

**CENTER FOR  
STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES (CSIS)**

**2010 GLOBAL SECURITY FORUM: WHAT IMPACT WOULD THE  
LOSS OF OVERSEAS BASES HAVE ON U.S. POWER PROJECTION?**

**WELCOME/MODERATOR:  
MAREN LEED,  
DIRECTOR, NEW DEFENSE APPROACHES PROJECT,  
CSIS**

**SPEAKERS:  
GEN. (RET.) PETER PACE,  
FORMER CHAIRMAN,  
JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF**

**AMBASSADOR THOMAS PICKERING,  
FORMER UNDERSECRETARY OF STATE FOR POLITICAL AFFAIRS,  
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE**

**RAYMOND F. DUBOIS,  
SENIOR ADVISOR,  
CSIS**

**THURSDAY, MAY 13, 2010  
10:50 A.M.  
WASHINGTON, D.C.**

*Transcript by  
Federal News Service  
Washington, D.C.*

MAREN LEED: Good morning, everyone. I think we will get started, particularly because Ambassador Pickering, unfortunately, has another engagement and needs to leave a few minutes early, so we have him until about noon. The rest of the panel will continue until 12:20 as scheduled. But if you have questions for him, get them in early in the Q&A.

THOMAS PICKERING: Or leave them until late.

MS. LEED: Or leave them until late, right. I am Maren Leed. I am a senior fellow and project director at CSIS and I am very pleased and honored to be hosting this panel on a discussion of how the U.S. basing posture affects our ability to project power overseas. And we have a perfect array of expertise from a variety of different perspectives to offer insights on this issue.

I am going to start with my colleague at CSIS, Ray DuBois. Ray is a senior advisor at CSIS and has, again, served in a number of positions in DOD that are responsible for installations, the deputy under secretary for installations and environment, the first, I believe, in that position.

Also, the director of administration and management and the director of Washington headquarter services. So he was responsible in the mid-2000s for DOD's installations at large. Also has spent some time in the Army in Vietnam as part of an intelligence unit and has a distinguished career and lived all over the world as a businessman. So he brings that perspective to this panel.

Immediately to my right is Gen. Peter Pace who most recently served as the vice chairman – excuse me, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and prior to that, the vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and has served at almost – and commanded at almost every level starting initially early on as a rifle platoon leader in Vietnam and then commanded Marine and joint forces at multiple echelons around the world to include a deputy commander of both Marine and joint forces in Somalia, Marine forces, Atlantic, Europe and South, and as SOUTHCOM commander.

So he also has a wide experience living around the globe and working with foreign governments everywhere, as does from a different seat and different hat, Ambassador Pickering. Ambassador Pickering is a career ambassador, the highest rank in the Foreign Service and has served as ambassador, I believe, to seven nations.

MR. PICKERING: Six.

MS. LEED: Six nations, excuse me, and the United Nations. And speaks 8,000 different languages? (Laughter.) Six, I think, different languages, to include Russia – excuse me, he was ambassador to Russia, to Jordan and United Nations –

MR. PICKERING: I won't help you because it is boring.

MS. LEED: It is widespread. And so he has a slightly different perspective on how the military needs and requirements for basing fit into the broader national security picture. So we are looking forward to a very rich discussion. I would like to start off with a few comments from everyone beginning with Ray and then we will work right to left – my right to left, your left to right.

RAY DUBOIS: Thank you, Maren. It is important, I think, at the outset to note that Maren Leed is on maternity leave, so you really don't see her. She is virtual here. Her two-month old son, Peyton (ph), is out there, so I want you all to go out there and say hello to him when this panel is over. So we are very grateful that she has come back to moderate this important subject.

Maren has asked me to go back and give a little history as to how and why Secretary Rumsfeld, now nine years ago, began the process of looking at our overseas basing structure, which began with a memo that Andy Hone (ph), my colleague then, and I drafted in August of 2001 from Secretary Rumsfeld through the chairman of the Joint Chiefs to the combatant commanders, the regional combatant commanders, directing them to do an assessment of the military assets, specifically the physical assets, the installations in their areas of responsibility.

That idea didn't hatch automatically, if you will. It actually came out of a discussion the second day Rumsfeld was secretary of defense – that is to say, Sunday, the 21<sup>st</sup> of January, at a staff meeting he called after he was sworn in the night before of his immediate staff to review several of the issues that he wanted to initiate quickly. As most of you know, the Pentagon is divided into really two pieces. That enterprise has a half – half of it is the military operations, the intelligence, the policy side, and the other half is the business side.

Don Rumsfeld was, as we all know, very interested in both sides. But that Sunday afternoon, he talked about money. He talked about his responsibility as a steward of the taxpayers' dollars in terms of managing the budget and where possible, reducing costs. Believe it or not, he mentioned the dreaded word, BRAC, that afternoon – base realignment and closure. Those of you who are from New York will appreciate my comment because he looked at me and he said, what do you think, Ray? And I said boss, BRAC is the third rail of defense politics. And he said yeah, you don't get up every morning wanting to do one.

And I said, but you can't really ask the Congress to authorize a BRAC until such time as you have done a BRAC overseas. We spend – the Department of Defense spends on average when you include both military construction – that is to say, capital budgeting – as well as O&M, operations and maintenance, base services budgeting, of its total worldwide number, about 16 to 17 percent of that is actually spent outside of the United States and its territories. That is a significant amount of money. It is several billion dollars every single year.

So this process started, as I said, in the summer of '01. The drivers from rationalizing physical plant, if you will, were really fourfold. And my two fellow panelists will be able to

address in some detail, I suspect, two of the four issues. The first one is the diplomatic or the political-military issue. What kind of forward presence ought we have? What implications does that have for commitments to our alliances, to include training and interoperability?

The second one is military operations. You have to remember that our installations are really deployment platforms from which we send our units and formations into combat. The third is cost. As I indicated, 16-plus percent of the total installations budgets are spent overseas. And the fourth and equally important is the quality of life.

Rumsfeld was quite interested in, how do we affect positively the quality of life for our soldiers, sailors, airmen, Marines and their dependents with respect to whether they are based in the United States or based in Europe or Korea or Japan and elsewhere? In this process – and it also came home in spades, if you will, during Operation Iraqi Freedom, the planning for it and the execution of it – how fast do we need to move personnel to the point of the spear? You would think that it was easier to move personnel from shall we say, installations in Europe to the Middle East versus installations in the United States.

An analysis undertaken by the Joint Chiefs and OSD indicated that that was not the case. You could move people just as quickly from Fort Bragg as you could from Grafenwohr or Ramstein Air Force Base in Germany. The real question was equipment and how long did it take equipment to get there. Of course, if you determine that the time to deploy is not place-specific or not place-determined, you then have to decide how do we preposition or move in advance people, equipment?

What kind of over flight permissions are we going to negotiate? Do we have enough strategic lift to move people? Do we have the staging areas between domestic bases in the United States and areas where we are going to go into combat? These issues indicated to the staff, to Rumsfeld that it was in our interests – that is to say, the United States interest – all four categories that I mentioned, to reduce or shrink our overseas basing structure.

