Iraqi institutions to maintain infrastructure, rejoin the international economic community, and improve the general welfare of all Iraqis.

This Strategy is Integrated and its Elements are Mutually Reinforcing

Progress in each of the political, security, and economic tracks reinforces progress in the other tracks.

For instance, as the political process has moved forward, terrorists have become more isolated, leading to more intelligence on security threats from Iraqi citizens, which has led to better security in previously violent areas, a more stable infrastructure, the prospect of economic progress, and expanding political participation.

Victory Will Take Time

Our strategy is working: Much has been accomplished in Iraq, including the removal of Saddam's tyranny, negotiation of an interim constitution, restoration of full sovereignty, holding of free national elections, formation of an elected government, drafting of a permanent constitution, ratification of that constitution, introduction of a sound currency, gradual restoration of neglected infrastructure, the ongoing training and equipping of Iraqi security forces, and the increasing capability of those forces to take on the terrorists and secure their nation.
Yet many challenges remain: Iraq is overcoming decades of a vicious tyranny, where governmental authority stemmed solely from fear, terror, and brutality.

- It is not realistic to expect a fully functioning democracy, able to defeat its enemies and peacefully reconcile generational grievances, to be in place less than three years after Saddam was finally removed from power.

Our comprehensive strategy will help Iraqis overcome remaining challenges, but defeating the multi-headed enemy in Iraq -- and ensuring that it cannot threaten Iraq's democratic gains once we leave -- requires persistent effort across many fronts.

**Our Victory Strategy Is (and Must Be) Conditions Based**

- With resolve, victory will be achieved, although not by a date certain.
  - No war has ever been won on a timetable and neither will this one.

But lack of a timetable does not mean our posture in Iraq (both military and civilian) will remain static over time. As conditions change, our posture will change.

- We expect, but cannot guarantee, that our force posture will change over the next year, as the political process advances and Iraqi security forces grow and gain experience.
- While our military presence may become less visible, it will remain lethal and decisive, able to confront the enemy wherever it may organize.
- Our mission in Iraq is to win the war. Our troops will return home when that mission is complete.

There is no way to be certain how much better the situation would be if the US had begun with such a strategy, if it had not committed the strategic mistakes described earlier, or if it had begun its invasion with the plans and resources to preserve as many existing Iraqi capabilities as possible and encourage Iraqis to take the lead in the areas where new capabilities were needed. US efforts to implement this strategy have come late in terms of organization, staffing, resources, and coherence. As a result, success virtually had to be uncertain at the ideological, political, security, and economic levels. Iraq may plunge into civil war, divide, or simply fail to emerge as a strong and viable state that meets its peoples’ needs.

It may well be that much of the tragedy that followed the fall of Saddam Hussein could have been avoided, although no one can ever be sure. The sheer scale of the task of reshaping a nation of some 27 million people in a divided state after decades of dictatorship, war, and economic mismanagement may well have been beyond US capability even if it had chosen such a strategy to begin with, committed the necessary resources, and chosen to work closely with every faction in Iraq.

What is clear is that time and experience have since forced the US to focus on the development of local forces and capabilities, and that this is a serious warning about how the US should shape its strategy and military interventions in the future. The US found in practice that only a strategy that could allow it to remove most or all of its forces from Iraq within a few years, produce some kind of victory, and solve America’s immediate problem of “overstretch” on a timely basis, was to create a mix of Iraqi forces and Iraqi governance that could relieve the burden on the US, and support this effort with added economic aid.

Moreover, the US found it could not hope for any kind of victory until it was clear that the Iraqi government had created both a far more stable political structure for Iraq and a far more effective government. It could not hope for victory until Iraq had a suitable mix of military, police, and legal forces in the field. It could not hope for victory without maintaining major military
advisory and aid efforts, providing continuing support from US heavy and special forces, and eventually reshaping Iraqi military capabilities to deter and defend against Iraq’s neighbors. Even under the best conditions, the US found it would not face “tipping points” in Iraq; it faced “tipping years.”

**The Lessons of US Intervention in Iraq**

It is too early to draw a full set of conclusions about the more detailed lessons the US should draw from its intervention in Iraq, and it must be stressed that the lessons from one contingency may not apply to the next. At the same time, the US cannot afford to prepare for an era of asymmetric warfare, and a “long war” against Islamist extremism and terrorism, without acting on such lessons as quickly as possible. It is also clear that some lessons are certain to apply to many future contingencies.

**Risk Assessment and Operational Planning**

One critical grand strategic lesson that does clearly emerge from the Iraq War is that the decision to intervene is the moment at which the US can do most to limit the strain on its forces. The US must learn from Iraq what it did not learn from Vietnam. It cannot unilaterally reshape the world or even other nations. Moreover, limited wars are always optional; they are not crusades, they do not merit open-ended commitments, and diplomatic and military alternatives must always be fully considered.

Risk assessment must always look beyond the narrow issue of the immediate rationale for military action, and the prospects for short-term success, and consider the cost-benefits in terms of stability operations, nation building, and long-term efforts. Such assessments must also be regional and global. The US can never take serious military action without affecting its overall strategic and diplomatic position, affecting regional and global perceptions, and impacting on other nations.

Risk assessment must also be realistic, and consider failure as well as success. One of the few iron laws of contingency planning is that planning for success is often a good way to plan for failure. It is far better to be cautious and pessimistic in deciding whether to act, and—if that decision is taken—to plan for much higher force levels, costs, and periods of commitment than may ultimately be necessary. A nation with America’s resources can afford waste—which may often be its best secret weapon. It cannot afford too little and too late.

If there is any clear parallels between Iraq and Vietnam, it is that risk assessments cannot be based on responding to the desires of policymakers or their political ideology. The Neoliberals that took the US to war in Vietnam were strikingly similar to the Neoconservatives that took the US to war in Iraq. They both learned the hard way that in a confrontation between reality and political hope and belief, it is reality that tends to win.

It is equally clear that these decisions should explicitly consider how much the US can and must rely on local capabilities. No matter how many other members may be in a given coalition of the willing, with or without a UN mandate, the center of gravity in such wars will always be local forces and governance. Grand strategic success does not depend on who deploys or invades; it depends on the local government and forces that remain once US and allied forces leave.

Accordingly, the US has several lessons to learn from the initial phases of its experience in Iraq:

> Fully assess the risks in going to war as objectively as possible, and do so in the light of both explicit analysis of all the alternatives, and the risks through successful conflict termination and nation building if
necessary. A “can do” approach is both stupid and self-destructive. So is bypassing the Interagency process or seeking to serve the policymaker, rather than the nation.

Look carefully at containment, diplomacy, and alternative uses of resources: Containment was not an ideal solution to Saddam Hussein, but it is clear in retrospect that it had succeeded in both crippling Iraq’s conventional military capabilities and denying Iraq the ability to reconstitute it weapons of mass destruction. If one uses Congressional Budget Office (CBO) estimates—which are lower than those estimated by the Congressional Research Service (CRS)—the Iraq War alone cost $290 billion between March 2003 and the end of FY 2006, and was likely to cost at least $166 billion more to terminate successfully (with a high end estimate of $368 billion). Even if one ignores the human, political and diplomatic costs of the fighting to the US, these are immense opportunity costs in terms of alternative spending on US military forces, US allies and influence, and aid programs. Furthermore, many experts put the predicted total cost at $800 billion to $1 trillion.

Do not commit US forces without a detailed operational plan for integrated Interagency action: One of the major problems in the US approach to the Iraq War was that the Interagency analysis before the war was far more diagnostic than operational. This was partly due to a lack of core competence. The US simply did not have a large pool of personnel, or outside experts to draw upon, with detailed knowledge of Iraq’s internal politics, methods of governance, security forces, or economy. It lacked meaningful generic experience in counterinsurgency prevention, ensuring continuity of government, and stability operations in general. The US had virtually no experience with command economies, particularly one as distorted and corrupt as Iraq’s, and lacked the most basic data and expertise to do sectoral analysis and planning.

If the US is to conduct stability operations and nation building, it must go to war with clear plans for the entire conflict to the final conflict termination stage, with estimated costs, or at least go to war with a clear and honest understanding of the area where it lacks core expertise and the ability to plan. This is also an essential aspect of risk and cost benefit analysis. If the US cannot create workable operational plans, this is a major additional risk that must be weighed as such. If the US lacks suitable assets in terms of core competence to plan, it will be far worse off when it comes to executing the plan. If the US cannot estimate the full range of costs over time before engaging, decision makers need an explicit analysis of what the US can and cannot cost.

If the US faces a “long war,” and many such operations do involve military and advisory presences that last years and often a decade, a clear decision must be made to make such a commitment. American political and policymaking culture looks for quick and simple solutions. In many, if not most, cases involving “failed states,” or countries with serious internal problems, the search for speed and simplicity is an exercise in self-delusion. Shaping history is complex and it takes time. American strategic planning and military operations must accept this.

Such plans cannot eliminate risk or produce any certainty. They will inevitably be wrong in many areas, and require constant change and adaptation. All of the tired military homilies about the war plan being the first casualty of combat apply even more strongly to comprehensive operational plans. If the US does not start with a plan, however, its efforts to improvise one will be far worse than if there were no plan at all, and its risk assessments will have little meaning.

Do not commit US forces without committing US resources: The US went to war in Iraq with no commitment to providing an enduring military presence, with no meaningful plan or resources for civilian support, and with no meaningful costing of the possible contingencies that could emerge and no funds for foreign aid. In 2006, the Bush Administration still could not provide the Congress with even the crudest plan for future expenditures, and relied on supplemental budget requests that were decoupled from its ability to execute the strategy it had developed. Once again, there are no uncertainties in such planning.

The failure to even begin realistic efforts to plan was, however, inexcusable and helped make meaningful risk and cost-benefit analysis impossible. It should also be clear that the level of planning required to ensure success will at least take months and often years. Iraq strongly indicates that the US needs integrated plans to be developed now for possible contingencies on the scale of Iran, North Korea, and the Taiwan Straits.

