

Japan-India Security Cooperation

Building a Solid Foundation amid Uncertainty

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1. Introduction

Today, there is growing demand for a strengthened Japan-India partnership for the sake of peace and stability in the Asia Pacific as well as the international environment as a whole. The shift of the global center of gravity to Asia and the need to cope with the increasing security and non-security challenges have created opportunities for Tokyo and New Delhi to cooperate more closely. In November 2016, Prime Ministers Shinzo Abe and Narendra Modi pledged to seek deeper bilateral cooperation and synergy between Japan's "Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy" and India's "Act East" policy.² This reflects their mutual determination to strengthen the "Special Strategic and Global Partnership" in a "new era in Japan-India relations."³ With regular summit meetings and vice minister/secretary-level "2 plus 2" dialogues, the two countries are acting to solidify their relationship in a variety of areas, including economics, energy, climate change, global governance, and security. Meanwhile, uncertainty about the Trump administration's priorities has raised concerns among U.S. allies and partners, including Japan and India, and forced many to reassess their relationship with the United States and each other.

Focusing primarily on security issues, this paper seeks to clarify the ways in which Japan and India can strengthen their partnership. It first examines the historical ties between Japan and India, showing that their relationship is still at an early stage of development. Second, from a Japanese perspective, it considers the opportunities and challenges for deeper security cooperation between New Delhi and Tokyo. Special attention is paid to how India and Japan work together not only on bilateral issues but also regional and global issues. Finally, the paper provides some policy recommendations for a sound and steady Japan-India partnership. This includes the possibility of a multilateral security framework with the United States and Australia.

2. Japan-India Relationship Still at an Early Stage

With its policy of making a "proactive contribution to peace," Japan is determined to strive harder for peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region and in the wider international community. The central pillar of Japan's security strategy remains its alliance with the United States. However, Tokyo has also begun strengthening its partnerships with countries such as India with whom it shares common values and strategic interests. India, like Japan, seeks to play greater economic and security roles as an Asian power based on its "Act East" policy. Prime

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² Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (hereafter Japanese MOFA), "Japan-India Joint Statement," press release, November 11, 2016.

³ Japanese MOFA, "Japan-India Relations: Japan-India Summit Meeting," press release, December 13, 2015.

Minister Abe has noted that the Japan-India relationship is now “blessed with the largest potential for development of any bilateral relationship anywhere in the world.”⁴

Over the centuries the relationship between the two countries has been helped by commonalities in traditional culture. Buddhism, for example, has had a great impact on Japanese heritage since the 6th century and has contributed to Japanese people’s sense of closeness to India.⁵ Established in 1903 in Tokyo, the Japan-India Association has also facilitated exchange between the two countries. Indians’ affinity for Japan has an even wider base of support. According to a former Japanese ambassador, India’s pro-Japan inclination is based on the following elements: a spiritual bond through Buddhism; Japan as a model for Indian nation-building (i.e., its rapid development after the Meiji Restoration and remarkable reconstruction after the Second World War); Indian’s high regard for the qualities of Japanese people, products, and services; and the indirect Japanese contribution to India’s independence, with respect to its 1905 victory in the Russo-Japanese War and support for the establishment of the Indian National Army.

Japan-India cooperation has received increased attention in recent years. Yet the push for a strong strategic relationship really came about only after the start of the 21st century. Japan has pursued the path of a peace-loving nation aligned with the U.S.-led Western bloc since the end of World War II. It has always sought robust cooperative relations with other countries, including India. The Japan-India diplomatic relationship kicked off in 1952 and from the very beginning India played a substantial role in Japan’s return to the international community. For example, India facilitated Japan’s participation in both the 1951 Asian Games and the 1955 Bandung Conference.

These initial interactions, however, remained limited to the economic realm. Japan’s first official development assistance (ODA) package was provided to India in 1958 and since then ODA loans have been the predominant form (99 percent) of Japanese assistance to India.⁶ This failure to develop a strong non-economic bilateral relationship was a result of the unique international environment of the Cold War. Japan deepened its relationship with the United States while non-aligned India moved closer to the Soviet Union to counter the United States’ increasing involvement in Asia. Progress in the Japan-India relationship was also stymied by events like Japan’s neutrality in the 1962 Sino-Indian and 1965 Indo-Pakistani wars, as well as Japan’s strong opposition to India’s nuclear tests in 1974 and 1998. The relationship began to improve around the turn of the century. Prime Ministers Yoshiro Mori and Atal Bihari Vajpayee established a bilateral “Global Partnership” during Mori’s visit to India in 2000. This was the first visit by a Japanese prime minister to India in 10 years. The primary focus of the summit was strengthening bilateral relations especially in the fields of economics and information technology, while also addressing the nuclear issue – India’s second nuclear test had led to the suspension of Japanese ODA in 1998. The relationship gained momentum when Prime Ministers Junichiro Koizumi and Manmohan Singh emphasized the “Strategic Orientation of Japan-India Global Partnership” in April 2005. Since then, summit meetings have been held annually in the two countries’ respective capitals. The relationship strengthened further when Shinzo Abe first

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ Japanese MOFA, “Japan-India Relations (Basic Data),” press release, January 19, 2017.

⁶ Japanese MOFA, “Overview of Japan’s ODA to India,” press release, June 2011.

assumed leadership in Japan in September 2006.⁷ This was made clear with a joint Japan-India statement toward their “Strategic and Global Partnership” in December, as well as Abe’s “Confluence of the Two Seas” speech to the Indian Parliament in August 2007. The relationship gained bipartisan support in Japan when the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) came to power and signed the Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation in 2008 and the Action Plan in 2009.

These developments formed the basis for stronger security ties between the two countries. Upon returning to power in December 2012, Prime Minister Abe reaffirmed India as an important security partner for Japan as well as for stability in the Asia Pacific and the international community. Japan’s 2013 National Security Strategy (NSS) lists India as Japan’s fifth most important partner behind only the United States, the Republic of Korea, Australia, and the members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).⁸ Today, the government of Japan views India as “becoming increasingly influential, due to what is projected to become the world’s largest population, and to high economic growth and potential.” It considers India to be “geopolitically important for Japan as India is positioned in the center of sea lines of communication [in the Indian Ocean].”⁹

It was Prime Ministers Shinzo Abe and Narendra Modi that truly accelerated the momentum in the relationship between the two countries. The overall partnership has been built on stronger economic ties, (e.g., Japan’s investment in the Indian domestic market); the rise of various security challenges; and common values that include democracy, tolerance, pluralism, and an open society.¹⁰ During Modi’s first visit to Japan in August-September 2014, Tokyo and Delhi upgraded their relationship to a “Special Strategic and Global Partnership.” In December 2015, Abe and Modi commemorated “the dawn of a new era in Japan-India relations” and resolved to move toward “deep and broad-based cooperation and concrete actions in defense, security, economic, and cultural fields.”¹¹ The two leaders have also signed two important defense agreements – the Agreement concerning the Transfer of the Defense Equipment and Technology and the Agreement concerning Security Measures for the Protection of Classified Military Information – that will provide a firm foundation for greater strategic ties. In November 2016, the two leaders undertook a comprehensive review of the Special Strategic and Global Partnership as outlined in the “India and Japan Vision 2025” (set forth in December 2015) and pledged to find more synergy between India’s “Act East” policy and Japan’s “Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy.” Tokyo and New Delhi also signed the Agreement for Cooperation in the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy, marking, in Modi’s words, an “historic step in our engagement

⁷ Yuki Tatsumi, “Abe’s Visit Takes Japan-India Security Relations to the Next Level,” *Diplomat*, December 14, 2015.

⁸ Government of Japan (GOJ), *National Security Strategy* (Tokyo: GOJ, December 2013), 24.

⁹ *Ibid.*

¹⁰ According to a 2014 survey, India was ranked as the most promising country/region for Japanese business operations to invest overseas over the next three years or so for the first time since 1992 when the question was first posed in its present form. The survey received responses from a wide range of industries, including automobiles, chemicals and electrical equipment & electronics. Japan Bank for International Cooperation (JBIC), “Survey Report on Overseas Business Operations by Japanese Manufacturing Companies: Results of the JBIC FY2014 Survey – Outlook for Japanese Foreign Direct Investment (26th Annual Survey)” (Tokyo: JBIC, November 2014), 17–18.