We were left with a post-World War II, post-Korea basing structure to a large extent and Rumsfeld thought it was important to reshape that global military network. As he said, it has been recounted subsequently, it was important to plan for uncertainty. But the locations and nature of future threats also could not be predicted.

But for the reasons that I have outlined, he came back to the fact that global presence, global military presence is more than how many bases you actually have and maintain overseas because you have issues and – the previous panel discussed this – space-based assets. You have strategic lift and strategic logistics capabilities. You have naval presence overseas with aircraft carriers and attack submarines. You have prepositioned supplies or what was referred to as POMCUS stocks. You have the constant engagement with our allies for training purposes.

You don't necessarily have to station a brigade in Germany in order to train with the German army. You can have a rotational training sequence and cycle that could accomplish that. So in September 2004, the report entitled, "Strengthening U.S. Global Defense Posture" was issued. It determined that we could reduce by approximately 20-plus percent our overseas

footprint. But it was also important – and Secretary Rumsfeld said at the time that that was not to be interpreted as a reduction or a diminishment of our commitment, whether it was to the peninsula, to Korea, or to our allies in Europe.

As you may remember, the Korea decision was to reduce by one brigade, the 2<sup>nd</sup> Infantry Division, remove our forces to south of the Han River. In Europe, we brought back two division flags, the 1<sup>st</sup> Infantry Division, the 1<sup>st</sup> Armored Division. The Japanese questions pertain principally to the Marines in Okinawa and reducing our presence on that island to include moving the Futenma Marine Corps Air Station out of the Futenma at the bottom.

In any event, those were the basic building blocks of what happened in the 2001-2005 period. And it is not over. And this administration has made some adjustments to it. But notwithstanding, as I and others have written, the legacy of Donald Rumsfeld is inevitably tied to the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. But there is also a legacy on the business side and perhaps a very lasting legacy. And it is how he has – or how he recommended and how it has been implemented to reduce our commitment – permanent commitment, permanent stationing around the world.

MS. LEED: Okay, thank you. Gen. Pace?

GEN. (RET.) PETER PACE: Well, thank you very much. It is great to be with you all this morning. I would start out by questioning the premise of the name of the session, which is what will be the impact on U.S. power projection with a loss of overseas bases? That seems to me to be a statement of fact that we will, in fact, lose bases overseas.

I don't subscribe to that. I think that what Hoss Cartwright said this morning is exactly right, that we need as a nation to reach out to our friends around the globe and have discussions with them and come to the understanding that for all of us, it is important to be able to share bases and stations and the like.

So I would just bring into question the certainty of the loss of bases. But clearly, U.S. global force posture is a statement and an execution of U.S. national policy. And you can take that in many ways. One way, if you want to see how to do what Ray just got done talking about, what would happen in the first several years of the Bush administration, a way to go about figuring out where you should be basing stations is to make the fundamental decision as a nation to what do you want to respond and how fast do you want to respond?

So if you were to take a lap around the globe and say to yourself, start in Iraq and come west, you run into Syria, Israel, Lebanon pretty quick. You go south to Yemen. You come across the water to Somalia, Ethiopia, Eritrea. Keep on coming, Sudan and Chad and Algeria, our responsibilities in NATO. Keep on coming over to our own hemisphere, our friends in Cuba and Venezuela.

The narcoterrorists in Colombia, Peru, Ecuador, Bolivia. Out into the Pacific with the Philippines, Indonesia, Malaysia, North Korea, China, Taiwan. Our relations with India and

Pakistan, ongoing operations in Afghanistan, the challenges of Iran and you are back to Iraq. And I am sure I missed something in there.

But if you had that as a band, for example, of places where you would want to respond, and then you said to yourself, pick a number. We want to be able to do something in all those places inside of 72 hours, then you have got to look at, basically, three factors. One, bases and stations; two, machines; and three, weapons. If you are going to respond within 72 hours, you lay out the places where you currently have your forces and places where you have agreements that you can transit and use as bases.

You can draw your 72-hour circles around those based on how fast your ships can move, how quickly your planes can move and the like. And you can determine for yourself pretty quickly whether or not you have got A, the access to stations, and B, the kinds of machines you need to get the job done inside of your quote, "72-hour response time," if that is what you have decided.

If you don't, then you either need to negotiate more bases or you need as a nation to take a look at your planes, your ships, your way of deploying, your means of transportation and change those by building different machines or you can do it through precision weapons. And as one example, the development of the hypersonic missile could make it possible to reach anywhere in the planet inside of about an hour, if that were your decision.

But you need to start with your basic national policies, then how quickly you want to be able to implement those national policies to be able to give yourself a lay down globally of the places you would like to be and the kinds of machines and weapons that you would like to employ to be able to do that.

Having said that then, obviously, your bases and stations communicate your commitment to your friends. Arguably, our presence in Japan has helped that nation be comfortable with a reduced size of their own self-defense forces and their own weapons. And it also sends a large message to others in the region who might think about getting frisky.

Intel is significantly impacted, in my opinion, by presence overseas. First of all, what you are able to obtain. Human intelligence is extremely important. But being on the ground, understanding the cultures, understanding the context in which you are receiving the intel or whether it be HUMINT or SIGINT or whatever, being able to through your own experience understand the context of the intel is extremely important.

Military-to-military relationships, arguably, one of the best ways for nations to go through the dog-meets-dog part of relationships is initially through military-to-military contact, whether it be friend or potential foe. The more you are able to live and work and communicate with your friends and allies and your potential enemies, the more you understand what is important and what is not. And living in those regions, having bases and stations, it is critical to that capacity and capability.

I would argue also that a strong military and a strong economy are two sides of the same coin. And certainly, wherever our bases and stations are around the world, including our own country, those economies have benefited from the influx of money. But also, the global economy has benefited from the stability that that provides.

And therefore, our own economy and the global economy had benefited and in so doing, so has our capacity as a nation as Gen. Cartwright pointed out this morning, our ability as a nation to defend ourselves, to provide for our own defense is very heavily dependent on the strength of our own economy.

The last point I would make is perhaps not what you came to hear, but I do believe that there is a very real impact on where our bases and stations are around the globe on our ability to recruit young men and women to serve. There is no doubt that young guys and gals out there have adventure in their heart and, you know, join the Navy and see the world.

There is more than just a slogan there. Clearly, the opportunity for, you know, Pete Pace from Teaneck, New Jersey, to join an armed force and have a chance to travel around the world and live with people and do what we believe is good work in those countries has an impact on our ability to recruit quality people.

So it is not what would normally come to mind. But I do believe when you talk about the impact of potentially losing bases and stations, you have to look at the strength of your force. The fundamental strength of your force is on the quality of the men and women who serve in it and to some extent, the ability to live overseas and to have their families over there and to get worldly education is a major factor. Thanks.

MS. LEED: Thank you, general. Ambassador?

