Europe is currently enjoying a period of peace and stability unprecedented in its history. Over the last fifty years, a number of authoritarian regimes in and around Europe have given way to stable and democratic partners, creating an environment where war between states now seems unimaginable. Never has the European continent been so whole, secure, and free.

Europe Faces New Security Challenges

Yet Europe, as well as the United States and Canada, still face serious security threats. Longstanding security challenges such as failed states, transnational crime, and internal and regional conflicts continue to threaten European interests. At the same time, Europe and its North American allies are grappling with the rise of a new brand of international terrorism born of extremism and new dangers associated with the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. These five security threats — terrorism, WMD proliferation, organized crime, failed states, and regional conflicts — now serve as the focus of European, as well as North American security strategies at both the national and regional levels.

Further European Defense Integration is Good for Both Sides of the Atlantic

This new set of security challenges coupled with the European Union’s political development makes further integration in the defense domain a logical next step. As stressed in the EU’s European Security Strategy, Europe now has a global security role to play and requires military forces that can protect and advance European interests both at home and abroad. European leaders must come to a greater political consensus on appropriate roles and missions for European militaries in this new security environment and on the capabilities necessary to perform these missions.

Building stronger European defense capabilities is also critical for strengthening the transatlantic relationship in a world in which both sides of the Atlantic must work closely together to combat common security challenges. Neither Europe nor the United States can meet these challenges alone. Each needs the cooperation of the other to protect and advance its interests. It is in America’s interests for Europe as a coherent whole to be able to undertake a wider set of military missions as a full partner. Whether the transatlantic partners work together or opt to act on their own, enhancing European defense capabilities is not only in Europe’s interest, but also in the interest of the United States and Canada.
Having more capable European military establishments will also give European leaders more options for preventing and responding to crises than just diplomacy. The ability of European states and the United States to jointly field expeditionary forces and sustain long-term operations will have a direct bearing on our collective capacity to deal with 21st century challenges ranging from international terrorism to failed states.

Substantial Capability Shortfalls Need to Be Addressed

The need for more expeditionary forces has already placed new demands on European militaries in recent years, including increased deployments and calls for operational readiness. Forces that were designed for the defense of Europe rather than the conduct of expeditionary operations abroad have struggled to respond adequately to the changing security environment. Today, members of the European Union have 1.9 million military personnel, but only a small fraction of these are readily deployable.

In addition, many of Europe’s deployable troops are better prepared for peacekeeping and nation building than high-intensity combat. But today’s defense requirements go well beyond peacekeeping and nation building, two areas of traditional European comparative advantage. Recent missions in Bosnia, Kosovo, Sierra Leone, Ivory Coast, the Congo, and Afghanistan underscore the need for European militaries to organize, train, and equip their forces for combat operations as well.

With some notable exceptions, most European militaries suffer from severe capability shortfalls. In Kosovo, European air forces lacked the precision-guided munitions to contribute more than 15 percent of the total air sorties. Several European militaries also lack critical C4ISR, lift, and strike capabilities, greatly hindering their operational effectiveness. Furthermore, few European militaries have the capabilities to sustain their forces in out-of-area missions for any significant length of time. Europe as a whole lacks many of the military capabilities called for in European strategy documents.

Collectively, militaries across Europe also suffer from unnecessary levels of duplication in areas ranging from infrastructure (such as headquarters, training, and bases) to deployable military assets (such as fighter aircraft and large tank formations). More troubling, Europeans spend not only on equipment that duplicates capabilities, but also on capabilities that are often inefficient or outmoded. Such duplication wastes precious defense resources that could be better directed to a more coordinated approach to research, development, and procurement that would ultimately improve European military effectiveness in operations.

Current Capability Initiatives Need to Be Strengthened

European governments recognize that if such trends continue, Europe’s ability to conduct effective, integrated military operations in today’s international security environment will further erode over the next decade. As a result, the European Union and NATO have launched a number of initiatives in recent years aimed at both improving existing capabilities and generating new ones.

In 1999, NATO unveiled the Defense Capabilities Initiative (DCI) to “ensure that all Allies not only remain interoperable, but that they also improve their capabilities to face the new security challenges.” Three years later, when most of the 58 suggested capability improvements had not been realized, the alliance launched the Prague Capabilities Commitments (PCC), a streamlined version of DCI. Despite good intentions, the PCC has been slow to produce the necessary changes in capabilities. NATO has, however, succeeded in establishing a NATO Response Force that will significantly enhance the alliance’s ability to rapidly deploy forces in the event of a crisis.
The European Union has also launched initiatives aimed at strengthening the defense capabilities of its member states. In 1999, EU members committed themselves to creating a Rapid Reaction Force, capable of deploying 60,000 troops within 60 days, sustainable for up to one year. In 2001, the European Union also launched the European Capabilities Action Plan (ECAP), which focuses on fourteen areas of improvement. The hope is that the ECAP, combined with the European Union’s Headline Goal 2010, will move the European Rapid Reaction Force closer to reality. In 2004, the UK, France, and Germany proposed the creation of up to nine EU Battle Groups — combined formations of 1,500 personnel, supported by the necessary air and naval assets and available for operations within 15 days and sustainable for 30 days.