Make the role of local governments and forces an essential part of risk assessment and planning. In retrospect, US action in Iraq is the model of what not to do in the future. The US relied far too much on the hopes of exiles and a “coalition of the willing.” The US failed to assess what aspects of the Iraqi system of
governance, legal system, military, and police services it should seek to preserve or work with. It sought to impose a new constitution rather than alter the old one, and ended in doing the same for the legal code. It saw the Ba’ath Party as a whole as a potential problem or threat, rather than the political cover that most secular Iraqis have been forced to adopt. It did not plan for, or provide, forces to secure government offices and operations as it advanced.

US planning should, from the start, focus on how to use and develop local capabilities as a key “force multiplier.” Even the best and most willing outside allies cannot be an enduring presence, and they too have every reason to encourage local governments and forces. More important, no end game is possible except through the success of local forces and governments. Indefinite occupation is simply not an option.

Anticipate the fact that conflict or crisis almost inevitably exacerbates sectarian/confessional and ethnic/tribal divisions, and other local fault lines. The idea that “liberation,” peacemaking interventions, outside assistance, and the urgency of humanitarian crises somehow unite a people is false far more often than correct. In most cases, the opposite is true. Both risk assessment and plans cannot be based on political and ideological assumptions based on hope and good intentions. They must reflect the fact that any kind of national turmoil tends to uncap previous local fault lines and divisions, and that operations can only succeed if they anticipate this and are willing to commit the necessary effort and resources to deal with the result.

Look beyond military force development and plan accordingly: One key lesson that Iraq provides that has emerged out of one insurgency, stability operation, and nation building exercise after another, is that developing stability and security means a tight focus on developing local military, security, and police forces and not simply military forces. Equally important, security forces without courts and the rule of law inevitably become corrupt, abusive, or fractional.

Moreover, any serious stability operation requires police and security forces, and courts and prisons, strong enough to withstand serious paramilitary and insurgent attacks. US-style police cannot survive or function under the conditions required and the resulting local power vacuum will cause far more human rights abuses than creating effective forces. On the one hand, this means the precedent that the MNF-I MNSTC-I set in October 2005 of combining advice through the US military to the Ministry of Interior, Ministry of Defense, army, security forces, and police is one that should be followed in all similar cases. On the other hand, it makes it equally important to provide immediate and parallel civilian support to creating effective courts and prisons, and ensuring a civil government presence in the field.

Do not seek to narrowly impose US goals and values on a foreign country and culture: The US cannot, however, make effective use of local capabilities unless it is willing to defer to many local values and sensitivities. There is nothing new about the US treating war as a moral crusade and seeking to impose its values on a foreign country and defeated enemy. Hans Morgenthau and James Reston talked about these American tendencies, and the strengths and weaknesses, more than half a century ago. In Iraq’s case, however, this was carried to unique and dangerous extremes.

Neoconservatives, and many others including leading liberals in the Congress, assumed that US values were global, the values Iraq should choose, and the values Iraqis either already had or would quickly acquire once Saddam Hussein and his elite were removed from power. Even today, the US often tacitly rejects the right of Iraqis to put religion before secular values, and their own culture before US concepts of human rights. It is one thing to influence and persuade, and quite another to impose and assume. It is particularly naive to assume the US can achieve massive, sudden change when a society has a different religion that is a key to its political life, such different cultural values, a history of colonial occupation and tensions going back to the crusades, and so many unresolved internal ethnic and sectarian differences.

Moreover, the US is still saddled in part with the problems it created for itself by placing excessive reliance on exiles. There has never been a historical reason to place great trust on exiles as a source of objective information or as proxies for local citizens and governments. A few succeed, most fail, and all serve their own—not US—interests. Choosing the few with capability, credibility, and common interests is an art form at best, and it is particularly important to recognize that the fact exiles have acquired, or claim to have, US values and goals does not mean they speak for their country or are politically viable. The US should also not forget the historical irony that ever since ancient Greece, and the Napoleonic wars in Europe, exiles have done a surprisingly better job of using the governments that tried to use them.
As a corollary, it is dangerous and absurd to assume that US action will not only transform the country where operations take place, but also create a transformational example. Nations are too different, peoples too sensitive to outside action, and change (when it occurs) is too long and too time consuming.

The US needs to have a clear plan from the start that it can communicate to the population of the country where it will go to war or conduct military operations. It is not enough to say the US has good intentions and noble goals. The US must be able to communicate its intentions in terms of clear plans and actions that the local populace and leaders can see and judge. It must anticipate local concerns (and hostility and conspiracy theories) and do its best from the start to defuse them. Broad, unsupported, slogans and rhetoric are not tools in political and psychological warfare, they are paths to defeat.

These lessons do not mean that there will not be many low-level contingencies where limited US military action cannot achieve decisive results without such coordinated approaches to risk assessment and planning. However almost all of the above lessons apply in some form to Afghanistan, and most apply to the US experience in Vietnam and Somalia. If the contingency and the risks are serious, they must be considered.

Wartime Execution and Adapting to Circumstances

One key lesson of Iraq, Afghanistan, and many other modern wars is the need to look beyond struggles between conventional forces. It is becoming harder and harder to define “war” as struggles between the armed forces of state actors. The conventional phases of recent conflicts have often been episodic or brief, while the low-level periods have lasted years. Asymmetric conflicts are generally wars of attrition, and this means the so-called conflict termination, stability operation, and nation-building phases of a conflict can involve years of armed struggle after the main phase of conventional fighting is over. Vietnam, Lebanon, the Balkans are just a few additional examples.

Iraq and Afghanistan also show that stability operations and nation building activities not only should begin before hostilities or any other form of military intervention, they should be an integral part of even the most intense conventional warfare. Political and psychological operations are a critical aspect of seeking to influence local and enemy behavior. Targeting and the location and intensity of tactical operations must consider both the political dimension and the needs of the post-conflict environment. This is not simply a matter of reducing collateral damage; it is a matter of shaping operations.

One key issue is how to integrate ideological and political warfare, and the need to combine conventional warfighting at the command level with effective stability operations. In the Balkans, Afghanistan, and Iraq, the US benefited from allied military personnel and sometimes allied political interference. In many cases, allies vetoed or “red carded” operations and air strikes whose political cost outweighed their military value. There was not, however, a political planning cell to provide coherent advice on the political dimension of operations or support activities for stability operations and nation building. Such a cell may well be needed as the definition of “joint operations” is broadened to look beyond interservice coordination.

Actual operations, however, are equally important. Iraq provides a clear warning that rapid maneuver does not mean that the US does not need to either secure or occupy rear areas, and preserve security as its forces advance. Tactical operations need to explicitly consider continuity of government. The fall of Baghdad provides an example of extraordinary tactical success against the enemy, but under conditions where the US forces involved were small, exposed elements in a potentially hostile city and could not secure it against looting. Having civil-military teams to work immediately with local police and local governments, and military units to work with Iraqi military units to keep them in place and preserve potential cadres for future Iraqi
forces would have been critical. Local aid teams might have done much to defuse hostility, particularly if they had worked through local authorities, mosques, and institutions.

Iraq also provides a clear message that calls to deploy far higher US troop levels to solve these problems will not solve the problems involved and may actually increase them. The US almost certainly did have too few troops on the ground to deal with rear areas and urban security missions. At the same time, it provides little evidence that sheer numbers of troops would have solved the problems that emerged after the fall of Saddam Hussein. “Boots on the ground” alone simply highlight the alien nature of the occupying force unless the “brains above them” have the right training and skills.

The US went to war in Iraq with virtually no overall area and cultural training for its troops, and far too few translators. Most of its forces had no real training and experience in modern counterinsurgency or counterterrorist warfare. The US had only token numbers of civil-military personnel and military police, most with few if any area or language skills. Much is made of the military’s lack of close liaisons with the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA), and the feuding between Ambassador Bremer and General Sanchez.

What was equally serious was that neither the US military nor the US State Department had recent experience of working closely together in the field or in rear areas, and the military had no pool of competent civilians to draw upon to substitute for their own lack of experience and specialization. This was certainly made worse once the CPA was established by the Administration’s screening of politically correct civilian volunteers, almost all of which had no experience in working under local conditions or meaningful experience of any kind, no real area expertise, no training for working in the field under threat conditions, and who were recruited for tours as short as three months.

There simply was no pool of qualified US civilian or military personnel to provide the level of skills required. Sending in an other 100,000 men and women in uniform that did not know what to do and did not have the required training would have helped in terms of “boots,” but would not have provided “brains.” Things could have been better, but they could not possibly have been adequate.

This experience does provide the lesson that the US must do more to create the necessary mix of military and civilian skills and a pool of personnel it can send into operations as soon as combat begins, not simply once the intense phases of combat are over. However, the US needs to be far more honest with itself about the acute limitations that are inherent in any such efforts. Whatever the US does, its numbers will still be limited; it will often lack the right mix of skills and experience; and it will not be able to substitute for local personnel.

“Warehousing” semi-competent “specialists” and “experts” in full time jobs to wait for missions they may never perform is an expensive recipe for failure. The competent will not wait, and only the failed or mediocre will remain. Creating reserve volunteers will waste far less personnel, but still have acute limitations. The competent will already be doing similar jobs somewhere else. The US military and State Department cannot possibly maintain a large pool of operationally ready personnel with the full range of area and language skills that may be needed, and certainly cannot maintain a pool of personnel with practical experience if such personnel do not exist.

**Dealing with the Transition to Stability Operations and Nation Building**

Many of the same lessons apply during the transition to stability operations and nation building as during any phase of intense conventional military operations. Iraq and Afghanistan both
demonstrate, however, that there may be a narrow window of opportunity in which to create local government and security capabilities out of existing elements of local forces, reduce the image of US forces as “invaders” or “occupiers,” and avoid local tensions and ethnic and sectarian rivalries from exploding into terrorism or insurgency.

The US will probably always face the problem of impossible local expectations, coupled with hostility and conspiracy theories. Iraq does warn, however, that the US will make things far worse if it cannot provide an immediate civil-military presence, if it does not turn immediately to local leaders, and/or if it attempts another pro-counselor operation like the CPA. Going from the illusion that Iraq was essentially self-healing to trying to remake the entire country from a massive occupying presence—particularly one sited in Saddam’s former palace—was exactly the wrong approach.

The US needs to stop congratulating itself on mythical versions of its success following World War II. The first few years of occupation in Germany and Japan involved massive suffering and poverty. Germany recovered largely because of its own leaders and because of the aid that came out of the Marshall Plan and the Cold War. Japan recovered from the flood of money that also came as a result of the Cold War, but most of all from spending in Japan during the Korean conflict.