MR. PICKERING: Thank you very much. It is a pleasure to join the panel. And obviously, it is an interesting and in many ways, commanding subject for us as we look ahead. Just an aside, Gen. Pace, I am delighted to join you. I had forgotten you came from Teaneck. I come from a town called Rutherford. We used to play each other in high school sports frequently. I can't remember what the record was. (Laughter.) And I had better not.

I kind of start from the presumption that the political-military side to the equation has been one of the traditional and more difficult areas to deal with. That means to begin with the kind of obvious start that bases, in my view, are neither all good nor all bad as we look at them from the foreign policy and national security interest perspective. Some of them are probably both at the same time more often than we would like. And the job is obviously to get the right structure. And I think Gen. Pace outlined precisely how you want to get there.

And to bring into play the factors that Secretary Rumsfeld put forward on the 21<sup>st</sup> of January as he started his new job. And I am delighted to hear that we can remember Secretary Rumsfeld for more than just the complaints about Iraq and Afghanistan. And I am delighted to hear that his approach to the whole base question attempted to bring in what we would all call these days as much of a whole of government, a significant look at it is possible.

I have done two things, which may border on the puerile, if not the totally simplistic, but sat down and did the Richard Nixon thing, took a legal pad and tried to say what do bases do for us and what are our problem areas with bases as a kind of predicate for talking a little bit about how we might think about these in the future from the political-military perspective. And obviously, Gen. Pace has made the case very clearly. The first question we have got is how do we maintain our national strength and defend our country? And bases are an intimate support mechanism and, indeed, functional and operational base for making that possible.

There is no question at all that as a diplomat working around the world, I would far rather have an effective U.S. military in our background as much as I would have a functioning and, indeed, thriving and progressive economy as the background for my discussions with foreigners as anything else I could possibly think of.

And so there is no propensity, I think, in my colleagues and in me to look at the base structures as only problems. I also had the opportunity to serve in the Navy and spend two-and-a-half years in the naval air station in Morocco. So I know something about bases not just from the outside in, but perhaps from the bottom up is a better way to phrase it and understand those particular issues.

I think it is also important that our ability to confront threats around the world as they emerge. Both state and now non-state threats is very much enhanced by our ability to have this international footprint. It is also important that we have a base structure to support our cooperative alliances with others – fundamentally defense, but in many cases, this relates to totally non-defensive tasks, including things that our military have done magnificently over the years in dealing with earthquakes in Haiti, with tsunamis in Indonesia, with hurricanes almost everywhere.

And the ability to have that kind of support structure is absolutely invaluable, and the ability, obviously, to meet all of the scenarios that we look at. And in the State Department over the years, I dealt with many scenarios, which, in fact, moved or required our moving U.S. citizens out of harm's way at late notice. And, in fact, one of the recurring difficulties not having to do with bases between State and Defense has always been, why don't you move people earlier out of difficult places?

And the simple answer to that is it sends the wrong diplomatic signal to the government. And why do you move them so late? Because in fact, that is the best way that we can square the circle. And who is going to pay for it? And the State Department, of course, has no budget. But it has a large number of unpaid bills from the Defense Department for this particular aspect of the base business, which it eventually will have to be, I think, closed off. But I think it is significant.

I think that those are part of a complex web of needs and, indeed, promotions of our national strength. On the other side, there are also problem areas that have come up from time to time, more derivative of the base structure than fundamentally related to it. But in some cases, they are. Secretary Rumsfeld obviously saw the structure as large, imposing, high cost and

maybe having some negative significance. There is no question at all that those who don't like us fasten on the base structure as one of the attributes of what they charge us being either hegemon or an imperialist or both depending upon how you want to differentiate the two.

And, of course, over the years, the Soviet Union constantly harped on the notion that they were surrounded by American bases, not something that necessarily is totally relevant in a factual sense, but it is not irrelevant in a sense that it has had some influence on thinking around the world. There is no question, of course, that bases take land. They often take livelihoods, particularly newly established ones, particularly if they are near metropolitan areas. They become an irritant to some because of their obvious location and appearance.

And indeed, I was delighted to hear that Secretary Rumsfeld wanted to move south of the Han not just for security reasons, but for appearance reasons or presence reasons that made a lot of sense. So in a sense, these particular issues can be dealt with what I would call – to the extent that we can do it smart basing, something I think we have been practicing for a long period of time.

There is no question at all, too, that bases tend to morph in purpose, if I could put it this way. Those often established in the early years to support our NATO allies in the face of a particular series of very difficult threats have now become extremely useful in other ways either for deployment of forces from or deployment of forces through and logistic support. And these are obvious and significant.

On the other hand, governments who tend to look at these things say two decades ago, my predecessor agreed for purpose X, we are kind of still up in the air about purpose Y. How do we, in fact, square the circle on that? Some countries, notably Japan, help us pay for our base structure in their country.

That has been both an extremely valuable asset, but also as you can see, some kind of an irritant, even though the Japanese frequently forget that the base structure is fundamentally there to defend the Japanese home islands, something that they over the years, while they are still the sixth largest defense budget in the world, have not seen fit totally to rely upon because our connection to our nuclear capacities is significant to them.

It is also true that no particular organization and group is obviously totally free of people who misbehave. And American individual misbehavior, as we all know, in some countries has led, indeed, to serious crises that have required an undue amount of time and attention at the top with leading military authorities, with the ambassador and others to seek to find a way to resolve. I think there is no simple answer to that. But it remains, obviously, a question with respect to the base structure.

There is no question at all that this particular set of issues and complaints has been there since we started and will continue to be there. It is not a reason, in my view, to totally realign or change. But it is one of the critical factors, as Ray pointed out earlier, that has to be taken into account.

And there are interestingly a set of issues that are not necessarily totally related to overseas base structure. There are domestic problems as well with some of the support structure that are not unknown. Anyone like me who lives close to Fort Belvoir will wonder why it has taken so long to discover the road net is inadequate and some of the other arrangements that are now coming to the fore as the implementation takes place have been put aside for such a long period of time.

I think that I see as we move ahead tremendous and increasing importance attached to several aspects of dealing with bases in the political-military context. One is that obviously we need to be alert to changing needs as we have been, I think, very much over the last eight years. We need to be alert that when factors change, we need to review and, indeed, examine the base structure. If – and I certainly against any hope wish it to be true that we will in time and shorter than sooner be out of Iraq and Afghanistan nearly entirely.

We need to make clear, as I think we have, but in a higher voice and perhaps with a more insistent tone that we are not seeking a permanent base arrangement in those countries, nor in my view are we necessarily seeking support bases for operations in those countries beyond what we might vitally need to meet the kind of contingencies and exigencies we have talked about. And I think that that is important.

I think it is well that we continue to look obviously at questions in the NATO era. Our commitment to NATO remains total. On the other hand, NATO's mission is shifting as we have seen. The Fulda Gap is perhaps now much less important than Northern Afghanistan for both of us, even if there are concerns in some areas in the European side about the latter.

