Next START Verification, a Step towards Weapons-Centric Verification

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Arms Control Theory as a Roadmap

- Fundamental constraints:
  - Trust is rare in the international system
  - 100% assurance is unobtainable, we seek high-degree of confidence

- Objectives which bound arms control as a tool:
  - Reducing the risk of war occurring
  - Reducing the damage should war occur
  - Reducing the costs of war and competition
## Operational Experience

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>SALT I</th>
<th>SALT II</th>
<th>INF</th>
<th>START</th>
<th>SORT</th>
<th>NST</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Strategic Impetus for US</strong></td>
<td>Missile Gap</td>
<td>A more permanent agreement;</td>
<td>INF threatened</td>
<td>Window of</td>
<td>Codifying extant plans</td>
<td>Maintaining AC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>establishing limits; MIRVS</td>
<td>allies, were</td>
<td>Vulnerability</td>
<td></td>
<td>relationship w/ Russia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Strategic Impetus for Soviets/Russians</strong></td>
<td>Curtailing arms racing; strategic stability</td>
<td>A more permanent agreement; establishing limits; MIRVS</td>
<td>Euro-missiles</td>
<td>Nuclear force was reducing anyway</td>
<td>Russians wanted bilateral treaty w/ U.S.</td>
<td>Little strategic compromise; transparency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Deployed Warhead Limit</strong></td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>6000 (with sub-limits)</td>
<td>1,700-2,200</td>
<td>1550</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Deployed Delivery Vehicle Limit</strong></td>
<td>U.S.: 1,710 ICBMs &amp; SLBMs</td>
<td>2250 (including heavy bombers)</td>
<td>Banned all intermediate range nuclear missiles</td>
<td>1600 (sub-limit: 154 heavy ICBMs)</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Throw-weight Limits</strong></td>
<td>Partial</td>
<td>Partial</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Non-Deployed Delivery Vehicle Limit</strong></td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Banned all INF</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Verification</strong></td>
<td>NTM</td>
<td>NTM</td>
<td>NTM/OSI</td>
<td>NTM (including telemetry &amp; OSI)</td>
<td>START verification</td>
<td>OSI to verify data exchanges: NTM</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Verification and Monitoring Requirements

- Establish baseline count of all weapons
- Maintain chain of custody
- Prevent undetected reconstitution of capacity
Weapons-Centric Verification

- **Limits**
  - Platforms, a hedge and Article VI
    - Specific bans on destabilizing platforms
    - Includes DCA and other NSNW platforms
  - Actual weapons, sub-limits within stockpile
    - No more attribution rules
  - Deployed/non-deployed platforms and weapons

- **Deployed Platforms**
  - Data exchanges, NTM, and OSI
  - RDE to verify objects declared to be non-nuclear
  - FRODS to distinguish conventional flying units
  - Mandatory telemetry exchanges

- **Stockpile and Disposition**
  - Establish baseline count of total stockpile
    - MHF portal monitoring
  - Objects entering MHF verified by attribute RDE; non-nuclear on exit
    - Tagged with tamper-indicating RFID
  - Verify monitor dismantled primaries and CSAs
Strategic Impetus for Next START

• United States
  – Reduce Russian strategic capacity
  – Increase insight into Russian force structure development
  – Maintain strategic stability
  – Demonstrate commitment to Article VI

• Russia
  – Strategic stability, to include missile defenses, CPGS, and forward-deployed NSNW
  – Limit and observe US capabilities and recapitalization
  – National prestige

• How to get to the table?
  – Broaden negotiating space to include “red lines”
  – Pursue “peace through strength”
Next START Verification

• Limits
  – Platforms
    • Destabilizing platforms subject to sub-limits/bans
  – Actual weapons
    • Sub-limits on deployed/non-deployed stockpile
  – End attribution rule for bombers
    • Attribution becomes redundant if deployed weapons are defined and verified
  – If NSNW included, limit DCA

• Deployed Verification
  – Data exchanges, NTM, and OSI
  – Establish baseline count of deployed weapons
    • Manned or remote portal monitoring at WSAs; inspection of platforms
    • One-time inspection in WSA to confirm data
  – RDE to verify objects declared to be non-nuclear
  – Mandatory telemetry exchanges
Next START Verification Strategic Implications

• Verifying actual number of deployed weapons may alter current strategic guidance
  – Portal monitoring of WSAs and SNDV inspections establish a deployed count higher than NST attribution
  – Guidance may be predicated on NST attribution

• Limiting (not even reducing) DCA may be unequal
  – All US strategic and NSNW platforms will be accounted for by the treaty
  – Russian NSNW platforms may still be outside treaty
  – Any NSNW verification will need to establish host-nation rights, unless mitigated