¹¹ Japanese MOFA, “Japan and India Vision 2025 Special Strategic and Global Partnership: Working Together for Peace and Prosperity of the Indo-Pacific Region and the World,” press release, December 12, 2015.

to build a clean energy partnership” as well as to help “combat the challenge of climate change.”¹²

Stronger practical cooperation has led to increasing popular support for the bilateral relationship in India. In particular, Japan’s reputation among Indian opinion leaders and the general public has improved markedly, as illustrated by opinion polls.¹³ In 2016, 95 percent of Indian respondents perceived the current state of the relationship between Japan and India as being “very friendly” or “somewhat friendly” and 46 percent ranked Japan as the most reliable country among the G20, higher than Russia (23 percent) and the United States (14 percent). This is a clear change in perception among the Indian population, which ranked Japan as the third most important partner behind the United States and Russia in 2013 and 2009.¹⁴

While the Japan-India relationship has strengthened since the beginning of the 21st century, it remains unclear whether and how it might evolve to be of true strategic importance, especially amid uncertainty over President Donald Trump’s foreign policy priorities.

3. Key Opportunities for Cooperation

In line with the “Special Strategic and Global Partnership,” Japan and India have begun to share many areas for cooperation. The rise of India has enabled the two countries to cooperate extensively in the realm of economic development. Meanwhile, the changing international environment has opened up opportunities for Tokyo and New Delhi to cooperate in security as well. Japan and India can harness these opportunities for cooperation in three different dimensions: their own national defense (narrowly defined); peace and security in the wider Asia-Pacific region; and the stability of the international environment as a whole.

3.1 Cooperation in Defense of Japan and India

Japan and India are both concerned about North Korea’s recent nuclear and missile development. For Tokyo, North Korea poses “a serious and imminent threat to Japan’s security” as noted in the 2013 National Defense Program Guidelines (NDPG).¹⁵ Today, Japan is already within reach of North Korean short- and medium-range missiles, and in the near future it is highly likely that Pyongyang will “deploy ballistic missiles mounted with a nuclear warhead that have ranges covering Japan.”¹⁶ Although Pyongyang says that it will not use nuclear weapons unless its sovereignty is threatened, in 2013 it listed specific Japanese cities where U.S. forces are stationed as potential targets, including Yokosuka, Misawa, and Okinawa.¹⁷ Japan’s concerns increased further when Pyongyang conducted its fourth and fifth nuclear tests in 2016. Meanwhile, the North Korea nuclear issue has also been a serious concern for India. India’s

¹² “Japan-India Nuclear Cooperation Agreement Signed,” *World Nuclear News*, November 11, 2016.

¹³ Japanese MOFA, “Opinion Poll: Image of Japan in India,” press release, November 2016.

¹⁴ Japanese MOFA, “Opinion Poll: Image of Japan in India,” press release, June 20, 2013; Japanese MOFA, “Opinion Survey on the Image of Japan in India,” press release, May 8, 2009.

¹⁵ GOJ, “National Defense Program Guidelines for FY 2014 and beyond” (Tokyo: GOJ, December 2013), 3.

¹⁶ Ministry of Defense of Japan (hereafter Japanese MOD), *Defense of Japan 2016* (Tokyo: MOD, 2016), 4.

¹⁷ “North Korea ‘Will Not Use Nuclear Weapons’ Unless Threatened,” BBC, May 8, 2016.

worries stem from suspicions over Pyongyang's close collaboration with Pakistan on nuclear and missile technologies. India has repeatedly condemned Pyongyang's program. When North Korea carried out the fifth test, New Delhi expressed deep concern over the adverse impact of further proliferation on India's national security.¹⁸

Tokyo and New Delhi's threat perceptions vis-à-vis Pyongyang are not identical: the former is worried about the danger of being directly targeted as well as about the abduction of its citizens; the latter is primarily concerned with North Korean assistance to Pakistan's military. Despite these differences, North Korea continues to pose a grave threat to both Japan and India because it is highly unlikely that Kim Jong-un will give up his country's nuclear and missile development programs voluntarily. Furthermore, Kim Jong-un's intentions are not necessarily clear and some have pointed out that the young leader might not know where other countries' red lines are.¹⁹ Japan and India therefore need to cooperate with the international community and take a firm stance against North Korea.

Additionally, China's assertiveness along its land border with India and its maritime boundary with Japan has driven the two countries to pursue deeper cooperation. A concern for Tokyo has been the intrusion of Chinese government vessels into the territorial waters of the Senkaku Islands since December 2008.²⁰ In addition, Chinese military aircraft have been observed more frequently in the East China Sea, forcing the number of Japan Air Self-Defense Force (JASDF) scrambles to increase drastically. Moreover, in 2013 China announced the establishment of its East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone, which Japan sees as unduly infringing on its sovereignty over the Senkaku Islands and presenting a potential risk for freedom of overflight in the region. Furthermore, over the past 15 years Beijing has strengthened its naval modernization program, placing high priority on its submarines. This is changing the military power balance in the region. Today, the number of Chinese submarines surpasses that of the U.S. fleet, and it is estimated to increase to between 69 and 78 submarines by 2020.²¹

There have been some efforts to improve bilateral relations between Tokyo and Beijing. The two countries affirmed a mutual desire for the early implementation of their Maritime and

¹⁸ Elizabeth Roche, "India Condemns North Korean Nuclear Test," Livemint, September 9, 2016.

¹⁹ During testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee in 2013, PACOM Commander Admiral Samuel J. Locklear expressed his concern over Kim Jong-un's intention and said, "His father and his grandfather, as far as I can see, always figured into their provocation cycle an 'off ramp'... and it's not clear to me that he has thought through how to get out of it. And so that's what makes this scenario, I think, particularly challenging." Choe San-Hun and David E. Sanger, "North Korea Warns It Is on Brink of Nuclear War with South," *New York Times*, April 9, 2013.

²⁰ In January 2013, a Chinese naval vessel directed fire-control radar at a Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF) destroyer and also allegedly at a helicopter based on the destroyer. In June 2016, a *Jiangkai I*-class frigate entered Japan's contiguous zone near the Senkaku Islands – a first for a Chinese surface combatant. In the same month, a Chinese navy intelligence gathering vessel (AGI) sailed in Japan's territorial waters near Kuchinoerabu Island and Yakushima Island, the first navigation in Japanese territorial waters by a Chinese naval vessel in approximately 12 years. Japanese MOD, *Defense of Japan 2016*, 52–56.

²¹ As of 2016, China possessed approximately four nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines, five nuclear-powered attack submarines, and 53 diesel-powered attack submarines. However, the quality of the Chinese undersea fleet is still lower than that of the United States. U.S. Department of Defense (hereafter U.S. DOD), *Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People's Republic of China 2016* (Arlington, VA: OSD, May 2016), 26; Andrea Shalal, "China Submarines Outnumber U.S. Fleet: U.S. Admiral," Reuters, February 25, 2015.

Air Communication Mechanism at their Foreign Ministers' Meeting in July 2016.²² Meanwhile, it seems that China is now more focused on the South China Sea than the East China Sea. However, China's maritime activities are still a matter of concern for Japan. For India, tensions remain with China along their shared border over Arunachal Pradesh and the Aksai Chin region.²³ While an Agreement on the Maintenance of Peace and Tranquility along the Line of Actual Control in the India-China Border Areas and a Border Defense Cooperation Agreement were signed in September 1993 and October 2013, respectively, New Delhi and Beijing have still criticized each other for frequent border incursions and military buildups near the disputed territories. Furthermore, China's attempts to woo Sri Lanka have raised strategic concerns for India.

Japan's territorial dispute with China does not directly affect India's own security and New Delhi's dispute with Beijing does not directly affect Japan's own security. Both countries, therefore, need to be sensitive and not openly take sides as a third party, as it could provoke accusations of encirclement from China. What Tokyo and New Delhi can do is to declare publicly the importance of abiding by international norms and not attempting to change the status quo by force. According to one observer, the number of Chinese intrusions in the India-China border areas decreased dramatically after the resumption of U.S. freedom of navigation operations in the South China Sea, suggesting a correlation between the two issues.²⁴ If this is indeed the case, China may be restricting its military movements along the Sino-Indian border in order to concentrate on the South China Sea without creating confrontations elsewhere. Likewise, China's actions in the East China Sea may alter its policies in the South China Sea.

Finally, Japan and India can cooperate on the transfer of defense technologies. Tokyo's 2014 decision to relax its arms export controls has enabled it to develop arms with allies and partners, including India. Indian defense equipment is old and India remains heavily dependent on Russian technology, which accounts for 70 percent of Indian defense imports. Cooperation in this area will not only stimulate the defense industry in both countries, but also boost the "Make in India" initiative, provide better balance in India's arms imports, and improve interoperability between Japanese and Indian forces. It will also have a geostrategic significance. Conclusion of the US-2 amphibious aircraft deal, for example, would enable India to conduct both surveillance patrols and search and rescue operations due to the aircraft's short takeoff capability and long flight range.²⁵ Furthermore, the deal would also build a foundation for the potential transfer of other defense equipment such as submarines and minesweepers.²⁶ Japan is well-known for its advanced technologies and extensive knowhow in these areas.

