Paths and Limitations to Universalizing the Additional Protocol

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Brief Outline

- Background of the Additional Protocol (AP or INF CIRC/540)
- Comparison of the safeguards system
- Status report
- Roadblocks
- Considerations
- Paths and Limitations
- Conclusions
CSA, 93+2, and the AP

The Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty and Article III
“…for the exclusive purpose of verification to the fulfillment of its obligations assumed under this Treaty with a view to preventing diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful purposes to nuclear weapons…”

Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement (CSA), INFCIRC/153, approved by the Board of Governors in 1971

Lesson learned: Iraq. Efforts turned to strengthening capabilities, both technical and legal

Model AP approved by IAEA Board in 1997 – voluntary
# Compare and Contrast

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CSA, INFCIRC/153</th>
<th>AP, INFCIRC/540</th>
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<tr>
<td>Correctness</td>
<td>Completeness</td>
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<td>Quantitative approach</td>
<td>Qualitative approach</td>
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<tr>
<td>Declared facilities</td>
<td>Mines to waste, entire nuclear fuel cycle</td>
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<td>Special inspections</td>
<td>Complimentary access</td>
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135 of 151 IAEA member states have signed the AP

106 have ratified

Significant Nuclear Activities:

62 NNWS have significant nuclear activity

55 of those have signed the AP

47 with the AP in force
Roadblocks

- **Iran** – signed in 2003, but not ratified. Application on provisional basis in 2005, now suspended.

- **Algeria** – draft AP approved by Board in 2004, not yet signed

- **Argentina, Brazil, DPRK, Egypt, Syria and Venezuela** – not yet begun negotiations of the AP

- **Brazil, Egypt and Syria** – have explicitly refused implementation
‘What next’ Considerations

- Perhaps a static situation?
  - Time for an 11+2

- Incentivize ratification of the AP

- Need to convince states that the AP is a security interest

- Address broader security concerns of NNWS

- Commitment to disarmament by NWS
Nonproliferation norm could become a nonproliferation obligation

Condition of Supply
- Nuclear Suppliers Group
- GNEP
- G8

Central Asian Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone

Mr. Abdulla Abdullatif Abdulla, Undersecretary, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Kingdom of Bahrain and IAEA Director General Yukiya Amano
Limitations

- Political polarization, NAM opposition
- Useful bargaining chip, voluntary
- Misunderstandings about obligations
- Difficulty implementing, complicated declaration process, requires further cooperation

Mr. Herman Nackaerts, IAEA Deputy Director General, Safeguards
Conclusions

- The IAEA is unable to verify absence of diversion without an Additional Protocol
- Member states must incentivize others to ratify and assist with implementation
- The AP is an essential component of the non-proliferation regime
- Time to revitalize momentum to universalize the AP