While the European Union and NATO have made firm commitments to strengthening their capabilities on paper, in practice, efforts to close the gap between European defense goals and capabilities have yet to produce many meaningful changes in available military capability. That said, there have been some notable successes. For example, the NATO PCC on strategic sealift has crafted an innovative approach to contract excess commercial shipping for military use. Similarly, since Kosovo, European air forces have substantially increased their precision strike capabilities through the acquisition of new precision guided munitions.

Europe Needs to Spend Smarter on Defense

Of all the factors contributing to Europe’s failure to acquire new capabilities, none is cited as often as declining defense budgets. Compared to the United States, most European governments spend considerably less on defense as a percentage of their GDP — an average of 1.9 percent. Raising these levels will be difficult. To cite just one important reason, the growing costs of supporting aging populations will likely constrain European defense spending in the future.

However, European defense expenditures should aim at a minimum to keep pace with inflation. Most importantly, European countries need to spend smarter on defense. More emphasis must be placed on research and development, European industrial consolidation, and better transatlantic cooperation to facilitate the transformation of European forces. In this regard, “Buy American” and “Buy European” requirements are extremely counterproductive.

Europe Needs Greater Defense Integration to Realize Its Goals

Given the political and budgetary constraints that European capitals face in increasing their defense budgets, the obvious way to address existing shortfalls and substantially enhance European defense capabilities is through a greater degree of defense integration — that is, coordinating the efforts of individual European countries, the European Union, and NATO to create an enhanced and more interdependent set of collective defense capabilities to meet Europe’s future defense needs. This must be done while recognizing that integration should not limit the ability of individual nations to carry out — or opt out of — specific military missions. To this end, we have launched a year-long study to explore how greater European defense integration might be achieved.

Various models of defense integration are possible. European countries could pool national resources to field combined units or capabilities with less overhead and lower cost, giving them access to more military capability than they could otherwise acquire. This approach is particularly attractive for generating more enabling forces and force multipliers. Individual countries could also opt to develop specific capabilities (such as long-range transport planes and ships, unmanned aerial vehicles, or chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear (CBRN) defense units) that would then be made available for collective security missions through the European Union or NATO. Finally, harmonizing procurement — by ordering from the same sources and pursuing economies of scale when purchasing expensive equipment like aircraft — is another way to move toward greater defense integration.
To conclude, European countries must move quickly to acquire the military capabilities that will enable them to share the responsibility for global security. We believe that further defense integration in Europe is critical to meeting Europe’s defense needs, now and in the future. Therefore, we recommend that the leaders of Europe:

- Make a clear commitment to greater defense integration and interdependence with the aim of increasing European effectiveness in military operations and maximizing the returns on defense expenditures.
- Agree on more explicit roles and responsibilities within both NATO and EU structures for addressing priority capability shortfalls, based on a common vision and the comparative advantages of various countries.
- Develop common plans for developing needed capabilities that build upon and enhance existing ad hoc arrangements. Such plans should formalize roles, responsibilities, resource commitments, and timelines for specified actions and results.
- Fundamentally redesign NATO’s force planning and requirements definition processes to focus far more on outputs rather than inputs, and give NATO’s Allied Command Transformation a lead role in the process.
- Accelerate implementation of the NATO Response Force and the EU Battle Groups as key vehicles for defense integration and transformation.
- Consider establishing NATO- or EU-owned and operated multinational component forces that could serve as force multipliers or enabling forces, thus eliminating the need to include such capabilities in the force planning of individual nations.
- Strengthen the role of the EU and NATO Military Committees in order to better coordinate and deconflict EU and NATO capability initiatives.
- Encourage the new EU Defense Agency to monitor and assess progress toward these goals in close cooperation with the EU Military Committee, including undertaking periodic hard-hitting assessments of all actions to date, outlining priorities, and recommending next steps.
- Enhance coordination of European defense research and development efforts, pursue greater European industrial consolidation, and work with the U.S. administration and Congress to remove obstacles to stronger transatlantic cooperation in procurement.

Taking action on these recommendations will require a renewed transatlantic relationship in which each side respects the other as a partner. It will also require the sustained personal leadership of heads of state and government, military leaders, and the leaders of NATO and the European Union. Although this will be no small challenge, failure is not an option. Failure to meaningfully improve Europe’s collective defense capabilities in the coming years would have profoundly negative impacts on the ability of European countries to protect and advance their own interests, the viability of NATO as an alliance, and the ability of European countries to partner in any meaningful way with the United States to meet shared security challenges. Seen in this light, defense integration is not just an appealing notion; it is a necessity.

For more information, contact Michèle Flournoy, Project Director, (202) 775-3136, mflournoy@csis.org.