²² Japanese MOFA, "Japan-China Foreign Ministers' Meeting," press release, July 25, 2016.

²³ U.S. DOD, *Annual Report to Congress 2016*, 51.

²⁴ Author's interview with Satoru Nagao, Research Fellow at the Tokyo Foundation and Lecturer in National Security at Gakushuin University, February 15, 2017.

²⁵ The aircraft can cruise at extremely low speeds (approximately 55 miles per hour), take off and land on water within a very short distance, and fly a range of over 2,800 miles.

²⁶ Prashanth Parameswaran, "Japan to Join Indian Submarine Race?" *Diplomat*, January 29, 2015; Satoru Nagao, "The Importance of a Japan-India Amphibious Aircraft Deal," *Diplomat*, December 12, 2016.

3.2 Contribution to a Stable Asia-Pacific Region

The protection of sea lines of communication (SLOCs) – including against piracy – has become a vital issue in the Indo-Pacific region. Japan, India, and China depend on maritime routes for much of their consumption of natural resources, including oil from the Middle East. During the first trilateral foreign ministerial-level talk between Tokyo, New Delhi, and Washington in September 2015, the ministers collectively expressed the importance of close cooperation in maritime security in the Asia-Pacific region.²⁷ Meanwhile, China continues to take assertive actions in the South China Sea and expand its naval reach in the Indian Ocean, partly in conjunction with its new “One Belt, One Road” initiative. This has raised concerns among some Asia-Pacific countries such as Japan and India. China’s actions are closely linked with its energy strategy, which aims in part to alleviate its heavy dependence on SLOCs running through the South China Sea and the Strait of Malacca.²⁸ While Beijing seeks to increase its overland oil supply from Russia and Kazakhstan, its annual volume of imported oil and liquefied natural gas from the Middle East and Africa continues to increase, making these SLOCs strategically vital.

In the South China Sea, China has intensified its activities in waters around the disputed Spratly Islands, Paracel Islands, and Scarborough Shoal. From time to time, there have been direct confrontations between China and other claimant countries as well as the United States.²⁹ China also continues to build and strengthen the artificial islands in the region.³⁰ Satellite imagery has revealed that point defenses such as anti-aircraft guns and close-in weapons systems have already been placed on all seven of China’s outposts in the Spratlys.³¹ Other claimants continue to improve defenses at their own outposts, contributing to a cycle of increasing militarization in the region.³²

Considering these challenges to regional stability, Japan has taken a deeper interest in the South China Sea. Tokyo supports Washington’s efforts to protect rules and norms like freedom of navigation and overflight and has called for the July 12 ruling by a specially constituted arbitral tribunal to be respected. On the other hand, India has taken a different stance on the issue. Because it views the South China Sea as a secondary interest, New Delhi did not join Tokyo and Washington in calling on Beijing to respect the tribunal’s judgment.³³ Meanwhile,

²⁷ Japanese MOFA, “Inaugural U.S.-India-Japan Trilateral Ministerial Dialogue,” press release, September 30, 2015.

²⁸ Approximately 83 percent of China’s oil imports transited these areas in 2015. U.S. DOD, *Annual Report to Congress 2016*, 47.

²⁹ For example, in March 2009 and December 2013, Chinese vessels harassed U.S. ships conducting surveillance in the region. In August 2014, a Chinese fighter allegedly came as close as 30 feet to a U.S. P-8 patrol aircraft. Tensions escalated in October 2015 when a U.S. Navy destroyer, the USS *Lassen*, sailed within 12 nautical miles (nm) of Chinese-occupied Subi Reef. “China Says U.S. Warship’s Spratly Islands Passage ‘Illegal,’” BBC News, October 27, 2015.

³⁰ In January 2016, China landed a civilian plane on a newly completed airfield on the Fiery Cross Reef, inviting protests from the neighboring countries. In the following month, China temporarily deployed HQ-9 missiles on Woody Island in the Paracels for drills. Te-Ping Chen, “China Lands Test Flight in Disputed Island Chain,” *Wall Street Journal*, January 3, 2016.

³¹ “China’s New Spratly Island Defenses,” Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative, December 13, 2016.

³² “Exclusive: Vietnam Moves New Rocket Launchers into Disputed South China Sea – Sources,” Reuters, August 10, 2016.

³³ The new Indian Maritime Security Strategy makes no reference to the South China Sea. Ministry of Defense of India (hereafter Indian MOD), *Ensuring Secure Seas: Indian Maritime Security Strategy* (New Delhi: October 2015).

India's navy and air force have engaged in military exercises and training with coastal nations in the region, demonstrating how it has increased its power projection capabilities beyond the Indian Ocean.

Likewise, China has been steadily increasing its naval operations in more distant seas, including the Indian Ocean. Chinese navy vessels have navigated through the Sunda Strait to the eastern Indian Ocean and have sailed to the Gulf of Aden to participate in international anti-piracy operations. Furthermore, China's submarines have been spotted operating in the region, making port calls for the first time in Sri Lanka and Pakistan.³⁴ The cornerstone of China's regional posture is Pakistan's deepwater port at Gwadar.³⁵ Against this backdrop, India and the United States have expressed concern about China's increasing presence. In December 2014, Indian Navy chief Robin Dhowan expressed concern about Chinese deployments. In January 2017, Admiral Harry Harris, commander of U.S. Pacific Command, warned India about China's growing influence in the Indian Ocean region and added that he was also concerned about China's relationship with Pakistan and Bangladesh.³⁶ In addition to Gwadar, China has recently secured another overseas base through the construction of Doraleh port in Djibouti, which will assist Beijing in far seas operations.³⁷

Meanwhile, development of India's Andaman and Nicobar Islands in the eastern Indian Ocean has become an area of cooperation with Japan. In February 2016, Tokyo and New Delhi initiated talks over a plan to upgrade India's civilian infrastructure on the island chain.³⁸ While the grant aid is modest in size, the islands have strategic significance due to their location in the Bay of Bengal, which is northwest of the maritime chokepoint at the Strait of Malacca.³⁹ India has acknowledged their strategic importance since the turn of the century when it established the Andaman and Nicobar Command (ANC), its first integrated theater command with headquarters at Port Blair. More recently in December 2015, Navy chief Admiral R. K. Dhowan has said that the islands have become a "very, very important aspect" of India's security.⁴⁰ In January 2016, two naval submarine hunter-killer P-8I aircraft completed their first ever two-week deployment

³⁴ China's increasing military presence in the Indian Ocean reflects China's 2015 military strategy, which shifts its naval forces toward "offshore waters defense and open seas protection." A *Shang*-class nuclear submarine and a *Song*-class submarine conducted operations there in winter 2013-14 and fall 2014, respectively. A *Song*-class submarine also made a port call in Colombo, Sri Lanka, marking the first time a Chinese submarine entered a port overseas. This was followed by a *Yuan*-class submarine that reportedly called at a port in Karachi, Pakistan in May 2015. Japanese MOD, *Defense of Japan 2016*, 59.

³⁵ Gwadar is the center of a \$46-billion-dollar China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) project between Beijing and Islamabad. It will open a new route for China's oil and gas imports. With the use of Gwadar port, China will be able to reduce its dependence on the Strait of Malacca and the South China Sea routes by providing it with the alternative of using a shorter route for energy imports from the Middle East. It has been recently reported that China assigned two ships to the Pakistan Navy to guard the Gwadar port. "China Assigns 2 Ships to Pak Navy to Guard Gwadar Port," NDTV, January 16, 2017.

³⁶ "Chinese Activity Is Up Exponentially in Indian Ocean," NDTV, December 3, 2014; "China's Forays in Indian Ocean a Matter of Concern, U.S. Commander Tells India," *Hindustan Times*, January 18, 2017.

³⁷ Japanese MOD, *Defense of Japan 2016*, 59.

³⁸ Ellen Barry, "As India Collaborates with Japan on Islands, It Looks to Check China," *New York Times*, March 11, 2016.

³⁹ The project aims to build three 5-megawatt diesel power plants on South Andaman Island.

⁴⁰ "India Enhancing Security in Andaman & Nicobar: Navy Chief Admiral R. K. Dhowan," *Economic Times*, December 3, 2015.

to the archipelago. Searcher-II UAVs have also been temporarily deployed to the islands.⁴¹ With Japanese economic assistance and, hopefully, the conclusion of the US-2 deal, the archipelago could become a significant platform for aerial maritime surveillance. The Indian Navy has tentative plans to station a number of US-2s on the archipelago.⁴²

Continued assertiveness by China will ultimately push Japan and India to cooperate more closely in maritime security. During the past few years, their heads of state and defense ministers have held regular high-level talks. Progress on cooperation between their navies and coast guards has also been considerable. As one Indian commodore has noted, Japan and India are seeking to engage each other as mutual “offshore balancers” against common strategic challenges. Bilateral naval exercises like JIMEX have taken place since 2012. Although a sufficient strategic rationale exists for the Japan-India relationship to develop on its own, cooperation between their two navies has progressed primarily due to India’s own closer strategic engagement with the United States.⁴³ Japan’s status in Exercise Malabar – which has been held between India and the United States since 1992 – was upgraded to that of a permanent participant in 2015. Additionally, Japan has recently expanded the number of its defense attachés posted in India, from one Ground Self-Defense Force (JGSDF) officer to one from each service (three total). These developments have solidified a foundation for further military exchanges.