I think that our ability to operate effectively against terrorists on a worldwide basis is an extremely important imperative, but it has helped us, I think, to do a couple of things – reduce the size of our overall presence, relate that presence, special forces, intelligence collection and ability to move quickly to the specific needs that we see with respect to terrorist operations. And I have named only a few.

And we need, I think, increasingly – having spent time in the Navy, Gen. Pace, I think, will not disagree with me – to continue to look at sea-based forces and air forces sea-based as extremely important and valuable ways to support our structure. It is not total without the necessity for increasing the size and scope of our footprint overseas as we go ahead.

And then finally, I would say that technological change is obviously a current imperative, but also – (inaudible). Predators while launched locally can be remotely interpreted and commanded. Much of our communications intelligence systems can operate effectively in that mode, which reduces, if not eliminates our footprint and, indeed, the size and scope of what we are doing.

The ability to create what we would call at one point lily pads, a very inapt and inappropriate way of describing bases that may be agreed upon, ready to operate, but not fully permitted. An extremely large U.S. presence would, in my view, be extremely helpful. We

might need more diversity for these kinds of activities given the changing nature of the worldwide scope of what we are doing.

And I think that is important to look at because it helps us find a way to attenuate some of the more difficult problems as we continue to have to exist with a strong overseas basing structure in support of our security and foreign policy. I think finally – and this may be something that we ought to look at. I don't think a BRAC every stated period of years is the right way to go.

But I do think something that I would call BRAC-like or pre-BRAC, an inside look led obviously by Defense and the JCS, but with the presence certainly of the intelligence community, of the National Security Council and State in a quiet way, maybe on a three, four-year basis to look at what are our needs? How have they changed? Does the base structure fit where we are? Are there things that we can recoup and retreat and back off on? Are there things that we need to move ahead? Is a healthy way to do it?

I think that the whole-of-government approach is extremely important. I think that there is no question at all that it needs to be led by the department and, indeed, by the services who have the greatest need for and the best interest of it. But I would suggest something like that, not in a kind of formal way, but frequently enough to give the U.S. government confidence that we are on top of this issue. It is not being dealt with purely in stovepipes. It is a worldwide look, a broad-based effort, fundamentally based on the outline that Gen. Pace put forward would make some sense. And I will leave it here and look forward to your questions.

MS. LEED: All right. Thank you very much, ambassador. Let me kick the discussion off following on to some of your comments. Gen. Pace, you talked about framing the fundamental question as what you want to respond to and how quickly do you want to do it. And ambassador, you talked about making sure you get the right structure. Let me put a more finely pointed point on this and ask you all directly whether or not we have that right structure, whether we have decided what we want to respond to and how quickly we want to do it and whether we are postured well to get there. So let me start with you, Ray, and we will work this way.

MR. DUBOIS: I think one of the aspects of what we went through over the last nine years and what the current administration and Secretary Gates continues to go through is as Ambassador Pickering and Gen. Pace said, we constantly ought to and we constantly need to review why we are where we are and for what reasons.

One of the things that is missing, it seems to me – and this is a military operational question that came up when I was there – and I am sure it still ceases some of the folks in the OSD staff and the joint staff – how do we effectively overcome when we need – with or without allies – to project force, to deploy force to areas either to deter potential enemies or to defeat them or to prevent conflict?

You may remember the situation in Turkey. Turkish parliament refused to allow the fourth infantry division to go through Turkey into Northern Iraq. That was a very – both the State Department and the Defense Department were upset, I think, is a charitable word. That

caused a number of us to begin to think about issues pertaining to permissive access, if you will, or over flight. And I suggested that we begin to negotiate, State Department with the Defense Department, with a number of different countries, in particular, Africa, to allow for not permanent bases, by any means, but access to bases for gas and go, for staging with minimal presence.

I remember when I was asked to come to Manila in the Philippines and the headlines in the paper the morning I arrived was Secretary Dubois arriving to negotiate new bases. And this is, of course, after we had left Clark, left Subic Bay, and I was compelled to immediately call a press conference and say no flag, no forward presence, no families, no facilities.

I said we are here to support the ministry of defense of the Republic of the Philippines in ways of training together, doing exercises together, determining where we could work better together in the Western Pacific. But one of the things that, as I said, that I think is still missing is this ability to when necessary, without being closed down in one particular avenue or another and having multiple opportunities to stage and move forward.

MS. LEED: General?

GEN. PACE: A couple of examples. The combination and rebalancing that is going on right now of our basing and stationing in Korea, in Japan, in Guam has served us enormously well in the region for decades and will. But ongoing dialogue as recently as yesterday here in the capital between ourselves and Japan about what is the right – how best to do that. But clearly, an understanding amongst all the players that yes, the presence is important. How – and the balance of that to be determined.

Manas Base in Kyrgyzstan, enormously important to our efforts in Afghanistan. Arguably, we have not done as good a job as we should have amongst ourselves and our own government or with the Kyrgyzstan government in understanding and articulating the value to both countries and to the region and to get it off of a dollar-and-cents basis of how much rent we are going to pay for the base and get it into what I think is more important, which is what are the values to our countries and to the stability of the region to be able to have access to those bases?

But that is very much an ongoing dialogue. And certainly the long-term access to that base and/or the need for it is part of the ongoing dialogue and should be part of the ongoing dialogue. And then you take a look at the U.S.-Africa Command, recently stood up, designed specifically to be different, designed specifically to start out as a joint interagency taskforce to have not only U.S. military officers, but State Department deputy who is an ambassador, to have representatives from the other agencies and departments in the U.S. government, specifically designed to be able to assist African nations before the need for military intervention.

And if you have that kind of an approach, then what kind of access do you need to the continent itself? Right now we are in Djibouti. But that is one small place in one small part of Africa. How would we go about laying down the kinds of access we would like to have? Why do we want that kind of access? And how do we convince first ourselves and then our friends in the region that having access to these facilities, these bases on a recurring basis would allow us

to do what we are trying to do in my mind, which is to help them help themselves prevent crises from requiring some kind of military intervention?

MR. PICKERING: I won't talk about the military adequacy. That has been, I think, widely covered. I will talk about a couple of things. I think that I agree with Ray very much on the ability to find ways to have access without having a large infrastructure, a big footprint in standby. I think that to be realistic, we can get what might be a series of agreements in which the general tilt would be in favor of allowing us to have access. But I think no government would give us a carte blanche. They will all want to be consulted before it is that we move.

I had the inordinate pleasure of back during the Yom Kippur Ramadan War when we finally decided that we were going to support Israel of calling the Portuguese foreign ministry on behalf of Henry Kissinger – he was busy doing something else; he never told me what it was – and telling him that our aircraft were on the way and they would be landing in Lajes in two hours and that we hoped that he would find a way to make all of this happen very smoothly.

He was not thrilled. Indeed, he was full of penchant comments – trenchant comments. But it worked – but it worked only because, in fact, he had no other alternative and that did not promote a great day in U.S.-Portuguese relations forever and obviously, raised the question of risking the future of the base if we have to perform in that manner, not one that I would recommend.