Few wars today will be fought against conventional secular enemies like Germany and Japan, or lead to the same level of acceptance by the occupied. Even those oppressed by the former regime often will not welcome a foreign presence unless it clearly is working with local authorities. Even the best trained US troops will not be police or suited for low level law enforcement work or providing security that requires an exact knowledge of, or intelligence on, local factions and tensions. Too low a profile may be seen as a power vacuum, but too high a profile—coupled with the declared goal of transforming a country—will often be seen as intolerable.

In most divided countries and failed states, military action will cause a significant part of the population to see US forces as a threat or an enemy from the start, and large portions of the populace will blame every failure or problem that follows on US forces. This will interact with the kind of internal turmoil that encourages core settling, violence, and political divisions between sects and ethnic groups. US actions to act as a broker or to enforce stability will make the US seem to oppose factions on any side that do not directly benefit from such US involvement. The US must make every conceivable effort to avoid fighting limited wars where it must actually occupy a nation, and where it would be seen by that nation’s people, as an occupier rather than a liberator both committed to the earliest possible transfer of the largest possible amount of power, and as actually executing that commitment.

The alternative to "occupation" is US civil-military action to bring as many existing local leaders into the government as soon as possible. It means reviving existing ministries, and provincial and local governments. It means using local police and at least consulting with and paying the military and security elements that may otherwise become unnecessarily hostile. It means putting more emphasis on effective governance and security than instant efforts to introduce democracy or sort out exactly who might have been guilty of abuses in the past. It is one thing to remove the clearly dangerous and hostile, and another to attempt to remove broad categories of people from both power and any form of employment, particularly when no aid or economic opportunity is created to tie the country together.

Such US efforts will require broad action at the local and provincial levels, not just attempts at building central governments. Power may be concentrated in the capital, but security and
development are national. Massive fortress embassies cannot reach out to a nation, try to defuse local flash points, or find ways to use local nationals to substitute for inadequate governance and security. Getting as many civil-military teams into the field as soon as possible, having all commanders begin civil-military operations immediately, and seeking as much local national participation as possible from the start are key steps. Having personnel ready from the start in the field, giving them aid funds and equipment, and providing military—not contract—security.

This does not mean early action can always ensure popularity, or stop decades of contained sectarian and ethnic tension from exploding. Afghanistan, Iraq, and Somalia have all shown that it will generally be critical to avoid taking a transformational approach to creating rapid democracy, Western standards of human rights, and secular approaches to change in deeply religious societies. One key step will be to determine how fast a given society can and wants to change. It is one thing to encourage what is already there, another to seek changes that create alienation and enemies.

**Operations from the Start of Stability to the “Advisory” or Active Conflict Termination Phase**

Iraq and Afghanistan also teach that the US must be prepared for long-term efforts that are costly, require an enduring US presence, and call for progress at levels local governments and forces can actually provide. Both countries have confirmed the lessons of Vietnamization, the Balkans, Lebanon, and Somalia.

Deeply troubled nations can sometimes be abandoned when it is strategically expedient, but they cannot be “fixed” quickly. Iraq, for example, can only be placed in an even worse position by premature US disengagement. Iraq cannot hope to reshape its political process and establish effective governance throughout the country for years, and this effort could easily have cycles of success and failure that take a decade. The same is true of Afghanistan.

Iraq is also a good example of a case where withdrawal is not strategically expedient, although circumstances could make this necessary. The US cannot exit from a strategic situation involving more than 60% of the world’s proven oil reserves and some 40% of its gas, and where the US and global economy are dependent on steadily increasing the flow of some 17 million barrels of oil a day through the Strait of Hormuz without paying a heavy price tag.

The US may well be able to reduce its troop presence in Iraq, and it may even be forced to leave and seek to influence Iraq from the outside. One way or another, however, it must try to make Iraq succeed for years, if not a decade, to come. It also cannot abandon Iraq without appearing to be defeated by Islamic extremism and asymmetric methods of war, and without being seen as abandoning some 27 million people it pledged to rescue from tyranny. The US bull is seen throughout the world as having broken the Iraqi china shop it claimed to rescue. It must now live with the political and strategic consequences.

As for the lessons that the US should have learned from Iraq, Afghanistan, and similar contingencies to date, they fall into four major categories: Ideological, political, security, and economic.

**Ideological Lessons**

Much will depend on whether the US is seeking to carry out missions in nations with fundamentally different values and cultural norms, where deep divisions have produced ethnic and sectarian conflict or are likely to do so, and above all where deep distrust exists of the US on
religious grounds and/or because of fears it seeks to occupy a country or shape it as some form of neocolonial proxy.

This may not be the case in many contingencies. The Balkans is one such example. It may well, however, be the norm in the Middle East and Islamic nations in Asia and Africa. It can easily be the norm in much of Latin America. One key lesson from Iraq and Afghanistan, and Lebanon and Somalia before them, is that the US must not go to war assuming that its actions and values are popular or transcend local values. It must recognize that rhetoric about the universal support for democracy, secular views of law and human rights, and/or capitalism is simply not realistic, and that a thin veneer of exiles and Western educated citizens who may claim to share such views does not provide a picture of what the people of a country want or can accept.

There are several lessons to learn from this experience.

The US not only must make it clear from the start that it has no intention to remain in a given country, that its goal is to create effective local governance and forces, and that it will leave as soon as this task is accomplished or a sovereign government asks it to; it must constantly reiterate this at the Presidential and Secretary of State level. One of America’s most serious problems in conducting effective stability and nation-building exercises is that it attempts to enforce its own values and goals, rather than adapt and reinforce local goals. The US cannot achieve political or psychological victory, or conduct successful public diplomacy, by remaining silent as to its objectives or by stating it will impose its own values and political system. It can exert powerful influence for change and reform, but only if it works through local leaders and reinforces natural forces for change. Values are local and relative, not Western and universal. Crusades are the road to failure; persuasion is the road to success.

Operations must be conducted with the knowledge that many of the people may be hostile to, or angry at, the US, and the US will not be greeted as a friend or liberator. The US needs to understand that it will normally face large elements in any given country where it introduces military forces that are hostile or angry, oppose such American action, deeply distrust America, or at best tolerate US action or support it conditionally. America’s ability to fall in love with itself is not contagious. This situation will also tend to deteriorate, not get better, over time. Exaggerated hopes and expectations will not be met. It is easier to blame outsiders. Faction will perceive the US as taking sides, and military and security actions will breed a legacy of anger and revenge. Conspiracy theories and hostile political groups will grow more sophisticated. It will take constant political and ideological efforts to minimize or reverse these trends.

Operations must anticipate the risk of ethnic, sectarian, and factional divisions and warfare or be based on the fact it is already a reality. Every effort must be made to preserve the political center and process of governance that can unite the government, and to avoid encouraging such divisions or letting them accelerate. Ever since Woodrow Wilson’s massive miscalculations following World War I, it has been clear that "self-determination" can cause at least as many problems as it solves, and the postwar period since World War II has reinforced the constant risk of nations dissolving into warring factions. The very conditions that lead to US military involvement will often have made this risk even worse or have either created civil war or brought the nation to the edge. This has already proved true even in supposed ethnically cohesive nations like Somalia. For the vast majority of citizens, security, stability, and national cohesion will offer more than attempts to intervene in readjusting the balance of power between national factions, and have priority over efforts to introduce democracy or redefine power in terms of demographic equity.

Ideological, political, and psychological efforts must be focused on local conditions and factions, and not regional or national. “Winning hearts and minds” will often succeed with only part of the population, consist of tolerance and not admiration or support, and depend heavily on factional and local support for the local government and forces the US backs. National and regional efforts to persuade a nation or people will be important, but success will generally require an ongoing, focused effort to win such support on a faction-by-faction basis and at the local level. This means that radio and TV campaigns are not substitutes for in-country efforts, and that a focus only on what happens at the national level or in capitol is no substitute for dialoq and action in the field.
The US must seek out local attitudes and views, not anticipate them or guess at them. The US should not make assumptions about local attitudes wherever tools like polls, local dialog, media analysis, internet surveys, etc. are available. One of the problems with US efforts to support political and psychological warfare and political operations in general is that the US often either does not actively measure local attitudes or looks for reinforcement of its current approach. It is particularly important to monitor opinion at a level of detail where the US has both a picture of national and regional trends and in key local areas of operations.

Extreme care must be taken to avoid alienation and “negative political and ideological warfare.” Iran has shown just how easily incidents like Abu Ghraib and the killings and rape of Iraqi civilians can be. Both Iraq and Afghanistan have reinforced the lessons of the Kosovo campaign that collateral damage must be kept limited and explained. Tactical operations like house-to-house searches or urban sweeps can be as important. All operations are now political operations and most are reported or misreported locally in near-real time. It is particularly important that the handling of detainees and prisoners conform with the standards set by the Geneva convention and that actual crimes against civilians be rigorously investigated and punished. America’s image, and seeing justice done, will often have more impact than any amount of political and psychological warfare.

Wherever possible, local authorities and forces should speak for themselves. The US made a serious mistake early in the Iraq War in having US spokespersons dominate communications and efforts at dealing with the political, ideological, and religious dimension. As is the case with most operations at the local level, every effort should be made to have local authorities and forces take over every possible aspect of such operations. They should be clearly sovereign and independent, speak in terms of their own values, and free to criticize the US. (In many cases, the US will also be better off relying on allied spokesmen, minimizing the image of US control and dominance.)

The US needs to persuade the Congress and the American people as well as those outside the US. The struggle for hearts and minds is as much a domestic one as this requires honest reporting, not spin, and reporting with depth and content, not meaningless metrics and reassurances.

This latter point is difficult for those inside government to raise, but the Bush Administration did serious damage to its own cause by trying to spin the course of war in Iraq into images of turning points and success and in failing to address the real risks and issues. Credibility is the key to success in both persuading foreign and domestic opinion. Short-term propaganda efforts are sometimes necessary, but political and information campaigns must focus on honest admissions of risk and cost, and realistic time scales rather than easy ways out.

The US military and senior US officials must avoid “cheerleading.” They must present the real facts and options, and provide metrics that give an honest picture of what is happening, good and bad. Americans need to see that there are practical plans; they need to be able to trust what senior military and civilian officials say; and they need to see a case for patience that builds credibility and trust. There is a reason polls show a growing lack of confidence and support. The US government simply has failed to earn it.