The second area in which Japan and India can cooperate for a stable Asia-Pacific region is capacity building assistance. Partner capacity requirements have increased in areas like maritime security as well as United Nations (UN) mandated peacekeeping operations (PKO) and humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HA/DR) missions. Japan’s Ministry of Defense has recently increased its capacity building assistance, including through the establishment of a Capacity Building Assistance Office (CBAO) in 2011. It also released a “Vientiane Vision” in late 2016, which highlights capacity building as one of the three main pillars for future Japan-ASEAN defense cooperation. The Japan Self-Defense Forces (JSDF) have already held human resource development programs, training, and seminars with many Asia-Pacific countries.⁴⁴ In addition, Tokyo is strengthening its partner assistance by leasing some JSDF defense equipment.⁴⁵ In May 2016, Japan agreed to lease the Philippines up to five TC-90 aircraft, which have twice the flight range of current Philippine Navy aircraft. This was the first time JSDF aircraft were slated to be leased to another country.⁴⁶ The agreement is expected to bolster Philippine maritime patrol capabilities as well as HA/DR activities. Meanwhile, India has also

⁴¹ Rajat Pandit, “To Fight China’s Andaman and Nicobar Forays, India Deploys Submarines Hunters,” *Times of India*, January 19, 2016.

⁴² Franz-Stefan Gady, “India-Japan Military Aircraft Deal Faces Further Delays,” *Diplomat*, November 15, 2016.

⁴³ Author’s interview with a retired Indian commodore, February 2017.

⁴⁴ This includes Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Mongolia, Myanmar, Papua New Guinea, the Philippines, Thailand, Timor-Leste, and Vietnam. Japanese MOD, *Japan’s Defense Capacity Building Assistance* (Tokyo: MOD, February 2016).

⁴⁵ Under Article 9 of the Public Finance Act, the government’s assets – including used defense equipment – cannot be transferred or leased to other parties without appropriate compensation. Presently, the GOJ is seeking to submit a bill that will allow Japan to give second-hand defense equipment to other countries free of charge. Meanwhile, an act on special measures was passed allowing heavy machinery used in UN peacekeeping operations to be given to the government of the country in which they had been used. “Gov’t to Submit Bill Allowing Free Giveaway of Used Defense Equipment to Other Countries,” *Mainichi Shimbun*, January 19, 2017.

⁴⁶ In a related move, the JMSDF had started to offer training to six Philippine naval pilots to fly the TC-90 aircraft in November 2016, before the leasing deal took effect. “Japan to Train Philippines Naval Pilots to Fly TC-90 Aircraft under Lease Deal,” *Japan Times*, November 22, 2016.

been active in capacity building assistance through its “Act East” policy. The Indian Navy, for example, has engaged the region in training, technical support and maintenance, provision of platforms and equipment, and hydrographic surveys. In particular, cooperation on hydrographic surveys has been a key feature of the Indian Navy’s regional engagement initiatives.⁴⁷

3.3 Securing a Peaceful International Environment

Japan and India also share an interest in securing a peaceful international environment. First, it is imperative that Japan and India engage in counter-terrorism and counter-piracy efforts. The rise of the self-declared Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) poses serious challenges not only to the Middle East, but also to the entire international community. In addition to ISIS’s level of violence and cruelty, it has also become a political, economic, and social issue, attracting many young fighters from the various parts of the world. Furthermore, ISIS has vowed to expand its activities to India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Afghanistan, citing prophecies of global war.⁴⁸ As a result, India is beginning to become more involved.

Meanwhile, the Indian Ocean region, which houses one third of the world’s population and forms “the intersection of two main reservoirs of Islamic extremism, the Middle East and Southeast Asia,” has become a greater concern.⁴⁹ The region has also been ground zero for the war on terror.⁵⁰ This requires that Japan and India, together with the international community, work continuously to help clear what some call “a lake of Jihadi terrorism.”⁵¹ In line with international efforts to eradicate terrorism, the JMSDF engaged in refueling operations and assisted the United States and others in the Indian Ocean during Operation Enduring Freedom.⁵² In 2009, Japan dispatched two destroyers along with P-3C patrol aircraft to counter piracy and protect Japanese vessels in the waters off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden. Since 2013, Japan has participated in Combined Task Force 151 (CTF 151) and even commanded it in 2015 – the first time a JSDF officer has ever taken command of a multinational force. India, on the other hand, has ample experience fighting terrorism and insurgencies, from which Japan can learn. Thus far, New Delhi has conducted at least 28 such military operations.⁵³

International peace activities, including UN PKO and HA/DR, are another area for cooperation between the two countries. The United Nations has been expanding its missions to include multiple duties such as the Protection of Civilians (POC); the promotion of political processes; and assistance in Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR), in addition to traditional ceasefire monitoring. The expansion of PKO missions increases opportunities for

⁴⁷ Indian MOD, *Ensuring Secure Seas*, 91–94.

⁴⁸ Praveen Swami, “Islamic State’s Latest Manifesto Vows to Expand War to India,” *Indian Express*, December 3, 2015.

⁴⁹ Walter Ladwig III, Andrew Erickson, and Justin Mikolay, “Diego Garcia and American Security in the Indian Ocean,” in *Rebalancing U.S. Forces: Basing and Forward Presence in the Asia Pacific*, ed. Andrew Erickson and Carnes Lord (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2014), 135.

⁵⁰ Andrew Erickson et al., “Diego Garcia and the United States’ Emerging Indian Ocean Strategy,” *Asian Security* 6, no. 3 (2010): 220.

⁵¹ G. S. Khurana, “Maritime Security in the Indian Ocean,” *Strategic Analysis* 28, no. 3 (2004): 414.

⁵² The law was extended twice in 2003 and 2005. Japanese MOFA, “Extension of the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law,” press release, October 27, 2005.

⁵³ Author’s interview with Satoru Nagao, February 15, 2017.

cooperation. Meanwhile, the United Nations' focus on PKO could change under its new secretary-general, António Guterres, who is making conflict prevention rather than peacekeeping a central theme of his time in office. At the same time, a draft leaked by the Trump administration suggests that it intends to reduce the U.S. financial contribution to the UN budget by 40 percent. If implemented, these measures are likely to have enormous effects on UN PKO.

Despite these looming changes, Japan and India are determined to keep up their own contributions. In the case of Japan, its contribution to UN peacekeeping began in Cambodia in 1992. Since then Tokyo has been involved in multiple missions, including its deployment to South Sudan.⁵⁴ In addition, Japan has dispatched JSDF personnel to leadership positions in mission headquarters and the Department of Peacekeeping Operations at the UN Headquarters.⁵⁵ In 2015, Japan also sent two JSDF officers to India's Center for UN Peacekeeping (CUNPK) to strengthen its ties with New Delhi. Meanwhile, India has played a leading role in UN PKO.⁵⁶ India has dispatched over 180,000 troops – the largest number from any country – in 49 missions, making major sacrifices including losing 167 of its peacekeepers. In 2016, India was the second largest troop contributor with 7,700 deployed personnel in 13 out of 16 active UN PKO missions. Furthermore, India has thus far provided 15 force commanders to various UN missions.

Japan's new security legislation enables it to exercise the right of collective self-defense and allows the JSDF to assist other countries under certain conditions. Under the legislation, the scope of the use of weapons has expanded to include the protection of UN officials and NGOs (called *kaketsuke-keigo*) and the conditional use of weapons while fulfilling UN PKO missions, such as protecting UN bases with other PKO troops. The legislation enables the JSDF to interact more with other foreign troops during missions, including peacekeeping activities. Therefore, it would be highly beneficial for both Japan and India to continue their participation in exercises such as the multinational peacekeeping exercise Khaan Quest held annually in Mongolia. It is also worth noting that China participated in the exercise for the first time in 2015. In addition to seeking greater cooperation in PKO, it is important that Japan and India continue to cooperate on the issue of UN reform, most notably the reform of the Security Council (UNSC), so that the two countries can contribute more actively to international security.