But I think that we have got to look at all these things. I think that having a Japanese government that is finding it horribly difficult to make up its mind on the longstanding issue of Futenma, which I dealt with as undersecretary of state long before the turn of the century, is a serious and difficult problem. And we can't minimize the democratically elected administration from the other side of the water has a different set of ideas. It may be highly unrealistic and unimplementable, but nevertheless, we have to deal with them. And those are the things that I think fit into the equation.

I think that at least there seems to be a general sense, this needs to be on the agenda on a pretty continuous basis and we need to review it fairly carefully from time to time to make sure that we are doing things right and that they come along and that they get done. The big change in our base relationship in Europe has not left everybody totally happy. And indeed, in a tiny case, I could remember four or five years ago the removal of what little we had left in Iceland was a national crisis.

To some extent, however, for foreign policy reasons, we cannot leave bases where they no longer serve a useful purpose. Just as I think on the other side and my view is – this is always controversial – but over time, we are going to have to take a look at Guantanamo. Do we keep a base where it is because, in fact, we can do so regardless of what the set of circumstances are? And would there be long-term better future uses for Guantanamo in terms of an evolving Cuban policy on the part of the United States that we ought to keep in mind and take a look at?

I don't believe in that situation you give something up for free. But there are, I think, potential putative advantages in terms of dealing with Cuba, not the government, but the people

that we ought to take a look at and some creative thinking there needs to be done. I just put those out on the table. I hope to stimulate some audience reaction.

MS. LEED: Let me ask one final question before I turn it open to all of you. Quick question about a recent analysis that showed that we are, in fact, moving as a general proposition towards more of a transactional type of set of arrangements in our basing constructs that we are more and more finding ourselves in situations where we are not able to articulate the shared interest argument as successfully and in as broad an area as we might have in the past.

And that we are being forced into more of a cost payment structure type of situation across the board. What are the implications for that given our national fiscal environment, the politics, the domestic politics of that kind of arrangement, set of arrangements and also, the military implications of that? Anybody? Any volunteers?

MR. DUBOIS: As I indicated, there is a significant cost to the American taxpayer to maintain a large military footprint overseas. On average, the last three fiscal years, on average, current dollars, we spend about \$46 billion overseas on both capital construction and base operating support. Excuse me, that is total. The overseas is 6.5 billion, not an insignificant number.

Reference Secretary Gates' comments over the last week or 10 days looking at overhead structure and the costs thereto. In the Army – we would call it the institutional Army, as opposed to the operational Army – I think that we have to look at these kinds of costs, but not at the expense of building partnership capacity, as was discussed in the QDR of '06 and the recent QDR of 2001.

But building partnership capacity, working with our alliances, forward presence, be it for intelligence purposes or training purposes with our allies and friends is not necessarily directly related to permanent stationing of our military assets. And we, I suspect – Ambassador Pickering quite right – God knows I don't want to do it – or my successors don't want to do another BRAC anytime soon be it a pre-BRAC internationally or domestic BRAC.

Although I think that it is something that needs to be reviewed on a fairly consistent basis every four to five years. It doesn't mean you actually go through it, but a review is a good thing and a healthy thing to be flexible, to be responsible and responsive to uncertainty. I see in the back of the room Adm. Keating. And I am sure that he – when he was PACOM, looked at these issues on a fairly frequent basis.

MR. PICKERING: Could I just, Dr. Leed, address one aspect of the question, which is the nagging and difficult one? And you mentioned Manas. Should we pay rent for bases? Ideally, no. I think that has been a Defense Department position. I think it has fully been supported by the State Department. If you do, you get into odious comparisons, potential for a bidding war, who sets the price? Does it go up if the circumstances get tougher in terms of your dependence? None of this you like.

Partnership is tremendous and partnership obviously has to have shared mutual interests. The problem is there isn't always obviously a shared mutual interest in the presence. Then the question has to be what sort of rent can help? And, of course, there is obviously the payroll on the base. There are facilities that may be left behind for short stays or otherwise. Your military assistance programs, which can support mutuality, even if the base isn't seen in that light. And they can be put in and they all have to be considered. And they are part of the complexities of dealing with the political-military side of the equation.

But the need to be out there in the last analysis, I suppose, as it has come to be with respect to Manas, the issue of funds can't be avoided. One would like to see them out of the category in rent and into the terms of mutual assistance if you could just for the sake of avoiding the kinds of things that I have raised. I had one interesting example.

On behalf of a purely private foundation, we approached the Defense Department for a program that would, in fact, take care in beginning in parts of Kyrgyzstan with 30 percent of the kids who are infected with worms in that part of the world. And unfortunately, it took us a whole year to have the Defense Department come to the realization that this might really be a beneficial effort, particularly when the program was centered around using medical consultations with Kyrgyz at Manas as a centerpiece of the activity. And I was disturbed.

Now, some of that came in the middle of negotiations about the future of Manas and I can understand why Defense had its problems. But it seems to me those are tremendously interesting activities. They are relatively low cost. They could do a great deal to generate the kinds of things that are going to adhere to the benefit of our service members and, indeed, of our base structure in the country.

And those could be done collaboratively across the government in ways that I think would be mutually helpful. And I think we need to think more about how to do that. I think that there are whole-of-government possibilities here that once we can get it out of the stovepipes, we can look at it and maybe a broader consultation about the future of the bases can also begin to take into account are there better things we can do across the government to make sure that our current structure stays in place or that our expanding structure, if we need it, is widely and mutually supported across the government to make those things happen.

GEN. PACE: Yeah, this is fundamentally relations between sovereign nations. And dollars and cents are background noise and really not the issue. When we went into Afghanistan, we had access to bases in Uzbekistan. I cannot speak for the Uzbek government, but I have got to presume that one of the reasons that they let us use their base was because it was in their best interest to have us do something about the Taliban next door and that it was in their best interest to help us help them fight the terrorists inside their own country.

Over time for their own reasons, they elected to have us leave. So it is very much about discussions among sovereign nations. I believe as a nation that we do too much talking at other people and not enough listening to other people. But I think if we listen, we can hear the kinds of opportunities that Ambassador Pickering just spoke about, which is what is it about this situation that is important to you, country A? How is it that together we can solve your problems

and solve our problems? There is enough opportunity out there to find things that work. If you take any issue, just like relations between individuals, relations between countries roll down pretty quickly, too.

There is 10 to 20 percent of what we want to do that they don't want us to do. There is 10 to 20 percent that they want us to do that we don't want to do, which leads to 60 to 80 percent in the middle that is good for both people and both countries. And if you talk and listen, you can get to that fact and get to the meat of the issue. When dollars and cents are being talked about publicly, it is about something else. That is the public issue. But the real issue is that we have not scratched each other's itch with regard to fundamental value to the countries involved.