Political and Governance Lessons

Some of the key lessons about the political side of operations that emerge from US experience in Iraq are to rely as much as possible on local government and expand its role and capability as soon as possible, to work within the limits imposed by local conditions, and to set a clear strategy for encouraging the kind of compromises and consensus that allows the political process to function and governance to operate.

There are several other key lessons for sustained operations and a successful transition to handing over power:

Politics are no substitute for governance. The US often seemed far more concerned in Iraq with how governments were chosen that with whether they could govern effectively. Democracy is a possible
path to effective governance and the day-to-day services and security that define true legitimacy in the state. It is meaningless, however, unless such governance is its end result. The Western obsession with elections and legal forms at best addresses the lesser half of successful political operations. It is what governments do that determines their success, not how they are chosen. This is particularly true in an environment where stable national political parties do not yet exist, and where elections produce service politics, ideological or religious parties, or divide the people along factional lines.

It is far more important to find ways to reduce local ethnic, sectarian, tribal and other tensions and fracture lines than to attempt rapid democratization and political, legal, and human rights reform by US or Western standards. This does not mean abandoning ultimate goals, but it is a clear matter of priorities. The image or illusion of political progress is no substitute for civil order and creating the conditions that make democracy and the rule of law function on a national, not special interest basis. Similarly, the US must avoid participating in excluding key factions from power, and appearing to take sides.

Build on existing institutions, constitutions, and legal codes wherever possible. To mix a metaphor, reinventing the wheel will often open up Pandora’s box. It does not make sense to force nations to confront the task of totally reinventing their political structures, constitutions, legal codes, procedures and other aspects of governance in the midst of war, insurgency, or crisis where this can be avoided. Such efforts almost force the resurfacing of every major issue that divides a country. Seeking reform of the most important features of existing structures is far less provocative. Where possible, it will be particularly important to avoid efforts to draft new constitutions or other sweeping legislation that can force national factions to struggle over the issues that divide them most in a formal and legalistic context.

The same is true of the practice of law. It is one thing to reform or prevent key abuses. It is another to try to reinvent the legal system or courts, create whole new police forces, and leave gaps and uncertainty in the day-to-day functioning of courts and law enforcement.

Do not conduct major purges or dismissals. It may be necessary to remove all top leaders, but all others should be removed on a case-by-case basis, and only for cause. It is far better to supplement than purge, particularly when any other course of action exacerbates sectarian and ethnic divisions.

Do not set artificial or impossible deadlines. Iraq is yet another demonstration that trying to do too much to soon does not act as a forcing function. Too many quickly repeated elections, constitutional drafts and redrafts, and referendums created political instability. It is better to let local authorities advance and compromise at their own pace, setting broad goals and timelines for progress.

Effective aid and/or liaison with ministries and civil government offices are critical. For all of the previous reasons, ministries and regional and local government offices and services must be made to work and improved as soon as possible. People must see their government operate and benefit from its services to be encouraged to support it. This puts a high premium on rushing in competent US advisors in the numbers required, and giving them the aid funds and authority to have influence and provide the local support.

National politics are only part of political operations, and national governance does not have meaning without local governance. Important as capitols may be, most people do not live in them, and even those who do interface on a day-to-day level with local governments. US advisory, aid, and civil-military efforts need in any case to be concentrated on improving governance in high threat and high-risk areas. The operational center of gravity at the political level will sometimes be at the national level, but far more often is will be regional and local. It also will often be much easier to build workable, functioning elected governments at the local level—where ethnic and sectarian tensions are less intense—than at the national level.

Give local authorities both power and responsibility as soon as possible. Governments do not become effective by waiting for training and advice. Iraq and Afghanistan have shown in different ways, that governments develop by acting and taking responsibility.

Strengthen planning, budgeting, and fiscal control functions. The US may not have the expertise to govern, or do many jobs by itself. It can usually provide expert support in planning and improve budget planning and control. Helping to create inspector generals, audit boards, and other tools that
prevent overspending and limit corruption can have great value. It should be noted, however, that
time war or crisis is not the moment to try to introduce ideal Western standards of accounting and anti-
corruption measures. Local standards of performance should be the goal.

*Use US influence but keep a low profile.* The US should be proactive, but not deliberately visible or
seen as taking the lead. The US must still actively “interfere” in Iraqi politics. Iraq and Afghanistan
have shown that if top-level US officials do not to engage local political leaders, and if the US
ambassador does not act as a forceful “agent provocateur,” efforts to create a workable political
process and efforts at governance are likely to bog down, and the risk of failure and division increases.
Such US action will inevitably lead to protests by whatever Iraqi faction feels the US is opposing or
failing to support it. It will provoke some Iraqi nationalists and outside critics on principle.

In cases that approach anything like the status of a failed state, the local government and political
leaders will need active outside pressure, criticism, and effort to force it to actually make decisions and
move. It also needs constant reminders that Iraqis are now responsible and that there are limits to US
and other outside support. Iraqis need to know that the US will provide support where it is productive,
but there are no open-ended commitments.

*Create strong civil-military teams to lead integrated action in the field.* Build on the Provincial
Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) example in Afghanistan rather than the Provincial Support Teams and
Regional Embassy Office (REO) used initially in Iraq. The PRTs should have been in place years ago.
According to the latest State Department reporting, however, they have only been established in
Ninawa, Babil, Kirkuk, and Anbar Provinces, and they seem to have serious recruiting problems and
difficulties in getting experience and qualified personnel.

*Avoid the central headquarters, fortress embassy, and overstuffed central facility problem that
developed in Iraq as the advisory and support mission developed.* The US does not need grossly
overstaffed “white elephants” like the Green Zone in Baghdad. It does need local efforts at every level,
to provide a full civilian component to support the US military in the field.

*Make participation in in-country and field efforts a key to military, foreign service, and other US
government career development and promotion, and enforce this.* Such efforts will require a major
reorientation in the US presence in Iraq, a “go or be fired” approach to ensuring full staffing by the
most qualified people in the foreign service, and direct Presidential pressure on Cabinet officers to
provide the rest of the needed staff. It needs the kind of Congressional funding, and flexibility in using
US aid funds at the local level, necessary to give such a presence.

*Ensure that the US military, not contractors, provide the necessary security for civil aid and advisory
teams.* While some contractor security teams have provided outstanding service, far too many have
been careless and alienated local populations. The reliance on contractors has also meant inadequate
military support for civilian operations in the field, including transportation. The US military must be
ordered to provide security for such missions. They will have the highest possible priority, and US
officials simply should never have been made dependent on contract and civilian security in a war
zone.

*Develop plans and assessments to aid local political development and governance that can shape a
structured effort.* Exercising US political influence requires effective long-term plans backed by aid to
Iraq’s emerging political structure. Moreover, effective US influence demands governance that
recognizes the need for at least a five-year strategy funded to have a major impact in aid at the regional
and local levels. Iraq’s politics are as much urban and local as they are national, and US strategy must
recognize this.

*Give priority to direct action in the field, and give the personnel in the field the freedom of action to be
effective.* Research and study efforts will generally be far too slow and distant from real-world issues to
pay off, and there is no way to wait for half-informed attempts to manage and control funds from
Washington. Advisory teams need to be able to act. It should also be noted that contractor and NGO
efforts in such areas often waste considerable amounts of money with little local impact and focus. At
a minimum, they need to be ruthlessly audited for efficiency and patterns of expenditure.

None of these lessons can be acted upon without sufficient US personnel and aid, and without
giving field personnel the proper funds and authority. The US needs to accept the fact that such
operations require relatively large staffs of responsible military or career personnel, and that such advisors will need aid funds they can allocate without constant reference to Washington or other authorities. As is the case with all aid and liaison efforts, it is also critical to ensure relatively long deployments with suitable overlap when personnel are rotated, and enough personnel to allow leaves to be taken without creating gaps. There are no potential countries where personnel relationships, continuity, and direct hands-on contact will not be critical.

**Security Lessons**

The most important security lesson is the need for immediate and sustained action to create an effective mix of military and police and security forces, and support them with aid and support to courts and the criminal justice system. The need for a matching presence in terms of government services has been addressed above and is equally important.

Another lesson is that it is far more cost-effective to act decisively from the start to create or strengthen local forces, giving such aid and force development missions at least the same priority as combat assignments and over funding and overstaffing them to help ensure success, than to delay, let terrorism and insurgency fester, and leave the mission to militias and other security forces not controlled by governments. The same is true of providing immediate transfers of funds and equipment, and using existing facilities, even when inadequate. Time is a critical resource, and every step forward in creating local capabilities minimizes the risk of serious low level or asymmetric conflict, will be far cheaper than maintaining and committing US forces, and will save American lives.

In practice, the US has also learned (or re-learned) a long list of practical lessons about how best to accomplish these tasks. The most important are:

*Treat the local force as a partner that must take the lead as soon as possible.* It can take years before some forces will be able to act as full partners or truly take the lead in all aspects of operations. Local forces must, however, be treated as true partners from the start, be respected as sovereign and not proxies, and shown that the US gives them responsibility and the lead as quickly as possible. They must not be treated as tools or proxies, and it must be clear to all concerned that the US goal is to enable them to serve their national interest in ways that serve all concerned, and not to create forces that simply serve the interests of the US.

*Act immediately to build up local security capabilities to defeat terrorist and insurgents, but act simultaneously to create balanced forces.* Priority does need to be given to providing immediate security capabilities, but local forces need adequate intelligence, headquarters, combat and service support, and logistic capabilities. The transfer of responsibility, keeping US forces and activities to a minimum, and expediting US and allied withdrawal requires the creation of balanced forces.

*Give equal priority to controlling, disarming, disbanding, or integrating factional militias and other non-governmental forces wherever possible, but ensure they have a secure and properly funded transition away to civil life.* Iraq and Afghanistan are simply more lessons in how dangerous it is not to act immediately to control any factional forces that can challenge the stabilization and national building effort, or provide armed support to civil violence or civil war. The dedicated teams that tried to deal with this issue at the time of the CPA were never given more than limited support, and a potentially successful effort was allowed to collapse during the transfer of power in June 2004. Lebanon, Somalia, and Haiti are just a few other examples of how militias, factional forces, and rogue elements in national forces must be brought under control as quickly as possible and of how serious a threat they present to the success of US efforts.