HA/DR is another field for deepening cooperation between Japan and India. The two countries have played significant roles in this area. Roughly 70 percent of all natural disasters occur in the Asia Pacific, costing the region \$68 billion annually over the past ten years.⁵⁷ Japan's involvement in HA/DR gained momentum with the introduction of the "Law Concerning

⁵⁴ The JSDF has been deployed to Mozambique (1993-95), Rwanda (1994), the Golan Heights (1996-2013), Timor-Leste (2002-04, 2010-12), Afghanistan (2001), Nepal (2007-11), Sudan (2008-11), Haiti (2010-13), and South Sudan (2011-present).

⁵⁵ In addition, JSDF personnel are being dispatched to PKO centers as instructors. By May 2015, a total of 20 JSDF personnel were sent to PKO facilities in eight countries in 17 total deployments, including the Cairo Regional Center for Training on Conflict Resolution and Peacekeeping in Africa (CCCPA). In March 2014, a JSDF officer was sent to the Ethiopian International Peacekeeping Center (EIPKTC) as an international consultant for the first time.

⁵⁶ Permanent Mission of India to the United Nations, "India and United Nations Peacekeeping and Peacebuilding," press release, 2016.

⁵⁷ U.S. Department of State, "U.S. Engagement in the 2015 ASEAN Regional Forum," press release, August 6, 2015.

the Dispatch of Japan Disaster Relief Team[s]” in 1987.⁵⁸ The Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) has played a primary role in HA/DR worldwide.⁵⁹ This includes its response to the spread of Ebola in 2014.⁶⁰ Meanwhile, the JSDF has actively engaged in HA/DR missions since 1998.⁶¹ Likewise, India has also been increasingly involved in HA/DR missions. Not only has New Delhi provided aid in post-conflict situations from Sri Lanka to Afghanistan, but it has also engaged in disaster relief operations after the 2004 Sumatra Earthquake, 2013 Typhoon Haiyan in the Philippines, and 2015 Nepal Earthquake. In the meantime, India has been strengthening its HA/DR capabilities. In 2007, India acquired a Landing Platform Dock from the United States, which has six helicopters and landing craft that enable New Delhi to deploy relief supplies and manpower faster on debris littered shores.⁶² In November 2013, India used C-130 aircraft to send relief supplies to the Philippines. The conclusion of the US-2 deal with Japan would further improve India’s disaster management capacity and create new opportunities for Japan-India cooperation.

Regional organizations such as the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), for which Japan and India are ASEAN Dialogue Partners, also serve as venues for Tokyo and New Delhi to cooperate. The ARF has made considerable progress in disaster relief, especially in the capabilities of ASEAN’s Coordination Centre for Humanitarian Assistance on Disaster Management. Achieving “One ASEAN, One Response” by 2020 figures prominently in Southeast Asia’s vision for HA/DR.⁶³

The increasing strategic importance of the Arctic Ocean is also pushing both Arctic and non-Arctic states to cooperate more closely in their approach to the region. On the one hand, rapid environmental change is providing greater opportunities for natural resource development and opening new sea routes. On the other hand, climate change has damaged the regional ecosystem and created a global rise in sea levels and an increase in extreme weather events. There are also unresolved issues over the demarcation of maritime boundaries based on the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and the extension of states’ continental shelves. This has resulted in new territorial claims by some Arctic Ocean states like Russia.⁶⁴

⁵⁸ Japan’s HA/DR history goes back to 1979, when a medical team manned by volunteer practitioners was sent to support the Cambodian refugees along the Thai border.

⁵⁹ As of January 2017, Japan had sent relief goods suppliers many parts of the world 505 times, medical teams 57 times, medical teams 57 times, search and rescue teams 19 times, and an infectious diseases response team once.

⁶⁰ In October 2015, JICA established the Japan Disaster Relief Infectious Disease Response Team to help minimize large-scale outbreaks of infectious diseases overseas based on its Ebola response experience. Japan International Cooperation Agency, “Launch of the Japan Disaster Relief Infectious Disease Response Team,” press release, October 20, 2015.

⁶¹ In 1998, the JSDF was dispatched in an HA/DR mission for the first time to Honduras in the wake of Hurricane Mitch. Following its involvement in Honduras, the JSDF has been deployed to places including Turkey (1999), India (2001), Iran (2003–4), Thailand (2004–5), Sumatra (2005), Russia (2005), Pakistan (2005, 2010), Java (2006), West Sumatra (2009), Haiti (2010), New Zealand (2011), the Philippines (2013), Malaysia (2014), and Nepal (2015). The JSDF also sent a liaison officer to U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) after the 2014 Ebola outbreak.

⁶² Sarabjeet S. Parmar, “Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HA/DR) in India’s National Strategy,” *Journal of Defense Studies* 6, no. 1 (January 2012): 91–101.

⁶³ U.S. Department of State, “U.S. Engagement in the 2015 ASEAN Regional Forum.”

⁶⁴ In August 2015, Russia resubmitted its petition to the United Nations claiming more than 463,000 square miles of Arctic sea shelf. Vladimir Isachenkov, “Russia to UN: We Are Claiming 463,000 Square Miles of the Arctic,” *Business Insider*, August 4, 2015. This claim goes beyond the rules set in UNCLOS which allows states to extend their exclusive economic zones (EEZs) under the condition that they can prove that their continental shelf extends beyond the 200-nm limit.

Today, Russia is believed to have deployed new military capabilities for securing its regional interests.⁶⁵ Meanwhile, non-Arctic Ocean states have also signaled their own interest in the development of the region.⁶⁶ Japan and India became permanent observers to the Arctic Council in 2013. Additionally, Tokyo recently released its new Arctic policy, which now addresses the Arctic more broadly and includes national security interests.⁶⁷ India likewise acknowledges that sea melt in the Arctic has scientific, economic, and geopolitical dimensions as observed by Science and Technology Minister Harsh Vardhan in 2015.⁶⁸ Effective governance is key to sustainable development in the Arctic.

4. Challenges for Cooperation

Although India and Japan enjoy many opportunities for deepening security cooperation, some challenges also exist. First, they differ in their attitude toward nuclear weapons. Nuclear issues remain very sensitive for Japan, as it is the only country to have experienced the devastation of a nuclear attack. Today, Japan firmly upholds its Three Non-Nuclear Principles of not possessing, not producing, and not permitting the introduction of nuclear weapons in line with its Peace Constitution.⁶⁹ Japan's basic position is to bring about "a world free of nuclear weapons" and support the international community in strengthening the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) regimes.

India has not signed the NPT or CTBT. From the Japanese point of view, India continues to take a unique stance on nuclear issues. New Delhi drew vehement protests from Tokyo when it tested nuclear devices in 1974 and 1998. The second test escalated tensions in South Asia; Pakistan followed suit within a month and tested its own weapons. The 1999 border conflict in Kargil was exacerbated by the fact that Pakistan did not have a no-first-use (NFU) policy, leading to fears of possible nuclear escalation. Needless to say, the Indo-Pakistan relationship needs to improve, and India should take actions to ameliorate their rivalry. Encouragingly, India has expressed support for initiatives that could lead to a complete elimination of nuclear weapons. India has also introduced a defensive nuclear posture including building only a "credible minimum nuclear deterrent" and adopting its own NFU policy.⁷⁰ In line with this

⁶⁵ Japanese MOD, *Defense of Japan 2016*, 142–143.

⁶⁶ Notably, China's *Xue Long* (Snow Dragon) became the first polar research vessel to complete the Northern Sea Route in 2012. In August 2015, five Chinese naval vessels were spotted for the first time sailing in the Bering Sea between the Arctic Ocean and the Pacific. *Ibid.*, 143.

⁶⁷ Japan's new Arctic policy addresses global environmental changes, indigenous peoples of the Arctic, science and technology, rule of law and the promotion of international cooperation, Arctic sea routes, natural resource development (mineral and marine living resources), and national security. Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet (hereafter Japanese PM&C), Headquarters for Ocean Policy, *Japan's Arctic Policy* (Tokyo: PM&C, October 2015).

⁶⁸ India's engagement with the Arctic began in 1920 when the country signed the Svalbard Treaty. "India Seeks Increased Participation in Arctic Council," NDTV, May 5, 2015.

⁶⁹ Then U.S. vice president Joe Biden stated that Japan has an ability to acquire nuclear weapons "virtually overnight" during his talk with Chinese President Xi Jinping in June 2016. Prime Minister Abe later reaffirmed that the country would continue to firmly uphold its anti-nuclear stance. "Japan Could Get Weapons 'Virtually Overnight,' Biden Tells Xi," *Japan Times*, June 24, 2016; Japanese PM&C, "Address by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe at the Hiroshima Peace Memorial Ceremony," press release, August 6, 2016.