MS. LEED: Okay, well, let's have part of that talking and listening with all of you. Let me bring you into this conversation. If you could please identify yourself and be as concise as possible in phrasing your question, it would be much appreciated. Is there anybody who would like to kick it off? Let's start in the back, back there.

Q: Hi, I am Christine Shank (ph) with Booz Allen Hamilton. I was wondering what your thoughts are on how seabasing may solve or not solve some of these challenges that we have with overseas basing?

GEN. PACE: Being a Marine, I think seabasing solves every problem. (Laughter.) The truth of the matter is and I think Ambassador Pickering mentioned it is that it is a solution to part of the problem. And it certainly allows you to the forward deployed without being intrusive and it allows you to have enormous capabilities deployed.

But the fact of the matter is as wonderful and as strong as aircraft carrier battle group is – and it is – and the fact that it can be anywhere on the planet that is covered with water for the most part – and they are – at the end of the day, you can generate many more sorties of airplanes per day from a land-based airfield than you can from a sea-based airfield. So you get to a point where your ability to generate the kinds of activity and power that you need from the seabase reaches a limit. And it just needs to be part of your solution.

It is a great solution for places that you haven't thought about having to go. Arguably, very few people in our country were thinking in 2001 that we would have to deploy to Afghanistan. The war games were based on going to help in Korea or to Iraq or Iran or someplace like that, but not to go into Afghanistan, yet that happened. And our ability to quickly respond with sea-based forces as we generated the agreements locally with Uzbekistan, Pakistan, et cetera, to be able to get in on a land-base basis and then build that capacity were all very important. So seabasing, you bet, but not exclusive.

MS. LEED: Anybody else? Okay, right here.

Q: I am Mitzi Wertheim with the Naval Postgraduate School. Ray, how many people are on these bases that are not in Iraq and Afghanistan?

MR. DUBOIS: Beginning – going back to 2001, we had slightly more than 100,000 military personnel, not dependents and families, but military personnel basically in Europe and slightly less than 100,000 basically in Korea, Japan, Okinawa and so forth. We had total worldwide overseas of 250,000. The idea was we would reduce by 70,000, bring 70,000 back to the U.S. bases, U.S. domestic territories, CONUS, et cetera.

Now, of course, the United States Army active component has increased its size by some 75 to 80,000 men and women. Accommodating them – most of them are in downrange in Iraq and Afghanistan. So those are the numbers, Mitzi. Were you going somewhere with the numbers issue?

Q: Well, I was interested in what would be the ramifications here in the United States both in terms of facilities, whether or not it gets impacted there, and also the question of bringing all those folks back and what are the jobs you give them? I mean, these things never have a one-off solution. They have second-, third-, fourth-, fifth-order consequences.

MR. DUBOIS: Quite correct. When I was in my previous jobs, I remember looking at Fort Bliss in El Paso, Texas, and doubling the size of the Army's active component at Fort Bliss, having to sit down with the mayor and the town council and the school board chairman and talking through the issues of infrastructure, schools, roads, housing, so forth.

Interesting – and this is slightly off the mark, if you will – but one of the issues that we have overseas when we permanently change station with a family is spousal employment. And that is a big deal today. You move Sgt. DuBois and his wife and his three kids to Germany and my wife is a teacher or physician's assistant, she can't get a job over there. So that is another aspect – small, though, it is – but an important one of quality of life when it comes to overseas versus domestic.

The issue about do we have enough facilities in the United States subsequent to our domestic BRAC to take back, if you will – and this is an issue right now that is slowing the return of brigades from Europe, pure and simple, number one. Number two, question mark, will we keep the same active component end strength in the Army as we draw down in Iraq and hopefully eventually draw down in Afghanistan? The answer is no, we won't keep the same – I don't believe we will keep the same end strength – 575 (575,000).

MS. LEED: Are there questions? If not, I will dive in with one. I want to talk a little bit more specifically about the Japan agreement from last year and its prospects. I know we have a firm political commitment on both sides to implement it. Ambassador, you alluded to some of the challenges on the Japanese side and there is also the Guamanian component and whether or not we have accurately reflected the cost associated with that, just exactly how much capacity there is to support the movement of significant numbers of additional forces to Guam.

Did we make a commitment that we can keep? Did they make a commitment that they can keep? And what are the implications for U.S.-China, U.S.-Japan and Japan-China and the region as a whole?

MR. PICKERING: Let me start. I think that we have got basically out there some differing ideas. So there is no agreement. And so the question of keeping it is a moot point, even though there were agreements with past governments that we thought weren't going to be kept. And they are a source of irritation, but not necessarily a source of celerity (ph) in how to get the problem solved. I think that has to come.

I think that the presence is very significant for the continued defense of the home islands. But we are also looking at flexibility. We have been for the last two decades. And I think that that combination has to be made to work. People will disagree on numbers over time. We would hope that, in fact, we get a military consensus about the right numbers in the right place. I would argue obviously, it is easier for us in principle in a foreign policy context to put bases in American territories.

On the other hand, it is not easier necessarily politically if, in fact, they begin to sink under the weight, which is a different sort of problem. We have stayed away from the Northern Marianas, the commonwealth, except for some limited functions. And one wonders whether that is doable or not. I don't know enough of the local politics to have any idea.

Guam is considerably farther away, better located for some missions, but not so well-located for others. And I think those are the kind of questions that all have to be hashed out. Those are the sort of things that, in my view, would be part of a process, formal or informal, of reconciling the structures. And the only distinction I would make is that if you treat each one in a stovepipe, you lose synergies and you open the door to what we would call unintended consequences. And I think it is useful to do that as a broad-brush thing.

I think there will never be a day when we do not have an ongoing negotiation of one kind or another over one or a number of what our bases are. And I think that is probably a good thing. I think it fits with my sense of the model is that we can't rest on our oars for long periods of time and expect everything is going to continue to be the same and there will be no changes in the world situation.

And our friends and allies and our base folks around the world are not going to let us do it. And it is always better, in my view, if you are dealing with a set of issues to be ahead of the problem and in front of it than it is to be caught at the end having to answer increasingly more difficult questions from people who are otherwise friendly supporters.

GEN. PACE: Yeah, the relationship between the United States and Japan has this piece to it and this piece to it. And in 1994 to 1996, I was the deputy commander in Japan. My responsibility for the U.S. military was to be part of the team that negotiated with our counterparts in Japan for the replacement of the air facility of Futenma.

And in 1996, we had an agreement. And Kurt Campbell who is now the assistant secretary of state was the prime negotiator from the State Department and I was the prime guy from the U.S. military on the ground in Tokyo. Obviously, our governments were giving us the guidance. But we agreed and the governments agreed in 1996 to move Futenma, et cetera. And it was to be done and was going to be done by 2006.

And as 2006 got closer and closer, then there were new agreements. So the frustration level is for both sides is that we have yet to come up with the solution. Everybody understands there is a problem. But we have yet to come up with a solution that accommodates as many concerns as possible. And as a result of that, you end up with one side or the other feeling like they are being put upon, and hence in my mind, the part of the relationship that goes a little jagged every now and then.