*Tailor the use of local and US forces to reduce the presence and visibility of US forces to the local population as soon as possible.* The US will never have enough trained forces with suitable area expertise to deal with most medium to large-scale stability, nation building and counterinsurgency capabilities, and will always be seen as a hostile or alien presence by a large part of the population. US
forces also should be concentrated on direct operations against the most dangerous insurgent, factional or terrorist elements. Putting a local face on local wars is a key priority.

Set realistic force goals and create effective short, medium and long-term plans; do not attempt minimal manning or minimal standards. There is no way to suddenly create large numbers of effective forces that do not already exist. At the same time, rushing to meet short-term, expedient levels with forces too small to do the job is an inevitable road to failure. There must be clear plans to train, equip, and facilitate the number of forces actually required, and calls for half measures or inadequate force levels and force quality must be strongly resisted. Rushing forward without clear plans also ensures inadequate levels of effort, and ones that may either alienate large elements of local forces or produce unsustainable and unaffordable programs.

Do not rush the job: It takes time to create new training centers and methods and train effective forces. Rushing inadequate local forces into the field, however, not only has a vast opportunity cost in terms of force disintegration and failure, it creates serious political problems both between the US and local forces, and between local forces and various local factions.

Pay the cost for proper facilities and equipment. It took years in Iraq to begin to plan and pay for the facilities and equipment needed, and Iraqi forces still lack protected vehicles, adequate firepower, and adequate facilities. Local forces do not need to be built up to US standards, and must be equipped with weapons and other systems they can maintain and support, but they must be capable of self-defense, given adequate facilities by local standards, and be properly equipped to take on offensive missions.

Advise and listen, do not attempt to mirror image. Local forces must work to local norms and under local conditions. They cannot be mirror images of US or Western forces, and their leaders and officers must take responsibility for force planning, doctrine, and shaping training efforts as soon as possible. There are many US and Western techniques and methods that can be rapidly and effectively adapted to strengthen the capabilities of forces in developing countries and fill in the gaps in forces in failed “states.” Ultimately, however, each case requires careful attention and adaptation to how local leaders and forces want their forces to be developed, and enduring success requires them to believe the forces that have been created meet their expectations and needs.

Build national forces with careful attention to sectarian and ethnic divisions and rivalries; create balanced and mixed forces rather than units that serve some factional interest. No effort to build local forces can have perfect representation, but every effort must be made to convince both those in the forces and the people in the nation involved that the forces being developed will not serve factional interests, or divide along such lines if they come under pressure.

Develop military, security, and police forces in tandem, not in sequence. There is a natural and dangerous tendency for military advisors to give priority to military forces. Areas cannot be secured, however, unless specialized internal security forces operate at a different level from conventional military forces, and police provide day-to-day security at the local level. The failure to act on this principle means either that military victories do not last or that military forces must stay in every liberated area, often alienating the local populace and not providing the kind of security required.

Seek better ways to shape local capabilities to provide guard forces and the ability to protect key government and economic facilities, and religious and cultural facilities. Like developing police forces, the US cannot simply focus on combat development. It must help local governments and forces develop effective low cost guard and protection forces.

Pay close attention to developing local HUMINT, translation, and liaison. There will always be security problems with local forces, but there will always be even more severe problems for US forces in establishing human intelligence, getting the necessary pool of language skills, and having local forces or personnel that can guide US forces in operations from the raid to strategic level. Once again, the US needs to adopt a "partner" ethnic.

Ensure that all of the ministries involved have adequate advisors and aid. Force development cannot really work or be sustained unless the key ministries involved can function effectively. These will, at a minimum, involve the Ministry of Defense, the ministry handling local security, relevant elements of the Ministry of Finance, and some element directly under the nation’s prime minister or president. Ministries are key elements in determining whether forces and security efforts are national or factional,
have sound financing, have controls to keep corruption to reasonable levels, and develop plans and the ability to implement them. A focus on forces in the field or on the Ministry of Defense, without matching concern for the ministries handling internal security, police, justice, and finance is a recipe for failure.

**Constantly assess local vulnerabilities and casualties, and develop plans for local force protection.** The US has often been slow to see that developing local forces and capabilities will often require at least some US military role in protecting them, and major efforts to train, organize, and equip local forces to protect and defend themselves. This is a key aspect of the mission.

**Do not isolate or ignore existing members of the military, security forces, and police.** Punishing the truly guilty is necessary, but numbers must be kept to an absolute minimum. Broad amnesty and inclusion in the government and local forces should be introduced immediately where possible, and as quickly as possible in other cases. Former military, security, and police should not be left without jobs or funds to make a transition to new careers when they cannot be included in the new security structure. This is particularly true when the former members of the security forces are largely composed of a single or disenfranchised faction.

**Vet individuals, not groups, and continue performance-based review.** Iraq once again validates the need to introduce vetting systems immediately to review recruits and those already in service in terms of individual capability and performance, rather than former position, or political, sectarian, and ethnic background. It also stresses the need to keep up performance review to exclude those who cannot perform or take sides on behalf of a given faction. When those with prior service must be dismissed, some kind of financial support and transition aid will normally be needed.

**Learn from the US experience in embedding training teams and creating partner units in Iraq.** It is not enough to train and equip local forces. They will often need cadres of US advisors and partner units as they actually move into the field. This is essential to holding them together, giving them support in initial periods of combat, and going from theory to practice. It is also clear that the need for embedded training teams can be just as important in security and police units as in combat units.

**Develop case histories and studies of the lessons learned in terms of training, tactics, support, intelligence, etc. for use by future US force development efforts and local forces.** Formal field manuals and efforts to create standard rules can be useful starting points, but can never predict or adapt to local circumstances. The US needs to develop case material for use by local forces, and case material for use by US trainers and liaison teams, and an inventory of practical methods and tactics that users can both draw upon and adapt to a particular contingency.

**Treat other allies as full partners in the local force development effort from the start.** The US military was often slow to listen to and learn from its allies, and sometimes turned a coalition of the willing into a coalition of the unheard or ignored. Other nations have a great deal to teach, and multilateralizing the local force development effort reduces the image of the US as dominating the country and local forces involved as well as reducing the burden on US forces.

**Ensure that the US aspects of security and force development efforts remain under US military control until suitable levels of local stability and security are actually achieved.** The US must never repeat the experience of dividing its advisory and force development efforts, and it must ensure that security, paramilitary, and police forces can deal with terrorists, insurgents, and organized crime and not simply act as police forces in a normal US sense. This requires the Department of the Defense and the military to be in charge of a unified effort with a single line of command and comprehensive plan and effort. The State Department may be able to recruit and deploy training teams for regular police development, but cannot handle the mission of dealing with Ministerial level aid or police development in counterinsurgency or serious anti-terrorist environments.

**Make it clear to the military command that creating effective local forces may have the same or higher priority as using US and outside allied forces.** The US military in Iraq was slow to see the need for developing local forces and took years to respond to the need to support this mission effectively in Washington and at the headquarters level. Issuing DoD Directive 3000.05 and improving some aspects of US training will not change this situation. Making effective use of local forces, like adding the political and economic dimensions to military operations, requires a change in military culture as well.
Develop effective accounting, planning, and budgeting tools that can rapidly be transferred and require minimum training and support. Iraq shows that it is dangerous to deny local commanders the freedom to use aid funds and equally dangerous at every level of command not to provide near real time accountability. The result is corruption and waste and a loss of Congressional confidence. But creating a massive paper chase is not the answer. Off the shelf automated aids that allow rapid, functional accounting and simple follow up reporting of execution and effectiveness need to be available, and the goal should be operational effectiveness, not meeting the needs of bean counters and rear area bureaucrats.

Create reporting tools and software to control, manage, and account for actual manning, how salaries are paid, and how weapons and equipment are allocated and inventoried. The same issues apply to reporting on other aspects of local force development.

Develop meaningful measures of effectiveness and tools to determine progress and report them honestly, without exaggeration or spin. Far too much of the reporting on progress in Iraqi force development and performance has had the same misleading reporting of success that the US military provided in Vietnam and Lebanon. The US took far too long to develop useful measures of performance in the training and equipment effort. It still uses meaningless measures of combat performance like taking the lead and control of battle space. Much more demanding measures are needed, and much better unclassified reporting is needed to build Congressional, public, and media confidence.

One of the most consistent challenges to effective US security action will be the need to resist false economies, cost-effectiveness analysis, and bureaucratic down-sizing of the required effort. Iraq and Afghanistan are warnings that advice and requests from the field to assign adequate personnel and resources to the development and support of local forces can easily become the step children of efforts to support US forces and meet immediate bureaucratic resistance from personnel in Washington with no competence to make judgments as to what is required.

Iraq and Afghanistan should fundamentally change the command ethic and policymakers’ priorities in this regard, but it is far from clear that they will. The same should have been true of “Vietnamization” or the failure of US force development efforts in Lebanon after 1982. This is an area where far too many people are generally in the loop with no real understanding of practical needs and priorities in the field, and where the US military tends to “forget from experience” rather than learn from it.

**Economic Aid and Development Lessons**

Iraq is scarcely a unique example of the problems in using foreign aid to help a developing country. The whole course of aid efforts since World War II has shown that aid can be of great value in helping a country get organized and become capable of helping itself. It has also shown that outside efforts to use aid to reshape the economies of failed states rarely produce meaningful results, and that the US has little competence in planning such efforts even under peacetime conditions.

The US should learn three important lessons from its experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as from other conflicts and aid efforts:

*The first is that the US government simply does not know how to do jobs of this kind on this scale, and lacks the core competence to do it.* The illusion that the US can remake a national economy, as distinguished from aiding a nation to do so, is simply dangerous. So is the idea that the US has, or ever will have, the cadre of experts necessary to carry out such tasks at the career civilian, contract, and military level.

There were critical problems in policy and planning that made things far worse than they had to be, but the CPA, USAID, and Corps of Engineers simply showed again and again that the US could not provide workable plans and program management for an aid effort of the scale involved, and that
reliance on US prime contractors and their subcontractors did nothing to reduce waste and corruption and a vast amount to increase security costs and divert large amounts of money away from the intended objective and outside Iraq.