⁷⁰ Prime Minister's Office of India, "Cabinet Committee on Security Reviews Progress in Operationalizing India's Nuclear Doctrine," press release, January 4, 2003.

posture, India does not maintain a constituted nuclear force on a heightened state of alert.⁷¹ India's entry into the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) in 2016 was a positive sign about controlling missile technology, but there is more to be done.

The second challenge is the two countries' respective relationships with China. That is, the stronger that Japan-India cooperation becomes, the more China may feel that it is being contained. Despite concerns over China's assertiveness in the Asia-Pacific region, Beijing remains a vital economic partner for both Tokyo and New Delhi. China is the third most promising country for Japanese manufacturing investment for the next three years according to a 2014 survey, improving its rank from fourth in an earlier poll.⁷² As of January 2017, Tokyo and Beijing, along with Seoul, have concluded eleven rounds of free trade agreement negotiations.⁷³ Over the medium and long term, Japan seeks to "construct and enhance a Mutually Beneficial Relationship Based on Common Strategic Interests with China in all areas, including politics, economy, finance, security culture and personal exchanges."⁷⁴ Meanwhile, India understands that its economic development depends on its cooperation with Japan, the United States, and also China. In April 2005, New Delhi and Beijing established the India-China Strategic and Cooperative Partnership for Peace and Prosperity based on their 2003 Declaration on Principles for Relations and Comprehensive Cooperation. More recently, during the BRICS Summit in July 2014, India joined China and other members of the organization to begin developing the New Development Bank.⁷⁵ India-China bilateral trade reached \$70.25 billion in 2014, an impressive increase from just \$2.92 billion in 2000. This made China India's largest trading partner in goods, replacing the United States.⁷⁶ In light of this economic dependence, Tokyo and New Delhi may at times refrain from taking too hardline a stance for fear of provoking Beijing.

The third challenge is the difference in interpretation over freedom of navigation (FON) in EEZs. Both Japan and India acknowledge the importance of FON, but India's position on FON is at least as – if not more – restrictive than China's, as recognized in a DOD report.⁷⁷ In its 1995 declaration upon its treaty ratification, New Delhi claimed that UNCLOS does "not authorize other States to carry out in the [EEZ] and on the continental shelf military exercises or maneuvers... without the consent of the coastal State." India even protested when the U.S. conducted survey operations in India's EEZ in 2001.⁷⁸ The difference in interpretation, as well as the United States' own reluctance to date in joining the UNCLOS regime, is an obstacle for closer multilateral and bilateral cooperative relationships over peaceful use of the maritime domain, including the South China Sea and the Arctic Sea, and in convincing China to respect rules and norms that other great powers also do not always follow.

⁷¹ Nuclear Threat Initiative, "India: Nuclear," last updated August 2016.

⁷² China is behind only India and Indonesia. JBIC, "Survey Report on Overseas Business Operations," 17–18.

⁷³ Japanese MOFA, "11th Round of Negotiations (Chief Delegates and DG/DDG Meetings) on a Free Trade Agreement among Japan, China and the ROK," press release, January 11, 2017.

⁷⁴ GOJ, *National Security Strategy*, 25.

⁷⁵ "Victory for Modi, India as BRICS Summit Clears Setting Up a New Development Bank," *India Today*, July 16, 2014.

⁷⁶ Embassy of India in Beijing, "India-China Economic Relations,"

<http://www.indianembassy.org.cn/DynamicContent.aspx?MenuId=97&SubMenuId=0>, accessed March 2, 2017.

⁷⁷ U.S. Department of Defense (DOD), "Freedom of Navigation (FON) Report for Fiscal Year (FY) 2015," April 19, 2016.

⁷⁸ Nilanthi Samaranayake, Michael Connell, and Satu Limaye, "The Future of U.S.-India Naval Relations," *CAN* (February 2017), 16.

Fourth, ensuring peace and stability in Afghanistan continues to be a challenge for the international community. While ISIS has yet to pose a major threat in the country, Kabul continues – despite considerable international support – to face various challenges in the fields of both security and reconstruction. This includes the need to enhance the rule of law, promote regional development, strengthen the crackdown on narcotics trafficking, and prevent corruption.⁷⁹ Both Japan and India have actively engaged in reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan since 2002. Tokyo has organized milestone meetings such as the first major international conference in January 2002.⁸⁰ By taking a comprehensive approach, Japan aims for its assistance to support Afghanistan’s self-reliance and prevent the country from becoming a hotbed of terrorism. Tokyo has not engaged militarily in Afghanistan but has played significant roles in security-sector reform programs, notably in DDR and the disbandment of illegal armed groups. As of April 2015, Japan is the second largest donor to Afghanistan after the United States. It has provided a total of approximately \$6 billion in assistance since 2001.⁸¹

Due to their proximity and history, Afghanistan is a more sensitive issue for India. Afghanistan has been at the core of New Delhi’s Central Asia strategy because the country serves as an important energy access route.⁸² Afghanistan is also critical to the national interest of Pakistan, which desires strategic depth and to limit India’s influence in South Asia. Furthermore, Afghanistan is the geographic hub of the “New Silk Road” – China’s economic initiative to link East and Central Asia.⁸³ Iran and Russia also have a stake in the region.⁸⁴

India’s assistance in Afghanistan has mainly been reconstruction-oriented. India is one of the largest contributors, having offered over \$2 billion in aid.⁸⁵ It was one of the lead organizers for the Delhi Investment Summit on Afghanistan in June 2012.⁸⁶ While India’s security-related engagement in Afghanistan was initially limited to capacity building for the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces, the withdrawal of the International Security Assistance Force has

⁷⁹ Japanese MOD, *Defense of Japan 2016*, 123.

⁸⁰ Japan later hosted another major international meeting in July 2012. Tokyo also hosted other international forums in 2003, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, and 2014.

⁸¹ Specifically, this includes enhancing Afghanistan’s ability to maintain its own security by supporting salaries, training, and literacy education for the National Police; helping reintegrate ex-combatants by providing assistance for vocational training and job creation in local communities; and assisting sustainable and self-reliant development in sectors like agriculture, infrastructure, human resources, education, and healthcare. Japanese MOFA, “Japan’s Assistance in Afghanistan: Towards Self-Reliance” (slides, April 2015, p. 2).

⁸² According to one observer, India’s strategic interests in Afghanistan since the fall of the Taliban regime in 2001 have been (1) balancing against China’s growing footprint in the region; (2) preventing the spread of Islamic militants into India, especially Indian-administered Kashmir, and restricting Pakistani influence in Afghanistan, as it may assist those militants; and (3) developing economic infrastructure that will stabilize the country and enable it to reconnect with the rest of the region. Neil Padukone, *Beyond South Asia: India’s Strategic Evolution and the Reintegration of the Subcontinent* (New York: Bloomsbury, 2013), 117.

⁸³ Shannon Tiezzi, “China’s ‘New Silk Road’ Vision Revealed,” *Diplomat*, May 9, 2014.

⁸⁴ In particular, the May 2016 Iran-India-Afghanistan trilateral transit agreement (known as the Chabahar Agreement), which will give India access to Afghanistan via Iran’s strategic port of Chabahar, has both heightened expectations as well as raised concerns.

⁸⁵ A. Pande, “Afghanistan’s Karzai Presses for Indian Support, Investment,” *Voice of America*, December 16, 2013.

⁸⁶ The summit attracted foreign investment in Afghanistan in areas such as mining, hydrocarbons, infrastructure, telecommunications, agriculture, education, and health care. Gulshan Sachdeva, “The Delhi Investment Summit on Afghanistan,” Institute for Defense Studies and Analyses, June 26, 2012.

led New Delhi to become more involved.⁸⁷ Despite India's limited initial engagements, increased Indian influence in Afghanistan has posed a danger of encirclement to Pakistan and as a result has provoked, one observer argues, Islamabad's "increasing support for the use of jihadi proxies to weaken Kabul, or to conduct further terrorist attacks against India."⁸⁸ Meanwhile, Afghan president Ashraf Ghani's initial multi-directional foreign policy (which aimed to improve ties with Pakistan, China, and the Taliban) concerned India as it implied a greater Pakistani presence. On the other hand, Taliban attacks in Kabul in August 2015 and April 2016 damaged relations between Kabul and Islamabad. Japan and India will need to pay considerable attention to this situation so that cooperation on Afghan reconstruction will not jeopardize the India-Pakistan relationship.

In addition to the above challenges, there is uncertainty about the future of the Japan-India relationship after Prime Ministers Abe and Modi step down from office, since it was under their strong leadership that the relationship gained so much momentum. As long as China keeps up its assertiveness, Japan and India are likely to continue deepening their strategic relationship. It must be noted, however, that while there is strong support for greater economic ties in Japanese and Indian business circles, the impetus for a stronger security relationship has not been quite as strong. This is particularly evident when one compares the Japanese public's desire for close relations with the United States, the Republic of Korea, and Australia.