On the other hand, since 1945, we have had a very, very stable bottom line, which is that our presence in Japan is as essentially fundamental to their freedom as to our own. And although it has been 14 years now since we said in 10 years, we would fix the problem on Okinawa, although that has – (inaudible) – we have continued, therefore and because of that to continue on with what we had previous to that because both nations understand that although we haven't quite figured out a better way to do it, what we have is essential to both countries.

Going to Guam then, you have U.S. citizens who live on a beautiful island. If you visit the island, you will see that the road network there, the electric grid, nothing on that island can accommodate 8,000 more Marines and therefore, 25,000 more Americans when you add in families, support structure and the like.

And therein is the cost in dollars and to the current lifestyle of our fellow citizens on Guam. Would there be a plus-up by adding the kinds of facilities that would require upgrading of the road network and the electric grid? You bet. But would an additional 25,000 folks on that island significantly change the way that island functions on a day-to-day basis? You bet.

So Japan is in negotiations with the United States and its own citizens on Okinawa. And the United States is in negotiations with Japan and our own citizens on Guam. And you can understand how getting to a quick solution isn't going to be in the cards. But you can also appreciate that as both nations try to figure out how best to do this that we have held hands and continue to march together in the same way we have for the last almost 60 years.

MS. LEED: Let me just – Ambassador Pickering needs to leave, so thank you very much for joining us.

MR. DUBOIS: So if we could talk about, Tom, as soon as you leave the room, Tom –

MS. LEED: So the next question can be one for him. (Applause.)

MR. DUBOIS: If I could, Maren, the overseas negotiation or the negotiations with respect to the Futenma Marine Corps Air Station, you must remember that Okinawa Island was a United States military installation in its entirety up until 1972, when it reverted back to Japan. I will never forget. We were about to land in Okinawa, Secretary Rumsfeld and a small staff. We had been to Tokyo. We had been to Seoul, Korea. On the way back, policy in OSD wanted him to visit with the governor of Okinawa.

And we landed and he was briefed prior to landing. A small, private meeting with the governor of Okinawa to basically renew and reaffirm the friendship of the Okinawans and the idea that Futenma would close and we wouldn't move north to what is called Camp Schwab on the northern end of the island. We arrived; motorcade took us to the prefecture's headquarters. And there was 55 press, cameras, open door, all the good and the great of Okinawa seated at this huge elliptical table. And Rumsfeld – (chuckles) – we walk in and he looks at me and he looked at Larry Di Rita and you could tell we were in hot water already.

So we sit down and instead of a – even in a public setting – cooperative, congenial, courtesy – no, no, no – the governor just ripped into Rumsfeld on the fact that the Marines must leave Okinawa. We don't want you. This went on and on and on. I saw the jaw set. I am sitting next to him. Richard Lawless was there, too. And I was going oh my god. What is going to happen? Former captain of the Princeton wrestling team is going to take him down. (Chuckles.) He was very cool, calm and collected. He said thank you very much, governor. I appreciate your concerns. I will take them under advisement. Staff, time to leave. (Laughter.)

So back on the airplane and you can imagine what happened. He said I am never going back to that island again. And he looked at me and he said I want you, as soon as we get to Washington, plan a trip back here and find out what is going on. Talk to the State Department. We had just met with then our ambassador to Tokyo, Howard Baker. And so I went back and I went up to Camp Schwab and where they want to build this airfield is on a coral reef, a pristine coral reef that not only is environmentally sensitive, there is also a marine mammal called the dugong, which feeds there and breeds there.

And this is no lie. Every week for the next six months into my e-mail account at the Pentagon, on average every day, 100 to 200 e-mails from around the world lobbying me not to put this airfield on this pristine coral reef. I walked out there in the water to see for myself because I knew that the boss was going to say did you really do this? And I came back and I said to him boss, I don't think this is ever going to be built here. I know that, that was the agreement. I know that the Japanese said that is what we were going to do. I know that the Marines and the DOD and the State Department said that. I don't think we are ever going to do it.

He said well, what is the alternative? And I said, can I whisper it to you? There is a small island off of Okinawa to the northwest called Iwo Jima, which actually is a Marine Corps reserve air station right now. The Marine Corps uses it. The current prime minister of Japan, you may have read, was suggesting an island 200 kilometers to the northeast in the island chain called Tokunoshima. And that didn't get very far.

My point is – and I think it is sort of reflective of what Ambassador Pickering was suggesting – notwithstanding prior agreements, you have got to maintain a certain amount of flexibility. The Marines need an air station on the island of Okinawa or within close proximity to it. We ought to – this administration, so far, at least publicly, has said no, we are going to stick to the agreement and this is it, no questions asked, basically saying to the Japanese government you have got to honor it.

I think we need to be a little bit more flexible. I think we can be a little bit more flexible. Notwithstanding there is a clear operational need for the Marine Corps to have their helicopter assets within close proximity to their infantry for training purposes.

MS. LEED: Let me move on to a question that we got over the Web – unless you would like to comment, general. (Laughter.)

GEN. PACE: No, I think in all honesty, whether or not I agree with Ray, makes not anywhere near as important as that I think truly right now, as we sit here, there are Japanese negotiators and U.S. government negotiators that have the responsibilities for their governments to help find the way and I would choose not to try to help them do their job right now unless they ask me to.

MS. LEED: Turning to a question that we got over the Web, given the so-called “arc of instability,” does U.S. basing strategy support regional stabilization? Or is more focus now placed on state-centric, anti-access area denial within key regions? Is it more of a state-focused strategy or a regional one? Is it an either or?

GEN. PACE: No, I think it is both. I mean, I really believe we have to start out at the very top, which is, what is the national policy of the United States? What are our goals? What are our objectives? Who are you trying to influence? What kind of access are we trying to have? And once you have that, then you can work your way down from there.

So I don't see any regional that there is not impact on our greater – and I don't any of our greater that there is not impact regional. And therefore, somehow trying to divide those into this sector and that sector, to me, just doesn't work because it is a continuum that starts out with the professionals in the State Department doing what they do through diplomacy. And then the professionals in the Department of Defense being positioned in case diplomacy doesn't get the job done.

MS. LEED: More audience questions? Let me pose another one then about – we have alluded to it a little bit earlier. I think, Ray, you talked about declarations that we ought to make – or maybe it was Ambassador Pickering – in Iraq and in Afghanistan. I think it was Ambassador Pickering. But let's talk a little bit about our posture in the Middle East and how that might evolve, how it should evolve, how we need to think about that over the next 10 years.

MR. DUBOIS: I think that as Gen. Pace said, you start with a strategic framework that you believe is appropriate for our military requirements, our diplomatic requirements, our presence requirements. My view is that – and it gets back to the arc of instability comment. We need a series of bases of different types, principally host-nation bases. Their flag flies.