The second is that in stability and wartime operations, the first priority is to use aid and money as a tool to bring order and stability, and one that responds to operational needs. There simply is no time to wait for structural change in the economy, for mid- to long-term projects to pay off, for interesting economic experiments to work, by acting as if war, insurgency, crime and social violence can be ignored.

Iraq and Afghanistan have also shown that US military officers and their US government civilian counterparts must have great discretion in using aid at the local level and essentially substitute dollars for bullets. Buying stability is cheaper by far than shooting for stability and much less provocative and destructive. It also provides quick benefits in terms of results the local populace wants and sees, disperses aid into the most troubled areas, and builds political trust.

At the same time, it is clear that NGOs and international institutions are often unsuitable for such activities. They cannot protect themselves and often will not allow the US military to do so. They bring their own institutional agendas and priorities into the field and will not act in concert to achieve the kinds of operational results needed for security operations or to buy political support and consensus. There are often times where this independence frees the US of political pressure, but stability operations and nation building need to use short-term aid for just the opposite purpose.

The third is that efficient or not, the US must rely on local governments, businessmen, entrepreneurs and contractors for longer term planning and implementation of aid projects—and not on US control of the aid and economic construction effort or the use of US personnel and contractors. The US does need more experts capable of dealing with the economic aspects of stability operations and nation building. Iraq, however, is scarcely the first country where the US has shown that it may be able to help nations that can help themselves, but it at best can plan project aid for peacetime needs. A reliance on local governments, businessmen, entrepreneurs and contractors at least keeps aid money in the country it is intended to benefit, shows the local populace that the US is directly aiding them, and responds to local needs and priorities.

It may take time to build local capabilities, but short-term direct US assistance can buy such time. It is also far too easy to fall into the trap of attempting too much, changing whole sectors of a local economy, restructuring the nation’s infrastructure, etc. Such projects inevitably are too complex to plan and manage, and leave half- implemented legacies built to US standards using US chosen equipment and methods that the country cannot finish or sustain.

These, however, are only the most serious lessons that the US should learn in terms of what it must do once conflict termination, stability, and nation building operations begin. Here is a list of more technical lessons that have emerged out of Iraq that can be of considerable importance in future contingencies.

Treat aid and economic development as short-term operational necessities until sufficient security and stability exist to give workable priority to longer-term efforts. Stability operations, counterterrorism, counterinsurgency, and true humanitarian emergencies in high risk areas must firmly put security and stability first. Trying to build on longer-term and more ambitious goals without a functioning short term foundation will simply lead to waste or failure.

Give top priority to local jobs, local services, and efforts with immediate visibility and targeted impact on the local populace. Aid and development must actually benefit ordinary people directly, make the local government seem useful and credible, and show people that the US is actually helping. In stability operations and any form of conflict, perception will be as important as performance.

Focus on sustaining and expanding key sources of government revenue. Iraq and Afghanistan are scarcely new demonstrations of the fact that planning local forces and stability efforts that cannot be financially sustained by the host country rapidly develop serious problems in distorting the local economy and operations of the government. They also show in very different ways the need to rapidly help local governments develop or protect their sources of revenue.
Do not attempt ambitious efforts to restructure infrastructure unless these can be managed and implemented at the local level. The task will be to meet local expectations as much as possible on local terms and to avoid creating unrealistic demands and expectations. Small or medium sized efforts to fix and improve existing capabilities will go a long way toward building positive expectations and confidence in the local population.

Do not attempt to remake the national economy in mid crisis or wartime, and only attempt major structural or sectoral change if the local government and people want it and can clearly sustain it. The US lacks the core competence to do this. It places an impossible burden on US forces and on the entire US mission, and creates major new problems for local leaders.

Let local governments take the lead and make their own mistakes; focus on reviewing and vetting existing capabilities will go a long way toward building positive expectations and confidence in the local population. US mission, and create major new problems for local leaders.

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mean tolerance of non or poor performance, failure to establish accounting and progress reports, or activities with no measures of effectiveness. Excusing problems and poor performance on the grounds of time pressure or exigency simply leads to failures and far more problems than it solves.

More broadly, legislation and regulation are needed to:

- Establish civil and criminal penalties for US government personnel, military personnel, and contractors who do not meet proper standards for accountability or try to waive them. Iraq is to some extent a history of American incompetence and corruption. The answer is a “zero tolerance” approach.
- Make the US military responsible for protecting aid activity. Contractor security is too expensive and wasteful, and far too often the end result is that the aid goes where things are more secure rather than where it is needed.
- Require US government agencies to provide long term planning and mandated measures of effectiveness reporting in submitting aid requests, and mandate that all contracts to US companies require evidence of performance and accountability with far more severe criminal and civil penalties.
- Require all civil US and non-Iraqi security contractors accepting money for US aid to accept criminal and civil liability for their actions. Leave no gaps.
- Require clear transition plans, reporting, and measures of effectiveness to show that completed programs and projects have a lasting impact and become sustainable, rather than are completed and dumped.
- Offer major “whistle blowing” rewards.

A very different approach to economic aid and development should generally be adopted once true stability and security are provided and a government is capable of acting at the local, regional, and national levels. International organizations and NGOs can play a major, if not lead role; multilateralizing aid efforts will be far more important; and so will a focus on mid and long-term development based on national priorities.

The same measures under these conditions are recipes for failure in the face of major security threats of any kind, and particularly when US and local forces are involved in major counterterrorist or counterinsurgency campaigns. The focus must be on operational success and security first.

The Broader War Against Terrorism

The need for local forces and governments may be different in the case of the broader war on terrorism, but it is no less important. The US does not face the risk of “overstretch” in the broader war on terrorism in terms of having enough total forces and resources to fight a “long war” against Al Qa’ida and other non-state actors. These groups will not even be serious military threats as long as they do not control governments or acquire large-scale sanctuaries.

The US will often, however, face a different kind of “overstretch.” It will lack expertise in the form of linguists and area experts. It will never have the local popularity, or even tolerance, necessary to directly defeat terrorists and extremists in countries where they have broad popular support and can exploit ideology and religion as weapons. As a result, the US may be even more dependent on local allies for success, and there already are many individual lessons from the war on terrorism that have close parallels to the lessons the US should learn from Iraq and Afghanistan.
Once again, the key lesson is that the US needs local allies and forces that are able and willing to act. Yet again, the problem is the lack of effective allies and local counterterrorism capabilities and forces. One key lesson from the war on terrorism over the last half decade is that a mix of Western action and Islamic inaction cannot win.

The US may be “politically correct” when it calls the current struggle a “long war” or “global war on terrorism,” but the reality is very different. Most terrorism is a minor and largely local or national threat. The real threat is Islamic extremism, and specifically neo-Salafi Sunni Islamist extremism. The violent transnational movements that support these beliefs, symbolized by Al-Qaeda, are the only serious global threat that uses terrorism. Isolated terrorist movements do need to be defeated, but Irish, Spanish, Palestinian secular, Sri Lankan, Japanese and other such groups are peripheral threats at most.

US ability to recognize this fact, and focus on it, is critical to winning the “war on terrorism.” This struggle is religious and ideological, not military or driven by secular values. It is a struggle for the future of Islam, not generic, global, or focused on political or economic systems. It is, however, regional, covers a wide range of nations, and hundreds of millions of people, and is enduring. It is also a point where US counterterrorism doctrine has not be updated to deal with the challenges involve as it has in the case of counterinsurgency. While the State Department reports on terrorism do focus on international cooperation it is purely in terms of direct cooperation in activity against terrorism organizations. The new National Strategic Plan for the War on Terrorism issued by the Joint Chiefs in 2006 virtually ignores the issue. So does the new National Security Strategy of the United States issued by the White House in March 2006, which focuses on transforming the Middle East and “cooperative action with the other main centers of global power”.7

It may be possible to defeat Islamist extremist movements at the local and national levels using the kind of strategies the US has chosen for Iraq and Afghanistan, but it is already clear that the US would have been far better off if it had focused on local sensitivities and creating local capabilities. The last half decade has also made it clear that there will always be places where such movements can regroup and resume operations. Just as counterinsurgency must be defeated at the political level by local forces and governments, the real war on terrorism is a religious war of ideals that can only be won within Islam and at a religious and ideological level.

This does not mean that US efforts are not needed to improve every aspect of counterterrorism at the national, regional, and global level. It does means that no amount of outside action by the United States, Europe, or non-Islamic states will be enough to contain and end such violence. It is only the religious, political, and intellectual leaders of Islamic countries and communities, particularly in the Arab world that can successfully engage and defeat Islamic extremism at a religious, intellectual, political, and cultural level.

**The Limits on US and Western Military Intervention and on Building Local Capabilities**

The US and the West cannot simply defend themselves on their own territory. They must seek to deny movements like Al-Qaeda sanctuaries in places like Afghanistan, Iraq, and Somalia. Whether or not anyone likes the word “war,” Islamist extremist violence is so dangerous that it must be met with force. The current efforts to transform US and other Western forces to give them better area and language skills, and true expertise in counterinsurgency and counterterrorism, are also vital.

The US needs to firmly understand, however, that none of these measures will ever enable it or the West to “win” at the critical ideological and political levels. They at best enable Western
forces to score limited tactical victories, help local forces contain major terrorist movements, defend home territory, and buy time. If the West seeks to use major long-term deployments of US, British, or other non-Islamic forces to fight sustained struggles in Islamic countries, the end result will be to breed new extremists and terrorists. As Afghanistan and Iraq have shown, military and counterterrorist battles need to be won by local and Islamic forces, not “occupiers,” “crusaders,” and “neo-imperialists.”

There are too many memories of colonialism and too much anger against US ties to Israel for Western forces to succeed unless they act in alliance with local forces, and local governments are clearly sovereign. Moreover, even the US will never be able to deploy the number of troops needed or have enough forces with language skills and area expertise. It will always have to rotate too much of its force too quickly to build up the personal relationships critical to success.

Islamist extremists have already shown how well they can exploit any long-term presence from “outside” forces, but Western efforts to train and equip effective local forces can have a very different effect. They can create enough local forces to do the job, and such forces will start with all the necessary area and language skills and personal relationships. They will be able to stay on the scene and create the lasting interpersonal relations that are a key to victory. Moreover, Western military, counterterrorism, counterinsurgency, and intelligence training and advisory efforts can introduce methods and tactics that have a lasting impact on improving respect for human rights and the rule of law in those cases where such reform is necessary.

