MEMORANDUM FOR:  Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

THROUGH:  Chairman, National Intelligence Council
Vice Chairman, National Intelligence Council

FROM:  National Intelligence Officer for USSR-EE

SUBJECT:  Soviets Playing on US Election

Attached are talking points for possible use with NSC principals at end-of-week meetings.
The Soviets have signalled, in an unusually blatant way, their intent to play upon the November presidential race.

Gromyko's comments to McGovern communicate very gloomy prospects for US-Soviet relations under Reagan, as well as the message that the Soviets do not expect to be at space-weapons talks in Vienna in September.

1st Secretary Rogov's remarks are even more interesting: a) no talks of any kind with Reagan before November and probably for two years thereafter, b) Soviet view that Reagan cannot be dealt with at all, despite expectation that he will win, c) interest in the prospects, however unlikely, of dealing with a Democratic administration.

Soviet public propaganda has avoided too obvious a preference for the Democrats although it leaves the clear impression that Moscow would rather deal with a new administration, even though uncertain about its actual policies, than carry on with the present one.

None of this should be taken as absolutely ruling out any Soviet willingness to bargain with the Administration even before November.

Precisely because the Soviets want to exploit election pressures on the Administration if possible, there is still a chance of space weapons talks this fall, a small chance but not zero. It depends on the concessions the Administration may be willing to make, especially on an ASAT test moratorium and precommitment to a "comprehensive ban on space weapons" -- which would, in effect, grant the Soviets all their objectives a priori.

Moreover, all-round inflexibility before November won't stop the Soviets from shifting tactics afterwards if they choose to.

The Gromyko and Rogov performances are probably intended to put pressure on the Administration itself in the pre-election period.

The Soviets probably realize that public partisanship would be counterproductive -- although they may be less restrained as the campaign goes on.

But they also probably believe that somewhat less visible signals of their intense displeasure with President Reagan could push his political advisors to press for more concessions, particularly on the space weapons agenda.

They may figure, further, that if these pressures backfire and make the Administration less flexible, they can publicize this and hope for a beneficial effect in November.