No doubt, India is on the rise and has a lot of potential. Its population is expected to surpass that of China by 2025.⁸⁹ According to one analyst, India's middle-class population is expected to grow from about 5 percent of the population to more than 40 percent in the same time period.⁹⁰ New Delhi has become a significant geopolitical actor and "is positioned in the center of sea lines of communication [in the Indian Ocean]."⁹¹ While interactions in Track 1 and Track 2 dialogues have recently increased, there should be more interest and support for India's role in the security realm within the Japanese community.

5. Policy Recommendations

With these opportunities and challenges in mind, Japan needs to reaffirm the fundamentals of its relationships with the United States and India and implement policies to maximize the effectiveness of the Japan-India partnership.

⁸⁷ India signed a security and trade pact with Afghanistan in October 2011, agreeing to boost cooperation in counterterrorism, training of security forces, and trade, as well as other political and cultural engagements. New Delhi also provided Kabul with four Mi25 helicopters in December 2015, and is now being asked by the United States to engage more in equipping Afghanistan's air force. R. Lakshmi, "India and Afghanistan Sign Security and Trade Pact," *Washington Post*, October 4, 2011; Waliullah Rahmani, "U.S. Wants India in Afghanistan: Assessing New Delhi's Importance in Kabul's Strategic Calculus," *Khabarnama*, August 16, 2016.

⁸⁸ Richard Weitz, "Afghanistan and India Deepen Strategic Cooperation," *Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst*, January 22, 2014.

⁸⁹ U.S. Census Bureau, "U.S. Projected to Remain World's Third Most Populous Country Through 2050, Census Bureau Reports," press release, June 27, 2011.

⁹⁰ India's middle class population is defined as households with a disposable income of 200,000 to 1,000,000 rupees (\$4,380-\$21,890) per year in 2000 dollars. Eric Beinhocker, Diana Farrel, and Adil Zainulbhai, "Tracking the Growth of India's Middle Class," *McKinsey Quarterly* 3, no. 3 (2007): 56.

⁹¹ GOJ, *National Security Strategy*, 24.

5.1 Ensure the United States Maintains its Presence in the Asia Pacific and that a Deeper Japan-India Partnership Complements the Japan-U.S. Alliance

It remains unclear how President Trump's "America First" principle will impact political and economic dynamics in the Asia-Pacific region and the international community more broadly. Uncertainty about his foreign policy priorities has heightened concern among U.S. allies and partners. This may weaken U.S. soft power by forcing these countries to doubt the reliability of their relationship with the United States. Such an outcome needs to be avoided at all cost; the resulting power vacuum would lead to an extremely unstable situation given the region's pressing security challenges.

Unlike India, Japan does not have the political and military flexibility to maneuver outside the framework of the Japan-U.S. alliance. As a result, Tokyo needs to make sure the alliance continues to function as the "cornerstone of peace and security in the Pacific region," which even Trump has noted. The development of the Japan-India relationship complements efforts to consolidate the alliance. For Japan, no other security mechanism can replace the alliance. Furthermore, Japan should reaffirm that Articles 5 and 6 of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty work in tandem, not separately, and that Japan is determined to take on some of the burden that the United States has traditionally shouldered in East Asia as well as in other parts of the Asia Pacific. While it will be difficult for Japan to further increase the total amount of host nation support (which presently covers over 70 percent of the U.S. presence in Japan), Tokyo may need to engage more actively in maritime security in the Indian Ocean. This will require Japan to strengthen the power projection capabilities of the JMSDF and JASDF as well as to deepen Japan's military ties with the United States and India. Specifically, Japanese forces would need to be able to utilize logistical centers like Diego Garcia and possibly some of India's ports and airfields as well. Meanwhile, it is important that the United States maintain its own solid bilateral relationship with India.

5.2 Deepen the Japan-India Partnership Steadily, Not Expeditiously

Some argue that Japan and India need to grasp the opportunity of this unique Abe-Modi "bromance" and speed up their efforts to deepen the bilateral relationship. In this respect, institutionalizing the relationship is a must. Conclusion of agreements such as on the transfer of defense equipment and technology, classified information, and peaceful uses of nuclear energy, as well as upgrading Japan's position in the Malabar naval exercise, have contributed greatly to institutionalizing Japan-India relations. However, a more cautious pace is needed if the momentum in the relationship is to be sustained. As noted, the Japan-India partnership is still at an early stage. There are also many uncertainties regarding the United States, including its diplomatic and economic relationship with China and Russia. China could perceive efforts to quickly bolster Japan-India ties as the beginning of containment. Therefore, Tokyo should have patience and strengthen its partnership with New Delhi steadily over time, rather than expeditiously rushing toward an alliance-like partnership.

For its part, the United States needs to understand that the Japan-India relationship rests, in part, on the U.S. relationship with each country. President Trump's pledge to maintain close security and economic cooperation with Japan, which came during Prime Minister Abe's visit to the United States in early February 2017, was a promising sign for Tokyo.⁹² It was also a relief when Secretary of Defense James Mattis stated that Article 5 of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty applied to the Senkaku Islands. Mattis called Japan "a model of cost-sharing and burden-sharing" and "an example for other nations to follow."⁹³ However, it remains unclear how Japan – the United States' most important ally in Asia – will be expected to contribute to Trump's "America First" policy. It is also unknown how Trump's inward-looking trade policies and decision to withdraw from the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) will affect the regional and global economy as well as security conditions.

Meanwhile, India has started engaging more closely with the United States with the 2016 conclusion of the Logistics Exchange Memorandum of Agreement (LEMOA) and on a possible Basic Exchange and Cooperation Agreement for Geo-Spatial Intelligence (BECA), as well as a Communications Compatibility and Security Agreement (COMCASA). President Trump has praised India as a "true friend and partner in addressing challenges around the world" and pledged that New Delhi and Washington will "stand shoulder-to-shoulder in the global fight against terrorism."⁹⁴ However, India is concerned over Trump policies on the H-1B visa and other issues that could have a profound effect on the Indian economy, which relies heavily on the technology sector. It is uncertain how this problem could affect the overall relationship between India and the United States. In order to maintain solid relationships with both Japan and India, Washington therefore needs to eliminate the uncertainty over its foreign policy. Specifically, the Trump administration should clarify how it expects both Japan and India to contribute to its global security and economic agenda.

5.3 Engage India in Seeking "a World Free of Nuclear Weapons"

As noted, North Korea poses "a serious and imminent threat to Japan's security" and remains the top priority for Tokyo. Pyongyang recently launched four ballistic missiles toward the Sea of Japan, with three of them falling into Japan's EEZ. Prime Minister Abe severely criticized these tests and warned that they have entered a "new stage of threat."⁹⁵ Furthermore, nuclear challenges have long-term implications not only to peace and stability for neighboring countries, but also for the international community as a whole. Therefore, it is imperative that Japan and India, no matter how difficult it might be, take a firm stance against proliferators like North Korea and cooperate through existing global security mechanisms. In line with this effort, India needs to become a full member of the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), which aims to stop the trafficking of weapons of mass destruction. While difficulties exist in the PSI, it helps strengthen the political commitment of like-minded states to cooperate in interdiction

⁹² Julie H. Davis and Peter Baker, "In Welcoming Shinzo Abe, Trump Affirms U.S. Commitment to Defending Japan," *New York Times*, February 10, 2017

⁹³ Brad Lendon, "Mattis: U.S. Will Defend Japanese Islands Claimed by China," CNN, February 4, 2017.

⁹⁴ White House, "Readout of the President's Call with Prime Minister Narendra Modi of India," press release, January 24, 2017.

⁹⁵ "North Korea: Four Ballistic Missiles Fired into Sea," BBC, March 6, 2017.

operations.⁹⁶ Japan needs, therefore, to encourage India to fully embrace the initiative. In addition, Japan should continue its support for India's entry into the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG). India's admission would enable the country to commit to the international non-proliferation framework. In 2008, India pledged to the NSG that it would maintain a voluntary moratorium on nuclear weapons testing, but in 2016 its entry was blocked by countries that included China. Furthermore, Japan needs to push India to become a signatory of the CTBT and seek India's greater engagement in the NPT regime. Back in 2001, a senior Indian foreign ministry official said that India's signing of the CTBT was a question of when and not a question of if.⁹⁷ It is high time for India to do so. India must abide by internationally-recognized principles on the peaceful use of nuclear energy.