The Need to Change the United States’ Image in the Muslim World

This requires far more, however, than simply changing the focus of US operations. The US needs to understand that it can only use its influence, counterterrorism capabilities, and military capabilities, if it is to change its image in the Islamic world. The importance of changing the United States’ image does, however, go far beyond public diplomacy. In fact, it is important to all Western efforts to push for reforms in the Middle East, and essential to “winning” the global campaign against counterterrorism. While US public diplomacy has been a failure, it is the policies that are being communicated that create the problem, not the way they are being “sold.”

The American image in the Islamic and Arab worlds is a key factor in building popular support and tolerance for extremist and terrorism movements. The anger against the US is not directed at its values or “democracy” but rather at tangible issues like the US role in the Arab-Israeli conflict, the Iraq War, and the other U.S. policies in the Middle East. It is shaped by the perception that the US reaction to “9/11” has gone beyond counterterrorism to a broad hostility to Islam and Arabs.

Such anger does not mean that the United States should change its core policies in any of these areas, but leaders in the Administration and Congress, and the American people, must understand the impact of such US actions in the Islamic and Arab world. One key to winning the real war on terrorism is to do everything possible to execute US policies in ways that minimize their negative impact in the region.

One key is the Arab-Israeli peace process. Most Arabs have reluctantly come to accept the reality that the US is, and will remain an ally of Israel. What they will not accept is what appears to be a passive or one-sided US approach to the Arab-Israeli peace process. The perception in the Muslim world is that the US cannot be even-handed in seeking peace because administration after administration has taken the Israeli point of view.
It is fair to say that the Arab and Islamic approach to an Arab-Israeli peace has been at least as biased and has often drifted towards rejection of Israel’s right to exist. The fault is scarcely American alone. From a practical point of view, what matters to both Israel and Arabs is a just and lasting peace. While that may or may not be possible at a time when Israel and the Palestinians are fighting a war of attrition that has now lasted half a decade, it is clear that “a good faith” and high profile US effort to constantly push both sides towards peace will go a long way in winning many people in the Muslim world who are on the margin. This is key to easing Islamic and Arab anger towards both the US and other Western states.

Islamic and Arab perceptions of the war in Iraq are an equally serious cause of anger and of tolerance or support for Islamic extremism and terrorism. Once again, both US intentions and actions create the problem. The US may think in terms of democracy, but many in the Islamic world see a “Crusader” and “neoimperialist” attack from outside the Islamic and Arab word. This has been compounded by the fact that weapons of mass destructions were not found, the insurgency has been increasingly dominated by those who claim to speak for all of Islam, and the Iraqi people have suffered greatly since the overthrow of Saddam Hussein.

These attitudes usually ignore the fact that the war has happened and cannot be undone, and that a US presence in Iraq is now essential to keeping Iraq together and insuring regional stability. The US again, however, needs to be far more visible in seeking to aid the Iraqi people, creating a fully sovereign Iraqi government, and committing itself to leave without seeking bases and any control of Iraqi oil.

The US focus on the role Iraq now plays in the larger war on terror is valid, but far too many outside the US see this nearly monolithic focus on terrorism and military victory, and on imposing an American political system, as proof the invasion of Iraq was motivated by Israel’s security, Iraq’s oil, and the search for military bases in the region. Once again, the US does not need to change its core policies, but it needs to give the highest possible visibility to aiding the Iraqi people, deferring to a sovereign Iraqi government, showing that Iraqi oil is for the Iraqis, and that it has no intention of maintaining any military presence that the Iraqi government does not need or want.

What is far more important than any such policy pronouncements, however, is that the US avoid alienating the Arab and Muslim world and inadvertently waging “negative political and ideological warfare,” for the same reasons in fighting terrorism that apply in fighting counterinsurgency. There must be no more Abu Ghraibs or Hadithas.

Mistakes in war will happen, and history is full of such mistakes. The implications, however, of mistakes like Haditha go beyond their tactical importance in the field and strike at the heart of the US posture in the region—the way Iraqis, Arabs, and Muslims see the United States—and such mistakes are used repeatedly by al-Qa'ida and other extremist groups as recruiting cries. Both the war in Iraq, and the war on terrorism, are religious, political, and ideological battles. Every true American abuse of the values the US truly stands for does far more harm in losing this battle than any direct act of treason.

Local versus Outside Political Reform: The Need for Evolutionary Change

More generally, the US and its Western allies need to understand that the wrong kind of efforts to “reform” the Middle East can lose the war on terrorism at precisely the ideological, political, cultural, and religious levels at which it must be won. Outside efforts to transform the region, rather than influence it, will be no more successful than US efforts to transform Iraq. Like it or not, the short and mid term battles against Islamist extremism, and day-to-day action in
counterterrorism, are going to have to be won or lost by existing regimes. Creating open-ended political instability, and broad popular hostility in the process, cannot win a religious and ideological struggle fought out by those with a different culture and faith.

US efforts to push instant political change and “democracy” are dangerously self-defeating. As Algeria, Iraq, Kuwait, the Palestinians, and Saudi Arabia have shown, elections do not mean progress unless there are national political movements that advocate practical courses of action. Electing Islamists, and/or provoking civil war, does not bring political stability and cannot defeat a religious and ideological movement. “Democracy” can only make things better if it is built on sound political and legal checks and balances that protect minorities and prevent demagogues and extremists from coming to power. Elections do more harm than good if they divide a nation to vote in ways that encourage violence and civil conflict.

As Iraq has shown all too clearly, the long history of sectarian violence and tribal wars has not been erased from the minds of much of the Middle East. Western efforts to achieve instant “democracy” can easily provoke a crisis in traditional societies. Where parties do not now exist, rushing to create new parties will make most of these sectarian, ethnic, or tribal in character. Where parties do exist, the better-organized and disciplined parties will come to power. In most cases, such parties have an Islamist nature such as Hamas, Egyptian Islamic Jihad, and the Islamist parties in Kuwait.

Efforts by “occupiers,” “crusaders,” and “neo-imperialists” to impose change from the outside, rather than encourage it from within, cannot succeed. In fact, neo-Salafi Islamist extremists often do a fine job of using such efforts to discredit internal reform efforts and reformers. Furthermore, the West needs to accept the fact that an evolutionary approach to change means working with many local leaders that are not democratic, fall short of Western ideals, or are traditional in character. Calls for “regime change” and other efforts that introduce political instability, and produce more resistance to reform, will do far more harm than good.

Political reform must be built on a foundation of moderate political parties, a real rule of law, and respect for human rights that protects all but the most extreme voices in a society. However, creating a true culture of political participation will take a decade or more to develop, and most of the impetus for political reform must come from within and be led by local political leaders and reformers.

**Local versus Outside Economic, Social, and Cultural Reform: the Limits to “Draining the Swamp”**

It is equally impractical to call for rapid economic, social, and demographic reforms to remove the causes of terrorism. In practice, such calls to “drain the swamp,” and eliminate popular support for extremism are at best, a well-meant fantasy. Iraq and Afghanistan may be two extraordinarily difficult cases, but the demographics of virtually all Arab and Islamic states have already created a youth explosion of new students and entrants to the labor force that will be a major problem for the next two decades.

Economies, societies, and birth rates do not change quickly. When they do change, they can only change in ways that bring internal stability if change in response to internal political and social dynamics move at a measured pace. As is the case with political reform, the West can do a great deal over time by working with moderate political leaders and local reformers, by focusing on the internal dynamics and windows of opportunity in individual nations, and by supporting what is really practical to accomplish. The US cannot, however, “win” by calling for instant change through efforts to impose change from the outside without giving the enemy new ammunition.
As in the case of counterinsurgency, the US cannot win through broad efforts at public diplomacy, regional meetings and initiatives, or part time efforts. At least in the case of the US, it is going to take strong embassy teams that work hard on a country by country level, and tailor their actions to what can be achieved and what is productive on a case by case basis. Clear national strategies will be needed for military and counterterrorism cooperation and advisory efforts, for supporting balanced political reform at the pace a given nation can accept, and for balancing political reform with economic, social, and demographic reforms.

Here, both governments and analysts in the West need to understand that people in the Islamic world do not make politics or Western approaches to human rights their main priority. They look for personal security, for jobs, for education for their children, for health services, and for other government services. The key to defeating Islamic extremism, and the broad popular base that sympathizes with such extremism, comes first from providing popular security without oppression and then from providing economic opportunity for both today’s workers and their children. Survey after survey has shown this. It does not make those in the region who call for political change and more sweeping human rights reforms unimportant—they are voices that will help shape the longer-term future of the Islamic world—but first things first.

Regional police, meetings, and slogans will not deal with real world needs or provide the kind of dialogue with local officials and reformers, tailored pressure and aid, and country plans and policies that are needed. Strong country teams both in Washington and in US Embassies are the keys to success. Quiet, steady advocacy—and well-staffed and funded efforts tailored to a given country—should replace noisy, episodic region-wide pressures and demands.

Above all, successful efforts at counterterrorism, reform, and public diplomacy must have a national focus. The Arab and Islamic world(s) are not monolithic. In fact, country-to-country differences are generally far greater than in the West. Each country requires different kinds of help in counterterrorism and different kinds of help in moving toward reform.

Some countries need help in reforming their political process and enhancing citizen participation; others need help dealing with economic development difficulties; and others need special attention paid to their demographic dynamics and population control. The West, therefore, must avoid any generalized strategy of dealing with the Arab-Islamic world as one entity and avoid making policy pronouncements that are as vague as they are unhelpful to local reformers who have been working on reforming their societies for decades.

**The Burden is On Islamic Nations and Communities, Not the West**

At the same time, this critique of the US and Western approach to winning the long war in no way means that the political, religious, and intellectual leaders in Islamic nations do not have to make even more striking changes in their behavior. Once again, local forces and efforts are the ultimate keys to success.

