Shift in Deterrence Dynamics on the Korean Peninsula: The U.S.-ROK Response

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Overview

1. How has DPRK nuclearization changed deterrence on the Peninsula?

2. How have the U.S. and South Korea responded?

3. What next steps must be taken to regain control over the escalation ladder?
DPRK nuclearization and its follow-on policies complicate escalation control:

**Aggression**
- Increasingly frequent
- Qualitatively more provocative

**Asymmetry**
- Strategic developments
- Non-strategic provocative technologies

Escalation is riskier and more probable
Post-nuclear deterrence: Aggression

Figure 1: Increasing frequency of missile tests
Figure 2: Increasing frequency of general provocative actions
Cheonan

Submarine torpedo ensured a high casualty rate

– First reference to DPRK nuclear shield

Yeongpyong-do

First shelling of civilian territory

Achieved some of DPRK strategic objectives:

– In response ROK:
  ➢ Halted on-going live-fire exercises
  ➢ Cancelled pre-scheduled exercises

U.S. commanders inspect Cheonan
Source: Time Magazine
Post-nuclear deterrence: Asymmetry

Pursuit of new strategic capabilities (SLBMs, miniaturization)
  – DPRK seeks to establish second strike capability

Continued development in other asymmetric arenas:
  – Cyber
  – SOF
  – UAVs

➢ High DPRK risk acceptance and past asymmetric attacks raises possibility of miscalculation

North Korea’s Polaris-1 SLBM test
Source: IHS Jane’s Defense Weekly, via KCNA
Response: “Proactive Deterrence”

Policy Details:
- Empowers Joint Chiefs of Staff
  ➢ Streamlines command and control
  ➢ Forces jointness between services
- Changes rules of engagement
  ➢ Allows immediate and more aggressive retaliation

Benefits:
- Expands freedom of action
- Tightens U.S.-ROK alliance
- Possibly effective at deterring attacks after Yeongpyong

Weaknesses:
- Entrenched risk-aversion
- Incentivizes covert attacks
- Conventional stressors strain new alliance policies
Next Steps

Improve strike capabilities:
- C4ISR improvements necessary within ROK services

Deny common escalation tactics:
- Anti-submarine and other naval investments critical

Display commitment to use of force:
- Establish clear response plans and communicate the risks of escalation under new policies
- Fund related budget obligations as geopolitical messaging
- Stronger U.S. rhetoric and more U.S. attention to Peninsular defense
Summary

Nuclearization disrupted escalation status quo and pressured parties to adapt

- DPRK: Increased aggression and asymmetry
- U.S.-ROK: ‘Proactive Deterrence’

Higher escalation probability and more risk

- U.S.-ROK must accept new status quo and further develop policies and capabilities in response