5.4 Take a Dual Approach toward China

Despite China's assertiveness in the Asia Pacific, the country remains an important economic partner for both Japan and India. Tokyo and New Delhi therefore need to take dual hard-and-soft approach toward Beijing, differentiating economic cooperation from security-related issues. In the realm of security, the two countries may need to examine some specific measures to cooperate on a cost-imposing strategy that would deny and offset gains that China could derive from unilateral changes to the status quo.⁹⁸

Furthermore, it is critically important that Beijing does not perceive Tokyo and New Delhi as trying to contain China. While it is imperative that Japan and India, together with other Asia-Pacific nations, increase their cooperation to persuade China to abide by international rules and norms, the two countries need to engage China in multiple security frameworks so that Beijing will be able to play a responsible role. Seeking to contain China's rise would leave Beijing few options other than trying to challenge the regional status quo by force. Current mechanisms, such as the ARF, ASEAN Defense Minister's Meeting Plus (ADMM-Plus), and the ASEAN Maritime Forum, should serve as a foundation. The ARF could be particularly useful for continuously engaging China in areas like counterterrorism and transnational crime. The forum is making solid efforts to improve collaboration between regional governments to address these issues.⁹⁹

As one observer has noted, one way for Tokyo to take a dual hard-and-soft approach would be to cooperate with New Delhi on SLOC protection while also speaking out when India makes excessive maritime claims, such as requiring prior consent for military exercises or

⁹⁶ Challenges include the difficulty to measure PSI's effectiveness, guarantee even participation, or sustain the effort over time in the absence of a formal multilateral framework. M. Nikitin, *Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI)*, RL34327 (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, June 2012).

⁹⁷ Hisane Masaki, "Tokyo, New Delhi Eager to Put Synergy Back in Relations," *Japan Times*, February 2, 2001.

⁹⁸ Per Thomas Mahnken, this involves imposing costs on a competitor by taking advantage of a broad portfolio of economic, military, and diplomatic instruments. Economic costs include monetary, human resources, and technology costs while military costs include efficiency and effectiveness costs. Patrick Cronin has also proposed the need to impose costs on all acts that violate existing international law, norms, or standards. Thomas G. Mahnken, *Cost-Imposing Strategies: A Brief Primer* (Washington, DC: Center for a New American Security, November 2014), 9–11; Patrick M. Cronin, "Countering China's Maritime Coercion," *Diplomat Magazine*, no. 4 (March 2015).

⁹⁹ U.S. Department of State, "U.S. Engagement in the 2015 ASEAN Regional Forum."

maneuvers in its EEZ.¹⁰⁰ This could help alleviate China's fears of containment by demonstrating Tokyo's genuine willingness to improve relations and to accept China's rise if Beijing exercises its power responsibly.

Japan and India may also need to work toward the establishment of a multilateral security framework that includes Japan, the United States, India, and Australia with China's possible participation in mind. There have been efforts among Japan, the United States, India, and Australia to work together for regional peace and stability within the abortive "Democratic Security Diamond" framework, a concept in which the four countries would jointly safeguard the maritime commons.¹⁰¹ The concept failed due to strong resistance from China. Therefore, the four countries may need to limit the scope and areas of cooperation to activities like anti-piracy operations in the Indian Ocean, and not include maritime security in highly contested areas such as the East and South China Seas. Furthermore, the countries may need to invite China into the framework to alleviate its concerns about containment. China's involvement is important if India and Japan are going to engage it in a "system of cooperative norms."¹⁰² This concept is not unrealistic, since China still participated in the biennial Rim of the Pacific exercise in 2014 and 2016 despite simultaneous tensions in the South China Sea.

5.5 Seek a Well-Balanced Security Contribution from India

Together with the Japan-U.S. alliance, the Japan-India partnership can provide public goods for the benefit of regional and global peace and stability. To maximize the effectiveness and efficiency of the Japan-India relationship, Japan should seek a well-balanced contribution from India for regional and international security issues. Tokyo can do so by focusing on the following factors.

First, Japan and India should clarify the division of roles. With regards to capacity building assistance for maritime security and HA/DR, Japan can focus on providing defense equipment to select navies and coast guards as well as improving information sharing networks. India, on the other hand, could concentrate on providing skills related to hydrographic surveys, in which India excels. Given a possible change of focus from peacekeeping to conflict prevention by the new UN secretary-general, as well as President Trump's determination to cut U.S. contributions, PKO is another area where roles need to be clarified between Japan and India if bilateral cooperation is to succeed. Furthermore, as the case of Afghanistan illustrates, it is imperative that Japan and India fully understand the sensitivities of regions in which they hope to cooperate successfully.

Second, Japan and India should strengthen military interoperability. With increasing opportunities for military cooperation, the two countries need to improve interoperability between Japanese and Indian forces. Thus far, cooperation between their navies and coast guards has progressed at a faster pace than the other services. Their ground forces and air forces need more opportunities to operate with one another through regular training and exercises and the

¹⁰⁰ Author's interview with Jake Douglas, research assistant at CSIS, March 20, 2017.

¹⁰¹ Shinzo Abe, "Asia's Democratic Security Diamond," *Project Syndicate*, December 27, 2012.

¹⁰² Megan Eckstein, "SECDEF Carter: China Still Invited to RIMPAC 2016 Despite South China Sea Tension," *USNI News*, April 18, 2016.

exchange of officers at various levels of seniority at military institutions. Strengthening their ability to conduct joint operations is also important. Focusing more on the transfer of defense and coast guard equipment would be yet another major contribution. Finally, Tokyo and New Delhi need to pursue an Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement (ACSA), which enables allies and partners to exchange common types of support like food, fuel, transportation, ammunition, and equipment. While concluding an ACSA between Japan and India is challenging due to their different defense equipment platforms, the framework would allow Japanese and Indian forces to significantly increase their interoperability, enhance operational readiness, and perform cost-effective mutual support by reducing logistical burdens. Japan has thus far concluded an ACSA with the United States and Australia. It is presently negotiating others with the United Kingdom, Canada, and France.

5.6 Widen Support for Bilateral Cooperation across the Policy Spectrum

While India and Japan are holding summit meetings and vice-minister/secretary-level “2 plus 2” dialogues regularly, they are still lagging behind on minister-level meetings. Talks need to be elevated to this level. Furthermore, as the Andaman and Nicobar Islands illustrate, there is a growing need for Japan and India to link economic development and security issues. Road building projects in the northeastern Indian border regions of Mizoram, Assam, and Meghalaya also have strategic significance.¹⁰³ Therefore, the two countries should hold minister-level “3 plus 3” dialogues that include officials in charge of economic development.

At the other end of the spectrum, people-to-people ties need to be strengthened among the general public. Tokyo and New Delhi should encourage the Japanese and Indian peoples’ understanding of the strategic importance of their bilateral relationship. In this regard, the Japan-India Association has played a significant role since 1903. Furthermore, Track 1 and Track 2 dialogues have also increased over time. Prime Ministers Abe and Modi both acknowledge the importance of these exchanges and cultural connections, including through international study and educational collaboration. However, there is ample room for improvement. For example, Japan should provide funds for Japanese universities to hold more English-taught courses in order to draw more students from overseas, including India as well as other Asia-Pacific countries. Currently, Indians account for only 0.4 percent of international students studying in Japan.¹⁰⁴ Tokyo also needs to encourage more Japanese students to study in India. These measures would enable Japanese and Indians to interact more extensively and exchange views on issues like the Japan-India security relationship.

6. Conclusion

Today, Japan and India are determined to find synergy between their respective “Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy” and “Act East” policy in order to strengthen the foundation of their “Special Strategic and Global Partnership.” As Japan seeks to deepen its relationship with India,

¹⁰³ Barry, “As India Collaborates with Japan on Islands, It Looks to Check China.”

¹⁰⁴ According to a Japan Student Services Organization survey, there were 879 Indian students who came to Japan to study at the post high school level in FY 2015, out of a total of 208,379 international students (India ranked 16th).

it also needs to encourage the United States to maintain its own presence in the Asia-Pacific region. Tokyo must ensure that the development of Japan-India relations complements efforts to reinforce the Japan-U.S. alliance. Although Japan does not have as much political and military flexibility as India, common threats and strong leadership under Prime Ministers Abe and Modi have driven Japan and India to strengthen their relationship. The Japan-India partnership faces both opportunities and challenges that are bilateral, regional, and even global in scope. New challenges also stem from uncertainty about the Trump administration's foreign policy.

To maximize their opportunities and overcome remaining obstacles, Japan and India need to better share their respective perceptions, policy priorities, and strategies on a number of issues. Specifically, Japan needs to: 1) welcome India to participate more in the NPT regime, 2) take a dual approach toward China in collaboration with India and other countries, 3) seek a well-balanced contribution to regional and international issues from India, and 4) widen support for the relationship across the policy spectrum. This demands that Tokyo and New Delhi hold off on expeditiously seeking a robust strategic alliance and instead pursue a steady deepening of their bilateral and multilateral cooperation.