The real “war on terrorism” can only be won if the religious, political, and intellectual leaders of Islamic countries and communities actively confront and fight neo-Salafi Sunni Islamist extremism at the religious and ideological level. The “long war” will be lost if such leaders stand aside, take half measures, or compromise with enemies that seek to destroy them and what they believe in. It will be lost if they deny that the real issue is the future of Islam, if they tolerate Islamist violence and terrorism when it strikes at unpopular targets like Israel, or if they continue to try to export the blame for their own failures to other nations, religions, and cultures.
One message the US needs to firmly communicate to the religious, political, and intellectual leaders of Islamic countries and communities is that they cannot be passive or hope to have this struggle won from the outside. No strategy can succeed that is not based on their broad acceptance of the fact that this is a war within a religion, not a clash between civilizations, and that they must take an active role. The war to defeat Islamic extremism can only be won at a religious and ideological level if every religious, political, and intellectual leader accepts the fact that the only choice is to actively engage Islamic extremism or engage in cowardice and self-defeat.

Islamic regimes can only win their part of the war if they accept the fact that repression, counterterrorism, and stifling local reform efforts ultimately aid the very Islamist extremists they are trying to defeat. Algeria, Egypt, and Syria have already shown that “long wars” fought on this basis may bring the threat under partial control but cannot defeat it.

If the US has pushed too hard, too quickly, and sometimes for the wrong thing, the Islamic or Arab leader that tries to defeat Islamic extremism by blocking or delaying reform, or making concessions to Islamic extremism, is guilty of committing self-inflicted wounds to his own faith and country—a failure far worse than any failure by Western states.

The Muslim world is starting to deal with these failures, although several decades after the fact. In December 2005, the Organization of the Islamic Conference met in Mecca and issued a clear statement advocating moderation. The Mecca declaration read in part “...we reaffirm our unwavering rejection of terrorism, and all forms of extremism and violence.” In addition, the declaration endorsed the creation of an International Counterterrorism Center to improve global cooperation against the fight against terrorism.

The Islamic World Must Take Responsibility at Every Level

The Islamic world must do far more to confront its own failures, and must stop blaming the West for its self-inflicted wounds. It must react immediately and decisively every time neo-Salafist terrorists, Islamists, Shi‘ites, and other extremist organizations use the Islamic faith as their recruiting platform. While various Muslim leaders have condemned violence against civilians, they have done little to defeat these groups at the ideological level.

Winning any kind of victory requires a massive additional effort by Islamic politicians, religious leaders, educators, and media to beat these extremists at their own game by using religious text and historical facts to counter them. Educational and religious reforms, use of the media, statements by leaders, sermons, articles, dialog, and intellectual debate are weapons that cannot be ignored. They ultimately will be more important than internal security forces and counterterrorism campaigns.

Time is also an issue. The US has dubbed the fight against transnational terrorism as a “long war,” but this may be a dangerous misnomer. Islamic leaders do not have time in which to react. They confront a world in which Islamic media and the Internet make inaction and attempts at censorship a certain path to losing popular support and seeing extremists gain by default. There is no time for tolerance of inaction, or political and religious cowardice, within the Islamic world. The religious and ideological struggle needs to be made as short as it possibly can.

Steady progress towards meeting popular needs and goals is equally important. Such progress may often be slow, and change will normally have to be evolutionary. But it must be a constant and publicly credible pursuit that leaders are seen to push forward. Extremists have capitalized on the dissatisfaction on the Arab street and in the majority of the Muslim world with their
economically, politically, and economically situation—the steady decay of public services, corruption, and the narrow distribution of income. Governments must be more proactive in ensuring personal security, job creation, improving education, improving health services, providing the environment for the private sector to flourish, and ensuring that rule of law to protect property and the right of the public.

Islamic regimes also have to at least move towards some form of centrist, moderate political pluralism. Leaders for life, hereditary presidents, one party systems, and monarchies with captive political parties or none, all help breed extremism by denying the rise of moderate Islamic and secular movements that would give local political leaders practical experience and provide a basis for useful compromise. The tolerance of moderate dissent is another key weapon in the real world war on terrorism.

The need for action is scarcely limited to regimes. Far too many Islamic intellectuals have learned to ignore the candle, live in the dark, and curse the West or outsiders for their plight. They wallow in the problems of the past, and ignore the need to shape the future. They turn history into a self-inflicted wound and tolerate extremist violence when they perceive it as being directed at their enemies.

Elites in the Muslim world must act on the reality that they cannot survive without contributing to the building of viable civil societies that are sustainable in the long run. Many elites in the Arab and Muslim worlds argue—rightly so—that the West’s push for “democracy” is backfiring. They also, however, do far too little themselves to provide viable alternatives and put far too much blame for the current level of stagnation on their own government. An intellectual or businessmen that fails to actively help build viable private sectors, erect educational institutions, and provide employment opportunities for the youth in his own society is little more than a whining parasite.

Both leaders and elites must be far more willing to try to end regional conflicts in ways that actually benefit the peoples involved. Pretending that the conflicts in Iraq, Afghanistan, Chechnya, Darfur, and Palestine are the problems of others or are going to solve themselves is not a solution. Blaming the West and waiting for the United States to solve them is no better. Holding endless summits and issuing countless declarations has not solved anything for the last fifty years. These conflicts not only impact their Muslim brethren, but have the potential to impact their own stability. For example, a civil war in Iraq, an Iraq that disintegrates into three countries, or an Iraq that suffers chronically from the threat of insurgency not only impact the livelihood of Iraqis, but also of every neighboring state and every country in the Middle East.

**The Need for Common Western and Islamic Action**

Terrorism can never be totally eliminated as a tactic, but the ideology that drives organizations like Al-Qaeda can be discredited and isolated. Support for extremism is still extremely marginal in Islamic nations. Bin Laden and Al-Zarqawi are killing innocent civilians including Arabs and Muslims, have tarred the image of Islam in the world through suicide bombings and beheadings, and have destroyed the livelihood of Muslim nations like Iraq and Afghanistan. Poll after poll has shown that people in the Muslim and Arab worlds want moderate alternatives to the status quo, if their political, religious, and intellectual leaders will actually provide them.

The Muslim world has wasted far too much time complaining about history and spent far too little time building the future. Governments in the Islamic world must understand that in order to salvage the image of Islam, and insure stability in their countries, they must actively destroy support for Islamist extremism at every level.
The US and its allies must join in this struggle, but their roles should be to help Islamic nations develop the military and security capabilities they really need, and intervene only as allies when it is absolutely necessary. The West should support long-term sustainable and evolutionary efforts at reforms geared toward helping Islamic nations improve their own economic, political, and social systems.

The West must reinforce local reform efforts and avoid being seen as meddling in countries’ internal affairs by supporting secular over religious Islamists, driving reform from the outside, or trying to change the Islamic character of Islamic countries. The West must not be seen as picking sides in the “sectarian “game” between Sunnis and Shi’ites, Arabs or Persians, and Afghans or Pakistanis. To the extent possible, the US and other Western nations must be seen as an even-handed broker in the Arab-Israeli conflict.

Both sides, however, need to get their true priorities straight. The key to victory is ultimately in Islamic and not Western hands. Implementing a “winning” strategy in this struggle does require mutual cooperation, but the key lies in the ability of those who are part of the Islamic world to exploit the real-world limitations and capabilities of the enemy and defeat them at the heart of their ideological arguments in the mosques, in the classrooms, on the television screens, and at all levels of civil society. This is not the job of Western nations or intellectuals but of Muslim religious, government, business, and intellectual leaders.

The Combined Priorities of Counterinsurgency and Counterterrorism

The US is almost certain to face many of the same demands for enhanced counterterrorism and counterinsurgency capabilities over the coming decades that it does today in Iraq, Afghanistan, and many other countries. It will also face a complex mix of steadily more sophisticated state and non-state actors. These will normally operate with a high degree of independence, but they have collectively and individually already found a form of low technology "swarm" tactics that can defeat high technology US forces unless the US can depend on local allies.

Time literally is on the side of such enemies. They can afford to fight wars of attrition, out wait the US, and pause their activities to regroup. They can "swarm" slowly around targets of opportunity. They can operate in cycles, and episodically, and concentrate on vulnerable local, regional, and transnational targets at the time of their choosing.

They do not need high technology communications, “bandwidth,” or coordination. Media coverage, word of mouth, and penetration into US and local governments and forces will usually give them good intelligence and a good picture of what tactics work in military, political, and media terms.

Such movements can "swarm" slowly around targets of opportunity and do so either individually or collectively. They can rely on open source reporting for much of their intelligence and knowledge of what targets, tactics, and propaganda provide the most combat effectiveness. The Internet and infiltration from other nations gives them knowledge of what tactics work from other areas. Their ability to "swarm" against vulnerable civil and military targets at the time of the insurgent's choosing, and focus on political and media effects, sharply reduces the need to fight battles—particularly if the odds are against the insurgents.

These tactics reinforce a point raised by General Sir Rupert Smith.9 Such threats will seek to operate below the level of US and allied conventional superiority. They will use proxies and avoid battles when they can. They will prefer low-level wars of attrition and avoid present conventional targets. They will attack US, allied, and local civil targets using suicide bombings,
kidnapings, assassinations, and other tactics in ways that are hard to anticipate or fully defend against.

At the same time, terrorists can exploit religion, ideology, culture, and ethnic and sectarian identity to attack and isolate the US and outside allies. This means such threats will also seek to fight above the level of US conventional superiority. They will try to shape the ideological, political, and psychological battlefields in ways that make the US an invader, occupier, or crusader. They will use the support they gain to disperse and hide among the population, and seek to force the US to use tactics and detainments that alienate the people in the areas where they operate.

Unless the US can rely on local forces and local allies, this mix of attack tactics will often deprive the US of much of its ability to exploit superior weapons, IS&R assets, and conventional war fighting expertise. It will succeed in using a far lower cost “countervailing strategy” to exploit US weaknesses, and no amount of talk about “fourth generation” war, changes in tactics or field manuals, or creation of new specialized forces will change this.

This leaves the US with some hard choices. It needs to realize that no matter what it does to improve its counterterrorism capabilities, counterinsurgency capabilities, and area expertise, it will fight an uphill battle if it fights alone or without substantial support. Winning local and regional support, however, means accepting allies that often will have different values. The US cannot simultaneously seek to impose its own vision of “democracy” or reform, and cannot count on quick and rapid progress. It cannot assume that its Western values will always be right or triumphant, and it will have to be far more realistic about the possible pace of reform in much of the world, the need to work with individual countries and groups at their own pace, and defer to local leaders and reformers.

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