I was interested in the comment about leases and rents. We don't enter into – for those of us who understand government budgeting and real estate – we don't enter into capital leases with foreign countries. We do, however, have constructs for usage fees and other ways to quote, “compensate,” for the use of an airfield, a port, a military training area, et cetera. I think that we are going to require for the next easily 10 years continued presence in Qatar, in Saudi Arabia.

We have a very large – in Kuwait. I do not, however, think that we will have to maintain permanent installations in Iraq. I think we need to think – we ought to be really careful about that.

GEN. PACE: I would simply point out that you don't have to have our own permanent base, as Ray said, to get the job done. Diego Garcia, for example, owned and operated by our good friends in the U.K. We do many, many things in there that we do because they allow us to because it is in their best interest and ours. And arguably, we won't need long-term quote, "U.S.," facilities in Iraq. But if the Iraqi people and their government want us to continue to stay there and do training and the like, well, then we are going to need access to Iraqi facilities and the same thing in Afghanistan.

So Gen. Cartwright said it and if you read the QDR, it is very explicit that what we as a nation are interested in is the opportunity to have access to these facilities. And we are not so concerned about who owns which side of the fence, so to speak, but rather can we or can't we use a facility? Is it in both countries' interests and how do we get the dialogue to the point where we understand that? And I personally believe that Ray is right, that we will not have U.S. facilities in Iraq, in Afghanistan. But we will have U.S. presence – my opinion – that we will have U.S. presence in Iraq and Afghanistan for a long time to come because both countries will determine that it is in our best interest.

MR. DUBOIS: I remember, just as an aside, testifying once and being asked by the chairman of the military construction subcommittee about the permanence of our bases in Iraq. And I made this straightforward statement that there is no intention to maintain permanent U.S. flag bases in Iraq. He said – and then he listed a series of construction that was taking place or had taken place in Iraq. And I, granted, somewhat flippantly, said Mr. Chairman, I was unaware that there was such a thing as temporary concrete. You have to lay concrete. It is concrete for an airfield. And afterwards, he chastised me, but nonetheless.

MS. LEED: We have a question back there.

Q: It is really just a very small comment. Terry Murphy, former U.S. Navy and former U.S. Navy Marine amphibious officer. Once upon a time, a very long time ago, we used to come out of the Med or into the Med into Rota, Spain. Rota, Spain – at the height of the Cold War, not the era we are in today – Rota, Spain was under the Spanish flag and there was a Spanish rear Adm. commanding the base at Rota, Spain, where there were any number of U.S. uniformed people whom I remember quite well. So I think there is plenty of precedent for that. Thank you.

GEN. PACE: As a matter of fact, I inspected Rota and sat with the Spanish rear Adm.. There was far more United States naval presence on the Spanish naval base at Rota. Notwithstanding it is their flag. But I will remind all of us – and this gets back to a comment made notwithstanding with respect to Guantanamo – when the United States historically has been asked to leave, we have left, whether it is Clark Air Base or Subic Bay in the Philippines or in the case of Spain, Torrejon – we had a United States Air Force Base there. The Spanish did not want us to continue. We left.

MR. DUBOIS: And we left the cement.

GEN. PACE: And we left the cement.

MS. LEED: Gentleman back there in the glasses. Sorry, I guess you are both in glasses.

Q: Albert Seligman, retired Foreign Service officer, who at one time or another spent some time in the policy-planning staffs of both Defense and State Department. A couple of comments, which really adumbrate, I think, a consensus that I see from the previous remarks. One is the permanence of agreements. And this is going back to the Futenma dilemma. Futenma dilemma.

But we had an agreement once, security treaty between the United States and Japan. And it could have lasted indefinitely maybe or more likely, for just a year or two more because it enabled us to intervene in Japanese internal politics, to do whatever we want whenever we want it and no consultation with the Japanese government. But we got ahead of the power curve and renegotiated the security treaty. There was a bit of fracas at the height of the Cold War, but it was accepted throughout Asia. This is 1960, the renegotiation. And it has stayed in place.

Now, Okinawa has an interesting side to it. We got ahead of the power curve there also by not waiting until it became such an issue in Japan that we might have put the treaty itself in jeopardy. We agreed to return administrative rights in Okinawa. There was no requirement that we ever had to do that. But we got ahead of the game. Twenty years later, there was a huge celebration in Japan sponsored by the Japanese government inviting anybody who had anything to do with that agreement to revert administrative rights to Japan.

But all the celebrations, all the symposiums, everything that accompanied that from tea with the emperor on down were in Tokyo. And the Okinawans have always felt a little bit left out of it. And that is part of what is going on today. I am just trying to suggest what others have said that you can't just stick to the letter of the contract and you have to factor in a lot of considerations and show a little flexibility from time to time.

MS. LEED: I think we have time for one more before I get in the way of you and lunch. Maybe two more. We will do these last two and then we will – I will let you eat. We have mikes. We will start here and then we will go over there.

MR. : Yeah, right here. This lady right here.

MS. LEED: And can we have another? Is there another mike back there? Go ahead.

Q: Famika Torii (sp) with the – (inaudible). Thank you, gentlemen, for your views. Going back to Futenma, as we try to resolve this issue between Japan and the U.S. or domestically in Japan, there is a delicate balance between flexibility and what is good for the Marines. Where does the U.S. draw the line in terms of flexibility? How far can the U.S. go, for example, moving the bases, moving the operations? And where does the U.S. draw the line, say, we can't do this because this is not good for the operations of the Marines?

GEN. PACE: Without being overly glib about it, wherever the president of the United States draws it. So the U.S. Marines will argue, as they should, that they are an air-ground-logistics force and that they are the strongest where their air wing and their ground forces and a logistics base are together, able to train together and operate together. So from a pure military standpoint, having those elements together, training together and operating is exactly what your U.S. Marines should be saying to the U.S. government.

When it gets to the government-to-government level, you could see a situation where the government might say we hear you, military, but the greater good for the nation is to do A or do B. And that happens over the course of history, where the greater good is what should happen. And I am not sure I heard your question right. But the answer is there is a greater good. And it is not always the best solution for the military.

So the line that I would help draw if I was helping with the pencil would be to draw it in a place where you do not lose your capacity to use those forces. It makes no sense to so dissipate your Marines that having them overseas is of no value. If they can't train together, they can't work together. They will not be able to deploy together and they will not be effective. So you lose the reason to have them there in the first place. I am not trying to say that if you lose Futenma that oh my god, you know, the planet as we know it comes to a stop.

But the truth is that from the Marine Corps standpoint, our ability to function as effectively as we do would be severely impacted. And that voice will be heard in the dialogue inside the U.S. But your question is, who draws that line? And the answer is, the administrations in Tokyo and in Washington, D.C., draw those lines. And the rest of us get to say, "aye, aye, sir."

MS. LEED: Okay, I have been – the line has been drawn for our panel. So I apologize that we won't get our last question in. But I believe food is through those doors. Thank you all very much for coming. We have appreciated it. Thank you, panelists. I really appreciate your contributions today. (Applause.) Thanks, Ray.

(END)